Ameeruddhin Ahammed v. Mehurunesa Begum — 1990 DIGILAW 492 (KER)

Judgment :- The main point to be decided is whether the court which appointed a guardian under the Guardians and Wards Act (hereinafter referred to as the act) has the jurisdiction to scrutinise the accounts filed by the guardian and to direct him to pay the balance amount as determined by the court. 2. In respect of the properties of the 1st respondent in CRP. 1920 of 1986, who is the revision petitioner in CRP. 2266 of 1986, (who is hereinafter referred to as the ex-minor) the District Court, Thodupuzha appointed her mother as her guardian in a guardians and wards petition. 4.65 acres of cardamom land belonging to the minor was in the possession of one A.M.A. Sultan as the power of attorney holder of the guardian. He assumed possession and management of the property from 19-10-1972 onwards. The minor attained 21 years of age on 10-2-1978. She filed I.A.155 of 1979 for a direction to hand over possession of the property along with the profits collected by the power of attorney holder. Before the lower court the above said A.M.A. Sultan filed a counter affidavit contending that he had put the property in the possession of his son, who is the 1st revision petitioner in C.R.P. 1920 of 1986. Petitioners 2 to 10 in. that C.R.P. are the wife and other children of the said A.M.A. Sultan. For convenience sake they are hereinafter referred to as lessees. 3. The said AM. A. Sultan died on 27-7-1982 and his legal representatives were impleaded in the proceedings. By Order dated 5-11-1979 the District Court directed the lessees to hand over possession of the property to the ex-minor. That order was challenged before this Court in C.R.P. 2910 of 1979. This Court by order dated 6-3-1981 confirmed the order of the District Court. A special leave petition against the said order before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dismissed by that Court. The property was delivered to the ex-minor on 15-11-1979 through court, 4. It would appear that the court directed delivery of property at the first instance without disposing of the prayer for payment of the income from the property. After the disposal of the C.R.P. before this Court, the application was again considered by the lower court. Both sides adduced evidence. It would appear that the court directed delivery of property at the first instance without disposing of the prayer for payment of the income from the property. After the disposal of the C.R.P. before this Court, the application was again considered by the lower court. Both sides adduced evidence. By the order uudcr challenge in C.R.P.Nos.1920 of 2266 of 1986 the lower court fixed the amount of au ears of income due from the lessees and directed them to deposit that amount in court. The lessees are challenging that order in C.R.P.1920 of 1986. The ex-minor is challenging that order in CRP. 2266 of 1986. 5. Since the lessees did not pay the amount, the ex-minor filed I.A.No.605 of 1986 for recovering the amount from the assets of deceased A.M.A. Sultan in the hands of the lessees. On that application the Court ordered attachment of the properties scheduled to the application and directed the ex-minor to take steps for the sale of the property. The lessees are challenging that order in C.R.P. 731 of 1987. 6. According to the lessees, a court exercising jurisdiction under the Act has no jurisdiction to scrutinise the accounts filed by the guardian or to compel the guardian to deposit any balance profit due from him as fixed by the court. The remedy available to the minor after he attains majority is to file a suit against the guardian to recover any amount that may be due from the receiver. According to their learned counsel, S.41(3)of the Act empowers the court only to require the guardian or his legal representative to direct delivery of any property m his possession or control belonging to the Ward or any accounts in his possession or control relating to any past or present property of the ward. According to the learned counsel, that sub-section does not envisage scrutiny of the accounts of the guardian in order to fix the actual amount in the hands of the guardian or the issue of any direction to deposit such arrears. 7. Before examining this question it may be observed that in CRP.No.2910 of 1979 against the direction to deliver possession of the property to the ex-minor, this Court examined the scope of S.41(3), in view of a similar objection raised by late A,M.A. Sultan. 