VENKATACHALA, J. ( 1 ) SRI lakshminarasimhaswamy charities, the plaintiff in the suit, o. s. no. 4613/1980, on the file of the court of the city civil judge at Bangalore city ("the trial court"), has brought this appeal feeling aggrieved by a decree of dismissal of that suit against defendants 1 to 7 who are respondents 1 to 7 here respectively. ( 2 ) UNDISPUTED material facts leading up to this appeal, briefly stated, are on the southern side of the city market square of Bangalore city, there was 5 1/2 acres of land together with some buildings thereon belonging to jyothinagar vysya yajaman janopakari doddanna setty, where a free hostel for jyothinagar community students and a free public school were run as Sri lakshminarasimha institution. That land with the hostel and the school building along with several other properties was endowed by the owner- the said yajaman doddanna setty under a trust deed dated 23rd june, 1920 for the charitable purpose of advancement of education among jyothinagar vysya students and other students belonging to general public with the name Sri lakshminarasimhaswamy charities ("the sln charities" ). The trustees named in that trust deed, who were given the authority to manage the charities along with the author of the trust Sri yajaman doddanna setty had to relinquish the right of trusteeship in the event of neglect or default on their part in fulfilling the obligations under the trust and re-transfer the right of management of the institution to the author of the trust or to any other persons or persons who may be nominated in that behalf by will or by other instrument duly executed, or in the absence of such nominee to the then Mysore government. A situation contemplated in the trust deed that the Mysore government should take over the management of the sln charities having arisen, the then Mysore government took over the control and management of the sln charities inasmuch as it was a charitable institution under the Mysore religious and charitable institutions Act, 1927. Eversince, the Mysore government started to control and manage the sln charities through the managing committees appointed by it from time to time. Eversince, the Mysore government started to control and manage the sln charities through the managing committees appointed by it from time to time. Therefore, rules for the management of the sln charities being framed by the then Mysore government in the year 1943 and amended from time to time, the same have formed the basis for control and management of the sln charities. It is the said rules which enabled the successor Karnataka government to appoint a managing committee in the year 1973 with one Sri n. Puttarangaswamy as its chairman. On 13-2-1974, that committee, by its resolution, recommended to the government to accept the offer of the first defendant-partnership firm to obtain a portion of the land belonging to the sln charities on lease for construction of a cinema theatre, for a period of 30 years with an option for renewal of lease by the lessees for a further period of 10 years. The government having accepted the said recommendation, the sln charities, under the management of the state of Karnataka represented by the chairman of the committee of management, entered into a lease deed on 26-4-1974 in favour of the first defendant-partnership firm and the partners of that firm, defendants 3,4,6 and 7, as evidenced by the registered lease deed (exhibit p-1), on the lessees agreeing to pay the monthly rent of Rs. 2,100/- in the first two years- the tune likely to be occupied by them for construction of the theatre, and the monthly rent of rs. 16,500/- thereafter for 28 years and the monthly rent of Rs. 17,500/- for the optional period of 10 years. The lessee-firm since constructed a mini cinema theatre as well in the leased vacant land in contravention of the approved plan, the monthly rent payable during the 28 years of the regular period came to be enhanced to Rs. 18,500/- and the monthly rent payable during the optional period of 10 years came to be enhanced to Rs. 20,000/-, such refutation of rent being agreed upon between the parties and approved by the government, by its order dated 24-7-1976. Defendant-2 having subsequently joined as a partner of defendant-1 firm, became its managing partner. 18,500/- and the monthly rent payable during the optional period of 10 years came to be enhanced to Rs. 20,000/-, such refutation of rent being agreed upon between the parties and approved by the government, by its order dated 24-7-1976. Defendant-2 having subsequently joined as a partner of defendant-1 firm, became its managing partner. After the cinema theatre was constructed by the lessees-defendants on the leased land, the khata number given to the leased vacant land by the municipal corporation was No. 290 made out in the name of the sln charities, while the khata number given to the cinema theatre constructed on the land was No. 291 made out in the name of the first defendant-firm. Thereafter, a dispute arose between the lessor and the lessees as to which of them had to pay the municipal tax on the vacant land leased to the lessees and where a cinema theatre had come to be constructed. However, the city corporation, as per its notice dated 19-3-1979 (exhibit p-2) called upon