Judgment MATHUR, J. ( 1 ) THIS legislation has a chequered history and this is third round. On two previous occasions the similar provisions had come up for interpretation before this Court and now this is third time it is coming over again. ( 2 ) THIS order will dispose of all the writ petitions mentioned in the Schedule appended to this order. ( 3 ) IN order to appreciate the controversy and points involved in these writ petitions the facts of M/s. Pal Bus Service v. State of Rajasthan. (D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 982/1989) are taken into consideration for the convenient disposal of all these writ petitions mentioned in the Schedule appended to this order. ( 4 ) THE petitioner is an existing operator of the route Suratgarh to Hanumangarh via Manakthedi, Jakhadawali, Kalibanga etc. which was formerly 83 Kms. in length and thereafter due to certain extension it became 95 Kms. in length. During the year 1973-74 the aforesaid route Suratgarh to Hanumangarh had scope of 6:4 and in pursuance there of 6 permits were granted in the year 1974. Out of which one permit was granted in favour of one Darshan Singh. In the year 1984, the vacancy of two permits was filled up and one permit each in favour of Jagannath and Babukhan was granted. Thus, all the six permits came into existence in the year 1984 and all the six permit-holders were plying their vehicles in rotation performing 4 return services over the same. The permit of Darshan Singh was transferred in favour of the petitioner w. e. f. 31-12-1985. The petitioner was regularly plying the vehicle on the basis of the scope of 6:4 and the District Transport Officer, Sri Ganganagar vide his order dated 28-7-1987 assessed the vehicle No. RRK 9443 of the petitioner for the period ranging from 1 -1 -1987 to 30-6-1987 on the basis of the scope of 6:4. Thereafter, on 30-6-1989 he assessed the vehicle of the petitioner for the period from 1-7-1987 to 31-12-1988. It is alleged that in the year 1986 the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority without notice to the existing operators asked the existing operators of the petitioners route to avail six return services instead of 4 return services against which the existing operators preferred an appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and a stay was granted. Thereafter it was vacated. It is alleged that in the year 1986 the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority without notice to the existing operators asked the existing operators of the petitioners route to avail six return services instead of 4 return services against which the existing operators preferred an appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and a stay was granted. Thereafter it was vacated. Then, again the existing operators were asked by the District Transport Officer to pay the special road tax in accordance with the scope of 6:6 with retrospective effect i. e. from 26-2-1986. This was challenged by filing Writ Petition No. 2613 of 1988 challenging the validity of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation (Amendment) Act No. 3 of 1987 and the same was accepted by this Court by the order dated 1-11-1988 and the validation Act was struck down. It was directed that the petitioner shall pay the tax in accordance with the distance actually covered and not for the distance ought to have been covered or on the basis of the scope. Aggrieved against this the State of Rajasthan preferred a special leave petition before the Honble Supreme Court and the same is pending. The Honble Supreme Court granted a limited stay to the extent of staying the refund of the excess amount of tax collected. ( 5 ) THEN, again the petitioner was handed over two assessment orders dated 10-3-1989 relating to the assessment of the arrears for the period ranging from 1-3-1986 to 31-12-1987 and 1-1-1988 to 28-2-1989 along with demand notice. Similarly the petitioner was also handed over the assessment order for the period ranging from 1-3-1986 to 31-12-1987 along with demand notice. This was objected to by the petitioner. But he was informed that after the decision of the Division Bench in the aforesaid case the State of Rajasthan has issued an Ordinance, namely, the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation (Amendment) Ordinance No. 1 of 1989, which had come into force therefore, these new assessment orders issued in pursuance of the aforesaid ordinance. This Ordinance was thereafter enacted as an Act of the Assembly, known as the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxati of 1989, repealing the Ordinance. This was me effective w. e. f. l -10-1982. Hence, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging the validity of the provisions of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation (Amendment) Act No. 5 of 1989. This Ordinance was thereafter enacted as an Act of the Assembly, known as the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxati of 1989, repealing the Ordinance. This was me effective w. e. f. l -10-1982. Hence, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging the validity of the provisions of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation (Amendment) Act No. 5 of 1989. ( 6 ) BEFORE we advert to the contentions raised by the learned counsel, it would be proper to refer the past history of this legislation and two previous judgments given by the Division Bench. The Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation (Amendment) Act No. 20 of 1982 came into force with effect from 1-10-1982. This was an amendment to the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1951), (consequently, the Rajasthan Passengers and Goods Taxation Act, 1959 was repealed ). The Amending Act No. 20 of 1982 brought about a number of changes in the Act of 1951 and specially Section 4-B was inserted in the Act of 1951 after Section 4-A of the Principal Act. Though other changes were also brought about but we are not concerned with those changes as they have no material bearing on the controversy involved in the present writ petitions. Hence, they are not referred to. Section 4-B introduced a tax known as Special Road Tax. Section 4-B reads as under :-"4-B. Special Road Tax.- In addition to the tax and surcharge levied under Section 4 and 4-A respectively and subject to the rules as may be made by the State Government in this behalf, there shall be levied and paid to the State Government a Special Road Tax on all transport vehicles at the rates fixed by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette not exceeding the maximum rates specified in Schedule A. " ( 7 ) UNDER Section 4-B a Schedule was also appended known as Schedule A whereby the maximum rates were specified and it was mentioned that it is open for the State Government to levy the same by a notification in the Official Gazette. But the maximum ceiling was fixed in the Schedule issued under Section 4-B. Schedule A issued under Section 4-B Reads as under:-schedule-A (See Section 4-B) s. No. Description of Transport Vehicle maximum Rate of Special Road Tax 1 2 3 1. State Carriages (a) Ordinary services rs. 0. But the maximum ceiling was fixed in the Schedule issued under Section 4-B. Schedule A issued under Section 4-B Reads as under:-schedule-A (See Section 4-B) s. No. Description of Transport Vehicle maximum Rate of Special Road Tax 1 2 3 1. State Carriages (a) Ordinary services rs. 0. 30 paise per seat per 10 Kms, for entire distance to be covered during the month. (b) Express / Mail services rs. 0. 40 paise per seat per 10 Kms, for entire distance to be covered during the month. (c) Semi Delux Services rs. 0. 50 paise per seat per 10 Kms. for entire distance to be covered during the month. (d) Delux Service rs. 0. 60 paise per seat per 10 Kms. For entire distance to be covered during the month. @@@ note:- If the distance to be covered is not exact multiple of ten, the tax for kilometres falling short of ten shall be chargeable prorata. " in pursuance of this the State Government issued a notification on 1-10-1982 fixing the rates for various services but here we are concerned with the ordinary services item (a) i. e. @ 18 paise per seat per 10 Kms. for the entire distance to be covered during the month. The notification reads as under:-"home (Gr. VIC) DEPARTMENT NOTIFICATIONS jaipur 1/10/1982 s. O. 96.