ORDER R.P. Singh, J. - By means of this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the order passed by the District Judge. Pilibhit allowing the revision after setting aside the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and further releasing the disputed accommodation in favour of the landlady respondent No. 2. 2. Briefly the facts of the case are that the shop situate at J. P. Road in Pilibhit was in tenancy of one Sharafat Ullah who intimated to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that he was going to vacate the said shop. Respondent No. 2 the landlady of the disputed accommodation then filed an application for release of the said accommodation while the petitioner filed an application for allotment of the said accommodation in his favour. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer vide phis order dated 4-1-83 holding that the need of the landlady for the disputed ,accommodation was not bona fide and genuine, rejected her application for the Release of the disputed accommodation and further holding that the accommodation was already in possession of the petitioner who was the only applicant for allotment of the same, order the allotment of the disputed accommodation in favour of the petitioner. The landlady respondent No. 2 feeling aggrieved, went up in revision before the District Judge who vide the impugned order allowed the revision after setting aside the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and further ordered the release of the said accommodation in favour of the landlady respondent No. 2 which order is in challenge in the present writ petition. 3. Heard Sri Triloki Nath learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Navin Sinha for the respondent. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to re-assess the evidence and interfere in finding of fact in revisional jurisdiction and hence the impugned order passed by him after re-assessment of the evidence and interfering on the question of fact is liable to be set aside. He further contended that the District Judge after allowing the revision could not himself order the release of the disputed accommodation side the impugned order and hence also the impugned order passed by him is liable to be set aside. 5. He further contended that the District Judge after allowing the revision could not himself order the release of the disputed accommodation side the impugned order and hence also the impugned order passed by him is liable to be set aside. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that the petitioner being a prospective allottee could not be allowed to participate in the proceedings for the release of the disputed accommodation and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in allowing the petitioner. who is a prospective allottee, to participate in the proceedings regarding release of the disputed accommodation has clearly committed a manifest error of law and hence the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is liable to be set aside. He further contended that the need of the landlady respondent No. 2 should have been decided on its own merit irrespective of the case set up by the prospective allottee regarding his possession in the disputed accommodation and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in rejecting the release application on the ground that the petitioner is already in possession of the disputed accommodation and paying rent to the landlady, and hence the need of the landlady for the disputed accommodation is not bonafide and genuine has wrongly rejected the release application after taking extraneous facts into consideration and hence the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is liable to be set aside and in that view of the matter this Court should not interfere in the order passed in revision by the District Judge allowing the revision and ordering the release of the accommodation in favour of the landlady. 6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the relevant order I find that while the order passed by the District Judge is vitiated in law as he has allowed the revision on re-assessment of the evidence and interfering on the question of fact, on the other hand, the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is also liable to be set aside on the ground that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has allowed the prospective allottee to participate in the proceedings for the release of the disputed accommodation. From the perusal of the order passed by the District Judge I find that he has re-assessed the evidence and held that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has not properly assessed the evidence and has taken into consideration photostat copies which are not admissible in evidence and on re-assessment of evidence he has held that the petitioner had colluded with the old tenant and moved the application for allotment and then entered in possession. The District Judge held that in his opinion there was no reason to reject the assertion of the landlady about her bona fide need for the disputed accommodation. In the result the District Judge allowed the revision after re-assessment of the evidence and then further he ordered the release of the disputed accommodation in favour of the landlady which is clearly vitiated and liable to be set aside. 7. Now coming to the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, I find that he has allowed the petitioner, who is a prospective allottee to participate in the proceedings for the release of the disputed accommodation which is manifestly erroneous. It is well settled that a prospective allottee has no locus standi to contest the application for release filed by the landlady. See Talib Hasan v. Ist Addl. District Judge, Nainital, (1986) 1 All Rent Cas 1 : 1986 All LJ 845 (FB) and Prem Chand Goyal v. 1st A.D.J. Dehradun, (1982) 1 All Rent Cas 464. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer after taking into consideration the application moved by the petitioner for the allotment of the disputed accommodation came to the conclusion that the landlady seems to be giving the accommodation on rent to various persons and has also allowed the petitioner to remain in possession and issue rent receipts in lieu thereof and in view of the same he held that the need of the landlady for the disputed accommodation is not bona fide and genuine and on this ground rejected the application for the release of the disputed accommodation. This order passed by Rent Control and Eviction Officer is manifestly erroneous in view of the well settled view that the prospective allottee has no locus standi to contest the application for the release filed by the landlady. This order passed by Rent Control and Eviction Officer is manifestly erroneous in view of the well settled view that the prospective allottee has no locus standi to contest the application for the release filed by the landlady. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer should not have permitted the petitioner to participate in the proceedings for the release moved by the landlady and should have first decided the release application moved by the landlady on its own merits and only in case he had rejected the application for the release of the disputed accommodation, thereafter alone the Rent Control and Eviction Officer could consider the application for allotment moved by the petitioner and pass order in accordance with law. In that view of the matter the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is also liable to be set aside. 8. In the result, I allow the writ petition and quash the orders passed by the District Judge and also passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 10-8-83 and 4-1-83 respectively and remand the case to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to decide the release application of the respondent No. 2 in accordance with law in view of the observations made above. Since the case is already very old pending since 1980, I direct the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to decide the case expeditiously and if possible within three months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order before him. 9. The parties shall bear their own costs.