HANUMANTHAPPA, J. ( 1 ) ON the application tiled by the utsavamba educational institution, anaji, taluka davanagcrc, the authorities had accorded permission to start a primary school at yeralakallcin ihcir order dalcd 24-7-1987. Because of somepractical difficulties, the said ulsavamba educational institution society requested the pelilioncr-socicly to lake over ihc institution torun a primary school al yeralakattc, which in fact the petitioner did. Subscqucnlly, ihc petitioner society filedan application before the authorities concerned i. e. before the deputy director of public instruction, on the basis that there was. no necessity for it to file such an application before the zilla parishad, requesting that the primary school which was taken over from the ulsavamba educational institutional society, bepermitted to shift to the doddasid davanahalli,chitradurga taluka. When this application waspending, the case of the petitioner is, the fourth respondent also made an application requesting the authority concerned that he be permitted tostart a school al dodda siddavanahalli. As on the dale of the fourth respondent's application, the concerned local authorities like the assistant educalional officer, had recommended the petitioner's request to shift the primary school from ycralakatlc to dodda siddavanahalli, on the ground that the petitioner-institution has all the requisite qualifications including the need to have one more school at dodda siadavanahalli,etc. Without considering his request, the authorities have permitted the fourth respondent to start the school at dodda siddavanahalli. This is the order under challenge by the petitioner,on the ground thai the authorities were not rightin straightaway according permission lo the fourth respondent to start a school at dodda siddavanahalli without considering the petitioner'srequcsl to slart the school al the same place; that the authorities were not right in nol notifying the petitioner; and on the basis of ihc report submitted, ihc authorities were duty bound to consider the petitioner's request dispassionately, namely, even in a case where decision had to belakcn as of an administrative in nature, an obligationis cast on such authorities to complete the procedure lo be adoplcd as one of judicial approach. Lastly, he contended lhat the according of permission to the fourth respondent ignoring the case of the petitioner, is a clear case of misusing powers. Lastly, he contended lhat the according of permission to the fourth respondent ignoring the case of the petitioner, is a clear case of misusing powers. In support of these contentions, sriumesh r. Mali math, learned counsel for the petitioner, relies upon three decisions, namely, (1) ILR 1985 (1) Karnataka 80 Bapuji Educational Association v State, to draw sustenance to his contention that as far as the starting of institutions is concerned, the right conferred on them is of a fundamental in nature as enshrined in articles 16 and 19 (1) (g) of the constitution, and any deviation affects its right; (2) 1983 (1) KLJ 337 deccan Model Education Society v State Of Karnataka and another, in support of his contention that there was already a school in the same area is totally irrelevant, where the institution is a minority educational institution and that cannot be a ground for recognition. Lastly, the decision Sri umesh malimath relied upon is one decided by the Supreme Court in the case of K. M. Neelima Misra v Dr. Harinder Kaur paintal and others, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1402 (august part), to demonstrate that even the Administrative Action, when are of quasi-judicial in nature, contemplates that there shall be 'fairness'. The observations made in the said decision, which the learned counsel relied upon, read thus:"19. We find it difficult to accept the reasoning underlying the aforesaid view. Before we consider the correctness of the proposition laid down by the high court we must, at the expense of some space, analyse the distinctions between quasi-judicial and administrative functions. An administrative function is called quasi-judicial when there is an obligation to adopt the judicial approach and to comply with the basic requirements of justice. Where there is no such obligation, the decision is called 'purely administrative' and there is no third category. This is what was meant by lord reid in Ridge v Baldwin, (1963)2 all. Er 66, 75-76:"in cases of the kind with which I have been dealing the board of works. . . Was dealing with a single isolated case. It was not deciding, tike a judge in a law suit, what were the rights of the persons before it. But it was deciding how he should be treated something analogous to a judge's duty in imposing a penalty. . . . . . Was dealing with a single isolated case. It was not deciding, tike a judge in a law suit, what were the rights of the persons before it. But it was deciding how he should be treated something analogous to a judge's duty in imposing a penalty. . . . So it was easy to say that such a body is performing a quasi-judicial task in considering and deciding such a matter and to require it to observe the essentials of all proceedings of a judicial character the principles of natural justice. Sometimes the functions of a minister of department may also be of that character and then the rules of natural Justice can apply in much the same way. . . "20. Subba rao, j. , as he then was, speaking for this court in G. Nageshwara Rao v Andhra Pradesh State Transport Corporation, (1959)1 scr 319: ( AIR 1959 SC 308 ) put it on a different emphasis (at p. 353) (of scr) : (at p. 326 of air): "the concept of a quasi-judicial act implies that the act is not wholly judicial, it describes only a duty cast on the executive body or authority to conform to norms of judicial procedure in performing some acts in exercise of its executive power. . . "21. Prof. Wade says "a judicial decision is made according to law. An administrative decision is made according to administrative policy. A quasi-judicial function is an administrative function which the law requires to be exercised in some respects as if it were judicial. A quasi-judicial decision is, therefore, an administrative decision which is subject to some measure of judicial procedure, such as the principles of natural justice". (administrative law by h. w. r. wade, 6th ed. Pp. 46-47 ). 