V. D. GYANI, J, J. ( 1 ) BOTH these petitions relate to the same matter praying for cancellation of bail granted to the accused - non-applicants. Mr. Cr. C. 1442/90-a letter petition which Bansilal the complainant, has preferred before this Court while M. Cr. C. 1314/90 has been preferred through his counsel. Both these petitions are heard together and are being disposed of by a common order. ( 2 ) SHRI Jaisingh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri S. L. Garg with Shri S. S. Garg, learned counsels for the accused-respondents, are heard. ( 3 ) SHORT facts giving rise to these petitions may now be noted: Sangita, the daughter of the complainant-petitioner Bansilal, was married to Rajmal and Rajendra sb Prabhulal - non-applicant No. 2. This marriage was solemnised on 5th June, 90 at Bhasoda Mandi, District Mandsaur, Just within five days of the marriage, it is alleged that Sangita was so much tortured for dowry, that the on 10-6-1990, committed suicide by setting fire to herself. Her father, however, suspected that she was infact burnt to death. Sangita in her dying declaration had also made such a statement. It is a question relating to merits, which I do not, at this stage propose to go into. The grievance of the petitioner is about the manner in which the accused were ordered to be enlarged on bail by. Additional Sessions Judge and even by the Magistrate. ( 4 ) ACCUSED-NON-APPLICANT No. 3 and 4, the mother-in-law and sister-in-law respectively of deceased Sangita were granted anticipatory bail u/s. 438 Cr. P. C. in face of charges u/s. 498-A, 306 and 304 (b) IPC levelled against them vide order dtd. 6-7-90 passed by the Addi. Sessions Judge, Garoth (Camp: Bhanpura ). ( 5 ) AS can be gathered from the impugned order, one of the objections raised before the A. S. J. at the time of hearing of above bail petition, was that the police was in league with the accused, and it would be highly unjust and improper to grant them anticipatory bail u/s. 438 Cr. P. C. is respect of such anti-social crime, the bride burning no matter that the accused happened to be ladies. P. C. is respect of such anti-social crime, the bride burning no matter that the accused happened to be ladies. It was also specifically brought to the notice of the learned Judge that the police was deliberately avoiding to procure a dying declaration made by Sangita before a Judicial Magistrate of Bhavani Mandi (Raj.) clearly implicating the applicants. The learned Judge however without even adverting to these objections was pleased to grant anticipatory bail to the mother-in-law and sister-in-law, a practice denounced by the Supreme Court in Samunder Singh v. State of Rajasthan which was cited before the learned Judge who perfunctorily dealt with it. ( 6 ) THE accused-non-applicant Rajmal Rajendra was admitted to bail u/s. 439 Cr. P. C. by order dtd. 10-7-1990. During the course of hearing of this bail petition, the learned Judge was apprised of the fact (evident from the impugned order), that none of the family members of the accused- side was present after the post-mortem examination to take charge of the body of Sangita, accused non-applicant Rajendra, her husband himself was reported to be missing right from the incident. This fact is certainly a relevant consideration for grant or refusal of bail but the learned Judge, as it was felt necessary otherwise very elaborate order, does not even advert to this aspect of the matter and very conveniently omits to consider the same. It is one thing to reject a particular point after consideration, but to omit to consider the same is altogether a different thing. ( 7 ) THE record of the Courts below was, therefore, sent for. ( 8 ) NOW coming to the case of accused-non-applicant Prabhulal. Accused Prabhulal, the father-in-law of deceased Sangita, was arrested and produced before the Magistrate on 25-7-90 for offences punishable u/s. 304 (I), 498 (A), 306 IPC with Section. 4 (A) of the Dowry Prevention Act registered at P. S. Bhanpura as Crime No. 128/90, was admitted to bail by the J. M. F. C. , Garoth by his order dtd. 25-7-90. He was shown to be a patient of high blood pressure suffering from some cardiac disorder, a medical certificate of the same date was also filed. The learned Magistrate therefore, invoking the proviso to Sub. 25-7-90. He was shown to be a patient of high blood pressure suffering from some cardiac disorder, a medical certificate of the same date was also filed. The learned Magistrate therefore, invoking the proviso to Sub. Section 1 of the Section 437, granted him bail without passing for a while to consider that the medical certificate, filed by the accused, was regarding dysentery - another fact which the learned Magistrate has not considered is that the certificate filed by the accused was tailored for the occasion; it was issued on that very date i. e. 25-7-90. The learned Magistrate does not think it proper to consider as to how come it that the accused was arrested on 25th (at 12-55 p. m.); he was, medically examined on 25th at Bhawani Mandi in Rajasthan, produced before him on 25th It is also