the sln charities, in whose name the khata of the vacant land stood, to pay the vacant land tax amounting to rs. 1,25,566-20 and rs. 1,240/- as penalty, by furnishing the following details: year Year Amount Rs. Ps. 1974-75 4,422-60 1975-76 4,422- 60 1976-77 38,907-00 Rs. Ps. 1977-78 38,907-00 1978-79 38,907-00 Penalty 1,240- 00 1,26,806-20 that amount being paid by the sln charities to the corporation of the city of Bangalore, the sln charities, as plaintiff, filed a suit in the trial court to direct the lessees- defendants in the suit to re-imburse that amount to the plaintiff alleging that the liability to pay vacant land tax under clause 8 of the lease deed was that of the defendants. In that suit, the plaintiff claimed as well the interest at 18% per annum on the said amount from the date of payment to the date of filing of the suit and rs. 200/- as lawyer's notice charges, apart from costs, current and future interests. In that suit, the plaintiff claimed as well the interest at 18% per annum on the said amount from the date of payment to the date of filing of the suit and rs. 200/- as lawyer's notice charges, apart from costs, current and future interests. The defendants, by filing a written statement in that suit and getting that written statement amended subsequently,resislcd the plaintiffs claim made in the suit pleading, inter alia, that they were not liable to pay vacant land tax under clause 8 of the lease deed dated 26-4-1974 nor the interest claimed thereon or the lawyer's notice charges; that the suit was unmaintainable for non joinder of all the members of the managing committee of the sln charities as plaintiffs; after the retirement of the chairman of the committee, the chairman of the succeeding committee not being brought on record to represent the plaintiff. The trial court, which framed the necessary issues on the basis of the pleadings in the suit, recorded the evidence adduced by parties on both sides, heard arguments of their learned counsel and rendered a judgment and decree thereon dismissing the suit finding, inter alia, that the dcfcndanls-1 lessees were not liable to pay to the corporation the vacant land tax on the land leased by the plaintiff to the defendants, under clause 8 of the lease deed (exhibit p-1) and that though the suit was maintainable for non-arraying of the members of the managing committee of the sln charities, it was not maintainable as, after the expiry of the terms of the office of Sri puttarangaswamy, chairman of the managing committee of the sln charities, the chairman of the subsequent managing committee was not brought on record in the place of Sri puttarangaswamy. It is that judgment and decree which is appealed" against by the sln charities, the plaintiff-a charitable institution under the management of the government of Karnataka through its chairman- Sri d. p. sharma, in this appeal. ( 3 ) WHILE it was argued before us on behalf of the appellant-plaintiff that the findings of the trial court recorded against the plaintiff were unsustainable in law and the suit of the plaintiff had to be decreed as prayed for, it was argued on behalf of the respondent-defendants that the findings recorded by the trial court were sustainable arid the judgment and decree dismissing the suit were required to be upheld. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the defendants filed before us an interlocutory application-i. a. iv seeking our leave for amendment of the written statement of the defendants and also another interlocutory application-i. a. v seeking our leave for production of additional documents, to both of which the learned counsel for the plaintiff has filed objections. ( 5 ) HAVING regard to the arguments of learned counsel addressed before us, the applications filed on behalf of the defendants and the objections filed thereto on behalf of the plaintiff, the points which arise for our determination in this appeal, arc: (1) whether clause 8 of the lease deed dated 26-4-1974 (exhibit p-1) fixes the liability for payment of vacant land tax on the land leased to the defendants, on them; (2) whether leave sought for in the interlocutory applications- i. as. iv and v filed in this appeal on behalf of the defendants in the suit to amend their written statement by raising a fresh plea of defence and for production of documents to support such plea, warrants grant;and (3) whether the suit brought by sln charities as plaintiff was unmaintainable for non-arraying of all its managing committee members as additional plaintiffs; (4) was the suit of sln charities unmaintainable because of non-substitution of the newly appointed chairman of its managing committee, under order xxii, Rule 10, c. p. c. ( 6 ) WE shall now proceed to consider and determine the said points seriatim. Re. Points (1): as to whether the defendants-lessees are liable to pay vacant land tax on the land taken by them on lease from the plaintiff, has to depend upon their undertaking contained in clause 8 of the lease deed dated 26-4-1974 (exhibit p-1) entered into between them, it is excerpted:"8. Re. Points (1): as to whether the defendants-lessees are liable to pay vacant land tax on the land taken by them on lease from the plaintiff, has to depend upon their undertaking contained in clause 8 of the lease deed