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1990 DIGILAW 491 (BOM)

State of Maharashtra & another v. Chandrakant Vasudeo Somshetty since deceased by his heirs Shantabai & others

1990-12-07

M.L.PENDSE, V.P.TIPNIS

body1990
JUDGMENT - PENDSE M.L., J.:---This petition filed by the State of Maharashtra under Article 227 of the Constitution and the group of companion writ petitions filed by the State Government and various claimants are directed against judgment dated July 6, 1982 delivered by Assistant Judge, Solapur, in proceedings commenced under Chapter VI of the Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, 1961, for acquisition of large tracts of land admeasuring 540 acres, 26 gunthas and 34 annas situate adjoining the boundary of Solapur Municipal Corporation and within the compass of Solapur revenue village. The Maharashtra Legislature passed the Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, 1961, being Maharashtra Act No. III of 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') to make special provision for securing the orderly establishment in industrial areas and industrial estates of industries in the State of Maharashtra, and to assist generally in the organisation thereof, and for that purpose to establish an Industrial Development Corporation. The Act came into force on March 1, 1962 but Chapter VI can come into operation only from such date as the State Government notifies in the Official Gazette. Section 3 provides for establishment of Corporation by the name of Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation for the purpose of securing and assisting in the rapid and orderly establishment and organisation of industries in industrial areas in the State of Maharashtra. Chapter VI deals with the subject of acquisition and disposal of land. Section 32 inter alia provides that if at any time the State Government is satisfied that any land is required for the purpose of development by the Corporation, then the State Government may acquire such land by publishing in the Official Gazette a notice specifying the particular purpose for which such land is required and stating that the Government has decided to acquire the land. The section demands that before publishing a notice, the State Government shall by another notice call upon the owner of the land or any other person who is interested therein, to show cause why the land should not be acquired. After considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of the land, the State Government is authorised to pass appropriate orders. Sub-section (4) of section 32 provides the land shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances when notice under sub-section (1) is published in the Official Gazette. After considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of the land, the State Government is authorised to pass appropriate orders. Sub-section (4) of section 32 provides the land shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances when notice under sub-section (1) is published in the Official Gazette. Section 33 deals with the liability of the State Government to pay compensation for acquisition of the land. The section inter alia provides that amount of compensation can be determined by agreement between the State Government and the person to be compensated. In case the agreement cannot be reached, then the State Government shall refer the case to the Collector for determination of the amount of compensation to be paid for such acquisition and the person or persons to whom such compensation shall be paid. Sub-section (5) of section 33 provides that in determining the amount of compensation, the Collector shall be guided by the provisions contained in sections 23 and 24 and other relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It further prescribes that the date of publication of notice under sub-section (2) of section 32 shall be treated as the date of publication of the notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act while the notice under sub-section (1) of section 32 shall be considered as publication of declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. 2. Initially, section 34 of the Act read as under :- "34(1). Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Collector determining the amount of compensation may, within sixty days from the date of such decision, insofar as it affects him, appeal if the land acquired is situate in Greater Bombay to the City Civil Court, and elsewhere to the District Court (hereafter in this chapter referred to as the Court). (2) The decision of the Court on such appeal, and subject only to such decision, the decision of the Collector determining the amount of the compensation, shall be final." The Maharashtra Legislature passed the Maharashtra Industrial Development (Amendment) Act, 1974, and the Act received the assent of the President on June 17, 1975. (2) The decision of the Court on such appeal, and subject only to such decision, the decision of the Collector determining the amount of the compensation, shall be final." The Maharashtra Legislature passed the Maharashtra Industrial Development (Amendment) Act, 1974, and the Act received the assent of the President on June 17, 1975. Sub-section (1) of section 34 was substituted and it now reads as under :- "Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Collector determining the amount of compensation may, within sixty days from the date of such decision, insofar as it affects him, by written application to the Collector require that the matter be referred by him for determination of the Court as defined in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in its application to the State of Maharashtra, and when any such application is made the provisions of Part III of the said Act shall mutatis mutandis apply to further proceedings in respect thereof. (2) The decision of the Court on such reference, and subject only to such decision, the decision of the Collector determining the amount of the compensation, shall be final." The Statement of Objects and Reasons sets out that sub-section (1) of section 34 was substituted to bring the provisions of the Act on par with the corresponding provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 3. The Government of Maharashtra, Industries and Labour Department under notification dated September 6, 1969 prescribed September 18, 1969 as the date from which chapter VI of the Act shall take effect in the area declared in the notification and situate in village Solapur, Tahsil north Solapur, District Solapur. The area covered by this notification admeasures 540 acres, 26 gunthas and 34 annas. On April 2, 1970, the Government of Maharashtra published notice under sub-section (2) of section 32 and called upon the owners of these lands to show cause why the lands should not be acquired for the purpose of development by the Corporation. After considering the cause shown by the owners of the lands, the State Government decided to acquire the lands by publishing in the Official Gazette a notice specifying the purpose and stating that the State Government has decided to acquire the lands in pursuance of sub-section (1) of section 32. In accordance with sub-section (4) of section 32, the lands vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances on October 15, 1971. In accordance with sub-section (4) of section 32, the lands vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances on October 15, 1971. In exercise of powers under sub-section (5) of section 32, the State Government recovered possession of these lands on December 25, 1971. A joint meeting of the land owners, representative of the Corporation and the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Solapur, was held on February 11, 1971 for the purpose of determination of valuation of acquired lands by agreement as contemplated under section 33 of the Act. The Corporation initially offered the rate of Rs. 3,000/- but increased the same to Rs. 4,000/- per acre while the owners demanded compensation at the rate of Rs. 80,000/- per acre and, ultimately, came down to the rate of Rs. 50,000/- per acre. As an agreement could not be reached, the Government decided to refer the issue of determination of amount of compensation to the Collector and by notification dated January 14, 1972, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Solapur, was appointed to perform the functions of the Collector under section 33 of the Act. The Special Land Acquisition Officer declared his award on March 31, 1973 holding that the lands acquired are jirayat lands but are adjacent to the Corporation limits of Solapur Municipal Corporation and the adjoining area being in the process of development has building potentialities. The Land Acquisition Officer noted that a spinning mill, a huge weaving mill, Solapur College, Polytechnic, Vikoprocess and handloom factories are just near the acquired lands. The Land Acquisition Officer held that though the lands are used for agricultural operation and are not converted for non-agricultural use, still the lands have got building potentiality. The Land Acquisition Officer concluded that compensation should be awarded at a flat rate of Rs. 2,474/- per acre to various land owners. The Land Acquisition Officer also directed payment in respect of trees, wells and some structures standing on the acquired lands. 4. In accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 34 of the Act, the claimants approached District Court, Solapur, for enhancement of compensation offered by the Land Acquisition Officer. The District Judge, Solapur, ignoring the amendment to section 34 of the Act, proceeded to dispose of the reference as it was only an appeal against the order of the Special Land Acquisition Officer. The District Judge, Solapur, ignoring the amendment to section 34 of the Act, proceeded to dispose of the reference as it was only an appeal against the order of the Special Land Acquisition Officer. Consequently, the District Judge did not permit the claimants to lead evidence to establish the market value of the lands on the date of notification under sub-section (2) of section 32 of the Act and which is equivalent to section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. The District Judge, on perusal of whatever material was relied upon by the Special Land Acquisition Officer and some documents produced by the claimants, came to the conclusion that the proper compensation would be Rs. 8,000/- for the lands situate in the interior and Rs. 10,000- for lands which have frontage on Akkalkot road and Kumbhari road. The decision of the District Judge was challenged both by the State Government and by the claimants by filing 45 petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution and those petitions were allowed by Division Bench by judgment dated July 27, 1981 and to which one of us (Pendse, J.) was a party. The Division Bench held that sub-section (1) of section 34 provides that the proceedings should be treated as a reference as contemplated under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and the provisions of Part III of the Land Acquisition Act are applicable to the reference made under sub-section (1) of section 34 to the District Court. The order passed by the District Judge was, therefore, set aside and the proceedings remitted back to the District Court with a direction that opportunity should be given to the parties to lead evidence and then the proceedings should be decided be treating as a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. On remand, the claimants led oral as well as documentary evidence and the Assistant Judge by the impugned judgment dated July 6, 1982 came to the conclusion that the proper compensation would be Rs. 15,000/- per acre in respect of the land and an additional amount of Rs. 500/- per acre in respect of lands bearing Survey Nos. 202, 190, 169, 199, 198 and 773. The Assistant Judge granted additional compensation to the owners of these lands on the ground that these lands have a frontage on Akkalkot road and Kumbhari road. 15,000/- per acre in respect of the land and an additional amount of Rs. 500/- per acre in respect of lands bearing Survey Nos. 202, 190, 169, 199, 198 and 773. The Assistant Judge granted additional compensation to the owners of these lands on the ground that these lands have a frontage on Akkalkot road and Kumbhari road. The Assistant Judge also increased the valuation of well and structure of one of the claimants. The decision of the Assistant Judge is under challenge in these petitions filed by the State of Maharashtra as well as the claimants. The claim of the State Government is that the compensation awarded is excessive and the rate is arrived at without any evidence whatsoever while, on the other hand, the claimants are asserting that the compensation should have been granted at a rate far higher than Rs. 15,000/- per acre. 5. The first question which falls for determination is whether the petitions filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to challenge the judgment of the Assistant Judge, Solapur, are maintainable. The issue arises because it is claimed that an appeal is permissible against the decision recorded by the District Court under sub-section (1) of section 34 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of section 34 confers right upon the claimant to seek reference to the Court as defined in the Land Acquisition Act and to such reference, the provisions of Part III of the Land Acquisition Act apply mutatis mutandis. Part III of the Land Acquisition Act deals with the subject of reference to Court and procedure thereon and sections 18 to 28-A are included in this part. Section 18 provides for reference to Court by any person who has not accepted the award made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. The expression "Court" is defined in section 3(d) and means a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. Section 7 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869 prescribes that the District Court shall be the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction in the district within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure. The expression "Court" is defined in section 3(d) and means a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. Section 