JUDGMENT 1. Revision petitioners are judgment debtors 1 to 3 in E.P. 292 of 1989 in O.S. 260 of 1987 of the Sub Court, Palakkad. They contended that the decree is not executable as no preliminary decree was passed in terms of O.34 R.3, 4 and 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The objection was overruled by the executing Court and further steps in execution were ordered. 2. Learned counsel for the revision petitioners submitted that the decree sought to be executed is a nullity as a composite decree alone was passed by the Trial Court - Counsel relied on State Bank of Travancore v. Balakrishnan 1990 (1) KLT 391 and submitted that a decree for sale of the property after the enactment of the new O.34 cannot be passed under O.34 as amended by the High Court. Learned counsel for the respondent (decree holder) pointed out that the failure to pass a final preliminary decree and final decree does not invalidate the decree in any manner and it can never be said that the decree is a nullity. Counsel relied on Francis Mathew and others v. Bank of Madura Ltd. and others (2), where this court held that the failure of the Court to pass a preliminary decree and a final decree does not make the decree passed a nullity. It was further held that it cannot be said that the Court lacked inherent jurisdiction to pass the decree and if any party is aggrieved by the decree he could have filed appeal against it and without doing so he cannot contend before the executing court that the decree is a nullity. 3. In Francis Mathew and others v. Bank of Madura Ltd. 1986 KLT 897 , this Court followed the decision in Mathew v. Bank of Cochin 1982 KLT 591 , where also it is held that the failure of the Trial Court to pass a preliminary decree and a final decree does not make the decree passed a nullity, and that there is no want of inherent jurisdiction of the Court to pass such a decree. 4. The revision petitioners could not point out that any prejudice was caused to them on account of the passing of the composite decree. 4. The revision petitioners could not point out that any prejudice was caused to them on account of the passing of the composite decree. In this context it is useful to refer to Chinnammal v. P. Arumughan 1990 (1) SCC 513 where the Supreme Court held thus: - "It is well to remember that the Code of Civil Procedure is a body of procedural law designed to facilitate justice and it should not be treated as an enactment providing for punishments and penalties. The laws of procedure should be so construed as to render justice wherever reasonably possible. It is in our opinion, not unreasonable to demand restitution from a person who has purchased the property in court auction being aware of the pending appeal against the decree." In Mosa Rajayyan v. Jacob Haris 1981 KLT SN 92 (Case No. 164), Bhaskaran, J. (as he then was) held that is merely because a (final) decree, without a preliminary decree preceding it, has been passed, the decree does not become null and void. It has been further held that once decree is allowed to become final, without being appealed against any irregularity, even illegality, unless it be a case of total lack of jurisdiction, would not render the decree null and void or incapable of being executed. In view of the settled legal position the contention of the revision petitioner that the decree is not executable has only to be rejected. There is no merit in the Civil Revision Petition and hence the same is dismissed with costs.