dated 26-4-1974 (exhibit p-1) entered into between them, it is excerpted:"8. The lessees shall during the period of this lease and during the period of renewal of the lease if the lessees exercise their option to renew the same in accordance with the clause 16 bear and discharge all rates, taxes, assessments, duties, impositions and outgoings whatsoever imposed or charged on the schedule property from the date of commencement of the lease whether it be for the vacant land or the construction thereon, that is, the cinema theatre or other buildings which may be constructed by the lessees with the permission in writing of the lessor or upon the owner or occupier thereof including the property tax that has to be paid to the corporation of the city of Bangalore. The rates or taxes shall be paid by the lessees for and on behalf of the lessor and the receipts therefor shall be preserved by the lessees. In no event is the the lessor liable to pay any of the rates or taxes above mentioned. " (emphasis supplied by us) as the construction placed on the said clause by the trial court has led it to conclude that the lessees- defendants were not liable to pay the vacant land tax on the leased land to the corporation as assessed by for the years 1974-75 to 1978-79, it would be advantageous to reproduce what is said by the trial court in paragraph-10 of the judgment:"so from a plain reading of clause 8 of the lease deed exhibit p-l it is found that the word used therein is 'or' and not 'and' which means that the defendants were required to pay the tax for the vacant land or the building. That means the liability of the defendants is to pay the tax either for the vacant land or the building put up by them. Admittedly, the defendants have been paying the tax levied on the building. Moreover, the kalha of the vacant land stands in the name of the plaintiff and the katha of the construction put up thereon is made in the name of the defendants. Admittedly, the defendants have been paying the tax levied on the building. Moreover, the kalha of the vacant land stands in the name of the plaintiff and the katha of the construction put up thereon is made in the name of the defendants. The vacant land and the super structure have been assessed separately. If really the defendants were to pay both the tax levied on the lands as well as the super structure then there was no (blank) in levying the tax separately that is on the vacant land and the super structure constructed thereon". as seen from the above reproduced portion of the judgment of the trial court, the factors which have weighed with the trial court in coming to the conclusion that the defendants-lessees were not required to pay the tax for vacant land as well as the buildings constructed thereon are: (1) that the word used between the words "vacant land" and "the construction thereon"being 'or', the lessees' liability to pay tax under the said clause must relate either to the vacant land or to the construction thereon and not both: and (2) that the making out of the katha by the corporation of the vacant land in the name of the lessor and of the buildings thereon in the name of the lessees, and the separate assessments made thereto lend support to the construction that the word 'or'uscd in the clause between the words "vacant land" and "the construction thereon" cannot be regarded as 'and' as would fix the liability for vacant land tax as well as constructions thereon, on the defendants-lessees. the aforesaid construction placed by the trial court on the word 'or' found in clause 8 between the words "vacant land" and "the construction thereon"having regard to its meaning alone and separate kathas made for the vacant land and for the super structure, looks to us to be rather superficial, in that, the trial court in construing clause 8 has ignored its content and the purpose sought to be achieved by the parties to the lease deed by introducing that clause. When we see the former portion of the first sentence of clause 8 starting from the words "the lessees" and ending with the words "on the schedule property" which is the main clause in the sentence, it would be abundantly clear that the lessees have agreed to bear and discharge all rates, taxes, assessments, duties, impositions and outgoings whatsoever imposed or charged on the schedule property (the property leased under the lease deed ). Then, when we see the next portion of the sentence "whether it be for vacant land or the construction thereon", it is a subordinate clause-the adjective clause in the sentence which qualifies "the schedule property" found in the main clause being either the vacant land or the constructions thereon. The trial. h court has misread the word 'or' found in the adjective clause "whether it be for the vacant land or the construction thereon", which qualifies the 'schedule property' in the main clause as qualifying (referable to) the persons (lessor or lessec/s) liable to bear or discharge the rates, taxes, assessments, duties, impositions and outgoings imposed or charged on the schedule property, when the main clause does refer to the person 'lessee/s' and not to 'lessor'. The taxes made liable to be paid for the schedule property (be it vacant land or constructions theron) by the lessees under the main clause of the