JUDGMENT - T.D. SUGLA, J.:---By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner company has challenged the legality and validity of both the first and second awards of the Presiding Officer, First Labour Court, Bombay dated 7th October 1986 and 6th November 1987 under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The petitioner, a company, employs about 250 workmen. The first respondent is the Presiding Officer, First Labour Court, Bombay and is, thus, a formal party. The second respondent is the General Secretary, Maharashtra General Kamgar Union, 252 Janta Colony, Ramnarayan Narkar Marg, Ghatkopar, (E), Bombay. The six workmen Sarvashri (1) Vishnu Tukaram (2) Barkatali Ashrafali (3) Lingappa Sakharam (4) Madhukar Bhiwa (5) Madhukar Eknath and (6) Vasant Bhiwa were working with the petitioner company for quite some time. They were charge-sheeted and suspended under separate orders dated 28th December 1982. Except Lingappa Sakharam, all other workmen were charge-sheeted under Clauses 23(b), 23(k), 23(I) and 23(c) of the Certified Standing Orders of the petitioner company. Shri Lingappa Sakharam was charge-sheeted under clauses 23(b), 23(k) and 23(1) of the Certified Standing Orders. It is common ground that no subsistence allowance was paid to the workmen during the period of suspension. Departmental Enquiry was held by the management despite protests on behalf of the workmen. By order dated 24th February, 1983 the workmen were dismissed from service. 2. The Deputy Commissioner of Labour made reference to the Labour Court under section 10(1) and section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The claim of the workmen was for reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service with effect from 24th February 1983. The Union i.e. the respondent No. 2 herein appeared as party before the Labour Court on behalf of the workmen. The Labour Court passed its first Award on 7th October 1986. The issues framed in the Award were two namely :--- 1. Does the opponent (company) prove that the workmen were given full and fair opportunity to defend themselves and they did not avail same and the enquiries are fair and proper? 2. What order? For reasons given in the impugned award the Labour Court concluded that the enquiry was not fair and proper and was vitiated on account of non-payment of subsistence allowance to the workmen during the period of suspension pending enquiry. 2. What order? For reasons given in the impugned award the Labour Court concluded that the enquiry was not fair and proper and was vitiated on account of non-payment of subsistence allowance to the workmen during the period of suspension pending enquiry. However, as provided under the Law in this behalf the Labour Court fixed the proceedings under reference for further evidence on 6th November 1986. The second Award was passed on 6th November 1987. The issues framed in that Award were : (1) Do the workmen prove that the findings of the enquiry officer are not flowing form the evidence and these are perverse? (2) Do they further prove that the punishment of termination is shockly disproportionate to the charges proved against them? (3) Does the opponent (company) prove that all the workmen are gainfully employed since the date of retirement? (4) Whether the workmen are entitled to the reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service w.e.f. 24-2-1983? (5) What order ? The Labour Court came to the conclusion that the workmen had not proved that the findings of the Enquiry Officer were not flowing from the evidence and/or were perverse. Yet it was held that the punishment was illegal; the workmen were entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service with effect from 24th February 1983; and the employer company had not proved that the workmen were gainfully employed during the period of suspension and after their dismissal from service till the date of the Award. 3. It is contended by Shri John, the learned Counsel for the petitioner company that in the absence of specific issue framed the Labour Court ought not to have gone into the question whether the petitioner was or was not under an obligation to pay any subistence allowance during the period of suspension and whether the non-payment of it amounted to denial of opportunity in the conduct of enquiry proceedings. Having regard to the fact that the Certified Standing Orders did not contain any provision for payment of subsistence allowance during the period of suspension and that model standing order or any other provision does not automatically have the effect of modifying the certified standing orders he argued, the conclusion arrived at by the Labour Court in this regard was unwarranted and illegal. In particular he pointed out that non-payment of subsistence allowance in the present case did not and could not amount to denial of proper opportunity as the departmental enquiry itself was over within about two months from the order of suspension. He submitted that it was, therefore, not correct conclude that the departmental enquiry was vitiated. Shri John further argued that the dispute referred to is also not an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act as the respondent union had failed to prove that it was representing a substantial number of workmen at the time the reference was made. The conclusion in the second Award that all the allegations regarding the misconduct referred to incidents outside the factory premises and therefore outside the scope of industrial dispute, Shri John stated, was wholly unjustified in view of the Supreme Court decision in the case of (Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Labour Court, Meerut and others)1, A.I.R. 1984. S.C. 22. On the evidence recorded by the Labour Court the conclusion that the assault took place in front of the gate of the factory and had a direct causal connection with the misconduct and the employment was, according to Shri John, obvious. He submitted that both the Awards required to be quashed. In the alternative, he submitted that the case be remanded to the Labour Court with direction to give a finding as to the nature of the as to the nature of the assault and whether the same had causal connection between the misconduct and the employment and whether such a connection was real and substantial and not remote or tenuous. 