JUDGMENT - S.W. PURANIK, J.:---The petitioner challenges the order of detention of one Abdul Jabbar Usman, passed by the 1st respondent on 18th July, 1990 under section 3(2) of the National Security Act. 2. Briefly stated the detenu Abdul Jabbar Usman was involved in an incident dated 21st May, 1990 in a running BEST Bus in a section of City of Bombay. In the said incident, the petitioner and his other five associates successfully decamped with a brief case containing cash from one of the passengers after showing an open razor and knife and also threatened the other passengers in the bus. There was chaos and terror in the bus. Shrieks of passengers were heard. Ultimately, when the bus was halted the detenu and his associates escaped in the crowd. Crime No. 311 of 1990 was registered against the detenu and his associates. After intensive search the detenu was arrested on 24th May, 1990 and was produced before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. After a few days of remand, the learned additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate ordered the release of the detenu on bail on 14th June, 1990. It is averred and not disputed that the detenu had not availed of the bail order from the date it was issued till 18th July, 1990 when the impugned order of detention came to be passed. In fact the detenu had not availed of the bail even upto 23rd July, 1990 when the impugned order of detention was served upon him while in custody. 3. In the grounds of detention it is further alleged that the Detaining Authority was aware of the fact that the detenu had not availed of the bail order yet he was satisfied that if released on bail sooner or later, he was likely to be indulged in prejudicial activities in future. It was also observed in the grounds that from the statement of the detenu recorded during the investigation he had confessed that he was a leader of a gang of pick-pockets and that it was under his instructions that the gang members operated this racket in the BEST Buses. In view of all this, the Detaining Authority came to the conclusion that it was necessary to detain the subject in order to prevent him from indulging in prejudicial activities in future. In view of all this, the Detaining Authority came to the conclusion that it was necessary to detain the subject in order to prevent him from indulging in prejudicial activities in future. The said order of detention and the Grounds of Detention are annexed to this petition as Exhibits `A' and `B' respectively. 4. It was contended initially by Shri L.R. Chari, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the detenu is a person conversant with Urdu language but the documents in respect of the grounds of detention which were supplied to him were not so translated in Urdu. However, during the course of arguments when Mrs. Desai, produced the original record, he was satisfied that in fact Urdu Translation of every document including that of the order and the grounds of detention in Urdu were tendered to the detenu at the time of service of the order of detention. Shri Chari, therefore, did not press that ground of challenge. 5. The only other ground raised and argued on behalf of the petitioner is that in the instant case admittedly the detenu had not availed of the bail even though the bail order was passed on 14th June, 1990. A long period of one month and a week thereafter, the order of detention came to be passed till which date the detenu had not availed of the bail order. Shri Chari, therefore, contended that a mere bald statement on the part of the Detaining Authority in the grounds of detention that, "However, you are likely to avail of the same shortly." would not be sufficient to reach the required subjective satisfaction of the necessity of detaining the petitioner. According to him, there should have been some subjective material before the Detaining Authority indicating compelling reasons on the part of the Detaining Authority to ensure that the proposed detenu does not indulge in prejudicial activities in future. In the absence of such compelling circumstances the subjective satisfaction is vitiated. 6. In support of this submission Shri Chari relied on (Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Elah)1, (1985)4 S.C.C. 232 , (Binod Singh v. District Magistrate)2, (1986)4 S.C.C. 416 and (Smt. Shashi Aggarwal v. State of U.P.)3, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 596 as also (Ashok Joshi v. The State of Maharashtra)4, 1983(1) Bom.C.R. 440 . 7. We have gone through these rulings. 6. In support of this submission Shri Chari relied on (Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Elah)1, (1985)4 S.C.C. 232 , (Binod Singh v. District Magistrate)2, (1986)4 S.C.C. 416 and (Smt. Shashi Aggarwal v. State of U.P.)3, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 596 as also (Ashok Joshi v. The State of Maharashtra)4, 1983(1) Bom.C.R. 440 . 7. We have gone through these rulings. The ratio in most of the cases seems to be that if the proposed detenu is arrested and is in jail custody and if there is no bail order passed in his favour then to make a bald statement in the grounds of detention that inspite of no bail having been applied for, the detenu was likely to be released on bail, may not be sufficient and ordinarily the order of detention should not be issued in such cases. 8. In the present case, the detenu had already applied for bail and as disclosed from the grounds of detention, the bail order was issued inspite of severe objection on the part of the investigating Officer. It was thus a matter of production of surety on the part of the detenu that he would have been released on bail on any date in future. 9. While supporting the above order of detention of the petitioner Smt. Desai, learned Public Prosecutor for the respondents Nos. 1 and 2, in reply, relied on the latest decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of (Sanjeev Kumar Aggarwal v. Union of India)5, A.I.R. 1990. S.C. 1202. The side judgment has discussed the entire case law in the situation where the order of detention has been issued while the detenu is already in custody. The cases relied upon by the petitioner in the present petition which have been referred above were all considered and finally Their Lordships have come to the conclusion that it is always a matter of particular set of facts and circumstances in which case the subjective satisfaction may be reached even if the subject of detention is already under custody. At the end of paragraph 11, Their Lordships have observed as follows : "It could thus be seen that no decision of this Court has gone to the extent of holding that no order of detention can validly be passed against a person in custody under any circumstances. At the end of paragraph 11, Their Lordships have observed as follows : "It could thus be seen that no decision of this Court has gone to the extent of holding that no order of detention can validly be passed against a person in custody under any circumstances. Therefore the facts and circumstances of each case have to be taken into consideration in the context of considering the order of detention passed in the case of a detenu who is already in jail. We have already, in the instant case, referred to the grounds and the various circumstances noted by the Detaining Authority and we are satisfied that the detention order cannot be quashed on this ground". 10. In coming to this conclusion the Supreme Court has relied on its earlier decision in (Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdwan)6, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 334. The said ruling as affirmed in (Shri Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India)7, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1196. The following extract from Chelawat's case may be reproduced here : "The decision referred to above led to the conclusion that an order for detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that (i) the Detaining Authority was aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention; and (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu is already in `detention. The expression "compelling reasons" in the context of making an order for detention of a person already in custody implies that there must be cogent material before the Detaining Authority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to be released from custody in the near future and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities". 11. 11. Considering this decision of the Supreme Court now and the affidavit in reply filed by the Detaining Authority, we are satisfied that there were incidents of similar nature of organised pick-pocketing in public buses in the city and there is also the admission of the detenu that he himself was leader of such a gang. Lastly, the fact that bail order was already issued by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in favour of the detenu, shows that the Detaining Authority was justified in coming to the subjective satisfaction that the detenu was likely to indulge in prejudicial activity if and when released on bail and that, therefore, it was necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from indulging in prejudicial activities. 12. In the facts and circumstances of this case, therefore, we are satisfied that the order of detention is just and proper and needs no interference. The writ petition is dismissed and rule discharged. Petition dismissed. ------