sentence includes the property tax payable to the corporation, becomes clear from the words found in the last portion of the first sentence including the property tax payable to the corporation of the city of Bangalore. When the sentence following the first sentence reads that "the rates or taxes shall be paid by the lessees for and on behalf of the lessor and the receipts therefor shall be preserved by the lessees", the same puts it beyond doubt that the rates, taxes, assessments, duties, impositions and outgoings whatsoever imposed on the schedule property (leased property) shall be borne by the lessees and shall be paid for and on behalf of the lessor. The last sentence that follows when reads that "in no event is the lessor liable to pay any of the rates or taxes above mentioned", it relieves the lessor in unequivocal terms its liability to pay any rates, taxes, assessments, duties, impositions and outgoings whatsoever imposed or charged on the schedule property (be it for vacant land or construction thereon ). When admittedly the parties who were aware before entering into the lease deed that the corporation, under the Corporation Act and the taxation rules, would levy tax for vacant land and buildings thereon separately, inserted a clause, like, clause 8 in the lease deed making the lessees bear and pay all taxes relating to the schedule property whether 'such property be a vacant land or the buildings thereon it is difficult for us to comprehend how such clause 8 of the lease deed, could be read to the effect that the lessor has agreed to bear and pay taxes either in respect of the vacant land or in respect of the structures thereon. More than anything else, the construction placed by the trial court on clause 8 that the lessees can pay either tax on the vacant land or tax on construction put on the land, ignores the fact that such construction will result rather in absurdity if the lessees choose to pay tax on vacant land instead of tax on constructions on the vacant land inasmuch as the rent stipulated in the lease deed as payable by the lessees to the lessor will not be sufficient for the lessor to meet the tax payable on structures on the land. Hence, in our view, clause 8 of the lease deed has to be construed as a clause under which the lessees had agreed or undertaken to bear and discharge all rates, taxes,assessments, duties, impositions and outgoings whatsoever imposed or charges on the schedule property (described in the schedule to the lease-deed) whether such schedule property is a vacant land or the construction thereon. From this it follows that clause 8 of the lease deed dated 26-4-1974 (exhibit p-1) fixes the liability for payment of vacant land tax on the land leased to defendants, on them. Re: point (2): by interlocutory application-i. a. iv filed under order vi, Rule 17, c. p. c. , by the defendants after the arguments in the appeal were virtually over, our permission is sought to amend their written statement introducing para 11 (a) thus:"these defendants submit without prejudice to the contentions already raised in the written statement, they submit, under any circumstances, the plaintiff is not for the land leased to the defendants. On the contrary, it is paid for the premises No. 290, kalasipalyam main road, retained by the plaintiff, whereas, the portion of the property that has been leased to the defendants is bifurcated as 290-a, kalasipalyam main road, for which thay have paid the tax and. 290 is the bigger portion, and only a portion has been leased to the defendants. The portion that has been leased to the defendants has been bifurcated as 290-a. Hence, under any circumstances, the amount said to have been paid by the plaintiff for the property is not the property that has been leased to these defendants, and the plaintiff cannot file a suit for reimbursement of the said amount and the suit is not maintainable. " we find it difficult to grant the permission sought for in the application - i. a. iv for the reasons which we shall presently state. The sln charities, the plaintiff in the suit, have objected to the grant permission sought for in i. a. iv, by filing an objection statement in that regard. It is indicated therein that what is sought to be introduced by the defendants in their written statement by way of amendment, is to say the least a clever ploy to avoid the liability of the defendants when it was clear from the evidence on record that katha No. 290 of the vacant land stood in the name of the plaintiff-the sln charities, was the very land which had been leased to the defendants and the only question that arose for decision in the appeal was whether under clause 8 of the lease deed, the defendants had undertaken to pay the vacant land tax on the leased land. When we sec the affidavit in support of the said application seeking permission to amend the written statement of the defendants, it is filed by one subbanna, said to be the manager of the first defendant-partnership firm. He is not a defendant in the suit nor had he anything to do with the lease deed (exhibit p-1) entered into between the plaintiff and the defendants. He is not a defendant in the suit nor had he anything to do with the lease deed (exhibit p-1) entered into between the plaintiff and the defendants. What is said by