K. J. VAIDYA, J. ( 1 ) ONE of the best teas and index to the overall sense of the judicial-awareness discipline efficiency and will to do justice and the too as expeditiously as possible lies in the sense of vigilance exhibited by the Court in exercising its discretion in the matter of handing and granting adjournment to parties. Frivolous adjournments are very anti-thesis of justice. Such adjournments not only waste precious public time defeat the cause of justice but at times they further tend to be harsh punishments to innocent and guileless litigants and witnesses who in high hopes knock the doors of justice and ultimately in return in utter dismay find themselves stranded and anextricably stuck up. 1. 1 This Appeal from Order accordingly represents one of such cases of indiscreet act of adjournments round which the entire discussion revolves in the following paragraphs of this judgment which can be an eye-opener to anybody. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 2 ) BRIEFLY the respondent-plaintiff No. 1 viz. the Bank of Baroda is a Nationalised Bank at Bhavnagar while the appellant-defendant No. 1 viz. Bhavnagar Bricks Manufacturing Co. is a partnership firm of which the appellants-defendants Nos. 2 and 3 and respondents-defendants Nos. 2 and 3 (Org. Defts. Nos. 2 3 4 and 5 respectively) are partners. That in the year 1984 the plaintiff-Bank had advanced certain cash credit facilities (on hypothecated goods) to the tune of about Rs. 1 30 0 in favour of the defendants doing the business of manufacturing and selling bricks at Bhavnagar. Since the defendants despite legal notice demanding the repayment of money so advanced persisted in continuing default with regard to the said repayment on 13/04/1987 the plaintiff-Bank was constrained to institute a suit the same being Special Civil Suit No. 104 of 1987 in the Court of the learned Civil Judge (S. D.) Bhavnagar against all of them for recovery of the said outstanding dues with an accrued interest thereon to the tune of Rs. 1 80 510 coupled with an application (Ex. 1 80 510 coupled with an application (Ex. 5) under Order 38 Rule 5 and Sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 inter alia praying for the attachment of the hypothecated goods (of the ownership of defendants) before judgment apprehending that if the defendants will come to know about the suit having been filed against them they were likely to transfer and dispose of the same resulting into a serious injustice to it inasmuch as if it succeeded in suit it would not be in to position to realise the decrease amount. This Ex. 5 application was duly supported by an affidavit sworn by Shri Ashokkumar Ramniklal Modi serving as an Accountant in the plaintiff-Bank itself at Bhavnagar. The trial Court thereupon by an order dated 15/04/1987 issued a notice (made returnable on 30/04/1987 to all the defendants calling upon them to show cause why they should not be ordered to furnish security in the sum of Rs. 1 85 0 It appears that despite the fact that the said notice was made returnable on 30/04/1987 the same could not be heard and decided till 7/09/1989 when the trial Court was ultimately pleased to allow the same by passing the following order:plaintiffs application under Order 38 Rule 5 of C. P. C. is allowed and the hypothecated property of the defendants is hereby attached and the defendants are restrained to dispose of the same till further order is made The plaintiff is directed to apply for the inventory of the property In question so that clear list of hypothecated goods be brought on record ( 3 ) FEELING aggrieved and dissatisfied by the said order the applicant-defendants have filed this Appeal from Order ( 4 ) MR. Trivedi the learned Advocate for the appellants-defendants submitted that the impugned judgment and order passed by the trial Court is patently illegal arbitrary and unjust in as much as the same has been passed in total disregard of the settled legal principles governing the cases of the attachment before the judgment Mr. Trivedi further submitted that an order of attachment before judgment is a very serious thing and that the trial Court ought not to have exercised its judicial discretion so lightly on mere bald and vague assertions of the plaintiff-Bank as alleged in Ex. 5 application Mr. Trivedi further submitted that an order of attachment before judgment is a very serious thing and that the trial Court ought not to have exercised its judicial discretion so lightly on mere bald and vague assertions of the plaintiff-Bank as alleged in Ex. 5 application Mr. Trivedi further submitted that before relying upon the alleged apprehension of the plaintiff-Bank the judicial prudence warranted for an insistence upon some tangible independent and reliable evidence which can satisfy its conscience regarding the acceptability of the same. ( 5 ) AS against the above Mr. Jani the learned Advocate for the respondent-Bank has taken me through the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court and on the basis of the same submitted that in facts and circumstances of this case it cannot be said that the trial Court has not exercised its