4. Shri Singh, the learned Counsel for the respondent Union, on the other hand, fairly conceding that the model standing orders do not automatically modify the certified standing orders, stated that the position herein was materially different. Section 10A of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, was, he pointed out, inserted in the statute book by Act 18 of 1982. The provision for payment of subsistence allowance during the period of suspension pending enquiry in that section is mandatory. The petitioner company is, thus, under an obligation to pay subsistence allowance despite absence of a specific provision in the certified standing orders. The provision for payment of subsistence allowance during the period of suspension pending enquiry in that section is mandatory. The petitioner company is, thus, under an obligation to pay subsistence allowance despite absence of a specific provision in the certified standing orders. In support of the proposition that non-payment of subsistence allowance vitiates the departmental enquiry, he referred to an relied upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of (Fakirabhai Fulabhai Solani v. Presiding Officer and other)2, 1986(II) L.L.J. 124 . He also relied upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. (supra) for the purpose of showing that the standing orders, particularly certified standing orders, are to be construed strictly. The expression used in Clasue 23(k) of the standing orders is, he stated, "on the premises of the establishment", which is narrower than the expression "within the premises of establishment or in the vicinity thereof". Admittedly, the alleged incident of assault took place outside the factory premises. Therefore, having regard to the decision in Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd.'s case in which the Supreme Court followed a number of its earlier decisions and distinguished the decision in the case of (Mulchandani Electrical and Radio Industries Ltd. v. The Workmen)3, A.I.R. 1975, S.C. 2125, the alleged assault could not certainly amount to misconduct within the meaning of certified standing orders. Alternatively, he submitted that this Court had enough power to appreciate evidence faithfully recorded by the Labour Court in its impugned Award No. II. The inevitable conclusion, according to him, would be that the assault was not proved and in any event assuming the same was proved, it would not amount to misconduct within the meaning of Standing Orders having no direct or proximate connection with the employment. Lastly, the punishment awarded by the Labour Court, he submitted, was out of proportion and not justified at all. Besides reiterating what he argued earlier, Shri John stated in his reply that the Labour Court was not at all justified in awarding back wages for the period covered by the illegal strike and for which period no other woprkman was paid wages. 5. Having heard the Counsel for the petitioner company and the respondent Union at length and after going through the authorities relied upon, I am of the view that this is not an appropriate case in which this Court should interfere in writ jurisdiction. 5. Having heard the Counsel for the petitioner company and the respondent Union at length and after going through the authorities relied upon, I am of the view that this is not an appropriate case in which this Court should interfere in writ jurisdiction. The argument that the respondent Union had not proved that it represented a substantial number of workmen and therefore the dispute raised was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act is too good to be accepted. The reason is not far to seek. In paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, of his affidavit dated 25th February 1987 filed before the Labour Court, Shir B.S. Pujari, Labour Ofrficern of the petitioner company has himself stated as under : "(2) I say that the company declared suspension of work followed by a lock out from 1-4-1982. Necessary notices were given by the Company to the workmen and the union. (3) The Company lifted the lock out on 4-10-1982 and put up the necessary notices in Marathi and English on the notice board and on the gate of the Company and a copy was sent to Maharashtra General kamgar Union. Lifting of lock out was also published in Navakal Marathi daily on 3-10-1982. (4) Company received a strike notice on 5-11-1982 from Maharashtra General Kamgar Union and workers were on strike till 23-12-1982." Underlining by the Court. In view of the averments on behalf of the petitioner company mentioned above the conclusion of the Labour Court rejecting this contention of the petitioner company cannot be found fault with. 6. The proposition that the provision in the statute overrides rules, notifications, standing orders etc. issued thereunder does not require any argument. In any event, a Division Bench of our Court, in the case of (Bush India Limited v. Harish Ramchandra Tahilramani and others)4, Writ Petition No. 35 of 1986 dated 30th January 1987 has already held that section 10A of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 automatically applies if the provisions in that regard are less beneficial to the workmen under the certified standing orders. There is no dispute that in the certified standing orders applicable in this case there is no provision for payment of subsistence allowance during the period of suspension pending enquiry. There is no dispute that in the certified standing orders applicable in this case there is no provision for payment of subsistence allowance during the period of suspension pending enquiry. In the circumstances, it has to be held that the petitioner was under an obligation to pay subsistence allowance during the period of suspension pending enquiry. 