him in the affidavit is that he was able to trace documents, such as, katha bifurcation order passed by the corporation on 28-5-1974 and certain receipts representing the taxes paid to the corporation for the vacant land in katha No. 290-a and that they will support the defence sought to be taken by way of amendment that the vacant land in katha No. 290, for which the plaintiff is said to have paid taxes, docs not relate to the vacant land leased to the defendants. We have perused the documents on which reliance is sought to be placed to find whether there is truth in what is said by subbanna in his affidavit. They appear to be some copies of copies of original documents. The documents said to relate to katha bifurcation indicates that the vacant land registered as site No. 290-a will carry a tax of Rs. 4,422-60. This also becomes clear from the receipts produced as document-4, while other receipts do not refer to the land tax. What is of significance is, exhibit p-2, the demand notice, on the basis of which the plaintiff has paid the tax as referring to kalha 290, would also indicate that the tax for the year 1974-75 is exactly Rs. 4,422-60. Since the very documents, on the basis of which a plea of defence by way of amendment of the written statement is sought to be introduced, show that the vacant land tax, which the plaintiff has paid and is seeking re-imbursemcnt from the defendants, is the very vacant land tax payable for even katha No. 290-a said to have been bifurcated, it becomes obvious that the permission for amendment sought by the defendants, if granted, cannot advance the defence of the defendants, and would serve no useful purpose. This apart, the plaintiff is a charitable institution and it has filed the suit in the year 1980 and 10 years have elapsed cvcrsince. In a situation as the one on hand, the inordinate delay of 10 years in seeking amendment of the written statement cannot be ignored and the permission if granted, could cause only delay and harassment to the plaintiff-charitable institution. Accordingly, we reject i. a. 1v. In a situation as the one on hand, the inordinate delay of 10 years in seeking amendment of the written statement cannot be ignored and the permission if granted, could cause only delay and harassment to the plaintiff-charitable institution. Accordingly, we reject i. a. 1v. Coming to the other interlocutory applica- tion-i. a. v filed under order xli, Rule 27, c. p. c. , the same subbanna, who has sworn to the affidavit filed in support of the application-l. a. iv, has sworn to the affidavit filed. in support of 1. a. v also. The documents leave for production of which is sought, as pointed out earlier, are copies of copies of the original documents. This apart, as slated by us in dealing with the applicalion i. a. 1v, the documenls produced ralher support the case of ihe plaintiff, inslcad of advancing the defence soughl to be taken by the dcfendanls by inlroducing ihc amendment in ihe wrillen statemenl. Entertaining of such belalcd application for producing copies of copies of documents produced along with it, will, in our view, be neither just nor reasonable, particularly when we have rejected the application for taking new plea by way of defence in the written statement, in support of which plea the documents are sought to be produced. Accordingly, we reject l. a. v as well. Re: point (3): sln charities, the plaintiff in the suit, out of which the present appeal has arisen, is a trust created under a trust deed dated 23-6-1920 by its author, Sri yajaman doddanna setty, a hindu, becomes clear from the contents of the trust deed found in the booklet, exhibit p-9. A perusal of the contents of the trust deed shows that the persons named therein as trustees were so named as they had agreed to fulfill the following conditions involving charitable purposes recognised as such among hindus:1. To retain the name of Sri lakshmi- narasimhaswamy or sln in the designation of the instilulion; 2. To conlinue the inslitution as a free school as far as the third form standard, collccling no fees; 3. To conlinue the industrial educalion along with the lilerary educalion; 4. To mainlain the existing free hostel, providing food, clolhing, lodging, malerials of study for not less than forty students of the jothinagarada community; 5. To conlinue the inslitution as a free school as far as the third form standard, collccling no fees; 3. To conlinue the industrial educalion along with the lilerary educalion; 4. To mainlain the existing free hostel, providing food, clolhing, lodging, malerials of study for not less than forty students of the jothinagarada community; 5. That ten year high school scholarships for boys from this school be provided yearly, if there be ten boys who pass satisfactorily, from the income from the present institution, endowment funds, the amount of which scholarships shall be rupees two per instalment in fourth form, rupees two and annas eight in the fifth form, and rupees three in the sixth form provided that the total cost shall not exceed rupees seventy-five per month; 6. That the trustees shall pay from the funds of the institution rupees ten monthly to srce anjaneya temple, and also rupees twenty-four annually on the telugu new year's day taking an agreement from the archika that