Judgment Bhuvaneshwar Prasad, J. 1. This is an application under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the Code). It is directed against the order dated 10-12-1986 as contained in Annexure 8 passed by Sri R.B. Rai, Sessions Judge, Siwan, in anticipatory Bail Petition No. 354 of 1986, by which the learned Sessions Judge modified his earlier order dated 6-10-1986 passed in another Anticipatory Bail Petition (Anticipatory Bail Petition No. 288 of 1986) filed by the opposite party No.2 to the extent that the second sentence of my previous order in the last para containing the expression" but the order........... during investigation" should now be deemed to have been deleted. " 2. It appears that a case under Secs. 364/34 of the Indian Penal Code being Bhagwanpur Hat P.S. Case No. 054 of 1986 (G.R. Case No. 1769 of 1986) was registered against opposite party No. 2 on the death of the father of the petitioner. The case was converted into one under Sec. 364/302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and charge-sheet and a supplementary Charge-sheet were submitted against the accused persons. So far as opposite party No.2 is concerned, his name figured in the supplementary charge-sheet said to have been filed on 10-11-1986 by the police. 3. It has been contended that the impugned order (Annexure- 8) is highly improper and quite illegal as having been passed in complete disregard of the earlier order dated 6-10-1986 (Annexure- 3), passed by the learned Sessions Judge himself in Anticipatory Bail Petition No. 288 of 1986, whereby the learned Judge had granted anticipatory bail to the opposite party No.2 for a limited period only. 4. From the prosecution case, it appears that on 11-7-1986 the deceased who happened to be the father of the informant had left his village home for Siwan to attend a case instituted by him before the Court. He, however, did not return, to his house in the right. On the following day the informant searched for his father, but could not find him. He, accordingly, lodged the first information report with the police under Secs. 364/34 of the Indian Penal Code. On 13-7-1986 the dead body of the father of the informant was recovered and subsequently, the case was converted into one under Secs. 364/302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. He, accordingly, lodged the first information report with the police under Secs. 364/34 of the Indian Penal Code. On 13-7-1986 the dead body of the father of the informant was recovered and subsequently, the case was converted into one under Secs. 364/302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. In the course of the investigation by 11-9-1986 sufficient materials were collected against opposite party No.2, who, however, could not be arrested since the police was acting as hard in globe with him. On 19-9-1986 the petitioner informant filed a protest petition before the learned S.D.J.M. Siwan praying to take cognizance of the offences against the accused persons. On 30-91986 opposite party No.2 moved learned Sessions Judge, Siwan for grant of anticipatory bail in Anticipatory Bail Petition No. 288 of 1986. This petition was disposed of by Sri. R.B. Rai, the learned Sessions Judge, Siwan by the order dated 6-10-1986. Its concluding paragraph runs as follows:- "In such circumstance it is ordered that in the event of arrest the petitioner shall be enlarged on bail bond of Rs. 10,000/with two sureties of the like amount. But the order would be valid only till the submission of charge-sheet where after the petitioner would have to surrender before the lower Court and pray for regular bail on the materials collected during investigation. " On 10-10-1986 the police submitted a chargesheet in the case, but not against opposite party No. 2. However, at the intervention of the S.P., Siwan, the police submitted a supplementary charge-sheet on 6-11-1986 against him. By the order dated 6-11-1986 the learned S.D.J.M. Siwan took cognizance of the offences under Secs. 364/302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. 5. As per the compliance of the order dated 6-10-1986 (as contained in Annexure - 3) opposite party No.2 was required to appear before the Court after submission of the charge-sheet on 6-11-1986 (Annexure - 4) but he deliberately chose not to appear before the Court. He also did not surrender before the Court incompliance of the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge in Anticipatory Bail Petition No. 288 of 1986, as a result of which Sri S.C. Pandey, S.D.J.M. Siwan by the order dated 18-11-1986 issued non-bailable warrant of arrest against him. He also did not surrender before the Court incompliance of the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge in Anticipatory Bail Petition No. 288 of 1986, as a result of which Sri S.C. Pandey, S.D.J.M. Siwan by the order dated 18-11-1986 issued non-bailable warrant of arrest against him. On 20-11-1986 opposite party No.2 filed a petition before the learned Sessions Judge, Siwan for the grant of fresh anticipatory bail to him which was registered as Anticipatory Bail Petition No. 354 of 1986. By the impugned order dated 10-12-1986 Sri R.B. Rai, the learned Sessions Judge, Siwan passed the order as contained in Annexure - 8 whose relevant portion runs as follows: "In the result I direct, being compelled by the peculiar circumstance of the case, that my previous conditional order dated 6-10-1986 is modified to the extent that the second sentence in my previous order in last para containing expression but the order during investigation would now be deemed to have been deleted." 6. In the present application, it has been submitted that there was absolutely no occasion for the learned Sessions Judge to have passed the impugned order as contained in Annexure- 8 , the same being without jurisdiction since his order as contained in Annexure. 3, could not be reviewed by the learned Sessions Judge himself. Being emboldent by the improper order (Annexure- 8) opposite party No.2 has started terrorising the petitioner as well as his witnesses. The impugned order (Annexure - 8) is nothing-but an abuse of the processes of the Court and the same is fit to be quashed. On these grounds it has been contended that the same be quashed. 