JUDGMENT - MOHTA V.A., J.:—Since a common question of law arises in these six petitions, they have been grouped together by consent of parties for hearing and disposal and hence this common order. 2. The question is whether the petitioners—the civilian defence personnel—are the members of the Armed Forces of the Union as contemplated by section 27-A under the Maharashtra State Tax on Professions, Trades, Callings and Employments Act, 1975 (“Professional Tax Act” for short) and therefore, exempted from the liability to pay professional tax chargeable under section 3 of the Professional Tax Act. Section 27-A reads thus: “Nothing contained in section 3 and other provisions of this Act shall apply to— (a) the members of the armed forces of the Union, that is to say, to whom the provisions of the Army Act, 1950, the Air Force Act, 1950, or the Navy Act, 1957 apply serving in any part of the State; (b) x x x (c) x x x (d) x x x The term “members of the armed forces of the Union” is neither defined by the Professional Tax Act nor by the Army Act, the Air Force Act or the Navy Act. Article 33 of the Constitution of India uses that terminology, but without defining it. 3. Writ Petition No. 303 of 1988, Writ Petition No. 1909 of 1988, Writ Petition No. 2937 of 1988 and Writ Petition No. 1424 of 1989 are by employees in the establishment of the Garrison Engineer, Military Engineering Services, Pulgaon. Writ Petition No. 511 of 1988 is on behalf of the employees in the Air Force establishment at Nagpur and Writ Petition No. 616 of 1989 is by employees in the Brigade of the Guards Regimental Centre, Kamptee. The petitioners fall under different categories like clerks, Superintendent, meter reader, electrician, driver, PA, Stenographer, librarian, storekeeper, Education Instructor, gestetner operator, painter, carpenter, draftsman, switch board attendant, senior mechanic, Pipe Fitter, Mazdoor, cook, Watchman, Savenger etc. 4. It is a common ground that all these petitioners are non-combatant civilian defence personnel whose service conditions are governed by the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (“Central Civil Services Rules” for short). Many of them have Army/Air Force Code numbers. Their services are transferable anywhere in India and when called upon to do so they are obliged to render field service. 5. Many of them have Army/Air Force Code numbers. Their services are transferable anywhere in India and when called upon to do so they are obliged to render field service. 5. Section 2(1) of the Army Act/the Air Force Act gives the list of persons who shall be subject to those Acts, wherever they may be. Undisputed position is that the petitioners do not fall under sub-clauses (a) to (g) of the Army Act/sub-clauses (a) to (c) of the Air Force Act. Crux of the matter is whether they fall under sub-clause of the Army Act and the Air Force Act respectively which are the provisions in pari materia. Section 2(1)(i) of the Army Act reads thus: “2.(1) The following persons shall be subject to this Act, wherever they may be, namely: (a) x x x (b) x x x (c) x x x (d) x x x (e) x x x (f) x x x (g) x x x (i) persons not otherwise subject to military law who, on active service, in camp, on the march or at any frontier post specified by the Central Government by notification in this behalf, are employed by, or are in the service of, or are followers of, or accompany any portion of, the regular Army.” 6. It seems to us that the point is no more res integra being concluded by some decisions of the Supreme Court. In the case of (Ous Kutilingal Achudan Nair v. Union of India)1, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1179, question arose whether the right to form union of the Civilian defence personnel like cooks, chowkidars, laskars, barbers, carpenters, mechanics, boot-makers, tailors etc. (unenrolled non-cambatants governed by the Civil Service Rules) could be curtailed under section 21 of the Army Act. The employees had taken a stand-that they were not “members of the Armed Forces”, as contemplated under Article 33 of the Constitution and hence their right to form union could not be curtailed under section 21 of the Army Act. The Union of India through the Solicitor General of India took a contrary stand and upholding that stand it is observed : “In enacting the Army Act, 1950, in so far as it restricts or abrogates any of the fundamental rights of the members of the Armed Forces, Parliament derives its competence from Article 33 of the Constitution. The Union of India through the Solicitor General of India took a contrary stand and upholding that stand it is observed : “In enacting the Army Act, 1950, in so far as it restricts or abrogates any of the fundamental rights of the members of the Armed Forces, Parliament derives its competence from Article 33 of the Constitution. Section 2(1) of the Act enumerates the persons who are subject to the operation of this Act. According to sub-clause (i) of this section, persons governed by the Act, include persons not otherwise subject to military law who, on active service, in camp, on the march or at any frontier post specified by the Central Government by notification in this behalf, are employed by, or are in the service of, or are followers of, or accompany any portion of the regular army. The members of the Unions represented by the appellants obviously fall within this category. It is their duty to follow or accompany the Armed personnel on active service, or in camp or on the march. Although they are non-combatant and are in some matters governed by the Civil Service Regulations, yet they are integral to the Armed Forces. They answer the description of “members of the Armed Forces” within the contemplation of Article 33. Consequently by virtue of section 21 of the Army Act, the Central Government was competent by notification to make rules restricting or curtailing their fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(c).” 