he shall perform regularly the temple puja and the feeding of a boy of sln institution. it is also said therein by the author of the trust that his interest and ownership of the sln institution shall vest in the body of the trustees of the sln charities, the trust created by him and the management of the trust-sln charities by the body of trustees shall come to an end in the event the trustees fail to fulfill the conditions of the trust contained in the following clause in the trust deed leading to the taking over of its management by the Mysore government;"in the event of any of the above conditions not being fulfilled by reason of neglect or default on the part of any one of the trustees, he will loose his right of trusteeship and will have to retransfer his right in the management of the institution to me, to any one person or persons whom i nominate in this behalf by will or other instrument duly executed or in the absence of such nominees, to the Mysore government. "the management of the trust-sln charities has come to Mysore government obviously as provided for in the above clause, from the year 1934 as the book-let, exhibit p-9, discloses that cversince, the Mysore government has appointed from time to time, its own managing committees for managing the trust-sln charities. "the management of the trust-sln charities has come to Mysore government obviously as provided for in the above clause, from the year 1934 as the book-let, exhibit p-9, discloses that cversince, the Mysore government has appointed from time to time, its own managing committees for managing the trust-sln charities. From the time the trust-sln charities has come under the management of the Mysore government in the year 1934, the letter, through its muzrai department, having taken control of the institution of the sln charities commenced to manage the'same under the rules of management of sri. Lakshminarasimhaswamy charities ("the rules")framed by it. Such a situation appears to have arisen as the body of trustees contemplated in trust deed having forfeited their right to continue as trustees by operation of the forfeiture clause in the trust deed. No doubt, the properties of the trust-sln charities vested in its body of trustees when they were there. But, the body of trustees when became extinct the ownership of properties of the trust-sln-charities vested in it has come to be vested in the trust-sln charities itself. When undisputcdly the trust-sln charities was a hindu charitable trust having regard to its objects, all its properties vested in the body of the trustees have come to be vested in itself, the same being a juristic person in hindu law. In other words, the properties of the trust-sln charities, which were dedicated to those charities by the author of the trust, will have come to be vested in itself, being a juristic person, when the trustees, who were holding the property on its behalf, ceased to exist on the happening of the event envisaged in the said clause in the trust deed. That is the correct legal position becomes evident from the passage found in the celebrated tagorc law lectures on hindu law of religious and charitable trusts at pages 30-31 (third edition) by Hon'ble b. k. mukharjca, which reads:". . . . the roman law recognised the foundation or institution itself as juristic person. Under the roman law an individual by dedicating property for a charitable purpose could bring into existence a foundation or institution which in law would be regarded as the owner of the owner of the dedicated property. A similar conception is present in the german "stiftung" where a found earmarked for a special purpose is deemed to be its own owner. A similar conception is present in the german "stiftung" where a found earmarked for a special purpose is deemed to be its own owner. There is no such conception in english law which recognises only one class of legal persons viz. , the corporations which are really personifications or groups of series of individuals, and are classified into corporation aggregate and corporation sole. Obviously neither a hindu religious institution nor a hindu idol can come within the scheme of artificial persons as framed and adopted by english law. Mr Justice west in his classic judgment in monohar ganesh v lakshmiram, ILR 12 bom. 247 pointed out that "the hindu law like the roman law and those derived from it recognises not only corporate bodies with rights of property vested in the corporation apart from its individual members but also juridical person and subjects called foundations. " the religious institutions like mutts, choultries and other establishments obviously answer to the description of foundations in roman law. The idea is the same, namely, when property is dedicated for a particular purpose the property itself upon which the purpose is impressed, is raised to the category of a juristic person so that the property which is dedicated would vest in the person so created. "further, the sln charities being a juristic person, in which the properties dedicated for charitable purposes by a hindu vested, became a charitable institution under Section 2 (2) (ii) of the Mysore religious and charitable endowments Act, 1927 ("the act"), requiring the taking over of its management as a charitable institution by the