discretion judicially. He submitted that all defendants were duly served with summons as well as show cause notices and in response to the said process of the Court the defendants Nos. 1 2 and 3 did appear before the Court and asked for the time Thereafter on their remaining absent right to file the written statement was closed. It was pointed out by Mr. Jani that defendants Nos. 4 and 5 have totally denied the case of the plaintiff-Bank Mr. Jani further submitted that not only the huge amount of the plaintiff-Bank had remained outstanding since many years but defendants had persisted in continuing the default of not repaying the sane despite the legal notice Even after filing of the suit the defendants have cleverly delayed the suit proceedings This queer and delaying dubious conduct of the defendants clearly justified and supported the alleged apprehension of the plaintiff-Bank against defendants as expressed in application Ex. 5. ( 6 ) MR. Jani the learned Advocate while on the one band supported the impugned judgment and order to the extent it upheld the case of the plaintiff-Bank was on the other hand at pains to point out certain illegal unjust unconcerned and inconceivable attitude of the trial Court in conducting the suit proceedings. According to Mr. Jani (i) looking to the facts and circumstances of the case as reflected in Ex. According to Mr. Jani (i) looking to the facts and circumstances of the case as reflected in Ex. 5 application it was quite clear that what the Bank prayed for was an ex parte ad interim order of attachment before judgment of the said hypothecated goods and yet the same was not granted and instead what the trial Court did was it issued 8 simple show cause notice to the defendants making it returnable on 30/04/1987 as if the present suit was petty suit (ii) that this obvious error committed by the trial Court did not rest here as it assumed a form of blunder as for about more than 2 years such an urgent application could not be taken up for deciding the same due to unreasonable laxity shown in granting prolonged adjournments to defendants and strike at relevant point of time. This grievance of Mr. Jani indeed has lot of substance and deserves an anxious consideration which is duly taken care-of in the later part of this judgment. ( 7 ) TAKING into consideration over all facts and circumstances of the case it is not possible to agree with the argument of Mr. Trivedi that the impugned judgment and order is in any way illegal arbitrary and unjust. Mr. Trivedi is also not right when he submitted that the trial Court has not exercised its discretion judicially. For the brevity sake it has to be stated that the complete answer to this criticism of Mr. Trivedi is available in reply arguments of Mr. Jani the learned Advocate quoted in earlier para-6 of this judgment with which this Court expresses its complete agreement. Ultimately such types of questions can and has best to be decided by testing the same on the touch-stone of the facts and circumstances of each case which ultimately lends assurance to the judicial conscience to pass an appropriate order. Jani the learned Advocate quoted in earlier para-6 of this judgment with which this Court expresses its complete agreement. Ultimately such types of questions can and has best to be decided by testing the same on the touch-stone of the facts and circumstances of each case which ultimately lends assurance to the judicial conscience to pass an appropriate order. However it has also got to be borne in mind that whenever a suit is filed by the Nationalised Bank for the recovery of its dues then (i) such claims are ordinarily bona fide honest and correct one (ii) it is ordinarily preceded by a legal demand notice; (iii) that such suits are ordinarily based on prima facie reliable documentary evidence; (iv) that the object of filing such suit is basically the public interest involved; (v) that one should not lose sight of the fact that the money advanced by the Bank is ultimately property belonging to its depositors-members of the public (vi) that the ulterior motive while filing such suit is marked by patent absence of any personalised bias against the person against whom such suits are filed (vii) that these days one cannot afford to be oblivious to the fact that barring few exceptions persons once having successfully duped Banks with small or huge amount when the time for repayment come they start playing cool trotting out lame excuses for not repaying the amount making and keeping the Banks on a constant run being chased by them for return of the money so advanced and after tiring out in the process leaves no option at the command of such Banks except to institute the suit against them and then to rest and wait indefinitely for the decree from the Court. As a matter of fact these are the circumstances which (though application by the plaintiff-Bank was essentially under Order 38 Rule 5 of C. P. C. yet) per se attracts the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in light of which ad Interim relief ought to have been given to the plaintiff-Bank. Not to do so may be disasterous to the public interest