7. Before examining this question it may be observed that in CRP.No.2910 of 1979 against the direction to deliver possession of the property to the ex-minor, this Court examined the scope of S.41(3), in view of a similar objection raised by late A,M.A. Sultan. Following the judgment in Wallace Sitha Boi v. Wallace .Radha Boi (1919 (36) MLJ189) this Court held that the 'word 'guardian' must be understood in the light of the definition in S.4(2) of the Act and would include the defacto guardian. It was also held that on his removal or discharge the court has power under S.41(3) to require him to deliver the infant's property, to him. This Court also held that in such cases the court has got also inherent jurisdiction to give proper directions in the matter. This judgment has now become final. It is binding on both parties. However, since that C.R.P. was against the order of delivery of immovable property alone, the further question whether the court has jurisdiction to scrutinise the accounts or direct the guardian or his legal representative to pay the amount as fixed by the court, did not arise for consideration. 8. Section 39 of the Act provides for suit against guardian where administration bond was not taken. During the continuance of the minority of the ward, the next friend of the minor may with the leave of the court file a suit against the guardian or his legal representative for an account of the income from the minor's property and for recovery of the same. Therefore the contention is that in view of such a specific provision, the Guardians and Wards Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate on any dispute regarding the accounts of a guardian. It is further contended that the guardian or his legal representative is liable only to deliver the immovable property of the minor together with the accounts relating to such property, and that only through a regular suit the balance profits, if any, in the hands of the guardian or his legal representative can be recovered. 9. The correct meaning of the words 'balance due' occurring in S.34(d) and the words "property in his possession" occurring in S.41(3) of the Act also require examination. S.34 specifies the obligations of a guardian. 9. The correct meaning of the words 'balance due' occurring in S.34(d) and the words "property in his possession" occurring in S.41(3) of the Act also require examination. S.34 specifies the obligations of a guardian. Under clause (d) of that Section the guardian is liable to pay into the court the 'balance due' from him on his accounts if so required by court. The Calcutta High Court held in Jagannatha v. Mahesh (361C 386) that the words balance due 'means the balance due as shown in the accounts exhibited by the guardian and not the balance found by the court on an examination of the account. This view was adopted by the Sind Court in Woondomal v. Nazir (AIR 1930 Sind 43). The Madras High Court in Hari Krishna v. Govindarajulu (AIR 1926 Mad. 478) followed the Calcutta ruling and held that S.34(d) does not empower the court to direct the guardian to pay into court more than the amount shown to be ;due in the accounts exhibited by him. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Ramachandran v. Balasubramania (AIR 1938 Mad. 347) held that the court had full discretion to discharge a guardian and the court cannot hold an enquiry into the correctness of the accounts or determine the amount or the property in respect of which the guardian is accountable. In Gopalaswamy v. Ramayya (AIR 1944 Mad. 396) the Madras High Court again held that S.34(d) does not empower the court to direct payment of more than what the accounts show. 10. The Nagpur High Court in Ramlalsaov. Tansingh (AIR 1952 Nag. 135) took the same view. The Lahore High Court in Shiv Charan Lai v. Bhawani Shanker (AIR 1928 Lah. 495) held that the death of the ward does not put an end to the jurisdiction of the court over the guardian and the property can be recovered from him without having recourse to a regular suit. However, the same High Court in Hakin Rai v. Khandi (AIR 1930 Lah. 420) and in Sadhu Singh v. MeharSingh (AIR 1931 Lah. 68) followed the Calcutta view. However, the same High Court in Hakin Rai v. Khandi (AIR 1930 Lah. 420) and in Sadhu Singh v. MeharSingh (AIR 1931 Lah. 68) followed the Calcutta view. But in a later case the Lahore High Court held that if the guardian fails to furnish any account on the ground that he has no accounts to furnish, this does not preclude the court from going into the accounts and if the court finds that a balance is due from him, the Court can call upon the guardian to pay balance as the Court may find to be due. The Court followed the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Sita Ram v. Mt. Govindi (AIR 1924 All. 593) and the Patna High Court in Md. Fariduddin v. Ahmad Abdul Wahab (AIR 1928 Patna 255) and held that the power of the court is not limited to directing the guardian to pay such balance as he may or may not show, because in such a case the "scrutiny of the accounts of a guardian becomes a mere farce", (see Chanan Singh v. Har Kaur (AIR 1933 Lah. 484). 