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1990 DIGILAW 507 (KAR)

UNION BANK OF INDIA, ZONAL OFFICE, BANGALORE v. LITTLE INDUSTRIES, MYSORE

1990-09-13

M.RAMAKRISHNA RAO

body1990
M. RAMAKRISHNA RAO, J. ( 1 ) IN this revision petition, the petitioner-plaintiff has sought for revising the order made by the trial court in o. s. No. 139/1986, dated 7th march, 1987 by which it rejected part of the claim put forward in an application under order 6, Rule 17 of CPC. , and allowed the remaining part. ( 2 ) THE salient facts that are necessary for the purpose of disposal of this revisionare as follows: the plaintiff-petitioner has brought a suit in o. s. No. 139/1986 on the file of the court of prl. Civil judge, mysore, seeking to recover a certain amount of money from the defendants-respondents. During the pendency of the suit, an application under order 6, Rule 17 of CPC. , came to be filed on 29-7-1986. In that application the following prayers was made to amend the plaint:1) by amending paragraph 4 after the words to add as "for all the transactions mentioned above. " 2) in para 6 to delete he total amount mentioned therein and he also wants to introduce para 8 (a) seeking permission of the court to file separate suit based on common security against the defendants. 3) in para 11 for the figure Rs. 1,72,238/-, the figure Rs. 2,50,457. 35 ps. Be substituted. 4) in para 13, to delete last two columns and insert four columns mentioned in the application and also to make consequential amendments. the object of the application to amend the plaint is that the plaintiff-bank has filed a suit along with an affidavit disclosing the facts of the case that the bank sought to recover a sum of Rs. 1,72,238/- due in respect of bills purchased or facility extended by the plaintiff-bank which the 8th defendant accepted and since he did not pay the amount to the plaintiff the suit was brought. It is also disclosed that on 24-3-1986 some bills were lapsed and hence the plaintiff-bank filed a suit on the face value of the principal sum mentioned in paras 3 and 6 of the plaint. But the interest is payable at the current rate of 17 1/2% per annum from the date of bills and the interest of the each bill is to be calculated and added to the principal sum. But the interest is payable at the current rate of 17 1/2% per annum from the date of bills and the interest of the each bill is to be calculated and added to the principal sum. It is necessary to mention here that there are 30 bills referred to in the course of the averments of the plaint seeking to recover not only the principal amount involved in the bills, but also the interest to be calculated and recovered from the defendants. In para 7 of the order under revision the learned trial judge referred to the salient facts wherein he has stated that out of 30 bills discounted on various dates right from 25-3-1983 to 20-12-1983 the total amount due from these bills amounted to Rs. 1,72,238/- payable to the bank, according to them. It is pointed out in the application under order 6, Rule 17 seeking to incorporate certain additional prayer as indicated above that the plaintiff wants to introduce specific prayers in para 6 to introduce 4 columns which may result in not only mere introducing the additional prayer as referred to in the application but it will result in introducing the additional amount of interest calculated and claimed in the application. Thus, the interest so calculated and sought to be claimed by way of amendment refers to the period from 25-3-1983 to 29-7-1983. In other words, though the suit came to be presented on 24-3-1983 which is within three years for the purpose of limitation, but in the application under order 6, Rule 17 of CPC. , the plaintiff wants to introduce a certain sum of money payable not only as on 29-7-1983 but also subsequently. For instance, the plaintiff has calculated interest payable upto 30th of july, 1983 which is clearly barred by time. It is in this context discussing the salient feature in paragraph 7 of the order the learned judge reached the conclusion that so far as the additional interest claimed on the principal is concerned, it is within time. Such permissible sum towards the interest has to be added to the main claim and hence, the total amount comes to Rs. 2,21,346. 25 ps. , while the additional interest calculated and sought to be introduced by way of amendment comes to Rs. 29,111. 10 ps. Which is beyond the period of 29-7-1983. Such permissible sum towards the interest has to be added to the main claim and hence, the total amount comes to Rs. 2,21,346. 25 ps. , while the additional interest calculated and sought to be introduced by way of amendment comes to Rs. 29,111. 