JUDGMENT : M.P.Singh, J. 1. Does the U. P. Act no. 13 of 1972 completely overlook the interest of the landlords ? No. This Act is a piece of social legislation aimed at easing the problems of tenants, protecting them from eviction by the greedy landlords, but at the same time it also protects the interest of the landlords for getting the accommodation released, of course, on proof of bona fide need and greater hardship. 2. The petitioners are the tenants of a shop situated at Bag Muzaffar kha, Agra. Opposite party no. 3, Jagdish Prasad Agarwal purchased bungalow no. 9/26, Bag Muzaffarkha in the year 1959 from one Loomba. The shop in dispute is situate just adjacent to the main gate of the bungalow and is a part of the said building. It is in the form of a garrage. The main building is being used for residential purposes by the landlord. 3. The said shop was taken on rent by one Chaturbhuj Jain from the erstwhile owner in the year 1954. He died leaving behind Shreepal Jain, his only son. 4. Opposite party no. 3 filed an application for release under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act. no. 13 of 1972 (herein-after referred to as the Act) against Shreepal Jain in the year 1979. Shreepal Jain died on 11-1-1983. The petitioners were substituted as his heirs. Petitioner no 1 is his widow while petitioner nos. 2 and 3 are his sons. 7 The case set up by the landlord in his release application (case no. 1 of 1979) was that he had four sons; 1. Shiv Narain Agarwal, a practising Advocate, 2. Umakant Agrawal, practising Advocate on taxation side, 3. Virendra Agrawal, charted accountant and 4. Surendra Agrawal, who was also highly qualified. He has a degree of M.B.A. from Ahmedabad. He wanted to start his engineering industry at Agra. 5. Opposite party no. 3 himself is a senior practising lawyer on taxation side. He has got his chamber at Rawatpara consisting of one room (25 x 15 feet) along with two kotharies (6x8 feet). It is a rented accommodation on the first floor. The kotharies are without any ventilation and are being used for keeping files. He has become very old and is aged about 66 years now. He cannot climb up the stairs to reach his chamber easily. He is present in Court. It is a rented accommodation on the first floor. The kotharies are without any ventilation and are being used for keeping files. He has become very old and is aged about 66 years now. He cannot climb up the stairs to reach his chamber easily. He is present in Court. He cannot even walk properly without the help of sticks in his both hands. 6. He sits in his chamber at Rawatpara at fixed hours. Sometimes his clients as well as the clients of his sons, also come for consolation at his residence. They have no accommodation to meet the clients. One small room which, in fact, is the study room of the children, is often used for meeting the clients which disturbs the studies of his grand-children. Mainly the application was filed for the need of Umakant Agrawal and Virendra Kumar Agrawal, the two sons. Umakant Agrawal is a practising Advocate on taxation side and Virendra Kumar Agrawal is a chartered Accountant. At present both the sons are sitting alongwith the landlord in his chamber at Rawatpara. On account of their growing practice, these two sons require Separate chambers. The disputed shop will be converted into two chambers after making suitable alterations. 7. Shreepal Jain was the only son of the original tenant, Chaturbhuj Jain He was a practising lawyer on taxation side till his death. Anil Kumar Jain, his elder son, who is having a degree of M.Com. was assisting him in the practice. According to him a commerce graduate was entitled to practise without any degree of LLB and without being entrolled as an Advocate. Now he is a regular practitioner Ashok Kumar Jain the second son is also a law graduate and is a practising Advocate. 8. The business of Halwai was being carried on in the shop in dispute through the servants of the petitioners. The petitioners have got two similar accommodation in adjoining building no. 9/25 and 9/25/2, Bag Muzaffarkha. It consisted of two shops about 7.5 x 10 feet each, with a verandah of 17.4 x 6.2 feet. The area of the accommodation in dispute is only 14.5 x 9 feet and 8 feet height. The petitioners can shift their business to the other two shops in the adjoining building on the same road. The shop in dispute is being used only for storing goods. The opposite party no. The area of the accommodation in dispute is only 14.5 x 9 feet and 8 feet height. The petitioners can shift their business to the other two shops in the adjoining building on the same road. The shop in dispute is being used only for storing goods. The opposite party no. 3 further alleged the need to be genuine and bonafide. The petitioners contested the said application stating that the need of the landlord was not bona fide and genuine. The applicant and his sons are comfortably doing their taxation practice in a big chamber at Rawatpara. It is a very spacious and large accommodation. They do not need any additional accommodation for their chamber. They have sufficient accommodation for occasional visits by their clients. The need for the disputed accommodation has been created with a view to make out a case for release. The accommodation is not at all needed by him. 9. The prescribed authority allowed the release application holding that the need of the landlord was bonafide. After comparing the hardship it was held that in case the accommodation was not released, then greater hardship would be caused to the landlord. 