A. M. BHATTACHARJEE, J. ( 1 ) A criminal prosecution has been initiated under Section 24 of the Contract Labour (Regulation Abolition) Act, 1970 against a Government Company and its Chairman and Managing Director, its Construction Superintendent and its Executive Engineer. The Company and the Officers, but not the Chairman and Managing Director, have moved this Court against the order of issuance of process and have urged that the prosecution ought to be quashed. For the reasons stated hereunder, we decline to do so. ( 2 ) IT has been urged that since the accused company is a Government company whose entire share capital has been subscribed mainly by the Central Government and also by some State Governments, it is very much an instrumentality of the State or the Government and a criminal prosecution against such a one must fail as the State or the Government cannot be criminally prosecuted. ( 3 ) THE Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 does not exclude the State or the Government or any of its instrumentalities from the operation of the Act, either expressly or by necessary implication. The English Common Law doctrine that the Crown is not bound by a Statute save by express provision or inevitable implication, was applied in India by the Privy Council even as late as in 1947 in Province of Bombay vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay (AIR 1947 Privy Council 34) and also by the Supreme Court in 1960 in Director of Rationing and Distribution vs. Corporation of Calcutta ( AIR 1960 SC 1355 ), but has thereafter been squarely overthrown by the Supreme Court in the Nine-Judge Bench decision in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs vs. Corporation of Calcutta ( AIR 1967 SC 997 ) ). In fact, that was also the consistent view of this Court as would appear from the Division Bench decisions in Corporation of Calcutta, vs. Bhupal Chandra Sinha (AIR 1950 Calcutta 421), in Corporation of Calcutta vs. Director of Rationing and Distribution (AIR 1955 Calcutta 282) and in State of West Bengal vs. Corporation of Calcutta (69 Calcutta Weekly Notes, 1167 ). It should be noted that while the decision of this Court in Corporation of Calcutta vs. Director of Rationing and Distribution (supra, AIR 1955 Calcutta 282) was reversed by the Supreme Court in Director of Rationing and Distribution vs. Corporation of Calcutta (supra, AIR 1960 SC 1355 ), the decision of this Court in State of West Bengal vs. Corporation of Calcutta (supra, 68 Calcutta Weekly Notes 1167) has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in that Nine-Judge Bench decision, overruling its earlier decision in Director of Rationing and Distribution (supra, AIR 1960 SC 1355 ). ( 4 ) THE Government or the State, as settled by the Courts beyond the pale of any doubt or dispute, can be reasonably classified from the rest and, therefore, any law for the State or the Government different from that applicable to the rest is not hit by the Equality Clause of our Constitution. A legislation, therefore, may exclude or exempt the State from its operation :but unless so done by express enunciation or irresistible implication, all our general legislations would apply to all and sundry and no exemption can be claimed by the State qua State. ( 5 ) IT is true that the punishment provided for the infringment of the provisions of the Act in question are, as usual with the general penal provisions, imprisonment and fine. it is obvious that the State or the Government cannot be put in prison and thus punished with imprisonment and it is accordingly urged that any penal statute providing for such punishment would not apply to State by inevitable implication. Even in respect of penal provisions providing for imposition of fine, it was urged before the Nine-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs vs. Corporation of Calcutta (supra, at 1008) that as the fine imposed on the State would merge in the Consolidated Fund of the State itself, it should be necessarily implied that the State was outside the reach of such penal provision. This contention appears to have earned the approval of the Nine-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court (supra, at 1008, paragraph 24) where it has observed that "in respect of such offences, it may be contended that, as the fines paid reach the State itself, there is an implication that the State is not bound by the Sections, for a person who receives the fine cannot be the same person who pays it" and "this incongruity may lead to the said necessary implications". ( 6 ) BUT accepting that the fines realised in criminal cases go to the State coffers or the Consolidated Fund of the State where such cases are initiated and as such the States or the State Governments should be held to be beyond the reach of penal provisions imposing fines, the same cannot apply where the Central Government is being prosecuted under a penal law in a State and is sentenced to pay fine. The Fund, whether the Consolidated Fund or any other Fund of the Central Government is entirely different from the Consolidated or other Fund of the State and if any fine paid by the Central Government goes to the State Fund, as it would, the payer and the receiver of the fine would not be the same entity, nor the amount of fine would come out of a Fund only to go back thereto and, therefore, no incongruity as referred to by the Supreme Court, would at all arise. There should, therefore, be no reason to hold that the Central Government cannot be prosecuted and fined in a criminal prosecution instituted in a State unless the relevant law governing the prosecution rules out such prosecution, expressly or by inescapable implication. ( 7 ) IN the case at hand, however, we are concerned not with any Government, but with a Central Government company, which in law has a distinct and independent entity and jural personality and it cannot in any way be urged that the Fund of such a company, wherefrom the fine, if imposed, shall be paid is the Fund of the Union or the State. A Government company, or any other authority controlled and run by the State may be, as pointed out by the Supreme Court times without number since the decade of Seventies, a State within the meaning of Article 12 and, as such, for the purpose of Part III of the Constitution conferring Fundamental Rights to the people of India. But otherwise, such a company does not, whether ipso jure or ipso facto, become, a State or the Government and cannot be treated as such. Be that as it may, since in our view, a criminal prosecution for offences punishable with fine can be launched and proceeded with