7. The above decision was followed in the case of (R.Viswan v. Union of India)2, 1983(3) S.C.C. 401 . That case related to the employees of the General Reserve Engineering Force who were governed by the Central Civil Services Rules. It was held that the said Force is an integral part of the Armed Forces and hence the employees answered the description of the term “members of the armed forces” within the meaning of Article 33. 8. The case of (Gopal Upadhyaya v. Union of India)3, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 413 related to the civilian employees like carpenters, tailors, boot-makers, gardeners, sweepers, cooks, messengers etc. in the Army Medical Corps, Lucknow. The registration of their Trade Union was cancelled on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ous Kutilingal Achudan Nair (supra). The said order of cancellation was challenged before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. in the Army Medical Corps, Lucknow. The registration of their Trade Union was cancelled on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ous Kutilingal Achudan Nair (supra). The said order of cancellation was challenged before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. The submission of the petitioners was that unless the members of the union are actually brought under section 2(1)(i) of the Army Act, they cannot be said to be the “members of the armed forces” and therefore cannot be held to be subject to the Army Act. Additional Solicitor General on behalf of Union of India opposed that submission of the employees and the stand taken by the Union of India was upheld by the Supreme Court which, inter alia, held that larger Bench decision in Ous Kutilingal Achudan Nair's case had concluded the point. Following observations are to the point : “Shri Gupta submits that unless the members of the Union are brought within the compass of section 2(1)(i), Army Act, it is not possible to hold them subject to the Army Act. Section 2(1)(i) refers to 'persons not otherwise subject to military law who, on active service, in camp, on the march or at any frontier post specified by the Central Government by notification in this behalf are employed by, or are in the service of, or are followers of, or accompany any portion of, the regular Army'. The question, therefore is whether these 'camp-followers' fall within section 2(1)(i) and are subject to the Army Act and the Rules made thereunder. Sri Gupta argues that they are not, unless they are 'on active service, in camp, on the march or any' frontier post specified by Central Government in this behalf'. On the other hand the learned Additional Solicitor General urges that in order to fall within section 2(1)(i), it is not necessary that the camp-followers should themselves be 'on active service, in camp, on the march or at any frontier post' but that it is enough if they can be required to follow or accompany armed personnel who are 'on active service, in camp, on the march or at any frontier post.' It is unnecessary for us to consider the merits of the submissions since the question is no longer res integra. It is concluded by the decision of a (near) Constitution Bench consisting of A.N. Ray, C.J. Beg, Sarkaria, Shinghal, JJ., in Ous Kutilingal Achudan Nair v. Union of India, 1976(2) S.C.R. 769 .” 9. On behalf of the respondent-State, it is contended that the ratio of Gopal Upadhyaya (supra) must be confined only to the “camp followers”. Now, it is pertinent to notice that the terminology “camp follower” is not defined and indeed is loosely used as a compendious description of the category of employees involved therein. It is difficult to see as to why the petitioners' case would stand on different footing. The list of camp followers is only illustrative and not exhaustive. It would include all those defence personnel (not otherwise subject to military law) who can be brought under Category (i) of section 2(1) of the Army Act. 10. We have already noticed the undisputed position before us that the petitioners who are civilian defence personnel are obliged to render field service if and when called upon to do so. In this connection, the provisions of the Defence Service (Field Services Liability) Rules, 1957, as amended from time to time are relevant. Avoiding field service by the civil defence personnel is a misconduct under the Rules. 11. Keeping all those factors in view, the expression “Armed Forces” has been liberally interpreted by the Supreme Court to include even non-combatants who are not otherwise subject to military law but who form part of the Armed Forces, their duty being to accompany the Armed Force on active service wherever called upon to do so. Section 2(1)(i) of the Army Act does not give exhaustive list of persons falling in that category. 12. Under the circumstances, we see no justification to confine the exemption clause contained in section 27-A of the Professional Tax Act only to the regular Army personnel who are governed by the Army Act in peace time or war time and not extend the same to civilian defence personnel who can be ordered to render field service and follow the Army in certain situations—mainly war time. 13. There is one more aspect to the controversy. After all, we are called upon to construe an exemption clause in a taxing statute which must receive liberal construction favouring a tax payer in case of doubt. 14. 13. There is one more aspect to the controversy. After all, we are called upon to construe an exemption clause in a taxing statute which must receive liberal construction favouring a tax payer in case of doubt. 14. To conclude, we declare that the petitioners fall under the exempted category contemplated under section 27-A of the Professional Tax Act and are not liable to pay the Professional Tax. We order that tax, if recovered, be refunded to the petitioners. Rules made absolute in the above terms with no order as to costs: 15. At the request of Shri Khamborkar, learned Assistant Government Pleader, the direction for refund of tax is suspended for a period of three months. Order accordingly. -----