significant to note that not only Probhulal was ordered to be released on bail on 25th but actually released as well accepting the bail bonds even in absence of any title deed or document, being produced by the Surety, ignoring an application made by him seeking time to produce the same. Although thereis a reference to this application in the order sheet drawn by the Magistrate, but the relevant portion has been scratched by him. Till 17th f Sept, 90, the last order sheet in the magistrate file, no such document, in support of solvency of the surety, appears to have been produced. It is not to suggest that a Court is precluded from accepting a surety bond in absence of a title deed or document. Having entertained an application praying for grant of time to produce title deed and in fact passed an order pertaining to the same but later scratching out the same, are facts speaking volumes for themselves. At the height of all these facts what is important to be noted is that it was all ex-parte, there was none for the State and the learned Magistrate did not even direct a notice to the State. ( 9 ) SHRI Garg, learned counsel appearing for the non- applicants has opposed these petitioners for cancellation of bail. Apart from replies supported by affidavits, documents have also been filed by him. The allegations made by the petitioner, have been denounced as false and false to the knowledge of the applicant. ( 9 ) SHRI Garg, learned counsel appearing for the non- applicants has opposed these petitioners for cancellation of bail. Apart from replies supported by affidavits, documents have also been filed by him. The allegations made by the petitioner, have been denounced as false and false to the knowledge of the applicant. It has also been emphatically denied that Sangita was burnt to death, but I do not propose to go into this aspect of the matter for the reason already noted above, that it relates to merits of the case, which is yet to go for trial. It is only so far as it relates to and with regard to the cancellation of bail and the grounds (which of-course, have been denied by the accused-respondents) Shri Garg, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, referring to para 6 of their reply, tried to explain the dubious role played in the matter by one Ramgopal, who was, as alleged by the accused was reprimanded and chastised by Prabhulal, for wilful indulgence of making false insinuation against Sangitas character and would not tolerate any such accusation against his would-be daughter-in-law. ( 10 ) AS for Sangita's grievance that she could not get her husbands love, it is stated that the newly married couple was to visit Savria Temple near Chittorgarh; but the visit could not materialise as Sangita was in menses. It is also alleged that her brother had once on 10th It was in his presence that Sangita has complained that her life had been ruined, as she never wanted to marry Rajmal. It is also alleged by the accused that she had threatned that in case she was not taken back immediately to her parental home, she would commit suicide. ( 11 ) THE above allegations as made by the respondents, to my mind cannot be gone into at this stage. The truth or veracity of these allegations or the merits thereof is a matter of evidence and proof which can only be considered at the stage of trial. While deciding a bail petition, the accusation as made and the evidence, collected in support thereof, as may be found in the case diary, need only to be considered. A meticulous probing of fact or consideration of a probable defence advanced by the accused is not necessarily required to be gone into. While deciding a bail petition, the accusation as made and the evidence, collected in support thereof, as may be found in the case diary, need only to be considered. A meticulous probing of fact or consideration of a probable defence advanced by the accused is not necessarily required to be gone into. The considerations which govern grant of bail and the question of cancellation of bails u/s. 439 (2) of the Code, is certainly different from admission to bail u/s. 439 (1), In fact, as has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Sanjay Gandhis case as reported in A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 961 State (Delhi Admn) v. Sanjay Gandhi it is easier to reject a bail application in a non-bailable case than to cancel a bail granted in such a case. Cancellation of bail necessarily involves the review of a decision already made and can by and large be permitted only, if, by reason of supervening circumstances. It would be no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom during the trial. ( 12 ) APART from the above primary consideration, bail may be cancelled on the following grounds: that the order granting bail was one without jurisdiction, or was made by the Magistrate or Judge without applying his mind or the order has been made upon irrelevant considerations. ( 13 ) SHRI Garg, learned counsel appearing for the accused-respondents strenuously urged that bail, as granted, was in conformity with the established principles governing