10. The petitioners filed an appeal against the said order which too was dismissed on 12-2-1986. The present writ petition is directed against this order. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 11. After hearing at length and giving my anxious consideration, I come to the conclusion that the present writ petition has got no force and is liable to be dismissed for the reasons given below. 12. In this case, primarily two questions are to be taken into consideration. First, whether the need of the landlord is bona fide, and secondly, the question of comparative hardship. Learned counsel for the petitioners in support of his contention that the need of the landlord was not bona fide, has referred to the following circumstances : EFFECT OF EARLIER LITIGATIONS : When the premises was purchased by opposite party no. 3 on 9-2-1959, the petitioners' predecessor in interest was occupying the shop at the rate of Rs. 15/- per month. Receipts were issued for four to five months, thereafter, the landlord stopped issuing the same. 3 on 9-2-1959, the petitioners' predecessor in interest was occupying the shop at the rate of Rs. 15/- per month. Receipts were issued for four to five months, thereafter, the landlord stopped issuing the same. In 1960 he moved an application under Section 3 of U. P. Act 3 of 1947 for permission of the District Magistrate to file a suit in the civil court as he needed the said accommodation for keeping his car. The said application was rejected. Ultimately, the matter came to the High Court and the writ petition filed by the landlord was dismissed. 13. The position has been explained by the landlord stating that his need was held to be bona fide but the application was rejected on the ground of comparative hardship. Chaturbhuj Jain who was alive at that time was carrying on Halwai business in the said accommodation. 14. I am of the view that the bona fide of the present release application cannot be doubted on the ground that earlier application under Section 3 of U- P. Act 3 of 1947 was rejected. The need set up at that time was for keeping the car whereas the need set up today is for setting up of his two sons, Umakant Aandarwal and Virendra Agarwal in the practice. They wanted to have their separate chambers. The submission made by learned counsel for the petitioners is accordingly rejected. After death of Chaturbhuj Jain, the landlord filed a release application under rule. 6 of the Rules framed under U. P. Act no. 3 of 1947 alleging the existence of vacancy. In that case, the need of the landlord was that he required the accommodation for his son Umakant Agrawal, who did not want to study further and was interested in establishing business of general merchandise. The said application was rejected on 31st March, 1968. 15. IN my opinion rejection of the said application under Rule 6 will have no effect on the need set up in the present application in as much as the application under Rule 6 was rejected on the ground that there was no deemed vacancy after the death of Chaturbhuj Jain. Moreover, the need set up in the present application is entirely new and different. TRUTHFULNESS OF THE LANDLORD 16. Moreover, the need set up in the present application is entirely new and different. TRUTHFULNESS OF THE LANDLORD 16. IN his effort to make out a case that the application was not bonafide, learned counsel for the petitioners placed the statement of the landlord, who was examined on oath, and tried to convince the Court that he is not a truthful person, as such his statement and the affidavit filed on his behalf may not be believed. So far as this Court is concerned, while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is not sitting as a Court of appeal, but is exercising oily supervisory jurisdiction. Reference may be made to the decisions reported in 1978 SC 29, Muni Lai v. Prescribed Authority and 1975 SC 1297, Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibhai R. Tarte. Under this provision even the question of sufficiency and insufficiency of the evidence cannot be gone into by the High Court as has been held in 1964 SC 477 Saved Yaqoob v. K. S. Radha krishnan. Moreover the present release application has been filed after expiry of about 11 years on entirely changed circumstances and on new facts. The stand of the landlord and affidavit filed by him have been believed by both the authorities below. I find no justification to take a contrary view after re-appreciating the evidence. 