- In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 4-B of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1951 (Rajasthan Act 11 of 1951), the State Government hereby fixes with immediate effect the rates of Special Road Tax on different classes of Motor Vehicles specified in column No. 2. of the schedule appended hereto as specified against each in column No. 3 thereof :-schedule s. No. Description of Transport Vehicle Rates of Special Road Tax 1 2 3 1. State Carriages (a) Ordinary services 18 Paise per seat per 10 Kms. for the entire distance to be covered during the month. Note:- If the distance to be covered is not exact multiple of 10 Kms. the tax for Kilometres falling short of ten shall be chargeable prorata. 2. Stage Carriage plying exclusively in Municipal or City limits. (a) For the first 20 seats Rs. 500. 00 per seat per annum. (b) For the next 20 seats rs. 300/- per seat per annum (c) For the next seats above 40 rs. 250/- per seat per annum. the tax for Kilometres falling short of ten shall be chargeable prorata. 2. Stage Carriage plying exclusively in Municipal or City limits. (a) For the first 20 seats Rs. 500. 00 per seat per annum. (b) For the next 20 seats rs. 300/- per seat per annum (c) For the next seats above 40 rs. 250/- per seat per annum. @@@ note:- Where the owner holds permit for more than one vehicle with a condition to operate any of the vehicles on the route covered by the permit, the seating capacity shall be reckoned on the average seating capacity of the entire fleet of buses, according to the classification of service mentioned at S. No. 1. ( 8 ) THIS notification came to be challenged by filing number of writ petitions and it was contended that the expression mentioned in the notification dated 1-10-1982 as reproduced above the criteria laid down distance to be covered during the month is too vague and the tax should be charged on the basis of the distance actually covered. In the case of M/s. Shiv Bus Service v. State of Rajasthan Civil Writ Petition No. 1500/1983, decided on 24-2-1984 the learned single Judge interpreted the expression the entire distance to be covered means that the entire distance to be covered according to the time table fixed by the R. T. A. In case the timings are not fixed then Taxation Officer may take aid of R. 90 of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1951. ( 9 ) AGGRIEVED against this order an appeal was preferred before the Division Bench and the Division Bench in the case of Pabu Dan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (Civil Special Appeal No. 46 of 1984, decided on 31-7-1986): 1986 WLN (UC) 443 interpreted this clause to mean the distance actually covered. The Division Bench observed as under: -"when the owner of the vehicle is required to maintain an account in respect of the distance covered during the journey and is called upon to file a return furnishing particulars of the total number of Kilometres covered by the vehicle during the month and under Section 8-A the special road tax has to be determined on the basis of the return filed in accordance with the account kept in the prescribed register MTN. The special road tax could only be determined and charged with reference to the distance covered by the vehicle during the month which certainly means the distance covered by the vehicle during the month which certainly means the distance actually covered by such vehicle and not the distance which the vehicle would have covered if it would have applied in accordance with the provisions of Rule 90 of the Rules. " (Italicised is mine ). (Missing in certified copy-Ed.) ( 10 ) AGGRIEVED against this, the State preferred a special leave petition before the Honble Supreme Court and the same is pending. ( 11 ) MEANWHILE, the State Government brought about the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1986. This subsequently became the Act known as the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the Act No. 3 of 1987 ). Section 2 amended the Schedule A issued under Section 4-B. Section 3 of this Act validated the collections of special road tax nullified the effect of judgment given in Pabu Dan Singhs case (supra ). Section 2 of the Act of 1987 by which the amendments were made in Schedule A issued under Section 4-B reads as under:-"2. Amendment of Schedule-A, Rajasthan Act 11 of 1951- In Schedule A appended to the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1951 (Rajasthan Act 11 of 1951), hereinafter referred to as the principal Act, in the entries against serial number 1 and the note thereunder for the words "distance to be covered". Wherever occurring, the expression "distance required to be covered as per the time-table fixed or, where no time-table has been fixed, as per the scope fixed by the Regional Transport Authority for a route under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act 4 of 1939)" shall be substituted and shall be deemed to have been substituted on and from the first day of October, 1982. " ( 12 ) THIS was made effective retrospectively i. e. w. e. f. 1-10-1982. ( 13 ) SECTION 3 by which the Validation was made reads as under :-"3. " ( 12 ) THIS was made effective retrospectively i. e. w. e. f. 1-10-1982. ( 13 ) SECTION 3 by which the Validation was made reads as under :-"3. Validation of certain determinations and collections of Special Road Tax.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, order or finding of any Court to the contrary, any determination or collection of special road tax on motor vehicles under the principal Act on the basis of the distance required to be covered as per the time-table fixed or where no time-table has been fixed, as per the scope fixed by the Regional Transport Authority for a route under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act 4 of 1939) or any action taken or thing done in relation to such determination or collection shall be deemed to be valid and effective as if such determination, collection, action or thing has been made, taken or done under the principal Act as amended by this Act and accordingly- (a) all proceedings taken by any officer or authority of the State Government in connection with such determination or collection of special road tax shall, for all purposes, be deemed to have been taken in accordance with the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act; (b) no suit or other proceeding shall be maintained or continued in any court or before any authority questioning the determination or collection of such tax or claiming refund thereof; and (c) no court or authority shall enforce any judgment order or finding with respect to the refund of any such tax on the ground that the actual distance covered by a motor vehicle on a route was less than the distance required to be covered as per the time table fixed or, where no time-table has been fixed, as per the scope fixed by the Regional Transport Authority for a route under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act 4 of 1939 ). (2) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing in sub-section (1) shall be construed as preventing any person- (a) from questioning, in accordance with the provisions of the principal Act, as amended by this Act, any determination or collection of special road tax; or (b) from claiming refund of any amount paid by him in excess of the amount due from him by way of such tax under the principal Act, as amended by this Act. "this Act came into force with, effect from 1-12-1986. The provision of this Act came to be challenged before this Court by filing Writ Petitions and one of such writ petition was filed by one P. D. Singh being D. B. C. Wr. Petn. No. 311 of 1987 : P. D. Singh v. State of Rajasthan. In this writ petition the validity of Section 3 was challenged and Division Bench of this Court held that Section 3 of the Act of 1987 is invalid as the levy notification issued on 1-10-1982 continued to be the same and the expression entire distance to be covered during the month remained intact. Therefore, without bringing the necessary amendment in the notification the levy was held to be bad and it was found that the basis on which the judgment was given by this Court in case of Pabudan Singh v. State of Rajasthan decided on 31-7-1986* was not altered. It was held that since in Pabudan Singhs case, the entire distance required to be covered was interpreted and the same notification still continues notwithstanding the amendment in the Schedule under Section 4-B of the Act the legislature could not declare the judgment of this Court invalid. ( 14 ) IT was observed as under: -"the amendment in the maximum Schedule alone, without a corresponding change in the relevant entry of the notification, does not alter the position of levy. We do not find any substantial change in the