22. An administrative order which involves civil consequences must be made consistently with the Rule expressed in the latin maxim audi alterant partem. and means that the decision maker should afford to any party to a dispute an opportunity to present his case. A large number of authorities are on this point and we will not travel over the field of authorities. What is now not in dispute is that the person concerned must be informed of the case against him and the evidence in support thereof and must be given a fair opportunity to meet the case before an adverse decision is taken. What is now not in dispute is that the person concerned must be informed of the case against him and the evidence in support thereof and must be given a fair opportunity to meet the case before an adverse decision is taken. Ridge v Baldwin, (1963 (2) all. Er 66) (supra); State Of Orissa v Dr. Binapani Dei, (1967) 2 scr 625 : ( AIR 1967 SC 1269 ). " ( 2 ) SRI n. b. n. swamy, learned government pleader argued in answer to the contentions raised by Sri malimath, that none of the contentions has, any merit. According to him (1) the petitioner has not shown any illegality or irregularity committed by the authority in according sanction to the fourth respondent to start its school at doddasiddavanahalli; (2) merely because the petitioner had submitted an application seeking transfer of the institution from yeralakatte to doddasiddavanahalli, that itself does not confer any right; and (3) on the ground of locus standi the petition is not maintainable. ( 3 ) AFTER hearing both sides and also going through the decisions which Sri malimath, learned counsel for the petitioner, relied upon, I am of the view that it is not a case where the relief sought for by the petitioner could be considered, for the following reasons. (1) according to the petitioner, the institution which it desired to be transferred from yeralakatte to dodda siddavanahalli, was not granted to it on its application originally, but it was granted to one utsavamba education society from whom it acquired by virtue of transfer. (2) it is not shown the right which it can have in challenging an order of permission granted in favour of the fourth respondent. Time and again this court and the Supreme Court have held that the decisions in matters relating to according permission to start schools or colleges, to transfer the headquarters of local authorities or hospitals, etc. , are the policy decisions or the decisions exclusively left to the discretion of authorities concerned. Such decisions are not amenable to challenge unless it is shown that such decisions have adversely affected one's personal rights. In the instant case, no doubt, the petitioner has made an application on 30-7-1989 requesting the authorities concerned to permit it to transfer the institution from yeralakatte to dodda siddavanahalli. Such decisions are not amenable to challenge unless it is shown that such decisions have adversely affected one's personal rights. In the instant case, no doubt, the petitioner has made an application on 30-7-1989 requesting the authorities concerned to permit it to transfer the institution from yeralakatte to dodda siddavanahalli. Merely because the petitioner institution is a minority institution, as contended by the petitioner, since it is started by the S. C. and s. t. association, which position has been disputed by Sri n. b. n. swamy, learned government pleader, the petitioner has not shown any locus standi to transfer the institution. No doubt, articles 29 (2) and 30 of the Constitution of India will help those who would like to start institution or if already started, provided when there is refusal at its threshold or when sanctioning authorities desired to impose all such type of restrictions to comply with; that is, indirectly to nullify what accorded earlier. At the same time, it shall be borne in mind that the according of sanction to start schools is with an intention to see the education is spread at all places, preferably rural side of the country. But it is not the intention of either the authorities or the state to see such education is monopolized by a particular individual or institution. In the instant case, petitioner-society which acquired an institution at yeralakatte from the utsavamba educational society, attempted to shift their institution to doddasiddavanahalli on the ground that the students are not adequate in number. If really interested in imparting education, it would not have ventured with an application to the authorities for a permission to shift the school from yeralakatte to doddasiddavanahalli. From the conduct of the petitioner, it shows that it is very much interested in not imparting education but for other reasons, which can very well be inferred. ( 4 ) IT is not a case of the petitioner that the fourth respondcnt-institulion/society has no equipment and experience; and also it is not its case that there is no necessity to start a school at doddasiddavanahalli. From the report which the petitioner relied upon (anncxurc-c), it discloses that there is need to have one more school at doddasiddavanahalli. Hence, the authorities were right in according permission to the fourth respondent to start the institution, which he has started. From the report which the petitioner relied upon (anncxurc-c), it discloses that there is need to have one more school at doddasiddavanahalli. Hence, the authorities were right in according permission to the fourth respondent to start the institution, which he has started. For the above reasons, I am of the view that neither the first decision nor the second decision, which Sri umesh malimath relied upon, in any way, is helpful to him. ( 5 ) AS far as the third decisionjs concerned, the Supreme Court has explained about the scope of administrative order and of late introducing an element of 'fairness' in all the administrative orders. There cannot be any dispute regarding the principles so laid down therein. But Mr. umesh malimalh has forgotten to look at the observations made by their lordships in para-23, which explains as to when and under what circumstances the said principles can be attracted or the courts be requested to decide whether