Judgment :- Bhat, J. Respondent herein is a tenant occupying a shop room belonging to the revision petitioner. Revision petitioner originally filed RCP 33 of 1975 before the Rent Control Court, Kayamkulam seeking eviction of the tenant from the premises on the ground that the premises is needed for reconstruction under S.11(4)(iv) of the Kerala Act 2 of 1965. The case was transferred to the file of the Rent Control Court, Chengannur because of personal embarrassment of the Rent Controller, Kayamkulam. It was re-numbered as R.C.P. 15 of 1977. The Rent Controller dismissed the eviction petition. However, the appellate authority, in an appeal filed by the land-lord, reversed the decision and allowed eviction on the ground sought for. This order was confirmed by the District Court in revision and by this Court in a second revision, the order of this Court having been passed on 1-4-1980. This Court granted two month's time to the tenant to vacate the premises and directed the land-lord to reconstruct the building within one year from the date of surrender. This Court also held that the tenant has a first option to take a room on fair rent. The premises was surrendered on 2-6-1980. It was not reconstructed within the period of one year allowed by this Court. In January 1981, the tenant filed IA764 of 1981 before the Rent Controller, Kayamkulam under the two provisos to S.11(4) (iv) of the Act praying that penalty may be levied on the landlord for wilful failure to comply with the order of reconstruction and direct the landlord to pay to the tenant the excess rent which the tenant has been constrained to pay for an alternative premises taken by him on rent. The Rent Controller declined to impose the fine under the first proviso, but passed an order directing the land-lord to pay the excess rent which the tenant has been paying under the second proviso, and determined the excess rent as Rs. 210/- per month. The land-lord challenged this order before the appellate authority, who, however, dismissed the appeal. Hence this revision. 2. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner has urged before us only two contentions; firstly that the Rent controller, Kayamkulam has no jurisdiction to pass an order of the nature passed by him and secondly that the second proviso to S.11(4)(iv) of the Act is inapplicable to the facts of the case. 3. Hence this revision. 2. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner has urged before us only two contentions; firstly that the Rent controller, Kayamkulam has no jurisdiction to pass an order of the nature passed by him and secondly that the second proviso to S.11(4)(iv) of the Act is inapplicable to the facts of the case. 3. Admittedly the disputed premises is situate within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rent Controller, Kayamkulam. The eviction petition RCP 33 of 1975 was filed originally before the Rent Controller, Kayamkulam. It was subsequently transferred to the file of the Rent Controller, Chengannur and the case was re-numbered as RCP 15 of 1977. The Rent Controller originally dismissed the eviction petition, but that was allowed by the appellate authority and the order of the appellate authority was confirmed by the District Court in revision and the High Court in second revision. It is argued by learned counsel for the revision petitioner that since the eviction petition was initially disposed of by the Rent Controller, Chengannur, it is only that court which can pass an order under the two provisos and the Rent Controller, Kayamkulam has no jurisdiction. The first proviso to S.11(4)(iv) of the Act indicates that it is the Rent Control Court which is to impose fine and the reference in the second proviso is also to that court, namely, the Rent Control Court. Ordinarily this would mean that it is the Rent Control Court which has passed the eviction order is to pass the orders contemplated in the provisos. However, many a time it may not be the Rent Control Court which passes the eviction order, as in this case, and it may be the appellate authority or the revisional court which passes the order of eviction. Even in such cases the order contemplated under the provisos is to be passed by the Rent Control Court, at any rate initially. At first blush the contention of the revision petitioner that Rent Control Court, Chengannur having disposed of the eviction petition initially, that court itself must pass the orders contemplated under the provisos appears to be weighty; but it is seen that the land-lord did not raise this contention in his objection to IA 764/81. At first blush the contention of the revision petitioner that Rent Control Court, Chengannur having disposed of the eviction petition initially, that court itself must pass the orders contemplated under the provisos appears to be weighty; but it is seen that the land-lord did not raise this contention in his objection to IA 764/81. If the land-lord had raised such an objection, it would have been open to the tenant to withdraw the interlocutory application from the Kayamkulam Court and file it before the Chengannur Court. The tenant was deprived of that opportunity because of the failure of the land-lord to raise this objection at the earliest opportunity. Now more than three years have passed since the interlocutory application was filed. Further, it is not as if the Rent Control Court at Kayamkulam has no territorial jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute; as we have pointed out, it is only that Court which has territorial jurisdiction over the subject matter. In these circumstances, we cannot permit the revision petitioner to raise this objection at this belated stage. 4. The second contention is that the second proviso would apply only where after the passing of the eviction order the Rent Controller has issued a fresh direction and such fresh direction is violated by the land-lord and since in this case the Rent Control Court has not issued any direction after the passing of the eviction order, the operation of the second proviso cannot be attracted. 