situation to necessitate different interpretation. ( 14 ) IT was observed as under: -"the amendment in the maximum Schedule alone, without a corresponding change in the relevant entry of the notification, does not alter the position of levy. We do not find any substantial change in the situation to necessitate different interpretation. Rather the circumstance that the legislature, after the decision in Pabudansinghs case, chose to make specific changes in the Schedule of maximum rates but left the levy notification as it is, gives recognition to and rather strengthens the view taken in Pabudan Singhs case, The Additional Advocate General invited our attention to the statement of objects and reasons that accompanied the Bill and submitted that the object of the legislation was to make it explicit by amending the law that the distance to be taken into account for the purpose of determining Special Road Tax was the distance required to be covered and not the distance actually covered. The legislature felt it expedient to validate the determination and collection of tax as the refund required to be made in pursuance of the judgment of this Court was to result in great loss of revenue to the State. There are several objections to the acceptance of the above submission made by the learned Additional Advocate General. A resort to the external aid for interpretation by reference to the statement of objects and reasons is permissible when the language of the law under examination is ambiguous. Here, what is under consideration is the language employed in the entry of the levy notification and the meaning of the said expression stands crystallised by the judgment in Pabudansinghs case (1986 WLN (UC) 443 ). The said judgment cannot just be ignored or disregarded. It has become final and binding. Further, the language employed in the notification is clear and admits of no ambiguity. In interpreting a taxing statute, the Court is required to look squarely at the words employed therein. It is not open to us to add, subtract or substitute anything while interpreting a provision of law. We cannot omit or delete any words from the language used in a legislation, whether it be primary, delegated or subordinate. We must give effect to the words which are plain and clear. It is not open to us to add, subtract or substitute anything while interpreting a provision of law. We cannot omit or delete any words from the language used in a legislation, whether it be primary, delegated or subordinate. We must give effect to the words which are plain and clear. We do not find any reason or justification to read the relevant entry of the notification under consideration by omitting therefrom the words "for the entire distance to be covered during the month, " or substituting in their place the changed expression of the Schedule. If we accept the suggestion made by the Additional Advocate General, it would rather have the effect of enlarging and expanding the scope of the notification. We are afraid. We cannot do this. It is not permissible. Even after the amendment of the Schedule by the Validation Act, the Schedule and the notification can co-exist. The notification does not conflict with the Schedule. As it is now, different expressions find mention in the Schedule and the notification. The Additional Advocate General fairly and frankly admitted that the language of the Schedule is wider than of the notification. It is always open to the legislature to select and choose a narrower field for taxation. It is for the legislature to make the required changes in the levy notification if it feels the need for this. When it has not done so, obviously this Court cannot cure the defect and supply the deficiency. We are clearly of the view that the expression "distance to be covered during the month" used in the levy notification issued in terms of Section 4-B of the Act, will still carry the same meaning spelt by the Division Bench of this Court in Pabudansinghs case. This would mean that the special road tax chargeable under 1 (a) - Stage carriage - ordinary service, would have to be computed on the basis of the distance actually covered during the month and not on the basis of the distance required to be covered as per the time-table fixed or as per the scope fixed by the Regional Transport Authority for the route under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. " ( 15 ) THEREAFTER the Division Bench examined the validity of Section 3 of the Act of 1987 and relying on Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Municipality, AIR 1970 SC 192 and reviewing the entire case law on the subject came to the conclusion that since the levy notification is the same, therefore, the basis upon which the judgment in Pabudansinghs case (1988 WLN (UC) 443) was founded remains unaltered. It was observed as under :-"we are clearly of the opinion that the premises and the position of the law have not undergone a change to render the said judgment ineffective. Section 3 of the Act seeks to set at naught the judgment of this Court given in Pabudansinghs case, without removing or altering the basis on which the said judgment was grounded. It appears to us to be legally impermissible. In our constitutional set up, the legislature is not competent to do so. Obviously, Section 3 of the Act encroaches upon the judicial field which is the domain of the Court and is, therefore, ultra vires the Constitution. "the sum total of the whole case was that it is true that the schedule was amended but no fresh levy notification was issued under Section 4-B and the same notification as was issued on 1-10-1982 for ordinary services remained in force, which reads as under :-"1, Stage Carriage, (a) Ordinary Services 18 paise per seat per 10 Kms. for the entire distance to be covered during the month : provided that for the months of July and August the rate shall be 16 paise per seat per 10 Kms. " ( 16 ) SINCE the basis in the levy notification remained the same, therefore, it was held that this very expression came up for interpretation in Pabudansinghs case (1986 WLN (UC) 443) and the levy notification still continues to be same, therefore, simply amending the Schedule under Section 4-B will not alter the position and the judgment given by this Court in Pabudansinghs case cannot be invalidated by Validation Act of 1987 as the basis for levy remains the same. In this view of the matter, Section 3 of the Validation Act of 1987 was declared ultra vires and it was directed that tax should be recovered on the basis of the distance actually covered as was held in the case of Pabudansinghs case. In this view of the matter, Section 3 of the Validation Act of 1987 was declared ultra vires and it was directed that tax should be recovered on the basis of the distance actually covered as was held in the case of Pabudansinghs case. ( 17 ) AFTER this the State Government rectified this mistake and brought a new Ordinance known as the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation (Amendment) Ordinance, 1989. By this Ordinance Section 4-B was amended and likewise a fresh levy notification was issued on 3-2-1989, which reads as under :- transport DEPARTMENT NOTIFICATION jaipur, 3/02/1989 s. O. 236- In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 4-B of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1951 (Rajasthan Act XI of 1951), the State Government hereby makes the following further amendments in the Schedule appended, to the Home Department Notification No. F. 1 (8) Home/ Gr. 7/76 dated 1/10/1982, as amended by the Notification of even number dated 21/07/1984 and 8/05/1986 : amendment i. In the said schedule for the entries at S. No. 1 (a), (b), (c) and (d) and note following shall be substituted, namely :-1 2 3 1. Stage carriages (a) Ordinary Services 18 paisa per seat per 10 Kms. for the entire distance required to be covered during the month as per the time-table (sic) has been fixed as per the scope fixed for a route by the Regional Transport Authority under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act 4 of 1939) or by a competent authority under any other law for the time being in force : provided that for the months of July and August the rate shall be 16 paisa per seat per 10 Kms. (b) Express/mail Services 20 paise per seat per 10 Kms. for the entire distance required to be covered during the month as per the time-table fixed, or where no time-table has been fixed for a route by the Regional Transport Authority under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act 4 of 1939) or by a competent authority under any other law for the time being in force (c) Semi Delux Services 35 paisa per seat per 10 Kms. for the entire distance required to be covered during the month as per the time table fixed, or, where no time table has been fixed as per the scope fixed for a route by the Regional Transport Authority under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act 4 of 1939) or by a competent authority under any other law for the time being in force. (d) Delux Services 40 paisa per seat per 10 Kms. for the entire distance required to be covered during the months as per the time-table fixed, or where no time table has been fixed, as per the scope fixed for a route by the Regional Transport Authority under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act 4 of 1939) or by a competent authority under any other law for the time being in force. 