involved. Can Court be a party to such public frauds and wastage of public time and money and allow itself to play in hands of unscrupulous defendants by unconcerned carefree adjournments ? Not to do so may be disasterous to the public interest involved. Can Court be a party to such public frauds and wastage of public time and money and allow itself to play in hands of unscrupulous defendants by unconcerned carefree adjournments ? Situation like the one in the present case may rightly or wrongly leave an impression as if the entire legal system under the sun existed with only mission namely to be soft and accommodative to unjust and wrong doors and permit all sorts of embarrassment anxiety and inconvenience to the honest citizens. It appears that ill such types of cases when the Bank institutes the suit for the recovery of the large amount and when it is apprehended by it that defendants were likely to transfer and dispose of hypothecated goods either to delay or defeat the ultimate decree in its fairness judicial prudence warrants that it should err on the safer side by passing an ex parte ad interim order in favour of the plaintiff-Bank in order to see that not even an inadvertent delay (by Court) unnecessarily defeats the ends of justice. Those are the cases where the Courts are expected to exercise their discretion in the manner which ultimately protects subserves and enhances the over all public interest by granting an ex parte ad interim relief. Only then it can serve the purpose of an instant and effective check on other side bent upon delaying and defeating the interest of the Bank. However this Court would like to sound a note of caution to the effect that while passing such ex parte interim orders a special care is required to be taken by the trial Court with a view to see that in zest for protecting the interest of the plaintiff-Bank the defendants are not put to unjust under loss and inconveniences. As a matter of fact in this regard clear guidelines have been duly provided in proviso to Order 39 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 which an as abundant caution be utilised in cases like the present one. As a matter of fact in this regard clear guidelines have been duly provided in proviso to Order 39 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 which an as abundant caution be utilised in cases like the present one. The said provision reads as under :rule 3 Before granting injunction Court to direct notice to opposite party: the trial Court stall in all cases except where it appears that the object of granting file injunction would be defeated by the delay before granting an injunction direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party; provided that where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party the Court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay end require the applicant- (a) to deliver to the opposite party. or to send to him by registered post immediately after the order granting the injunction has been made a copy of the application for injunction together with (i) a copy of the affidavit filed in support of the application; (ii) a copy of the plaint and (iii) copies of documents on which the applicant relies and (b) to file on the day on which such injunction is granted or on the day immediately following that day an affidavit stating that the copies aforesaid have been so delivered or seat. Over and above the aforesaid provisions of Civil Procedure Code the trial Court can also add a line or two reserving the right and liberty to the defendants to move the Court for early hearing of such ad interim relief after duly notifying such intention to the plaintiff. The plaintiff obtaining such ad interim relief can as well be asked to undertake and assure the Court of the assistance in event of the other side moving for early hearing for getting vacated the ad interim relief. This formula to my mind best ensures the rival conflicting interests of the parties at ad interim stage squarely balancing public interest versus the private interest. This formula to my mind best ensures the rival conflicting interests of the parties at ad interim stage squarely balancing public interest versus the private interest. Thus these are the matters where judicial discretion should not take any chance waiting for hearing the other side before passing ex parte interim order as any delay creating even a bit of the time- gap can provide golden opportunity to defendants to disturb the balance of convenience and tilt the scale of justice against the plaintiff-Bank. In the instant case at the earlier stage of the suit proceeding the trial Court did commit such an error of not exhibiting the said judicial prudence by granting an ex parte ad interim order of attachment before judgment immediately on presentation of Exh. 5 application. It is true that subsequently after two years the order of attachment of the hypothecated goods before the judgment has been passed but we do not know about the efficacy of the same at such a belated stage. ( 8 ) IN the backdrop of the aforesaid discussion the question that arises for consideration is as to what