7. The learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the State has opposed this application. Ii was his submission that it was open to the learned Sessions Judge to modify his earlier order for which he got sufficient authority under law. Moreover, it has been submitted that no illegality has been committed by the learned Sessions Judge. 8. I have carefully gone through the impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge. I have also taken into consideration the facts and circumstances of this case. I am, however, constrained to observe that the impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is completely without jurisdiction resulting in mis-carriage of justice. 8. I have carefully gone through the impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge. I have also taken into consideration the facts and circumstances of this case. I am, however, constrained to observe that the impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is completely without jurisdiction resulting in mis-carriage of justice. The reasons are as follows:- Annexure- 3 is the earlier order passed on 6-10-1986 by the learned Sessions Judge in anticipatory bail petition No. 288 of 1986. This petition for anticipatory bail was filed by the opposite party No.2 himself. From the concluding paragraph of this order as has been quoted above, it becomes clear that the petitioner was granted anticipatory bail till only the submission of the charge-sheet, where after the petitioner was required to surrender before the lower Court and to pray for regular bail on the basis of materials collected during the investigation. The order as contained in this paragraph is very specific and clear. By it the learned Sessions Judge granted the anticipatory bail to opposite party No.2 till the submission of the charge-sheet. Further he took pains to well-out that after the submission, of the charge-sheet the petitioner (opposite party No.2) would have to surrender before the lower Court and to pray for regular bail on the materials collected during the investigation. These observations made by the learned Sessions Judge in this portion of the order are very specific and clear and they do not admit of two interpretations. However, by the impugned order as contained in Annexure-8, the learned Sessions Judge "compelled by the peculiar circumstances of the case" (as observed in his order) directed that his order dated 6-10-1986 (Annexure-3) be modified to the extent that a certain portion of the order in the second sentence of the last paragraph (Annexure- 3 ) would now be deemed to have been deleted. The effect of this deletion would be that the petitioner would no longer be required to surrender before the lower Court and to pray for regular bail as required by the earlier order as contained in Annexure- 3. 9 Before taking up for consideration whether it was permissible under law for the learned Sessions Judge to modify his earlier order as contained in Annexure- 3 I would like to say that the impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge itself is not free from malice. 9 Before taking up for consideration whether it was permissible under law for the learned Sessions Judge to modify his earlier order as contained in Annexure- 3 I would like to say that the impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge itself is not free from malice. It contains indiscreat and unwarranted remarks against the S.D.J.M. and also the A.P.P. He has made special grievance against the order dated 18-11-1985 passed by the learned S.D.J.M. directing the issuance of warrant of arrest against opposite party No.2 by cancelling his bail bonds. This order by the learned S.D.J.M. appears to have been passed on a petition dated 11-11-1986 filed by the informant for the issue of non-bailable warrant of arrest on the ground that though the charge-sheet against opposite party No.2 was already filed on 10-11-1986 and also on account of the fact that by the order as contained in Annexure- 3 opposite party No. 2 was required to surrender before the learned Court Below on the submission of the charge-sheet, he did not do so. On the other hand, on his behalf the Court was informed that he would appear before it on 29-11-1986. The learned Sessions Judge has referred to the case of Free legal Aid Committee V/s. The State of Bihar, in support of the proposition that the accused released on bail can remain absent from the case and the proceeding unless the charge-sheet is submitted and information to this effect is given to him. It was, therefore, his view that the learned S.D.J.M. had given a go-by to this rule of law and in haste but without any necessity, had directed the issuance of warrant of arrest against the petitioner, who was on bail, in the manner noted above. 10. The impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge makes a distressing reading. Firstly, it appears that the learned Sessions Judge has not properly appreciated the decision of the case as mentioned above, in this case it was decided by the Supreme Court that, If the accused was released on pail, he was not required to appear before the Court after every 14 days until the charge-sheet is filed and process is issued against him. This decision, however, lays down a clear rule of procedure in a case when the accused is granted bail by the Court. This decision, however, lays down a clear rule of procedure in a case when the accused is granted bail by the Court. In such a situation, till the charge-sheet is submitted and till the process is issued against him, he is not required to attend the Court, after the period of every 14 days as was found to be on practice in many Courts of Magistrates in Bihar. This decision, however, can never mean to imply that when an accused is ordered to surrender before the court on the basis of specific and clear order passed by the Court, he will not surrender simply because he has been granted either regular or anticipatory bail by the Court. In this connection it may be stated that it is well settled in law that the accused persons released on bail can be called upon to appear or surrender before the court as per the terms of the order. A conditional order as a regular or anticipatory bail can be passed by the Court. Therefore, the aid of the case reported in 1982 Cr. I.L.J. 1943 which only lays down the general law on the subject could hardly be taken by the learned Sessions Judge in support of the contention that in no case the accused can be asked to surrender before the Court. 