A. M. BHATTACHARJEE, J. ( 1 ) A suit for eviction of tenant having been de- creed against the tenant ex parte, the tenant filed an application for setting aside the same under the provisions of Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But the same having been dismissed on merits, the tenant-defendant has filed this appeal. ( 2 ) A Court of first appeal has no doubt all the powers of a trial Court as provided in section 107 of the Code. But, to borrow from Shakespeare, while it may be good to have giant's power, it is not always good to use the same as a giant and therefore even a first appeal is not always to be treated as a full-fledged second round of trial subjecting the evidence and materials on record afresh to the strictest possible scrutiny. ( 3 ) AS pointed out by the Privy Council in Khoo sit Hoh v. Lim Thean Tong (1912 Appeal Cases 323), when an appellate Court is to express opinion on the credibility of conflicting witnesses whom it has not seen or heard or questioned, it must of necessity be greatly influenced by the opinion of the trial Judge, who sees the demeanour of the witnesses and can estimate their intelligence, position and character in a way not available to the appellate Court. Of course, it may be that in deciding on evidence, the trial Court has clearly failed on some point to take proper account of particular circumstances, or given credence to testimony which turns out to be substantially inconsistent with itself, or with indisputable facts. But except in rare cases of that character, a Court of appeal shall hesitate long before it disturbs the findings of a trial Judge based on appreciation of evidence. These observations in Khoo sit Hoh (supra) have been fully endorsed by the Privy Council in the later decision in Sitalakshmi Ammal v. Venkata Subrahmanian (AIR 1930 Privy Council 170 at 171-172 ). These observations in Khoo sit Hoh (supra) have been fully endorsed by the Privy Council in the later decision in Sitalakshmi Ammal v. Venkata Subrahmanian (AIR 1930 Privy Council 170 at 171-172 ). ( 4 ) IN the case at hand, the trial Judge has ably considered and analysed the evidence on record in considerable details and has spelt out with appreciable clarity the grounds which have led him to conclude that the alleged illness of the constituted attorney of the defendant, which was put forward as the sole ground for his inability to attend Court on the date of hearing, has not at all been proved by reliable evidence. The trial Judge also took into consideration the fact that on that very date and in that very Court, another proceeding was conducted and contested on behalf of this defendant and it is difficult to appreciate that if the defendant could take cafe of that other civil proceeding, why could he or his constituted attorney not take similar or some such care in respect of this suit also. We, therefore, do not find that the case at hand to be such a rare case, to justify our interference with the finding of the trial Judge, guiding ourselves by the decisions of the Privy Council in Khoo sit Hoh (supra) and Sitalakshmi (supra ). ( 5 ) RELIANCE placed by the learned Counsel for the appellant on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ramlol v. Rewa Coalfield ( AIR 1962 SC 361 ) and in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katji ( AIR 1987 SC 1353 ) was rather misplaced. The upshot of these decisions, though not very easily reconcilable, is that the expression "sufficient cause" in section 5, Limitation Act is, wherever possible, to be liberally construed in the absence of inaction, negligence or want of bona fide of the party concerned and that if two views are reasonably possible on the facts on record, the view which would enable a litigant to participate in the lis should be preferred in accordance with the principle of natural justice which disfavours a party from being condemned unheard. But as we have already indicated, no two views appear to us to be reasonably possible and the view taken by the trial Judge has appeared to us to be the only reasonably one. But as we have already indicated, no two views appear to us to be reasonably possible and the view taken by the trial Judge has appeared to us to be the only reasonably one. ( 6 ) SOME inspiration is sometimes sought to be obtained from the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Man Singh v. Sanghi Dal Chand (AIR 1934 All. 1631) and of the Nagpur High Court in Kashirao Panduji v. Ramchandra Balaji (AIR 1948 Nagpur 362) for the view that in the absence of any motive of the defendant not to present himself in Court on the date, the Court should hold that there was sufficient cause for non-appearance of the defendant. We have no doubt that these observations must be treated to be confined to the facts of those cases and must not be taken as a proposition of general application. If in a case, the evidence for and against the defendant suffering an ex parte decree appears to be evenly balanced, the fact that the defendant could have no motive in absenting himself may, not that must, lend some assurance to his case that he has sufficient cause for non-appearance. But otherwise, we respectfully express our inability to accept the view enunciated in the Allahabad and the Nagpur decisions as good law and would rather express our concurrence with the contrary view of the Oudh Chief Court in Baijnath v. Iqtidar Fatima (AIR !942 Oudh 75 ). But that apart, a tenant sued in ejectment and finding no good defence, may have a motive in not being present in Court on the date of hearing, and in allowing the suit to be decreed ex parte with the hope, very often well-grounded, that by indulging thereafter in initiating proceedings for setting aside the same in the trial Court and then in higher Courts in succession, he would be able to get the litigation protracted and to gain time to his advantage. ( 7 ) WE accordingly dismiss the appeal with assessed at Rs. 1000/-a. K. Nandi, J. , I agree. Appeal dismissed.