against the Central Government itself, it cannot but, a fortiorari, be initiated and proceeded against a Central Government company like the accused before us. ( 8 ) THE argument advanced on behalf of the two other accused, being the Construction Superintendent and the Executive Engineer, is the usual one which is very often urged whenever officers of a company are sought to be prosecuted along with the company for an offence alleged to have been committed by the company. Section 25 of the Act contains provisions analogous to those in almost all penal statutes where some person, other than the company, howsoever designated, is sought to be prosecuted along with the company and Section 25 (1) accordingly provides that in addition to the company, "every person in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business" shall be, deemed to be guilty of the offence. ( 9 ) IT has got to be accepted as the settled law, as a result of a long catena of decisions of the Supreme Court as well as the High Courts, that in a case like this, where Court can and does take cognizance of the case on the complaint alone without examining the complaint because of clause (a) to the Proviso to Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the complaint must spell out that the persons, other than the company, who have also been sought to be proceeded against were in charge of and responsible to the company, for otherwise the prosecution against such persons will be liable to be quashed. In the civil jurisdiction also, if, even after accepting allegations made in the plaint true mood et forma, no cause of action is disclosed, the plaint is liable to be rejected under the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and there cannot be any good reason for not applying the same principle to criminal complaints also, notwithstanding that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not contain any such express provision. ( 10 ) RELIANCE has been placed on behalf of the accused officers on the decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Ram Kishan Rhotagi (AIR 1983 SC, 67), where some of the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court have been relied on. We accept the propositions laid down therein, as we must and we are inclined to hold that on a proper reading of that decision and also on a meaningful reading of the complaint, we should decline to interfere at this stage. ( 11 ) THE approach of a criminal court at the trial is different from its approach at the earlier stages of, say, framing charge or taking cognizance. If at the trial, two views, are possible, one in favour and the other against the accused, the former must prevail, for in that case, the guilt cannot be said to have been proved beyond all reasonable doubt. But at earlier stages of taking cognizance or framing of charge, if two views are possible, one in favour of taking cognizance or framing of charge and the other against such a course, then, wherever reasonably possible, cognizance should be taken or, as the case may be, charge should be framed, leaving it to the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt at the trial, the reason being that the society is no less interested in the prosecution of offenders than in ensuring that no innocent is punished. At the earlier stages, the criminal court need not look for sufficient materials for conviction, but only for sufficient grounds to proceed with the trial. At the earlier stages, the criminal court need not look for sufficient materials for conviction, but only for sufficient grounds to proceed with the trial. ( 12 ) WITH that end in view, a complaint must be read meaningfully and Court must be ready to import a little bit common sense in such document, knowing, as it does, that a criminal complaint cannot be expected to be drafted with the exactitude of a civil plaint and a complainant, very often a lay person, is not expected to have a legal adviser constantly at his elbow. Be it noted that in Ram Kishan Rhotagi (supra, at 70-71) also the Supreme Court was ready to presume that a Manager was in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business and to infer that such Manager was vicariously liable, though it declined to do so in the case of a Director, and overturned the order of the High Court quashing the prosecution against the Manager. The complaint in the case before us obviously proceeded on the basis that the two accused, the Construction Superintendent and the Executive Engineer, were in charge of the Construction business and were responsible to the company for such business. The offices they hold also would reasonably lead to such inference. That allegation being thus clearly, even though not expressly, discernible, we would be putting too much premium on the formalities if we bang a complaint and quash a prosecution on the ground that the complaint was not articulated with desirable precision. If at the trial, it is not proved that the two officers were in charge of and responsible to the company for the construction business, in respect of which the present prosecution has been launched, the prosecution shall fail against them. But we have not been able to pursuade ourselves to agree to quash the prosecution or to otherwise interfere therewith on such hypothesis or in such anticipation. ( 13 ) IT has also been urged that these two accused Officers are Public Servants within the meaning of Section 21 of the Penal Code and as such they cannot be prosecuted without the requisite sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 13 ) IT has also been urged that these two accused Officers are Public Servants within the meaning of Section 21 of the Penal Code and as such they cannot be prosecuted without the requisite sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But granting that they are so, the present prosecution against them cannot be held to be not maintainable unless there are materials to show that they are "not removable from office save by or with the sanction of the Government", as required under the provisions of the said Section. As at present, there is nothing on record to that effect and the learned Counsel has accordingly submitted that he cannot press this point at this stage. This obviously would not, as it cannot, prevent the accused from urging this point at any later stage if the materials then on record indicate that they are such officers. ( 14 ) WE accordingly dismiss the revision. Let the records go down at once to the court concerned to proceed with the case as expeditiously as possible. A. K. Nandi, J. , I agree. Criminal revision dismissed.