such principles have been complied with or not. The relevant portion in para-23 in the aforesaid decision reported in AIR 1990 sc1402 reads thus:"23. The shift now is to a broader notion of 'fairness' or "fair procedure" in the Administrative Action. The administrative officers arc concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly. . . . For this concept of fairness, adjudicative setting are not necessary, nor it is necessary to have lites inter parties. There need not be any struggle between two opposing parties giving rise to a 'lis'. There need not be resolution of lis inter parties. The duty to act judicially or to act fairly may arise in widely different circumstances. It may arise expressly or imptiedly depending upon the. context and considerations. Ah these types of non-adjudfcative administrative decision making arc now covered under the general rubric of fairness in the administration. But when even such an administrative decision unless it affects one's personal rights or one's property rights, or the loss of or prejudicially affects something which would juridically be called at least a privilege docs not involve the duty to act fairly consistent with the rules of natural justice. We cannot discover any principle contrary to this concept. "in my view, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in AIR 1990 sc1402, in all fours apply to the instant case. We cannot discover any principle contrary to this concept. "in my view, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in AIR 1990 sc1402, in all fours apply to the instant case. Thus, according to me, the third decision which Sri umcsh malimath relied upon, goes against the contentions which he has raised. In addition to this, compliance of another mandatory requirement has not been shown as has been discharged by the petitioner, namely, under Section 182 of the Karnataka zilla parishads, taluk panchayat samithis, mandal panchayats and nyaya panchayats Act, 1983, it is the duty of the zilla parishad to start educational institutions in its area. Section 182 of the act readsethus:"182. Functions of zilla parishads.- (1) subject lo such exceptions, reslriclions and condilions as may from lime lo lime be specified by order by ihc government, it shall be the duty of every zilla parishad to make reasonable provision for the following matters within the area under its jurisdiction. I. To x. Xi. Education and social education.- (a) implementation with the collaboration of mandal panchayat schemes of adult literacy undertaken by other bodies. (b) survey and evaluation of Education Activities. (c) assisting, encouraging and guiding of educational activities in the district including the establishment and maintenance of primary and secondary school in the district. (d) xxx xxx (c) xxx xxx (0 xxx xxx. . . . . . . . . . . . . . "a reading of Section 182 (xi) makes it clear that whoever desires to start primary and/or secondary schools shall make an application and obtain sanction. Of course such sanction would be subject to such exceptions, reslriclions and condilions as may from time to lime be specified by the government. Here one has to sec that under the aforesaid Act, no rules have been framed which govern the sanction of schools or their refusal. In case of primary schools grant-in-aid for primary schools and also in the case of higher secondary schools grant-maid for higher secondary schools will apply, government made orders time and again fixing the norms and guidelines to start institutions including the eligibility for grant from the government. All those government orders have been codified. In case of primary schools grant-in-aid for primary schools and also in the case of higher secondary schools grant-maid for higher secondary schools will apply, government made orders time and again fixing the norms and guidelines to start institutions including the eligibility for grant from the government. All those government orders have been codified. As long as they are not replaced, it shall be presumed that any sanction to be made by the zilla parishad -shall be in conformity with the orders made by ihc government in the grath in code. In inconstant case, Sri umcsh malimalh did not produce any material to show lhat he had made any request to the zilla parishad lo transfer the primary school from ycralakatlc to doddasiddavanahalli. On the other hand, it is not his case thai the fourth respondent did nol make any application to the zilla parishad seeking sanction or permission to start a primary school at doddasiddavanahalli. In view of this non-compliance of this mandatory requirement, the petition has to be dismissed on this ground also. ( 6 ) HENCE, in my view the petitioner has not made out a case for issuing a writ against the authorities to consider his request to transfer his inslilulion from ycralakalte to doddasiddavanahalli, which two places arc siluatc at two different laluk hcad-quarlcrs of the district. ( 7 ) WITH these observations, the writ petition is dismissed as no merits. No order as to costs. However, Sri umesh malimath submitted lhat in view of the report submitted (Annexure-C) and in view of the need to start a school at doddasiddavanahalii where two different languages-kan nada and telugu are spoken; and that major population of that village and its surroundings speak telugu; that there are workers who come from outside the Karnataka state - tamil nadu and andra pradesh, working in ingaladalu copper mines, which is at two kilometers from doddasiddavanahalii and are slaying round about the said mines including the village doddasiddavanahalii, his institution be permitted to start a primary and higher secondary school both in kannada and enghsh. in any neighbouring village like ingaladalu. If such an application is made by the petitioner-institution, it is opcn to the concerned authority including the zilla parishad to consider it favourably. in any neighbouring village like ingaladalu. If such an application is made by the petitioner-institution, it is opcn to the concerned authority including the zilla parishad to consider it favourably. ( 8 ) SRI N. B. N. Swamy, learned government pleader, is permitted to file his memo of appearance on behalf of the stale-respondents in four weeks. Writ petition dismissed. --- *** --- .