1. Note: - If the distance so calculated for which tax is to be paid is not exact multiple of 10 Kms. , the tax for kilometers falling short of ten shall be chargeable pro rata. " ( 18 ) THIS Ordinance subsequently became the Act known as the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation (Amendment) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as 8th Act of 1989 ). The Amendment Act of 1989 reads as under:-"the RAJASTHAN MOTOR VEHICLES TAXATION (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1989 (Act No. 5 of 1989) (Received the Assent of the Governor on the 19th day of April, 1951)an Act further to amend the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1951. Be it enacted by the Rajasthan State Legislature in the Fortieth Year of the Republic of India as follows :-1. Short title and commencement. (1) This Act may be called the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation (Amendment) Act, 1989. 2. (a) This section and Section 7 shall come into force at once; (b) Sections 2, 4 and 5 shall be deemed to have come into force on the 21st day of December, 1988; (c) clauses (a) and (c) of Section 3 and clause (a) of Section 6 shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of October, 1982; and (d) clauses (b) and (d) of Section 3 and clause (b) of Section 6 shall be deemed to have come into force on the 27th day of January, 1989. 2. 2. Amendment of Section 4-A, Rajasthan Act No. XI of 1951.- In Section 4-A of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1951 (Rajasthan Act No. XI of 1951), hereinafter referred to as the principal Act,- (a) in the marginal heading, after the word "surcharge", the words "on tax under Section 4", shall be added; and (b) in sub-section (1), for the expression "the 5th day of November, 1974", the expression "the date of commencement of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation (Amendment) Ordinance 1988" and for the words "ten per cent", the words "twenty per cent" shall be substituted. 3. Amendment of Section 4-B, Rajasthan Act No. XI of 1951.- (a) The existing Section 4-B of the principal Act shall be numbered as sub-section (1) thereof; (b) in sub-section (1) as so numbeed, between the words "on all transport vehicles" and the words "at the rates", the words "and such non-transport vehicles as are used for carrying passengers or goods on hire or reward" shall be inserted; (c) After sub-section (1), the following subsection (2) shall be added, namely :-" (2) The rates of the special road tax fixed by the notification issued in this behalf under this section in respect of stage carriages, other than those plying exclusively within the municipal or city limits, shall be applicable to and charged on the entire distance required to be covered during the month as per the time-table fixed or, where no time -table has been fixed as per the scope fixed for a route by the Regional Transport Authority under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act 4 of 1939) or by a competent authority under any other law for the time being in force and the tax shall be levied and paid to the State Government accordingly"; and (d) after sub-section (2), the following subsection (3) shall be added, namely :-" (3) Where a transport vehicle is used without a valid permit or in any manner not authorised by the permit, there shall be levied and paid to the State Government further special road tax in addition to the tax payable under sub-section (1) on such vehicle at the rate fixed by notification not exceeding the maximum rate specified in this behalf in Schedule A. " 4. Insertion of new Section 4-C in the Rajasthan Act No. XI of 1951.- After the existing Section 4-B of the principal Act, the following new section shall be inserted, namely.-"4-C. Levy of surcharge on special Road Tax.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 4-B, the special Road lax imposed by the said Section shall, with effect from the date of commencement of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation (Amendment) Ordinance, 1988, be increased by a surcharge at the rate of ten percent of the said tax. (2) The provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to the surcharge chargeable under sub-section (1) as they apply in relation to the tax chargeable under Section 4-B. " 5. Amendment of Section 6-A, Rajasthan Act No. XI of 1951.- In Section 6-A of the principal Act, for the expression "if as a result of revision of rates made by a notification issued under sub-section (1) of Section 4 and Section 4-B, a motor vehicle in respect of which tax has been paid becomes liable to tax at a higher rate, ", the expression "if as a result of imposition of a tax or revision of rates made under any provision of this Act, a motor vehicle in respect of which tax has been paid becomes liable to higher amount of tax," and for the expression "and the tax which is payable at the higher rate" the expression "and the higher amount of tax which becomes payable" shall be substituted. 6. Amendment of Schedule-A, Rajasthan Act No. XI of 1951.- In Schedule-A appended to the principal Act,- (a) (i) in the entries against Serial Number 1, between the expression " (Central Act 4 of 1989)" and the expression "during the month", wherever occurring; and (ii) in the note thereunder, between the expression " (Central Act 4 of 1939)" and the expression "is not exact", the expression "or by a competent authority under any other law for the time being in force" shall be inserted; and (b) after the existing entries at serial number 6, following shall be added, namely :-"7. Transport vehicles used without valid permit or in any manner not authorised by the permit rs. 300/- per seat per trip in addition to the tax payable as at serial Nos. 1 to 6 above 8. Non-transport vehicles used for carrying passengers or goods on hire or rewards. Rs. Transport vehicles used without valid permit or in any manner not authorised by the permit rs. 300/- per seat per trip in addition to the tax payable as at serial Nos. 1 to 6 above 8. Non-transport vehicles used for carrying passengers or goods on hire or rewards. Rs. 300/- per seat per trip. Explanation :- "trip" for the purpose of this Schedule means a single journey from one point to another and every return separate trip. " 7. Repeal and Savings.- (1) The Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation (Amendment) Ordinance, 1989 (Ordinance No. 19 of 1988) and the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation (Amendment) Ordinance, 1989 (Ordinance No. 1 of 1989) are hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, all things done, actions taken or orders made under the principal Act, as amended by the said Ordinances shall be deemed to have been done, taken or made under the principal Act as amended by this Act. " ( 19 ) IT may be relevant to mention here that the charging notification was issued on 3-2-1989 under the Ordinance which subsequently became the Act of 1989. Section 7, Repeal and Savings of the Act of 1989 says that all things done, actions taken under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the principal Act as amended by this Act. ( 20 ) NOW, the net position is that Section 4-B the charging section, Schedule A issued under the notification and the notification stand totally amended and they are corresponding with each other. The basic flow which was pointed out in the judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Pabudan Singh (1986 WLN (UC) 443) that the expression distance to be covered continues to be same as was used in the notification dated 1-10-1982 was changed and now all the three provisions i. e. the charging Section, Section 4-B read with Schedule and the notification carry the same expression. As such the invalidity pointed out by the judgment of this Court was removed from retrospective effect. ( 21 ) NOW in this light we have to examine the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties. ( 22 ) MR. Vyas, Mr. Maheshwari, Mr. Chhangani and Mr. As such the invalidity pointed out by the judgment of this Court was removed from retrospective effect. ( 21 ) NOW in this light we have to examine the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties. ( 22 ) MR. Vyas, Mr. Maheshwari, Mr. Chhangani and Mr. Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioners submited that the amended provisions are not workable as they refer to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and those provisions have been repealed. Therefore, the present section cannot operate. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the present Section 4-B contemplates three situations, namely, (1) that the special road tax has to be charged on the basis of the distance required to be covered during the month as per the time-table (ii) or where the time-table has not been fixed as per the scope fixed by the R. T. A. under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and (iii) or by a competent authority under any other law for the time being in force. Learned counsel submitted that so far as the second contingency is concerned, i. e. where the time-table has not been fixed as per the scope fixed for a route by the R. T. A. under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, that is not workable. Learned counsel firstly submitted that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 has already been repealed and Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has come into force w. e. f. 1-7-1989. Learned counsel submitted that the Act of 1989 came into force on 20-4-1989. Therefore, learned counsel submitted that reference to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 has become redundant. Secondly, learned counsel submitted that under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 there is no power to fix the scope and as such amended provision of Section 4-B of the Act of 1989 to this extent is not workable. Learned counsel have also invited our attention to Section 217 of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 and submitted that any provision inconsistent with the Act of 1988 shall have no effect. ( 23 ) WE consider this submission of the learned counsel and we are unable to agree with it. Learned counsel have also invited our attention to Section 217 of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 and submitted that any provision inconsistent with the Act of 1988 shall have no effect. ( 23 ) WE consider this submission of the learned counsel and we are unable to agree with it. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force w. e. f. 1-7-1989, whereas the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation (Amendment) Act, 1989 came into force w. e. f. 20-4-1989 and S. 4-B was deemed to have come into force w. e. f. 1-10-1982. Obviously at the time when the Act of 1989 came into force the Motor Vehicle Act. 1988 had not come into force and as such the legislature could not have made reference to the Act of 1988 because at that time the Act of 1988 had not come into force. Moreover, wherever the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 occurs the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 will have to be read in view of the amended Act had come into force w. e. f. 1-7-1989. But the question before us is that whether one of the bases for charging the Motor Vehicles tax is the scope can survive or not. Since the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1989 came into force with effect from 20-4-1989 and the charging Section 4-B and the schedule thereunder has been made effective from 1-10-1982 at that time the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was in force and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force w. e. f. 1-7-1989, therefore, it cannot be said that at that time the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was not in existence, Till the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 held the field and there was a provision for fixation of scope under Section 47 of the Act. As such the basis for charging i. e. scope for taxation purposes cannot be said to be bad. It will only become redundant when the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force i. e. 1-7-1989. Till the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force the scope which was made a valid basis for charging will hold the field and can provide a valid basis for charging motor vehicles tax under the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation (Amendment) Act, 1989. It has only become redundant after 1-7-1989 till it is suitably amended. Till the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force the scope which was made a valid basis for charging will hold the field and can provide a valid basis for charging motor vehicles tax under the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation (Amendment) Act, 1989. It has only become redundant after 1-7-1989 till it is suitably amended. In this view of the matter, the contention of the learned counsel to this extent cannot be sustained. ( 24 ) LEARNED counsel next argued that the judgment given by this Court cannot be rendered invalid by the legislature unless the basis on which the judgment was given is altered. So far as bare legal proposition is concerned, there is no two opinions in the matter. The Division Bench in the case of P. D. Singh (supra) has already reviewed all the case law on the subject. Therefore, no useful purpose would be served by referring to all the judgments cited by the learned counsel. But suffice it to say that the legal position as enumerated in P. D. Singhs case holds good. Learned counsel have also invited our attention to all those cases which have been referred to in that judgment and we may refer those cases hereinafter i. e. Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality, AIR 1970 SC 192 ; the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. The New Shrock Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd. , AIR 1970 SC 1292 ; I. N. Saksena v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1976 SC 2250 ; Katikara Chintamani Dora v. Gautreddi Annamanaidu, AIR 1974 SC 1069 ; M/s. Utkal Contractors and Joinery (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1987 SC 2310 and the State of Rajasthan v. K. K. Bhatia, 1976 WLN 536. ( 25 ) BUT the question before us is that as to whether the proposition which the learned counsel have urged before us is applicable in the present case or not. It may be relevant to mention here that the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation (Amendment) Act, 1982 came into force w. e. f. 1-10-1982. Thereafter, the Act has undergone a considerable change and a fresh notification has been issued as aforesaid. Whether by these amended provisions the basis has been changed or not. It is true that in Pabu Dan Singhs case (1986 WLN (UC) 443) (supra) no provision was declared ultra vires. Thereafter, the Act has undergone a considerable change and a fresh notification has been issued as aforesaid. Whether by these amended provisions the basis has been changed or not. It is true that in Pabu Dan Singhs case (1986 WLN (UC) 443) (supra) no provision was declared ultra vires. Only the expression entire distance to be covered was interpreted to mean the actual distance to be covered and in P. D. Singhs case it was held that since the levy notification carries the same expression, therefore, it will have the same meaning i. e. the actual distance to be covered and it was further held that since the basis has not been altered as such the legislature was not competent to invalidate the judgment given by this Court. In this background, this Court struck down the provisions of Section 3 of the Validation Act of 1987. Now, the Government having realised the difficulty has amended the provisions of Section 4-B, Schedule thereunder and the notification keeping each one of them in the line of the charging section. It is true that in P. D. Singhs case (supra) it was contention of the State Government that the charging section is the Section 4-B and the expression the entire distance required to be covered as per the time-table fixed has been added in this light. It was contended that the charging section is Section 4-B. Therefore, the levy notification should be