10 ps. Which is beyond the period of 29-7-1983. Thus, such additional sum of interest calculated is barred by time. The learned judge calculating and referring to the period relevant for the purpose of considering limitation has reached the conclusion that any sum payable by way of interest beyond 29-7-1983 cannot be allowed. The learned judge considered various decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the bank and held that they were not relevant to the facts of the present case and hence reached the conclusion against the plaintiff. Therefore, the court below allowed the application in part in so far as the amendment for introducing additional sum of rupees towards the interest payable as on 29-7-1983 and not beyond that. Thus, he allowed partly the application under order 6, Rule 17 of CPC. , while he rejected the part of the prayer which is beyond the period of limitation for the purpose of amendment. I went through the order under revision. The submission made by Sri chandrashekaraiah is that the view taken by the court below is perfectly justified and there is no ground warranting interference of this court. ( 3 ) SRI chandrashekaraiah also relied upon the ruling of this court in V. Ramakrishna and others v A. Davidappa and others, 1970 (2) mys. L. j. 334 wherein Mr. Santhosh. J. As he then was observed in para No. 6 as follows: "granting or refusing amendment of the pleadings is a matter lying within the discretion of the trial court. Though earlier, the various high courts including this high court had interfered in revision under Section 115, CPC. , with the orders of lower courts cither granting or refusing amendment of pleadings, the Supreme Court has now laid down that the high court should not under Section 115, CPC. , interfere in the exercise of its revisional power, with the order of the trial court refusing or granting an amendment. , with the orders of lower courts cither granting or refusing amendment of pleadings, the Supreme Court has now laid down that the high court should not under Section 115, CPC. , interfere in the exercise of its revisional power, with the order of the trial court refusing or granting an amendment. In radhey shyam v ram autar, (1) (c. a. No. 506/1965 reported in gopalakrishna's Supreme Court short notes dated 15-2-1967, item 60) it has been laid down by the Supreme Court that the high court has no jurisdiction under Section 115, CPC. , to interfere, in the exercise of its revisional power, with the order of the trial court refusing amendment of the pleading. The Supreme Court has also pointed out in rouschilla v bengal jute mills ltd. (2), (c. a. No. 469/1963 reported in gopalakrishna's Supreme Court short notes dated 1-2-1965, item 12) that the question whether leave should have been granted to the appellant to amend its written statement, fell entirely within the discretion of the trial judge. Again in ratilal v ranchchodbhai, (3), the Supreme Court has observed as follows: 'therefore, if the trial court had jurisdiction to decide a question before it and did decide it whether it decided it rightly or wrongly, the court had jurisdiction to decide the case and even if it decided the question wrongly, it did not exercise its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. ' it is not necessary to consider the decisions of the high courts relied on by Sri gundappa, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court. " in the light of the above ruling the conclusion reached by the court below being justified there is no ground warranting interference of this court. Similarly in chinnamma v srinivas and others, 1970 (2) mys. Lj. 306, a division bench of this court held that the plaintiff could not be allowed to amend the plaint to plead a claim under hindu women's rights to property Act, 1937 on the basis of a cause of action which accrued when plaintiff died, as such a claim would have been barred by time. Lj. 306, a division bench of this court held that the plaintiff could not be allowed to amend the plaint to plead a claim under hindu women's rights to property Act, 1937 on the basis of a cause of action which accrued when plaintiff died, as such a claim would have been barred by time. In the instant case since the cause of action for the purpose of the suit being on 29-7-1983 for the purpose of limitation the court below has rightly allowed the amendment to introduce the additional sums of money by way of interest to that extent and the amendment sought to introduce certain sum of money by way of interest calculated beyond 29-7-1983 being clearly barred by time, it has rightly held to that extent, that the amendment being impermissible, the same came to be rejected. Similar is the view taken by this court in m. l. shankaranarayana rao v corporation of the city of Bangalore, 1973 (2) mys. Lj. 456 wherein Mr. Govinda bhat, c. j. as he then was has held that: "in allowing the amendment, the court has to consider whether the plaintiff's claim in respect of the amended relief would be barred by limitation on the date of the amendment application". ( 4 ) TO reiterate, this application for amendment came to be presented on29-7-1986. Therefore, as on the date when the certain sums of moneys were sought to be calculated and introduced by way of amendment towards interest, the claim was clearly barred by time. Hence, the trial court was right in allowing that part of the claim. I do not see any good ground to interfere with the order of the trial court. In the result, this revision petition fails and is dismissed. --- *** --- .