11. The Allahabad High Court in Sita Ram v. Gobindi (AIR 1924 All. 593) held that the power of the court in dealing with the accounts exhibited by the guardian was not limited by such balance as the guardian chooses to show therein and that the 'balance due' in this clause does not mean the balance shown by the guardian, but the balance which is found by the court to be due from him and that the court can enforce the payment of the balance so found due and was not obliged to refer the minor to a regular suit. However in Misra Ranganath v. Misra Murari Lai (AIR 1936 All. 179) the Allahabad High Court held that S.34(d)does not contemplate a detailed enquiry into the accounts, but only a summary investigation and observed as follows at page 181: "Accounts are exhibited under S.34 when the minor is still a minor and the powers of the guardian have not ceased. However in Misra Ranganath v. Misra Murari Lai (AIR 1936 All. 179) the Allahabad High Court held that S.34(d)does not contemplate a detailed enquiry into the accounts, but only a summary investigation and observed as follows at page 181: "Accounts are exhibited under S.34 when the minor is still a minor and the powers of the guardian have not ceased. There is no real difficulty if all that the Court did were to look into the accounts in a summary manner and see that the guardian has not incurred any expenditure which was positively prohibited by the court ...If the accounts are unsatisfactory or if the guardian disobeys any direction given under S.34 (d) the Court has ample powers under Ss.35 and 36 to sanction a suit by a proper person and relief can be given to the minor, and under S.37 the general liability of the guardian as trustee is preserved. The guardian can also be removed by the Court." In Abdul Ghafoor v. Property of Sarniulla (AIR 1960 All. 527) the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that an order directing guardian to withdraw investment and to deposit it in court cannot be supported under S.34(d) of the Act. 12. The Patna High Court in M.F. Ahmad v. A.A. Wahab (AIR 1928 Pat. 255)1 disagreeing with the Calcutta High Court and agreeing with the view of the Allahabad; High Court in Sita Ram v. Gobindi (AIR 1924 All. 593) and that of the Patna High Court in Abbas; Begam v. Yaq jiti Begum (AIR 1925 Pat. 477) held as follows: "The whole tenor of he Act shows that the District Judge has jurisdiction to examine the, accounts; and if that is so, it is clearly within the jurisdiction of the District Judge to call upon the' guardian to pay into court any sum that he may find due upon a true account of the affairs of the minor." In Munnilal v. Mukhteshwar Prasad (AIR 1938 Pat. 398) Dhavle, J. referred with approval to Abdul Hasim v. Malika Khatun (49 I.C. 132), where it was held that the power of the court under S.41 (3) to direct a guardian to deliver any property belonging to the ward extends to moneys belonging to the minor. In Mani Devi v. Anpurna Dai (AIR 1943 Pat. 398) Dhavle, J. referred with approval to Abdul Hasim v. Malika Khatun (49 I.C. 132), where it was held that the power of the court under S.41 (3) to direct a guardian to deliver any property belonging to the ward extends to moneys belonging to the minor. In Mani Devi v. Anpurna Dai (AIR 1943 Pat. 218) at page 220, the Patna High Court observed that if the District Judge had been careful the long litigation would have been avoided and the guardian would have immediately been called upon to pay over the large sums, which were reported by the auditors to have been misappropriated. The court also upheld the order allowing assignment of the bond executed by the guardian in favour of the ex-minor who wanted to file a suit against the guardian. 13. In Mirabai v. Kaushatyabai (AIR 1949 Nag. 235) it was held as follows: 78. Motiram died on 5th March 1924 without rendering an account of the sums he had received on behalf of his wards. His powers to act as a guardian of the property of the minors ceased by his death. As he was bound to make good the loss sustained by the minors for the sums which he had withdrawn from their estate but which he had not repaid, his estate is liable to reimburse Kaushalyabai of all losses sustained by her by reason of the withdrawal of theseveral sumsof money by Motiram without having repaid them. 79. As Mirabai has inherited the property of the deceased Motiram, she is liable to pay his debts, but her liability is restricted to the extent of the assets of Motiram in her hands." 14. In Abdul Hamid v. Abdu1jabbar (AIR 1940 Rangoon 246) the Rangoon High Court was of the view that the Order referring the ex-minor to file a fresh suit was misconceived and held that "it is the duty of the court to protect the interests of the minor until he gets the property which has been placed under the care of his guardian". 15. 