read in that context and if it has gone beyond the Act then levy notification can be struck down. But this contention was not accepted because the levy notification itself carried the same expression. But now, in the present case, the situation is entirely different and the basis has also been changed with effect from 1-10-1982 i. e. the legislature in its wisdom has now categorically clarified that the basis for charging the tax shall be the distance required to be covered as per the time-table fixed, so the basis on which the first Pabu Dan Singhs case judgment was given was taken out and likewise the view taken in P. D. Singhs case. When the basis on which Babu Dan Singhs case judgment was given has been altered and on these altered circumstances the Pabu Dan Singhs judgment could not have been given as such this amendment shall not amount to infringing the independence and supremacy of the judiciary in its field, as it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in various judgments mentioned above that the legislature is competent to render the judgment of the court invalid by changing the basis or by altering the basis, on which judgment was given. Now, the present is the case in which the basis for taxation has been changed and the legislature has very categorically laid down the basis of charging the tax under the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the basis has been changed by the legislature on which the judgment of Pabu Dan Singhs and P. D. Singhs cases was given, as such these judgments have become ineffective. ( 26 ) NEXT question which has been agitated by the learned counsel is that the amendment is ultra vires of the Constitution as it suffers from lack of any guidelines, therefore, it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In this connection, learned counsel have invited our attention to the State of Punjab v. Khan Chand, AIR 1974 SC 543 . But we regret to say that this contention has also no merit. The guidelines itself have been provided in Section 4-B that as to what shall be the basis for charging the tax under the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, three bases have been provided, namely, (i) the tax shall be charged on the basis of the distance required to be covered as per the time-table fixed; (ii) if no time table has been fixed then on the basis of the scope; and (iii) if no scope was provided by the R. T. A. then by any competent authority under law. Therefore, there is enough guidelines provided under the Act itself as to how the tax shall be charged. ( 27 ) IN the State of Punjab v. Khan Chand (supra) there were no guidelines provided under the provisions of the Act and the Act conferred unbriddled power on the State or officers authorised by it to requisition any movable property. Therefore, there is enough guidelines provided under the Act itself as to how the tax shall be charged. ( 27 ) IN the State of Punjab v. Khan Chand (supra) there were no guidelines provided under the provisions of the Act and the Act conferred unbriddled power on the State or officers authorised by it to requisition any movable property. As against this in the present case the guidelines have already been provided under Section 4-B and also maximum has been fixed in the Schedule A issued under Section 4-B. Therefore, there is no basis for argument that it lacks guidelines or it confers unbriddled. powers on the Government or any other authority. Therefore, this argument has no basis whatsover and is overruled. ( 28 ) NEXT, learned counsel submitted that the taxing statute cannot be made retrospective. In this connection, learned counsel has invited our attention to Katikara Chintamani Doras case (supra ). As against this Mr. Joshi, learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the legislature can always lay down the law prospetively and retrospectively. Learned counsel submitted that this question is now no more open for any argument as recently their Lordships of the Supreme Court have settled the issue by a constitutional bench in M/s. Ujagar Prints v. Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 488 . ( 29 ) WE have considered this argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner and we are unable to agree with his submission. The Ujagar Prints case (supra) was a case under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Earlier in Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (1985) 3 SCC 314 , it was held that the legislature can invalidate the judgment of the court by curing the defects retrospectively. This position was reaffirmed by the constitutional bench of the Supreme Court and it has been laid down that the legislature is competent to make law retrospectively also in the relevant entry under the Constitution, it was observed as under Re Contention (d)"there is really no substance in the grievance that the retroactivity imparted to the amendments is violative of Article 19 (1) (g ). A competent legislature can always validate a law which has been declared by courts to be invalid, provided the infirmities and vitiating factors noticed in the declaratory judgment are removed or cured. Such a validating law can also be made retrospective. A competent legislature can always validate a law which has been declared by courts to be invalid, provided the infirmities and vitiating factors noticed in the declaratory judgment are removed or cured. Such a validating law can also be made retrospective. If in the light of such validating and curative exercise made by the legislature-granting legislative competence - the earlier judgment becomes irrelevant and unenforceable, that cannot be called an impermissible legislative overruling of the judicial decision. All that the legislature does not to usher in a valid law with retrospective effect in the light of which earlier judgment becomes irrelevant. (See Sri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality ( AIR 1970 SC 192 ). Such legislaitive expedience of validation of laws is of particular compliance and utility and is quite often applied, in taxing statutes. It is necessary that the legislature should be able to cure defects in statutes. No individual can acquire a vested right from a defect in a statute and seek a windfall from the legislatures mistake. Validity of legislations retroactively curing defects in taxing statutes is well recognised and courts, except under extraordinary circumstances, would be reluctant to override the legislative judgment as to the need for and wisdom of the retrospective legislation. In Empire Industries Limited v. Union of India, this Court observed : ( 1985 (3) SCC 314 at p. 342, para 51) (Para 50 ). . . . . . . not only because of the paramount governmental interest in obtaining adequate revenues, but also because taxes are not in the nature of a penalty or a contractual obligation but rather a means of apportioning the costs of government amongst those who benefit from it. In testing whether a retrospective imposition of a tax operates so harshly as to violate fundamental rights under Art. 19 (1) (g), the factors considered relevant include the context in which retroactivity was contemplated such as whether the law is one of validation of taxing statute struck down by courts for certain defects; the period of such retroactivity, and the degree and extent of any unforeseen or unforeseeable financial burden imposed for the past period etc. Having regard to all the circumstances of the present case, this Court in Empire Industries, case held that the retroactivity of the amending provision was not such as to incur any infirmity under Art. 19 (1) (g ). Having regard to all the circumstances of the present case, this Court in Empire Industries, case held that the retroactivity of the amending provision was not such as to incur any infirmity under Art. 19 (1) (g ). We are in respectful agreement with that view. There is no merit in contention (d) either. " ( 30 ) AFTER this judgment the position of law is very clear that the legislature is competent to cure the defects and alter the basis on which the decision has been given and re-enact the law after curing the defects from retrospective effect. This is what precisely has been done in the present case. ( 31 ) IN Katikara Chintamandi Doras case ( AIR 1974 SC 1069 ), the question was regarding amendment of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act 26 of 1948 ). This was sought to be amended by the Acts Nos. 17 and 18 of 1957 and 20 of 1960. In that context, it was observed as under"the Amending Act 20 of 1960 did not operate