7 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869 prescribes that the District Court shall be the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction in the district within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act deals with the form of awards to be passed by the Court on reference and provides that every award shall be in writing signed by the Judge and shall specify the amount awarded under Clause first of sub-section (1) of section 23, and also the amounts respectively awarded under each of the other clauses of the same sub-section, together with the grounds of awarding each of the said amounts. Sub-section (2) of section 26 reads as under:- "Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of section 2, Clause (2), and section 2, Clause (9), respectively, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908." As sub-section (1) of section 34 of the Act provides that the provisions of Part III of the Land Acquisition Act shall apply to the proceedings in respect of reference to be made to the Court and consequently, the award to be passed by the Court shall be deemed to be a decree and the grounds of award a judgment as contemplated under the Code of Civil Procedure. Once the award passed by the District Judge under sub-section (1) of section 34 becomes a decree, then such decree would be appealable under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Section inter alia provides that an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising Original Jurisdiction to the Court authorised to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court, unless expressly prohibited by the Code or by any other law for time being in force. Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act prescribes the subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall only be, in any proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, to the High Court from the award, or from any part of the award. The section further provides that from any decree of the High Court passed on such appeal, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court subject to the provisions contained in section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 54 is included in Part VIII of the Land Acquisition Act and the said part is not made applicable to the award to be declared by the District Judge under sub-section (1) of section 34 of the Act, but once such an award becomes a decree, then it would be appealable and the appeal would lie to the High Court under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. Reference is required to be made to sub-section (2) of section 34 which provides that the decision of the Court on such reference, and subject only to such decision, the decision of the Collector determining the amount of the compensation, shall be final. It was suggested that sub-section (2) of section 34 makes the decision of the District Court on reference final and, therefore, appeal is not permissible against the said decision. It is not possible to accede to the submission. The State Legislature by substituting sub-section (1) of section 34 of the Act made its intention clear that the provisions of Part III of the Land Acquisition Act shall mutatis mutandis apply to the proceedings of reference to the District Court under sub-section (1) of section 34. The State Legislature was fully conscious that the decision of the Court would be a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure and the grounds for the award a judgment under the Code. Once the award becomes a decree and the grounds become a judgment, then such award or judgment would be appealable under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if delivered by a District Court and under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent if delivered by a Single Judge of the High Court. The reference under sub-section (1) of section 34 of the Act is to be made to the "Court" as defined in the Land Acquisition Act and that means a principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction. The reference under sub-section (1) of section 34 of the Act is to be made to the "Court" as defined in the Land Acquisition Act and that means a principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction. In our judgment, the expression "decision of the Court" under sub-section (2) of section 34 of the Act cannot be restricted only to the principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction, but extended to the decision of the Court in accordance with the hierarchy of courts. The appeal against the decree or judgment of the principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction is nothing but a continuation of proceedings commenced by reference to the original Court. The appeal being continuity of the original proceedings, the expression "decision of the Court" on such reference under sub-section (2) of section 34 brings within its sweep not only the decision of the District Court but also the decision of the High Court in appeal and further the decision of the Supreme Court. The State Legislature in its wisdom retained the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 34 after substituting sub-section (1) and thereby made it clear that the expression "decision of the Court" on such reference should not be construed in an artificial manner so as to prevent either the claimant or the State Government from filing an appeal to the High Court. In our judgment, sub-section (2) only provides that the decision of the Court on such reference whether by the trial Court or by the Appellate Court or by the Supreme Court shall be conclusive and shall not be questioned in any other forum by filing any other proceedings. This construction would subserve the intent of the Legislature and would advance the cause of justice. We are conscious that the right to an appeal is a creation of statute, but on a plain reading of the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act and the provisions of section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, it is clear that the decision of the District Court is subject to an appeal to the High Court and further to the Supreme Court. Accordingly, we hold that the impugned judgment of the Assistant Judge is open to an appeal and the writ petitions filed by the State Government and the claimants are not maintainable. Mr. Sawant, learned Counsel appearing for the Government, and Mr. Abhyankar, Mr. Accordingly, we hold that the impugned judgment of the Assistant Judge is open to an appeal and the writ petitions filed by the State Government and the claimants are not maintainable. Mr. Sawant, learned Counsel appearing for the Government, and Mr. Abhyankar, Mr. Bhonsale and other Counsel appearing on behalf of various claimants, seek permission to convert the writ petitions into appeals. Permission granted on the Counsel giving an undertaking to pay the requisite Court fees within a period of four weeks from today. Mr. Mengane, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1023 of 1984 sought permission to withdraw the petition and that permission being granted, conversion is not sought in that matter. -----