15. In I.G. Rane v. S.R. Rane (AIR 1948 Bom.15) Bhagwati, J., as he then was, held as follows: "A guardian of the property of a minor duly appointed by the High Court whether under, the Guardians and Wards Act or under its inherent and general jurisdiction stands in a fiduciary capacity towards the minor A guardianship isa right, a duty and a trust. The guardian would be liable to render an account of his dealings with the property as such guardian. He would also be liable to the court in the matter of the carrying out of all the directions which the Court has given to him in respect of the transaction relating to the property which the Court sanctions as for the benefit of the minor." 16. With great respect 1 disagree with the view that the court exercising powers under the Guardians and Wards Act has no jurisdiction to scrutinise the account of the guardians or to direct them to deposit the balance amount due as fixed by the court and respectfully adopt the view that the court has such powers. By upholding the jurisdiction of the court exercising powers under the Guardians and Wards Act to scrutinise the accounts and to direct the guardian to deposit the balance amount due as fixed by court, multiplicity of legal proceedings can be avoided. Otherwise the ex-minor will have to file a separate suit for recovering the balance amount due from the guardian. In such a suit the ex-minor will be in a definitely disadvantageous position in that all the records connected with the administration of the assets will be with the guardian and may not be readily available in the court in which the fresh suit is filed. There will also be considerable delay in the realisation of amounts due to a minor. 17. On an anaysis of the decisions of the various High Courts it would appear that the decisions which hold that the Guardians and Wards Court had no jurisdiction to scrutinise the accounts filed by the guardian or to direct him to deposit the balance amount due as fixed by court, were rendered for the following reasons: (1) the literal meaning of Ss.34(d) and 41(3) will not justify scrutiny of accounts. (2) In case the court scrutinizes the account and fixes the amount due from the guardian, he cannot challenge that order by filing appeal under S.47 of the Act. So also a suit to set aside such an order will not be maintainable under S.48 of the Act. On a closer examination of the sections, I am of the view that these grounds cannot be relied on to hold that the Guardians and Wards Court has no such jurisdiction. S.34(d) refers to 'balance due from him on those accounts'. Clause (c) of S.34 empowers the court to require the guardian to exhibit his accounts in the court. S.34-A, which section was added by the Guardians and Wards Amendment Act, 17 of 1929, empowers a court to appoint a person to audit the accounts and to pay his remuneration. The following statement of objects and reasons for that amendment gives considerable guidance for a correct interpretation of that provision: "The Guardians and Wards Act 1890 contains no specific provisions for the auditing of the accounts of minors' estates ad the meeting of the cost of audit out of the estates. The audit of such accounts tends to be left to the judges of the subordinate Courts or District Courts or to ministerial officers, who have rarely the time or training to apply anything in the nature of a thorough test. With a view to checking the possibility of defalcation, an adequate audit of these accounts is desirable. Accordingly the present Bill has been framed forthe purpose, of giving express power to the Court to award remuneration for auditing accounts out of the income of the property." Before the enactment of S.34-A the payment of expenditure was being made under S.43 read with S.34, which empowers the court to issue orders for regulating the conduct of guardians as well as the obligations of a guardian. Under the rule making power of S.50(ff) different High Courts have framed rules regarding the persons who should be appointed to audit the accounts and the scales of remuneration to be granted to them. The rule applicable to Kerala State is R.17 of the Rules framed by the High Court. If the power of the Court is limited to directing the guardian to pay such balance as he may show in his accounts the auditing of his accounts becomes a mere farce. The rule applicable to Kerala State is R.17 of the Rules framed by the High Court. If the power of the Court is limited to directing the guardian to pay such balance as he may show in his accounts the auditing of his accounts becomes a mere farce. I respectfully adopt the reasoning of the Patna High Court fn Abbas/ Begam v. Yaquiti Begum (AIR 1925 Pat. 477) and other similar judgments and hold that (the 'balance due' means the balance due as per a true and just account. 18. The second reason that there is no provision for appeal against such orders and therefore it should be taken that the guardians and wards court has no jurisdiction also seems to be without merit. The provisions for challenging any order or the non-provision thereof cannot be taken as widening or restricting the jurisdiction of any court. Even so, it may be observed that a revision under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is available to the aggrieved party. 