5. First and Second provisos to S.11(4)(iv) of the Act read thus: "Provided that the land-lord who evicts a tenant and does not reconstruct completely the building within a time which maybe fixed or extended by the Rent Control Court, shall on a petition before that Court be liable to a fine of rupees five hundred, if it is proved that he has wilfully neglected to reconstruct completely the building within such time. Provided further that the Court shall have power at any time to issue directions regarding the reconstruction of the building and on failure of compliance by the landlord, to give effect to the order in any manner the Court deems fit and in appropriate cases to put the tenant back in possession or award to the evicted tenant damages equal to the excess rent he has to pay for another building that he is occupying in consequence of such eviction. (emphasis supplied) 6. The first proviso deals with the power of the Rent Control Court to impose fine on the land-lord who evicts a tenant but does not reconstruct completely the building within the time which may be fixed by the Rent Control Court. The second proviso invests with the Court power "at any time" to "issue directions" regarding the reconstruction of the building and on failure of compliance by the land-lord to give effect to the order in any manner the Court deems fit and in appropriate cases to put the tenant back in possession or to award him damages equal to the excess rent that he has to pay in consequence of such eviction. According to the revision-petitioner, where the land-lord does not completely reconstruct the building within the time fixed or extended by the Rent Control Court he would be liable only to fine if he is guilty of wilful negligence and cannot be asked to pay damages to the tenant and damages can be awarded only where after the eviction order is passed the Court issues some further direction. The second proviso does not use the words 'at anytime after the eviction order 'and 'further direction'. The words used are the Court shall have power 'at any time' and the power invested is 'to issue directions". 7. It is necessary to understand the scheme of S.11 of the Act. Sub-section (2)(a) enables the land-lord to file an application for eviction on the ground that the tenant has kept the rent in arrears. It is clause (b) which con templates order being passed by the Rent Controller. Sub-section (3) enables the land-lord to apply for eviction on the ground that he bonafides need the building for his own occupation. Sub-section (3) does not specifically deal with order being passed by the Rent Control Court. So also various clauses in sub-section (4) contemplate eviction application being filed before the Rent Control Court on various grounds. Sub-section (4) does not deal with the Rent Control Court passing order of eviction on the petition. Similar is the position regarding subsections (7) and (8). The order to be passed by the Rent Control Court on application made under sub-sections (3), (4), (7) and (8) are dealt with in sub-section (10). Sub-section (4) does not deal with the Rent Control Court passing order of eviction on the petition. Similar is the position regarding subsections (7) and (8). The order to be passed by the Rent Control Court on application made under sub-sections (3), (4), (7) and (8) are dealt with in sub-section (10). Subsection (10) says that "The Rent control Court shall, if it is satisfied that the claim of the land-lord under sub-sections (3),(4), (7) and (8) is not bonafide, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the Rent Control Court, and if the Court is not so satisfied, it shall make an order rejecting the application". 8. Thus, ordinarily where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that the land-lord is entitled to an order of eviction, it passes an order of eviction, simplicitur. However in a case governed by S.11(4) (iv), the order may contain certain directions regarding the time for the landlord to reconstruct the building or other directions regarding reconstruction of the building. Even where the Rent Control Court omits to give a direction in the eviction order fixing time within which the landlord has to reconstruct the building, such a direction can be given in an order which may be passed subsequent to the eviction order. Even if the Rent Control Court does not in the original order of eviction, issue any direction regarding reconstruction, it shall be open to the court to issue such direction after passing the eviction order. The use of expression 'at any time' and 'issue directions' in the second proviso without any limitation regarding the time or the occasion for issuing directions, is a clear pointer to the Legislative intention that the directions could be issued either in the order of eviction or in any subsequent order to be passed. 9. The first proviso would obviously apply to all cases of eviction under S.11(4)(iv) of the Act and enable imposition of fine on landlord in appropriate cases. The purpose of fine is obviously punitive. It does not compensate the tenant for loss or damage caused on account of the latches of the landlord. Compensation is provided only in the second proviso. The first proviso would obviously apply to all cases of eviction under S.11(4)(iv) of the Act and enable imposition of fine on landlord in appropriate cases. The purpose of fine is obviously punitive. It does not compensate the tenant for loss or damage caused on account of the latches of the landlord. Compensation is provided only in the second proviso. To hold that the second proviso dealing with power of the Court to grant compensation to the tenant would apply only where the Rent Control Court has issued directions of some sort regarding reconstruction at a point of time subsequent to the passing of the eviction order would unnecessarily whittle down the efficacy and the purpose of the second proviso the wide amplitude of which is indicated by the expression 'at any time' used in the second proviso. We, therefore, reject the contention that second proviso could be invoked only where the direction issued regarding reconstruction is contained not in the original order of eviction but in an order passed subsequent to the order of eviction. The eviction order contains a direction regarding the time limit within which the building has to be constructed. Hence second proviso is attracted to the instant case. 10. It is not argued before us that even if the second proviso is applicable to the facts of the case, the statutory authorities committed any error in directing the landlord to pay damages to the tenant equal to the excess rent he has to pay for another building, namely, at the rate of Rs. 210/- per month. 11. We therefore decline to interfere and accordingly dismiss the revision petition.