grant of bail and in absence of any supervening circumstances it should not be cancelled. As a proposition of law, the contention advanced by the learned counsel has not been disputed even by the learned Penal Lawyer, Shri Desai. He however, submits that in disregard of the Supreme Court judgment in Samundersinghs case (supra), the learned Addi. Sessions Judge ought, not to have granted anticipatory bail to accused-non-applicants 3 and 4 (Tarabai and Hemabai) - the mother-in-law and sister-in-law. The father of the deceased had put on record his own, application objection to the grant of bail to both these ladies. This application dtd. 5-7-1990 in the nature of objection of grant of bail, is supported by an affidavit sworn by the applicant Bansilal - father of the deceased Sangita. The father of the deceased had put on record his own, application objection to the grant of bail to both these ladies. This application dtd. 5-7-1990 in the nature of objection of grant of bail, is supported by an affidavit sworn by the applicant Bansilal - father of the deceased Sangita. ( 14 ) ONE of the objections made was that the accused are highly influencial and their influence can well be gauged by the fact that even after a lapse of about 21-22 days (when he made the application by the time the objection was filed), the accused were not arrested by the Police. Sangita died in extremely suspicious circumstances just within five days of her marriage. The presumption was heavily loaded against the accused. The investigating agency was also not fairly investigating the case and it was alleged that police was in league with the accused. A dying declaration made by Sangita before a judicial Magistrate of Bhawani Mandi (Raj) was deliberately not placed before the Court so as to facilitate the release of accused-applicants on bail. Now all these objections being very much present on record, the least that was expected of the learned Judge was to apply his mind to the question of presumption, as has been introduced by Section 113 (A) and Section 113 (B) of the Evidence Act. But sadly enough the impugned order does not even remotely refer to this presumption. Al though the learned Judge has noted in his order the allegations made by the deceased in the three dying declarations, but he has totally omitted to consider them in the light of presumption arising out of Section 113 (A) and (B) of Evidence Act. Omission to consider the effect of presumption arising out of Section 113 (A) and Section 113 (b) of Evidence Act, is a serious lapse on the part of the learned Judge. ( 15 ) IT is significant to note that although Samundersinghs case (supra) was specifically cited before the learned Judge, and referred to in the written objection filed by the applicant Bansilal in his application dtd. 6-7-90, the learned Judge has very conveniently omitted to consider the application of the above case. It is this omission on his part which vitiates the bail order. 6-7-90, the learned Judge has very conveniently omitted to consider the application of the above case. It is this omission on his part which vitiates the bail order. He could well have considered the presumption as well as the Supreme Court judgment and given his own reasons for not following the same but the learned Judge does not do so. He simply ignores this vital aspect of law. Even observations made by the Supreme Court on a point, are binding on subordinate Courts. The Supreme court lays down the law of land. ( 16 ) THE learned Judge has referred to three dying declarations made by Sangita. First one recorded by the doctor, other by the Police and the third one by the Magistrate. Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhawani Mandi (Rajasthan ). He has noted this fact in his order dtd. 6-7-1990 that although the case diary contains a statement to the effect that such a dying declaration was recorded by the judicial Magistrate of Bhawani Mandi but the dying declaration was not available in the case diary- and the, A. G. P. appearing for the State made a statement before the learned Judge that the said declaration was not received till then. The learned Judge rests content with this recording of statement. As a fact he does not at all consider the specific objections raised by Sangitas father that the said dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate was being deliberately suppressed so as to facilitate grant of bail to the accused. In face of this specific written objection being on record no Judge could have rest contend with mere recording of the fact; as has been done in the instant case by the learned Judge. He could have insisted for its production and deferred the passing of order till the document was produced. After all it was the applicants who were seeking anticipatory bail. They were not behind bars what urgency could there be, if at all there was any an intering order could be passed but nothing of the sort is done. This application u/s. 438 was moved on 3-7-90. A copy thereof was supplied to the A. G. P. the same day and it was listed for arguments on 5-7-90 when the father of the