19. Another question that arises is whether the court administering the Guardians and Wards Act has only the specific powers conferred under that Act or whether the court can exercise its inherent powers, while exercising the jurisdiction under the Act. 20. In Rashmoni Dasi v. Canada SundariDasi (XX (1914) Cal. L.J.213) = 26 Indian Cases 275) Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, J. speaking for the bench observed as follows: "A Court which exercises powers under the Guardians and Wards Act has ample inherent jurisdiction to deal with matters brought before it, of which cognizance may be required in the interest of justice. S.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908 which provides that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such 1 orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, does not formulate a new doctrine. S.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908 which provides that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such 1 orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, does not formulate a new doctrine. It merely furnishes Legislative recognition of a well-established principle, which is applicable quite as much to Courts called upon to deal with matters under the Guardians and Wards Act as to ordinary civil Courts." In Jyoti Prasad Lala v. Pearilal Lala (AIR 1930 Cal.384) the Calcutta High Court held that the discretion conferred upon the court under S.12 of the Guardians and Wards Act to appoint receiver to minor's property is a wide one and there can be no doubt that it has the power to appoint a receiver and the receiver when appointed must, having regard to the provisions of S.141 Civil P.C. be deemed to have all powers of a receiver under the Code. 21. In Mrs. Annie Besant v. G. Narayaniah (AIR 1914 P.C. 41) the Privy Council held that as in the law of England in Hindu Law the father is the natural guardian of his children during their minorities, but this guardianship is in the nature of a sacred trust and therefore during his life-time he cannot substitute another person to be guardian in his place. The guardian may, however, in the exercise of his discretion as guardian entrust the custody and education of his children to another. But that authority is essentially a revocable authority and if the welfare of his children requires it, he can take such custody and education once more into his own hands. However, if the authority has been acted upon in such a way as in the opinion of the Court to create associations or give rise to expectations on the part of the infants which it will be undesirable in their interests to disturb or disappoint such court will interfere to prevent its revocation. The Privy Council also held that a suit inter parties is not the form of procedure prescribed by the Guardians and Wards Act for proceedings in a District Court touching the guardianship of infants. In re Baijamn Bai (ILR 36 Bombay 20) the Bombay High Court quoted with approval the following passage from Mr. The Privy Council also held that a suit inter parties is not the form of procedure prescribed by the Guardians and Wards Act for proceedings in a District Court touching the guardianship of infants. In re Baijamn Bai (ILR 36 Bombay 20) the Bombay High Court quoted with approval the following passage from Mr. Simpson's Book on-Infants, 3rd Edition, at page 345: "Where there was any danger that the fund would be lost, or that the trustees would not properly execute the trusts, the old practice seems to have been to require them to give security; but the modern practice is to order the funds to be paid or transferred into Court. It is not necessary to show that the fund is in danger, or that the trustee has abused or intends to abuse his trust; the cestui que trust has a right ex debito justitiae to have the fund brought into Court." The court overruled the contention that the Guardians and Wards Court has only power under S.12 and that section will not justify the court in ordering the money to be paid into court or to appoint a receiver in such a case and held as follows: "As the matter is one of very great importance in the administration of the Court's jurisdiction in relation to infants, I think it desirable to say that I have no doubt that the Court would have had power in this case to appoint a receiver had it considered it necessary or proper to do so". It was also held that having regard to the terms of S.12 of the Guardians and Wards Act the court may make such order for the protection of the person and property of the minor as it thinks proper and that S.141 of the Code as well as the sections and orders dealing with the appointment of receivers are applicable in a proceeding under the Guardians and Wards Act, observing as follows: "In my opinion to hold otherwise than as I have done would be to render S.12 of the Guardians and Wards Act practically nugatory. If the Court can neither order the person having the custody of the property to pay the money into Court (Order XLIX, rule 10) nor appoint a receiver (Order XL rule 1) of the property pending the further order of the Court, it is difficult to see what effective means it could take to protect the property if it considered that it was in danger in the hands of the person having possession or custody of the property at the time the application is made to the Court." 