retrospectively to nullify final decrees of Civil Courts which had before its commencement, declared such decisions. of Settlement Officer totally void and non-existent. The Amending Act did not expressly or by necessary intendment bring into life again all such dead decisions of the Settlement Officer. " ( 32 ) THEREFORE, this case is not of any avail to the petitioners. However, Krishna Iyer, J. , as he then was made a very significant remark which needs to be quoted - precedents should not be petrified nor judicial dicta divorced from the socio-economic mores of the age. Judges are not prophets and only interpret law in the light of the contemporary ethos. To regard them otherwise is unscientific while applying the policy of statutory construction the court should not forget the conditions and concepts which moved the judges whose rulings are cited, nor be obsessed by respect at the expense of reason. The Indian Constitution adopting the fighting faith of equal protection of the laws to all citizens necessarily contemplates a new jurisprudence where vested rights may be, and often times are, extensively interfered with for achieving the founding fathers social goals. Legislative exercises directed towards distributive justice cannot be considered in the light of a dated value system though sanctified by by-gone decisions of Courts. Legislative exercises directed towards distributive justice cannot be considered in the light of a dated value system though sanctified by by-gone decisions of Courts. Speaking generally, Courts have to be anchored to well-known canons of statutory construction and if they are out of time with the law makers meaning and purpose the legitimate means of setting things right is to enact a new interpretation Act. Therefore, to say that the legislature cannot bring the taxing statute from retrospective effect is not correct as in Ujagar Prints case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have categorically held that in such event the statute can be brought retrospectively and it does not violate Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. ( 33 ) NOW, having found the provision of the Act being intra vires, the next question which arises for our consideration is as to how these provisions have to be interpreted. In this connection, the main emphasis of all the learned counsel was that even the amended expression boils down to the same meaning that it should be read as actual distance to be covered. Previously, the expression the distance to be covered was vague. Therefore, in the case of Pabudan Singh (1986 WLN (OC) 443) the Division Bench sought the help of various sections and the rules and interpreted that expression to mean the actual distance to be covered. But here in the amended provisions the expression is not vague, but it has been qualified that distance required to be covered as per the time table, Therefore, the expression required to be covered by the time table has a definite connotation and a specific mandate that how the tax should be levied on the Motor Vehicles. The expression required has been defined in Websters Third New International Dictionary, which reads as under :-"to need, seek for, inquire after, alter, to ask, request, or desire to something, to ask for authoritatively or imperatively : claim by right and authority : insist upon. "the "required" is further qualified by the expression time-table that means to say that the distance is directed to be covered as per time-table and that shall be the basis for impost. This present expression is not same as it was used in the earlier notification issued on 1-10-1982. "the "required" is further qualified by the expression time-table that means to say that the distance is directed to be covered as per time-table and that shall be the basis for impost. This present expression is not same as it was used in the earlier notification issued on 1-10-1982. The present amendment in the section is very clear and it is imperative that the tax shall be charged on the motor vehicles on the basis of the distance required to be covered by the time-table. thus, the contention of the learned counsel that the same meaning should be given as was given to distance to be covered cannot be accepted. However, in this connection it would not be out of place to refer to certain provisions, which can be usefully read for the purpose of harmonious construction. Section 8 requires that the return has to be filed by person keeping the vehicle for use. The owner has to file the returns in prescribed form prescribing the particulars to the taxation officer and shall pay to him the tax which he appears by such return to be liable to pay in respect of such vehicle. It further lays down that in case the owner without reasonable cause fails to deliver the return within the prescribed time, the Taxation Officer may impose on him a penalty not exceeding Rs. 5. 00 for each day during which the default continues. Section 8-A says about determination of tax in certain cases. If the taxation officer is satisfied that the return filed by thef owner is not correct then he can give him notice and after hearing him can determine the amount of tax due and recover the same. In order to give effect to the provisions of the Act, the rules have also been framed under Section 22 of the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1951. The Rules were also correspondingly amended. In this connection, a special attention was invited to R. 25-B of the Rules. This was also correspondingly amended with effect from 1-10-1982. In order to give effect to the provisions of the Act, the rules have also been framed under Section 22 of the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1951. The Rules were also correspondingly amended. In this connection, a special attention was invited to R. 25-B of the Rules. This was also correspondingly amended with effect from 1-10-1982. Rule 25-B reads as under-"25-B. Reasons for non-use - The Taxation Officer shall satisfy himself and certify that the vehicle was not used in the State under any of the circumstances mentioned below: (1) that the Certificate of Registration was suspended by the competent authority; (2) that the Motor Vehicle was restrained from plying by the competent court or authority; (3) that the Motor Vehicle was involved in an accident and a report to this effect was made to the police and that because of accident it remained out of use at least for a period of 3 months; (4) that the Motor Vehicle was attached for the recovery of tax under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act by the competent authority or attached under the warrant of attachment issued by the competent authority or court and that during the period of attachment the vehicle did not remain in his possession: (5) that the vehicle has bn taken out of the State and certificate has been produced that the vehicle has paid tax in another State; (6) any other reason or reasons, due to which it was impossible for the owner to ply the vehicle. "this rule lays down that if the taxation authority is satisfied that the vehicle has not been used for any reason then in that case the vehicle will not be required to be taxed. The satisfaction of the taxing authority is a must. Sub-clause (6) of R. 25-B clearly lays down that if for any other reason or reasons due to which it was impossible for the owner to ply the vehicle, then the vehicle will not be required to be taxed. The satisfaction of the taxing authority is a must. Sub-clause (6) of R. 25-B clearly lays down that if for any other reason or reasons due to which it was impossible for the owner to ply the vehicle, then the vehicle will not be required to be taxed. In case it is found by the taxing authority that it was not possible to have plied the vehicle for any reason, may be on account of accident, may be on account of the vehicle being out of order, may be on account of floods or any other natural calamity or road being out of order, in that case the owner shall have to satisfy the taxing authority that the vehicle remained out of order and he was unable to use it and in that case the taxing authority can exempt the person from the impost of taxation for that period. Other contingencies have also been contemplated like suspension of Registration Certificate by the competent authority and the vehicle was restrained from plying by a competent court or authority or that the vehicle was involved in an accident and report to this effect was made to the police and because of accident it remained out of use at least for a period of three