ought to be the standard and degree of duty and care to be taken not only by the Courts alone but for that purpose any party to the proceedings particularly where the parties are - (i) Government or any Statutory Bodies; (ii) Boards; (iii) Corporations; (iv) Nationalised Banks etc in cases wherein the question involved is either recovery of public money revenue and/or such other things where public interests are heavily at stake in view of the special nature of the suit and/or urgent applications seeking either - (i) ad interim relief; and/or (ii) where show cause notice is made returnable on B particular date and the same is not being taken up for one reason or other to the disadvantage of the parties in whose favour such show cause notice was issued; and/or (iv) where after obtaining ex parte ad interim orders parties become slow and reluctant for final hearing of such applications; and/or (iv) in the matters of otherwise adjournments of cases. Keeping this aspect and direction in mind let us appreciate the facts and circumstances of the case in the light of the arguments made by the learned Advocate Mr. Jani. ( 9 ) MR. Keeping this aspect and direction in mind let us appreciate the facts and circumstances of the case in the light of the arguments made by the learned Advocate Mr. Jani. ( 9 ) MR. Jani has rightly voiced has grievance firstly against unreasonable laxity shown by the trial Court in granting prolonged frivolous adjournments and then to the strike-call in Courts as a result of which the urgent application for attachment before judgment could not be taken up for more than two years. In order to drive home the point Mr. Jani has specifically drawn my attention to the Rojkam proceedings of the case at hand which shows that right from 13/04/1987 an urgent application like the one under Order 38 Rule 5 of C P. C. has been adjourned from time to time and could be attended only on 7/09/1989 even though the trial Court itself realising the importance and urgency of the same at one stage hat made notice returnable on 30-4-1987 yet the hearing of the same lingered on till 7-9-1989. In between it appears that the defendants one after another went on taking for the time and the Court also without appreciating the importance of the said application at Ex. 5. whatsoever granted the same. Such a pathetic and carefree adjournments dolled out by the trial Court can never be lightly countenanced save and except at the risk and cost of the justice and ultimate faith and people in the administration of justice. ( 10 ) NO doubt granting of an adjournment is entirely within the discretion of the Court and as to how the said discretion in a given case is to be exercised certain well-defined guidelines are provided in Rules 1 2 and 3 of Order 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure. For ready reference the said Order 17 under caption ADJOURNMENTS with relevant rules thereunder is reproduced as under :order XVII : R-1 (1) The Court may if sufficient cause is shown at nay stage of the suit grant time to the parties or to any of them and may form time to time adjourn the hearing of the suit. For ready reference the said Order 17 under caption ADJOURNMENTS with relevant rules thereunder is reproduced as under :order XVII : R-1 (1) The Court may if sufficient cause is shown at nay stage of the suit grant time to the parties or to any of them and may form time to time adjourn the hearing of the suit. Costs of adjournment : (2) In every such case the Court shall fix a day for the further hearing of the suit and may make such order as it thinks fit with respect to the costs occasioned by the adjournment; provided that :- (a) when the hearing of the suit the commenced it shall be continued from day-to-day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined unless the Court finds that for the exceptional reason to be recorded by it the adjournment of the hearing beyond the following day in necessary. (b) no adjournment shall be granted at the request of a party except where the circumstances are beyond the control of that party. (c) the fact that the pleader of a party is engaged in another Court shall not be a ground for adjournments (d) where the illness of a pleader or his inability to conduct the case for any reasons other than think being engaged is another Court is put forwarded as a ground for adjournment the Court shall not grant the adjournment unless it is satisfied that the party applying for adjournment could not have engaged another pleader in time. (e) whose a witness is present in Court but a party or his pleader is not present or the party or his pleader thought present in Court is not ready to examine or cross-examine the witness the Court may if is thinks fit record the statement of the witness and pass such orders as it thinks fit dispensing with the examinations-in-chief or cross-examinations of the witness as the case may be by the party or his pleader not present or not ready as aforesaid. R-2 Procedure it parties fail is appear an day fixed :where on any day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned the party has already been recorder and such party