22. In Sita Ram v. Mt. Govindi (AIR 1924 All. 593) Walsh, ag. C.J., speaking for the bench held as follows: "We are of opinion that the Act must be construed with due regard to the object intended to be attained by the Legislature. The object may be summarized as the protection of the helpless minor and the control of the guardian charged with looking after his estate. In order to exercise that jurisdiction the Court has been vested with disciplinary powers which experience has shown are more effective in nine cases out of ten than the ordinary enforcement of rights by the prosecution of a suit under which individuals, who are sui juris, are left by the Legislature for the determination of their dispute. For example, if the guardian is threatening to destroy or make away with property belonging to the minor, and has not been called upon, possibly because of near relationship to give a bond at the commencement of his office of any substantial amount, if the District Judge's view is correct, the Court has no power to call upon him to replace what he has wasted and to submit to punishment if he does do so. The only remedy left is by an action at law, which may be indefinitely delayed by various obstructive means and prove in the end to be infructuous. It seems, therefore, to us that we ought not to cut down by narrow interpretation provisions which appear to have been made by the Legislature to enable this jurisdiction to be exercised, unless there are plain indications in the Act which prohibit us from taking what may described as the wider view." 23. Since the power under the Guardians and Wards Act is conferred on a court, the court can exercise its inherent and general powers, apart from the powers conferred under the said Act. Since the power under the Guardians and Wards Act is conferred on a court, the court can exercise its inherent and general powers, apart from the powers conferred under the said Act. It may also be observed that Guardians and Wards Act is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to guardians and wards. The word 'consolidate and amend' are generally used when the experiences gathered by the working of a statute, the interpretation placed on the statute by judicial decisions, the lacuna and defects in the statute which have been discovered in the course of years to be altered and amended and put in clearer form. By merely using the word 'consolidate' it cannot be inferred that there has been any intention of restricting the powers of the court by the provisions of the Act. (See K.P. Conoavi v. Sales Tax Officer, AIR 1967 Ker. 47). In any view of the case a guardian is an officer of court and the court must exercise "proper control over him. All the incidental matters arising out of his appointment must be decided by the Court.S.37 of the Guardians and Wards Act preserves the general liability of a guardian as a trustee, although in Mirabai v. Kaushalyabai (AIR 1949 Nag. 235) it was held that the guardian is not a trustee as defined in the Trusts Act. In Deokishan v. Asararn (AIR 1933 Nag. 62) it was held that the Guardians and Wards Act was not exhaustive or self-contained and that so far as it is deficient in procedure it has to be supplemented by the Code of Civil Procedure because S.141 C.P.C. expressly permits such a course. It was also held that a court having power to issue an order has the inherent power also to enforce it. S.43(4) of the Act also shows that some provisions of C.P.C. are made specifically applicable, where a guardian disobeys an order of court. 24. Therefore I hold that the court administering the Act can exercise its inherent powers and under that power scrutinise the guardian's account and direct him to deposit the balance amount fixed by the court. 25. Then the question is whether the court has the jurisdiction to enforce its order and to recover the amount from the guardian and his assets. Therefore I hold that the court administering the Act can exercise its inherent powers and under that power scrutinise the guardian's account and direct him to deposit the balance amount fixed by the court. 