7. Next question is whether non-payment of subsistence allowance during the period of enquiry amounts to denial of opportunity in the conduct of enquiry proceedings. This question, in my judgment, is squarely covered by the Supreme Court decision in the case of Fakirabhai Fulabhai Solani (supra). Accordingly, it has to be held that the departmental enquiry without paying subsistence allowance to the workmen during the period of suspension vitiated the enquiry. However, in view of the fact that the Labour Court was obliged to allow the petitioner company to lead evidence and prove the charges of misconduct on application, the conclusion that the departmental enquiry is vitiated loses much of its significance. It is for this reason that the question regarding the petitioner's obligation to pay subsistence allowance during the period of suspension under enquiry and the consequence of non-payment of it during the period of suspension under enquiry is not being dealt with at length. It may be mentioned that the judgement of the learned Single Judge of our Court in the case of (Anjani Kumar Co. Ltd., etc. v. Smt. Manubai Kashinath etc.)5, 1990(I) L.L.J. 316 and that Karnataka High Court in the case of (M.C. Raju v. Executive, Karnataka Vidhyuth Karkhane Ltd.,)6, 1983(II) L.L.J. 287 are not applicable in this case. In neither of those cases, the provisions of section 10A of the Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946 were applicable or considered. 8. Next important question is whether the alleged assault assuming it was proved had or could have any thing to do with the 'misconduct' contemplated under the Certified Standing Orders. There does not appear to be much dispute that the only charge that has some substance in the chargesheet dated 28th December 1982 against the workmen is under clauses 23(k) and 23(I) of the Standing Orders reading as : "23. The following acts and omissions on the part of a workmen shall amount to misconduct :--- (a) ..................... (b) ..................... (c) ..................... (d) ..................... (e) ..................... (f) ..................... (g) ..................... (h) ..................... (i) ..................... (j) ..................... The following acts and omissions on the part of a workmen shall amount to misconduct :--- (a) ..................... (b) ..................... (c) ..................... (d) ..................... (e) ..................... (f) ..................... (g) ..................... (h) ..................... (i) ..................... (j) ..................... (k) drunkenness, riotous, disorderly or indecent behaviour on the premises of the establishment; (l) commission of any act subversive of discipline or good behaviour on the premises of the establishment; (m) ..................... to (t) ....................." It is imperative that the incident has to take place on the premises of the establishment in order to be a 'misconduct' within the meaning of the certified standing orders. For the present it may be assumed that the premises of the establishment means 'factory' as defined under section 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 i.e. any premises including the precincts thereof is applicable. This definition does not also support the petitioner's case for more than one reason. Premises including the precincts thereof are evidently place whereon the workmen are or were working. The question may arise as to why then the legislature in its wisdom defined 'factory' as meaning any premises including precincts thereof. The reason is not far to seek. Our Court held in the case of (Emperor v. Ganpat Dattu Baskar)7, 32(1930) Bom. L.R. 329 that the word premises in section 2(3) of the Indian Factories Act, 1911, included all buildings of a factory together with the compound in which they stand and the word 'precincts' means the space enclosed by walls or other boundaries of a place or building. The definition of factory under the 1911 Act was not materially different. it was : "(3) "factory" means--- (a) any premises wherein, or within the precincts of which, on any one day in the year not less than twenty persons are simultaneously employed and steam, water or other mechanical power or electrcial power is used in aid of any manufacturing process." In (Re K.V.V. Sarma, Manger, Germini Studio, Madras)8, A.I.R. 1953 (Mad.) 269, Madras High Court also held that the term 'precincts' is usually understood as a space enclosed by walls. The issue again came up before out Court in (State v. Ardeshir Hormusji Bhiwandiwala)9, A.I.R. 1956 Bom. 219. It was held that the expression "premises including precincts" merely showed that there might be some premises with precincts and some premises without precincts. The expression does not exclude lands. The issue again came up before out Court in (State v. Ardeshir Hormusji Bhiwandiwala)9, A.I.R. 1956 Bom. 219. It was held that the expression "premises including precincts" merely showed that there might be some premises with precincts and some premises without precincts. The expression does not exclude lands. The words "and in any part of which "which occur in the latter part of sub-clause (i) of Clause (m) were not inconsistent with premises being including of lands. They meant that a manufacturing process might be carried on in the premises themselves or in any part of the land upon which the factory was situate within the lands of factory premises. In my judgment, reliance placed by Shri John on the Supreme Court decision in Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd.'s case for support, is misplaced. The subject matter of consideration in that case was the expression "within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof". This expression is obviously wider in scope than the expression "on the premises of the establishment". Therefore, the Supreme Court's observation in paragraph 15 of the judgment in that case to the effect that even where the standing order is couched in a language which seeks to extend its operation far beyond establishment, it would nonetheless be necessary to establish causal connection between the misconduct and the employment, requires to be read in that background. The relevant portion of the observations in paragraph 15 and 19 reads as under : Paragraph 15 :--- "...........Therefore, even