falls to appear on any day to which he hearing of the suit is adjourned the Court may in the direction proceed with the case as if such party where present. R-3 Court may proceed notwithstanding either party fails to produce evidence etc. WHERE any party to a suit to whom time has been granted fails to produce his evidence or to cause the attendance of his witnesses or to perform any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit for which time has been allowed the Court may notwithstanding such default- (a) if the parties are present proceed to decide the suit forthwith or (b) if the parties are or any of them is absent proceed under Rule 2. Unfortunately these days the above provisions are either not taken care of by the lower Courts an much as it deserves to be or perhaps conveniently connived at. Difficult to say. The exercise of discretion in the matters of adjournment is by no means less important and/or less responsible judicial function as it has a direct and serious hearing on the ultimate fate of the suit and therefore it calls for constant awareness on the part of the Court whenever the same is sought for. Not that the adjournments should always be refused but ordinarily the grant of an adjournment should always and only be in the larger interest of justice and of that some definite genuine and unavoidable grounds to the satisfaction of the judicial conscience must be made out by party taking adjournment. Particularly in cases where some interim reliefs are prayed for or the same has been already obtained by an ex parte order and when the delay is likely to defeat the justice the adjournment should never be granted on mere asking. In any case every Court is expected to be well equipped with power to just desecration and discrimination in distinguishing frivolous form genuine adjournment sought. Talking about the instant case it must be stated that the trial Court had exercised its discretion absolutely arbitrary. As stated earlier the granting of any adjournment has a direct nexus (i) with overall time duration of the suit proceedings; and (ii) it ultimate resultant impact on the interim relief and/or final decrees as the case may be; and (iii) that the delay is very anti-thesis of justice. Now. since the point regarding laxity by trial Court in granting the adjournment has been raised in this appeal it is desirable that its overall implications are threshed out through and through. Now. since the point regarding laxity by trial Court in granting the adjournment has been raised in this appeal it is desirable that its overall implications are threshed out through and through. ( 11 ) OVER and above the guideline that are provide in the matter of adjournments under Order XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 before granting adjournments the Court should also further invariable ask itself the following questions in order to have a complete and comprehensive picture and assessment of pending suit proceedings; (A) what is the type and nature of the suit ? (b) What is the type and nature of the application seeking ad interim relief ? (c) How old is the suit ? (d) How old ids the interim relief application ? (e) How many times party seeking adjournments have in past got adjournments and on what grounds ? (f) Whether the modus operandi of a party seeking adjournment is prima facie bona fide or mala fide ? (g) How much time the suit proceedings are reasonably likely to take along with its judgment and decree ? (h) What priority the pending proceedings deserved having regard to the nature of the dispute the reliefs prayed relations between the parties status nature of hardship balance of convenience and the nature and quality of the evidence likely to be adduced in support of the case ? (i) Whether the ground on which the adjournment is sought for is not only genuine and sufficient but further whether the same vas likely to result Into any loss of balance of convenience or cause irreparable harm hardship and injustice to the other side in case if granted ?as a matter of fact every Court in the background and on basis of the aforesaid guidelines are supposed to have an overall view review and rough estimate of the various stages of the suit proceedings in order to remember and remind itself the time that is likely to be taken for the same. Thus the importance of the time consciousness or time-budget can by no means be permitted to be overlooked or underestimated save sod except at the cost and risk of justice by losing ones own judicial conscience ( 12 ) THUS Mr. Thus the importance of the time consciousness or time-budget can by no means be permitted to be overlooked or underestimated save sod except at the cost and risk of justice by losing ones own judicial conscience ( 12 ) THUS Mr. Jani of course is right in blaming the trial Court for belated hearing of Ex 5 application but at the same time it has got to be stated that the plaintiff-Bank too also cannot be permitted to ran away from this issue keeping the blame entirely at the door of the Court without sharing to some extent its own responsibility for the delay that has occured. It is quite understandable why defendants sought adjournments after adjournments in this case but it is difficult to understand the stark apathy of the plaintiff-Bank itself in not opposing the adjournments sought by defendants and pressing hard for the early hearing of E3. 