deceased filed his objections duly supported by an affidavits; on 6-7-90 the application was decided. This application u/s. 438 was moved on 3-7-90. A copy thereof was supplied to the A. G. P. the same day and it was listed for arguments on 5-7-90 when the father of the deceased filed his objections duly supported by an affidavits; on 6-7-90 the application was decided. While the promptness shown in disposal of a criminal case is quite appreciable; but the haste, as shown in this case is self-indicative. It has even dispensed with a material document - a dying declaration recorded by a judicial Magistrate. Such haste needs to be deprecated, unholy as it manifestly appears on its face. If at all there was any such apprehension or urgency (which again stands belied by the soft pedalling on the part of the investigating agency) an interim bail order could have been passed. ( 17 ) A case of unsatisfied or unsatisfactory dowry (60 tolas as against 100 tolas of gold) brought by the bride which led to her death a case of suicide according to police and a dastardly diabolic murder according to her father, was a disturbing feature of the case which the learned Judge seems to have completely overlooked in granting bail even absence of the dying declaration, complained of wilfully suppressed by the police. Total non-consideration of the effect of presumption as introduced by Section 113-A and Section 113-B to the Evidence Act. The newly added section 304-B and the deeming fiction introduced therein and its effect have been very conveniently ignored or overlooked by the learned Judge, who granted bail. ( 18 ) NOW coming to the ease of Rajmal Rajendra, husband of the deceased Sangita (Bail Petition No. 140/90, decided by the Addi. Sessions Judge on 10-7-1990 ). His bail petition was presented on 9-7-1990 and was decided by the learned Addi. Sessions Judge just the next day on 10-7-90. A copy of the said petition was supplied to the Addi. Govt. Pleader on the same day, i. e. 9-7-90 with a direction that the case-diary be produced. ( 19 ) IT needs to be noted that Bansilal had filed his specific objections in writing to this bail petition as well on 9-7-90. A copy of the said petition was supplied to the Addi. Govt. Pleader on the same day, i. e. 9-7-90 with a direction that the case-diary be produced. ( 19 ) IT needs to be noted that Bansilal had filed his specific objections in writing to this bail petition as well on 9-7-90. Although the learned Judge in his order has observed that any discussion of evidence at that stage was likely to prejudice either party, yet what he has actually done is discarding the statements of those who alleged dowry demand and dowry death and ordered release of the applicant on bail subject to certain conditions regarding appearance before the 1. 0. and not leaving the jurisdiction of the Court. There is absolutely no mention of the specific objections raised by Sangita's father and these objections could not have been so easily overlooked. ( 20 ) SHRI Garg, learned counsel appearing for the accused-respondents, referring to Bhagiralhsingh Jadejas case3 contended that no cogent or convincing grounds are made out, nor any supervening circumstances exist or pointed out for cancellation of bail. In this case of Bhagirathsingh (supra), the Supreme Court disapproved of the approach of the High Court. The case at hand is materially different in the sense that the Addi. Sessions Judge has granted anticipatory bail in disregard of the Supreme Court Judgment itself in Samundersinghs case (supra ). The Magistrate. has also granted bail ex-parte without notice to the State, to accused Bansilal against whom grounds for believing that he was guilty of offences punishable with death or imprisonment of life did exist, but the learned Magistrate found a way out, overcoming the statutory bar under Section 437{i), by invoking the proviso thereto, acting on a medical certificate tailored for the occasion. ( 21 ) WHEN such orders are passed by the Courts below and the High Court is approached for the purpose of cancellation of bail, the basis postulate is that the order when passed was valid and did not suffer from any basis infirmity, suparveing circumstances are needed to interfere with such an order, but when as order is bad from its very inception, it is not so. ( 22 ) WRONG exercise of jurisdiction generally speaking has been recognised as a ground for cancellation of bail and the instant case is not only a case of wrong exercise of jurisdiction, but also cause thereof, by both the Judge as well as the Magistrate. ( 23 ) IN the result the impugned bail orders are liable to be cancelled and they are accordingly cancelled. The accused-non-applicants shall immediately surrender to the custody of the Court. The bail-bonds furnished by them shall stated cancelled on such surrender. ( 24 ) IN the light of the foregoing discussion and taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, it is directed that in the event of the case stands committed to Sessions for trial, the Sessions Judge, Mandsaur shall himself try the case. Petition allowed. .