where the standing order is couched in a language which seeks to extend its operation far beyond the establishment, it would none the less be necessary to establish causal connection between the misconduct and the employment. And that is the ratio of the decision, and not that wherever the misconduct is committed ignoring the language of the standing order if it has some impact on the employment, it would be covered by the relevant standing order. In order to avoid any ambiguity being raised in future and a controvertial interpretation question being raised, we must make it abundantly clear and imcontrovertible that the causal connection in order to provide linkage between the alleged act of misconduct and employment must be real and substantial, immediate and proximate and not remote or tenuous. Paragraph 19 :--- Having examined the matter both on principle and precedent, it would clearly emerge that cl. Paragraph 19 :--- Having examined the matter both on principle and precedent, it would clearly emerge that cl. 10 of S.O. 22 which collects various heads of misconduct must be strictly construed being a penal provision in the sense that on the proof of a misconduct therein enumerated, penalty upto and inclusive of dismissal from service can be imposed. We see no reason for departing from the well-established canon of construction that penal provisions must receive strict construction, and not extended beyond their normal requirement." In the above view of the matter, it is difficult to accept Shri John's argument that mere establishment of causal connection between misconduct and the employment is enough to bring the incident of assault outside the factory premises within the purview of misconduct under the standing orders. As laid down by the Supreme Court in Glaxo's case 'misconduct' contemplated under the standing order in this case Clause 23(k) and Clause 23(I) of the Standing Orders requires to be construed strictly. There are two conditions which must be satisfied before an incident can fall within the meaning of 'misconduct' under the above said clauses of the standing orders. The first condition is that the misconduct has taken place on the factory premises. The second is that there is a causal or direct connection between the misconduct and the employment. Accepting for the present that the express on "on the premises" is different from the expression "in the premises" it is not possible to hold that the view taken by the Labour Court that the act of misconduct having been committed if at all outside the gate of the factory did not amount to misconduct within the meaning of the aforesaid clauses of the standing orders is not a possible or reasonable view. The Supreme Court in the case of (Agnani W.M. v. Badri Das and others)10, 1963(I) L.L.J. 684 held that the High Court should interfere only when it can be said that the view taken by the Tribunal is not even reasonably possible. Observing that in the instant case it could not be contended that the construction put by the Industrial Tribunal upon the resolution was also reasonable possible, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the finding of the Industrial Tribunal based on the construction put by it upon the resolution of the management. Observing that in the instant case it could not be contended that the construction put by the Industrial Tribunal upon the resolution was also reasonable possible, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the finding of the Industrial Tribunal based on the construction put by it upon the resolution of the management. In this context it may be desirable to refer to another Supreme Court decision in the case of (Central India Coalfields Ltd. v. Ram Bilas Shobnath)11, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1189. The standing orders in that case inter alia provided that drunkenness fighting, riotous or disorderly or indecent behaviour would constitute entailing dismissal. There was no restriction as to the place or time in this standing order. Even then it was held that normally the standing order would apply to the behaviour on the premises where the workmen discharge their duties and during the course of their work. If a quarrel took place between the workmen outside the working hours and away from the work spot that may not fall within the provisions of such standing orders. In the present case as stated earlier, the standing order itself provides that the incident amounts to misconduct if it has taken place on the premises of the undertaking. Having regard to the above discussion I do not agree with Shri John that it is a fit case in which this Court should find fault with the view taken by the Labour Court that the alleged incident having taken place outside the factory premises, did not amount to misconduct within the meaning of the certified standing orders. In the above view of the matter it was, indeed, not necessary for the Labour Court to give a finding as to the exact nature of the incident assuming it had taken place if at all. In any event, on going through the evidence it is seen that the view expressed by the Labour Court in paragraph 26 of judgment, namely :--- "It is quite clear from my finding that the act of the misconduct has not been proved." Is a reasonable view and does not call for intereference in writ jurisdiction. 9. It was contended by Shri John that full back wages should not have been awarded by the Labour Court. 9. It was contended by Shri John that full back wages should not have been awarded by the Labour Court. It was pointed out that the period under suspension and after dismissal upto the date of re-instatement covered the period of illegal strike for which wages were not paid even to other workers. I have looked into the dates. The so called illegal strike took place in the year 1984 i.e. after the workmen were dismissed from the service. They can, thus, certainly be not responsible for that event assuming there was any justification for doing so in the case of continuing workers. In the result, the petition is dismissed. Rule stands discharged. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed. -----