17. In a case reported in 1979 (UP) RCC 590, Mahboob Ahmad,v. Mohammad Jan, while considering the similar question, the Court held that in case a fresh application was filed after six months of the rejection of the application under Section 3 of U. P. Act 3 of 1947 on different grounds, then the principle of res judicata will not apply. IN this case, the learned counsel for the petitioner has rightly not raised the question of res judicata but tried to impress upon the Court that this fact may be taken into consideration in holding that the action of the landlord was not bona fide. IN my opinion, there is nothing wrong on the part of the landlord in filing the present release application on entirely new and different grounds. Every person has a right to seek the legal remedies whenever a cause of action arises. RAWATPARA CHAMBER 18. IN my opinion, there is nothing wrong on the part of the landlord in filing the present release application on entirely new and different grounds. Every person has a right to seek the legal remedies whenever a cause of action arises. RAWATPARA CHAMBER 18. Referring to the chamber in possession of the landlord at Rawat para, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that it is a very big accommodation and can adjust 40-50 persons at a time. All the sons of the landlord can easily be accommodated there. There is no need of any additional or separate accommodation. Even if it is admitted that the applicant was guiding his sons when they started their practice it does not mean that they have no right to start their independent practice in a separate accommodation. Virendra Agrawal, who is a chartered accountant, carried on professional work on taxation side. He really needs a separate chamber where he can look into the confidential records of his clients. He van have professional discussion and maintain professional secrecy. The relationship of the client and his counsel is of great trust and confidence. On the taxation side the clients always try that their professional secrecy may not be divulged to anybody else. In support of this fact, the landlord has filed affidavits of some traders and industrialists to establish that they had to return on number of occasions for want of privacy. The opposite party no. 3 started his practice in the year 1946 and thus has put in about 46 years of practice. There is no dispute that there is only one big room at Rawatpara. The landlord and his sons, who have put in sufficient years of standing, they cannot be prevented from setting up their independent practice at a separate place. TWO SHOPS ALREADY IN POSSESSION OF THE TENANTS 19. There is no dispute that at present the petitioners are having two other accommodations (premises no. 9/25 and 9/25/2) on the same road adjacent to the accommodation in dispute. They are running sweetmeat shop in the name of 'Chaturbhuj Jain Sweets' in those shops. It is further not disputed a that Anil Kumar Jain, M.Com. is doing practice on taxation side and Ashok Kumar Jain, B ALL B. is also a practising Advocate on taxation side having his office at Fabbara in the city of Agra. They are running sweetmeat shop in the name of 'Chaturbhuj Jain Sweets' in those shops. It is further not disputed a that Anil Kumar Jain, M.Com. is doing practice on taxation side and Ashok Kumar Jain, B ALL B. is also a practising Advocate on taxation side having his office at Fabbara in the city of Agra. Even if they are interested to continue the Halwai business they have already an alternative accommodation adjacent 10 the present one and their need would not be affected in any way if the accommodation in dispute is released. SANJAY PLACE ACCOMMODATION 20. During the pendency of the appeal, certain additional evidence were brought on record by the petitioners. It was stated that the landlord had acquired a plot at Sanjay Place in Jaipur Housing Colony. The case of the landlord was that he had not acquired any plot of office at Sanjay Place or any where else. His 4th son, Surendra Agrawal had initially entered into an agreement for getting a small room at Sanjay Place out of his own Funds but later on changed the idea. He preferred to have a big room. This room was acquired by Surendra Agrawal from his own funds in connection with his intended industry. Second point taken up by the petitioners was that the landlord was in possession of Block no. 25 (28-F) on the first floor at Sanjay Place for his office purposes. The petitioners also filed a photograph. In reply, it has been stated by the opposite party no. 3 that he has got nothing to do with this property. The appellate authority after discussing the evidence has recorded a finding that this fiat has not been in possession of the opposite party no. 3. The submission made by learned counsel for the petitioners on this point is not acceptable to me in as much as it has come on record that Surendra Agrawal has acquired this flat from his own earning in connection with his industry which he wanted to set up. Neither opposite party no. 3 nor his other sons, have got any right to occupy the said premises. LAND AT PANDAV NAGAR 21. SO far as the open piece of land in Pandav Nagar is concerned, it cannot be taken into consideration while disposing of the release application. Neither opposite party no. 3 nor his other sons, have got any right to occupy the said premises. LAND AT PANDAV NAGAR 21. SO far as the open piece of land in Pandav Nagar is concerned, it cannot be taken into consideration while disposing of the release application. The landlord cannot be compelled to raise construction on it to satisfy his need. It is only the built up portion available to the landlord which is relevant in such cases. Thus, the submission regarding land in Pandav Nagar is wholly irrelevant. BONAFIDE NEED 22. IN view of the above findings, now expression 'bona fide required' is to be examined. In 1984 (1) ARC 113 N. S. Dutta v. A. D. J., while considering the scope of this expression, it was held :- "The expression 'bonafide required' appearing in the context of Section 21 (1) (a) has received judicial interpretation in various pronouncements. The assessment has to be objective depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. The word 'required' it was pointed out in Mattu Lai v. Radhey Lal, AIR 1974 SC 1596 signifies that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough, but there should be an element of need and the landlord must show that he genuinely required non-residential accommodation for purposes of starting or continuing his own business." 