25. Then the question is whether the court has the jurisdiction to enforce its order and to recover the amount from the guardian and his assets. From the discussion above, it is clear that the court exercising powers under the Act can exercise its inherent powers to enforce its orders. The judgments reported in Deokishan v, Asaram (AIR 1933 Nag.62)andfiasn/770/7/Das/V. Canada Sundari Das/ (20 Cal.LJ. 213), already referred to, have held that the court has inherent powers to enforce its orders. In so far as the statute has not imposed any specific restriction upon the power to enforce its orders and in so far as the provisions of the C.P.C. are not specifically excluded, it has to be held that the court has as wide a power as is reasonably necessary to give effect to the object of the statute. The court will have all necessary implied powers to give effect to its orders See P.M.K. Kunjahammad v. Chackappan (1983 KLT 854) and Abdulla v. Rent Controller (1984 KLT 865). In JM Patel v. A.S. Mehta (AIR 1989 S.C.1289), the Supreme Court has dealt with incidental powers in the following terms: "However, it does appear to us that, on a parity of reasoning, it must be held that the mayor had the implied power to cancel a meeting or postpone a meeting, which was duly convened before the said meeting commenced and to convene the same on a subsequent occasion. It is needless to say that this power must be exercised by the Mayor bona fide and not for a collateral purpose. The power must again be exercised for a proper purpose." applying these principles I hold that the court has inherent power to execute its orders and to realise the amount due from the guardian. CR.P.No. 731 of 1987 challenging the order of attachment is without merit 26. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that in any view of the case the amount fixed by the court was excessive. The evidence in this regard was referred to in detail in support of this contention. However, on a perusal of the judgment of the District Court it is clear that the amount fixed is proper. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that in any view of the case the amount fixed by the court was excessive. The evidence in this regard was referred to in detail in support of this contention. However, on a perusal of the judgment of the District Court it is clear that the amount fixed is proper. As per the accounts submitted by the receiver the net balance income for nearly 7 years was only Rs.1, 049.41. The evidence of P.W.1 was to the effect that from other nearby cardamom plantations an average income of 70 to 80 kgs. of cardamom per acre was being obtained. The evidence of P. W.2, who has 17 years experience in various capacities, in cardamom cultivation, was to the effect that the average production per acre in that area was 50 to 70 kgs per acre. In some places it will be above 100 kgs per acre. It was under those circumstances that the lower court held that the account submitted by the guardian was not true and could not be accepted. In the affidavit filed along with the petition for withdrawing a sum of Rs.12, 000/- from court, it was stated that the cardamom was being processed in the stores of other estates and the expenses for that will come to more than Rs.800/- per year. Thus even according to the guardian, more than Rs.800/- was being spent towards curing and storing charges for the cardamom collected from the plaint schedule property. The District Court rightly treated this evidence as an indication as to the quantum of cardamom that was obtained from the land. The curing charge for cardamom was 40 or 50 ps. for one 'padi' (nearly 1 Kg.) of raw cardamom during 1974-75 periods. Nearly 5 Kgs. of cardamom when dried will come to 1 Kg. Therefore the District Court adopted 50 Ps. as the curing charge of 1 Kg. of cardamom and on that basis it was estimated that atleast 1600 padi of cardamom would have been collected from the property. 1600 padi of raw cardamom will work out to 68.817 Kgs. of dried cardamom per acre. Ext.A-2 sales tax assessment order for 1974-75 to 1978-79 would also show that the sales tax department used to assess the income at a rate higher than 70 Kgs. of cardamom per acre. 1600 padi of raw cardamom will work out to 68.817 Kgs. of dried cardamom per acre. Ext.A-2 sales tax assessment order for 1974-75 to 1978-79 would also show that the sales tax department used to assess the income at a rate higher than 70 Kgs. of cardamom per acre. It was after taking into consideration all such factors the learned District Judge fixed the quantum of yield as 65 Kgs. of dried cardamom per acre in a season. I do not find any illegality in the reasoning of the learned District Judge. Since the guardian did not maintain proper accounts it was for the court to estimate the income and the income was estimated in a fair and reasonable manner. The expense estimated was also proper and reasonable. I do not find any illegality in fixing the amount due from the receiver. The C.R.Ps. filed by the lessees and the ex-minor are without merit to costs. Under the circumstances, the CR.Ps. are dismissed.