11. The two orders as contained in Annexure-3 and 8 have been quoted in the earlier portion of this judgment. From Annexure-3 it becomes clear that the anticipatory bail was granted to the petitioner only till the submission of the charge-sheet after which he was specifically directed by the learned Sessions Judge to surrender before the lower Court and to pray for regular bail. From the impugned order (Annexure- 8), it becomes clear that the supplementary charge-sheet was submitted against opposite party No. 2 on 10-11-1986. Under this circumstance. I think the informant was justified in filing a petition on the following day i.e., on 11-11-1986 before the Court for the issuance of a non-bailable warrant of arrest against opposite party No.2 since even after submission of the charge-sheet against him he had not surrendered. Under this circumstance. I think the informant was justified in filing a petition on the following day i.e., on 11-11-1986 before the Court for the issuance of a non-bailable warrant of arrest against opposite party No.2 since even after submission of the charge-sheet against him he had not surrendered. The import of the order as contained in Annexure- 3 is clear to the effect that after the submission of the charge-sheet the anticipatory bail granted to the petitioner had ceased and he was required to surrender before the Court and to pray for regular bail. If under this circumstance, the informant filed a petition on 11-11.1986 after submission of the charge-sheet against opposite party No.2. I do not think he was in the wrong. It appears that earlier a charge-sheet on 6-11- 1986 was submitted by the police (not against opposite party No.2) on the basis of which the cognizance was taken and 29-11-1986 was the next date fixed in the case for supplying the police papers. Since opposite party No.2 did not figure as an accused in the said charge-sheet. obviously, the order passed fixing 29-11-1986 for the supply of the police papers would hardly apply to him. It was only after the submission of the supplementary charge-sheet on 10-11-1986 that opposite party No. 2 figured as an accused. As such, the learned Sessions Judge was clearly in the wrong to think that it was open to the opposite party No.2 to surrender on 29-11-1986 ignoring the import of his earlier order as contained in Annexure- 3. It appears that the learned Magistrate had ordered for the issue of warrant of arrest against opposite party No.2 only on 18-11-1986, when till then opposite party No.2 had not appeared before him in compliance of the order as contained in Annexure- 3. Under this situation, I do not think the learned Magistrate had committed any illegality by issuing the warrant of arrest and by cancelling the bail bond of opposite party No.2. Under this circumstance, also I find that the impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is manifestly wrong. 12. Now I will take up for consideration the earlier point raised on behalf of the petitioner in this case to the effect that the learned Sessions Judge was not authorised under law to modify his earlier order passed on 6-10-1986 as contained in Annexure-3. 12. Now I will take up for consideration the earlier point raised on behalf of the petitioner in this case to the effect that the learned Sessions Judge was not authorised under law to modify his earlier order passed on 6-10-1986 as contained in Annexure-3. It is clear that by the impugned order passed on 10-12-1986 (Annexure - 8), the learned Sessions Judge had modified his earlier order as contained in Annexure- 3. This modification appears to be of far reaching consequence. While earlier as per Annexure-3, the learned Sessions Judge had directed the petitioner to surrender before the lower Court and to pray, for regular bail after the submission of the charge-sheet against him, by the impugned order he appears to have modified this portion of Annexure- 3, as a result of which, the petitioner was no longer required to surrender before the lower Court and to pray for regular bail after the submission of the charge-sheet. Thus, this modification appears to be of far reaching consequence. The question that now arises for consideration in this connection is whether the learned Sessions Judge had any authority or power to modify his earlier order so as to nullify the same. Has the learned Sessions Judge any inherent power to do so? In this connection a reference may be made to Sec. 482 of the Code which runs as follows: "482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court. - Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to, give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." From this Section itself, it becomes clear that through it only the inherent power as vested in the High Court has been saved. There is no provision in any other part of this Code to show that the Sessions Judge or for that matter of fact, any other court, except the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure has got inherent power. It is now well settled through a catena of decisions that subordinate Courts do not have any such inherent power. By way of an example, in the case of Bindeshwari Pd. Singh V/s. Kali Singh, may be cites. It is now well settled through a catena of decisions that subordinate Courts do not have any such inherent power. By way of an example, in the case of Bindeshwari Pd. Singh V/s. Kali Singh, may be cites. This was a case under the old Code of 1898. It has been observed that there is absolutely no provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 empowering a Magistrate to review or recall an order passed by him. The Code does not contain a provision for inherent powers namely, Sec. 561-A which, however, confirs these powers on the High Court and the High Court alone unlike Sec. 151 of Civil Procedure Code showing that Criminal Courts have got no inherent power. It may be noticed here that Sec. 482 of the present Code corresponding to Sec. 561-A of the old Code. Thus, it can safely be concluded that the learned Sessions Judge could not have reviewed or recalled any order passed by him. On this ground also the impugned order appears to be bad in law. 13 For the reasons stated above, this application is allowed and the impugned order is hereby, quashed. If the case is still pending before any Court, the opposite party No.2 is directs to immediately surrender before the said Court and it will be open to him to pray for regular bail. 14. With this observation, this application is allowed.