5 application. It is true that ordinarily when the learned Advocates are engaged to conduct proceedings parties relying upon them may not bother as regards the day-to-day conduct of the suit in the Court proceedings but then there are cases and cases whore these days parties also have to take some interest and initiative in their cases and must remain indirect touch with it to act upon of their own more particularly when the patties to the suit proceedings are either Government Banks or any other Statutory Corporations Boards and Bodies etc. and further when some important question of public interest is involved In such important cases it is desirable that parties themselves must remain present to instruct their learned Advocates in court-room even whenever the adjournments are sought Further wherever there is a strike call and the learned Advocates are not inclined to attend the Court proceedings and/or when the opponents are deliberately delaying the Court proceedings on one pretext or the other and the Courts in its turn for whatever reason are adjourning the cases unmindful of its public importance and consequences the officers attending upon such matters on duty should be asked by such respective departments not to lightly take shelter behind adjournments their Advocates strike call (which can be just genuine and justifiable) so far as Courts are concerned they do work during ordinary office time Accordingly the responsible officer should and can bring to the notice the urgency and importance of the matter and irreversible situation arising out of it resulting into great injustice if the matter is not heard at the earliest. Whenever such submissions are made the Courts are bound to call the other side and pass an appropriate order as warranted ant deemed fit under the facts and circumstances of each case. It has got to be appreciated that if the party itself is not vigilent and does not care to move the Court to pursue the matter the Courts cannot be entirely blamed for the delay so occasioned. ( 13 ) THESE days in more than about 80% of litigations Government and/or Statutory Corporations Boards and Bodies and Banks are parties. Delays in the Courts for one reason or other are also not unknown. Under such circumstances the time is ripe for all the Administrative higher-ups be it in Government or other statutory institutions bodies to take the stock of the situation think over it and impart appropriate instructions to their respective Law Officers as well as the officers in their departments attending the cases before the concerned Court as to how effectively and efficiently to deal with the situations in cases of public Importance before the Courts so as to counter-act adjournment moves and/or any other things obstructing and frustrating the publicinterest. It appears to me that during the strike period or under any such emergency the public officers or private parties can certainly approach the Court for appropriate orders in urgent matters The idea is not to by-pass on undermine the importance and role of the learned Advocates in Court proceedings. As a matter of fact it hardly requires to be emphasised that but for the constructive and active assistance of the learned Advocates no judicial system on earth can ever function as efficiently and effectively as one would desire to be but at the same time when any aggrieved citizen keen to seek the redress of the legitimate grievances approaches the Court the Court is duty bound to attend and decide the same Thus merely because there is a strike the Court cannot deny any citizen the right to approach it to ventilate his legitimate grievance calling for immediate redressal by urgent orders and the Court in its turn has to decide in whatever way it likes as warranted by the facts and circumstances of each case What is stated hereinabove is regarding the public servants in matters of public importance before the Court But the private party of course has equal right and can approach the Court in the similar way as the public servants are expected to be The only difference is that so far as private party is concerned it is entirely left to the sweet will of such parties to move or not to move the Court in urgent matters. But this sweet will of attending the Courts during he emergency like strike and adjournments in the opinion of this Court should not be open to the public servants as discussed above as the overall social public interest cannot be permitted to be attended in a mechanical and irresponsible way be guardians of the public interest. ( 14 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion since the learned Advocate for the appellants has failed to make out any case for interferance with the impugned judgment and order this Appeal will have to be dismissed. ( 15 ) IN the result this Appeal From Order fails and is dismissed accordingly with orders as to costs. Appeal dismissed. .