months or it remained under attachment or the vehicle has been taken out of the State and a certificate has been produced that the vehicle has paid tax in another State and lastly clause (6) as mentioned above which covers all other contingencies which do not fall in clauses (1) to (5 ). In these circumstances, the taxing authority has taken a good care that in the event the vehicle cannot be used then the taxing authority on being satisfied of its non-use may not subject it to special road tax. ( 34 ) RULE 27 also deals with exemptions and exceptions and R. 28 deals with the complete exemption from payment of tax in certain contingencies with which we are not concerned. ( 34 ) RULE 27 also deals with exemptions and exceptions and R. 28 deals with the complete exemption from payment of tax in certain contingencies with which we are not concerned. But suffice it to say that R. 25-B is exhaustive enough that it takes care of all the contingencies that the vehicle should not be taxed on account of non-use for various reasons mentioned in R. 25-B. All the learned counsel have tried to impress upon us that the taxing authority gave a complete go-bye to these provisions and they subjected the owners of this special road tax in complete disregard of the Rules. If any authority is not exercising the discretion properly or exercising the discretion improperly that could not make the provisions of the Act or the Rules arbitrary. It is the order which has been passed in contravention of the Act or the Rules that shall be declared bad or illegal but by that provisions of the Act or the Rules cannot be said to be bad or illegal. ( 35 ) AS a matter of fact, this Provision if honestly and discreetly followed then the amount of tax can be determined objectively without leaving any undue discretion with the taxing authorities. As a matter of fact, on the basis of the rates laid down per seat per 10 kms. of the distance required to be covered by the time-table the amount of tax can be determined with mathematical certainty. This leaves no discretion in the hands of the taxing authorities. The amount can be determined on the basis of the distance required to be covered on the basis of time-table and the amount of tax can be determined. This provision if honestly executed then it is a better workable formula which will avoid the manipulation or maneuvering on the part of either party. It is only when persons are actuated with bad faith then the trouble arises. The owner of the motor vehicle knows that he has to operate the vehicle on the basis of the time-table given by the R. T. A. and he also knows the distance of the two terminals of that time table and on that basis he can calculate the amount of tax and deposit the same. The owner of the motor vehicle knows that he has to operate the vehicle on the basis of the time-table given by the R. T. A. and he also knows the distance of the two terminals of that time table and on that basis he can calculate the amount of tax and deposit the same. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the interpretation which the petitioners want to canvass on this expression cannot be accepted and the plain and simple construction is that the owner of motor vehicle will have to pay the tax on the basis of the rates issued by the State Government vide notification for the distance required to be covered as per time-table given by the authorities. ( 36 ) MR. Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner has brought to our notice various difficulties and high handed actions of the taxing authorities namely that in some of the cases the time table was not given but it was given retrospectively, in some cases the time table has been stayed by the orders of the competent courts still the vehicle has been taxed. Similarly in some cases when the scope has been stayed by the Courts then too the authorities are taxing on the basis of the same scope. All these cases speak of the improper exercise of discretion by the authorities. If the R. T. A. has not given the time table and he wants to give the time-table with retrospective effect then such retrospective action of the executive authorities cannot be countenanced. Likewise, wherever the competent Court has granted stay of the time-table or scope then the taxing authorities cannot ignore that. They are bound to follow the provisions of the Act as well as the Rules together. It is not open for them to ignore the import of the Rules. If the Rules provide certain relief to the tax payer in terms of R. 25-B or any other Rule then the taxing authority shall give due regard to that rule and grant necessary relief to the incumbents. ( 37 ) MR. Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner has given us a list of various writ petitions before us where the authorities have not given due regard to the provisions of the Rules and has assessed the owners of the motor vehicles in high handed manner. Such action of the authorities cannot be countenanced. ( 37 ) MR. Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner has given us a list of various writ petitions before us where the authorities have not given due regard to the provisions of the Rules and has assessed the owners of the motor vehicles in high handed manner. Such action of the authorities cannot be countenanced. Mr. Vyas has invited our attention to various writ petitions to show that the authorities some times have not cared to take into consideration the stay orders granted by the competent Courts and notwithstanding the fact that the scope has been reduced by the Court and some times the time-table has been given retrospectively. All this only speaks of high handed action of the taxing authorities. It will not be possible for this Court to examine each and every case. Therefore, it will be proper for this Court to direct the authorities to consider all the matters in the light of the guidelines mentioned above. However, we will give a detailed direction hereinafter in this regard. ( 38 ) MR. Maheshwari, learned counsel for the petitioners also raised an additional ground that in Shiv Bus Service, the learned single Judge held that the assessing authority should recover the tax on the basis of the time-table and where time table was not given then in accordance with R. 90 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1951. This interpretation was not accepted by the Division Bench in the case of Pabudan Singh and the same was reversed. But the same has been made again the basis for taxation by amending Section 4-B, Schedule issued thereunder and the notification issued by the State Government. ( 39 ) IT is true that the view of the learned single Judge in Shiv Bus Service was not affirmed by the Division Bench in the case of Pabu Dan Singh (1986 WLN (UC) 443) but now the situation has completely changed as the provisions of the Act have been amended and Schedule thereunder and notification have specifically laid down the basis for taxing the motor vehicles. In these circumstances, the interpretation given by the Court to those unamended provisions cannot hold good. It has been laid down in the Act by the legislature while amending Section 4-B and Schedule thereunder that what shall be the basis for charging the tax on the motor vehicles. Thus, in these circumstances, the contention of Mr. In these circumstances, the interpretation given by the Court to those unamended provisions cannot hold good. It has been laid down in the Act by the legislature while amending Section 4-B and Schedule thereunder that what shall be the basis for charging the tax on the motor vehicles. Thus, in these circumstances, the contention of Mr. Maheshwari cannot be sustained. ( 40 ) IN the result, we find the provisions of Section 4-B and Schedule issued thereunder and the notification issued by the State Government as valid. Since we are not taking the individual cases and infirmities pointed out by the learned counsel, we remand all these cases back to the assessing authority who shall re-assessee the petitioner in the light of the observations made above and other relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules and then pass fresh assessment orders. The authorities are directed to re-examine all the assessment orders after notice to all the owners of the motor vehicles. ( 41 ) THE payment of tax shall remain stayed for a period of three months or subject to any orders passed by any assessing authority or by any competent Court, as the case may be. ( 42 ) THE Writ petitions are accordingly disposed of with the above observations. Order accordingly.