23. In Jayant Kumar v. Prescribed Authority, 1979 (UP) RCC 132, it was held :- "It is, however, not necessary that the landlord must stand in absolute need of the property. The requirement of law is that the need of landlord must be honest and in good faith. It is not correct that a landlord cannot succeed unless he is found in an extreme need." 24. In Chandra Kumar Sah v. District Judge, AIR 1975 (Alld.) 302, while considering the expression 'genuinely or in good faith,' the Court held that it must convey an idea of absence of any intent to deceive. Word 'bonafide' means genuinely, sincerely i.e. in good faith in contradiction to malafide. Of course, in case the landlord sought to release for an ulterior purpose, the need not be bonafide. All the above judicial pronouncements are based on the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, reported in 1979 SC 272. 25. Of course, in case the landlord sought to release for an ulterior purpose, the need not be bonafide. All the above judicial pronouncements are based on the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, reported in 1979 SC 272. 25. Viewed in the light of the above discussion, I uphold the concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the authorities below that the need of the landlord was bona fide. COMPARATIVE HARDSHIP 26. Now I come to the question of comparative hardship, Petitioner no. 2 Anil Kumar Jain, M.Com. is a practising Advocate on taxation side and Ashok Kumar Jain petitioner no. 3 is also a practising Advocate. This Court has to examine what hardship would be caused to the petitioners in case of release of the disputed accommodation. Admittedly, the petitioners have two other shops on the same road in the adjoining building bearing number 9/25 and 9/25/2 measuring 7.5 x 10 feet each with a big varandah (17.4 x 6.2 feet) where they can shift their business. It is true that whenever a tenant is ousted from an accommodation some inconvenience is bound to be caused to him. In the instant case, if the premises is not released, then landlord's two sons, Umakant Agarwal and Virendra Agrawal, cannot set up their independent separate taxation practice, whereas in the case of release, the petitioners can shift their business to the adjoining two shops. Thus, the balance tilts in favour of the landlord. The finding on the point recorded by the authorities below needs no interference by this Court as it is based on sound reasons. 27. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the decision reported in 1985 (2) ARC 295, Gautam Chand Jain v. Smt. Sushila Kumar Jain. In that case, the landlady needed the shop for clinic by her son. It was found that she was having several other premises in the same city where she could start the. required clinic. The tenant was having only one i.e. The disputed shop in which he was carrying on business since 193y and bad also earned a goodwill. The facts in the present case are entirely different. Here the landlord has no other accommodation to set up his two sons in their practice. On the other hand, the tenants are having two other shops in the adjacent building. The facts in the present case are entirely different. Here the landlord has no other accommodation to set up his two sons in their practice. On the other hand, the tenants are having two other shops in the adjacent building. Accordingly, the case cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners is not relevant for the purpose of the present case. 28. The learned counsel for the petitioners has also referred to the decisions reported in 1981 (2) RCR 405, Hasmat Rai v. Raghunajh Prasad, 1988 (2) ARC 478, Narain Hari Saxena v. A. D. J., 1985 SC 207, Variety Emporium v. A. D. J., 1988 (2) ARC 496 H. L. Kapoor v. 4th A. D. J. 1980 ARC 497, Ashfaq Ahmad v. State, and 1984 ARC 166 Chetan Lai v. 5th A. D. J. I do not feel it worth discussing these cases because in my opinion the present case is completely covered by the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Bega Begum (supra) and Division Bench of this Court in the case of N. S. Dutta (supra) on the question of bonafide seed as well as comparative hardship. 29. After examining the record and hearing the learned counsel for the parties. I am of the view that the findings of fact recorded by both the authorities below on the question of bonafide need and comparative hardship, do not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record. 30. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. 45- However, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, petitioners are granted six months' time to vacate the premises in case they file an undertaking before the prescribed authority within one month from today that they will hand over the peaceful vacant possession to the landlord on or before 30-10-1990 and shall also pay the entire amount of rent due up to 30-10-1990 at the time of filing the undertaking. In case of default, the order of release will become enforcable forthwith. Petition dismissed.