Mysore government. Hence, as required in the afore-referred clause of the trust deed as also the Provisions of the Act, the sln charities have come to be managed by the Mysore government from the year 1934 and after the re-organisation of the states, by the successor Karnataka government according to the rules for the management of sln charities framed under Section 7 of the Act, as becomes obvious from the contents of exhibit p-9 the book-let and the rules, exhibit p-10. The rules make it abundantly clear that the properties of the sln charities belong to it and all documents relating to or affecting the properties of the charities shall stand in the name of the sln charities and it shall be the duty of the managing committee to be appointed for the trust to manage the affairs of the trust (vide rules 20,29 and 4 ). Rule 30 (i), which provides for institution of suits of sln charities, reads thus:"the institution shall sue and be sued in the name of the sln charities represented by the chairman of the committee of management and the chairman shall have power to file suits and represent the charities in all legal proceeding and other matters in consultation with the committee. He shall also have power to do all acts connected with the said legal proceedings and other matters in consultation with the committee. He shall also have power to do all acts connected with the said legal proceedings and other matters. "from the above Rule, it becomes apparent that the institution (sln charities) has the power to sue in its own name (sln charities) represented by the chairman of the managing committee. Thus, when all the properties endowed or dedicated by janopakari doddanna setty, a hindu, for charitable purposes recognised by hindu religion vest in and belong to the trust-sln charities, a juristic person recognised under the hindu law as a person in which all the properties endowed and dedicated for charitable purposes could vest, and such sln charities, which has come under the state government under the provision of the act as a charitable/institution for being managed as per the rules made under the act providing for institution of suits by sln charities in its own name, represented by the chairman of the committee of management at the time of institution of suit, we are unable to see how a suit, out of which the present appeal has arisen, admittedly instituted as provided for in the rules, became unmaintainable for not arraying all the members of the committee of management of sln charities as additional plaintiffs. The plea taken in this regard on behalf of defendants on the assumption that the members of the committee of management of sln charities are its trustees in whom the properties have vested, being a wrong assumption, as could be seen from the history of sln charities to which we have adverted such plea cannot be sustained. Even the decided cases to which our attention was invited being cases relating to trusts, the properties of which vest in the trustees, cannot support the aforesaid plea of the defendants that the suit is unmaintainable for not arraying all the members of the committee of management of sln charities as plaintiffs. Hence, no need arises to refer to those decided cases. For the foregoing reasons, our answer to the point is that non-arraying of all the members of the committee of management of sln charities as additional plaintiffs in the suit filed by it in its own name, does not become unmaintainable as rightly held by the trial court. Re. Point (4): while dealing with point (3) we have pointed out that the suit, out of which the present appeal has arisen, was instituted by the sln charities in its own name, being represented by the then chairman of the managing committee of the sln charities as required under Rule 30 (i) of the rules. That suit was filed against the defendants, as pointed out in the facts of the case given by us, for re-imbursement of certain amounts payable as vacant land tax by the defendants-lessees, but paid by the plaintiff-sln charities, the trust. Before the rendering of the judgment and decree in the suit, it was urged in the trial court on behalf of the defendants that though the suit was duly instituted as required under Rule 30 (i) of the rules, it had become unmaintainable because of the non-substitution of the chairman of the newly constituted managing committee of the plaintiff-sln charities, after the chairman of the previous managing committee, who had instituted the suit as required under Rule 30 (i) of the rules, had gone out of the managing committee with the formation of a new managing committee. The trial court finding that order xxii, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("the code"), required such substitution, dismissed the suit as having become unmaintainable, purporting to place reliance in this regard on the decision of the Supreme Court in rikhu dev v som dass, AIR 1975 SC 2159 . We find that the trial court was in error in proceeding on the basis that the suit, out of which the present appeal has arisen, was similar to the one concerned in rikhu dev v som dass (supra) and order xxii, Rule 10 of the code was attracted as requiring the dismissal of the suit, for the reasons which we shall presently state. The case of rukhu dev v som dass (supra) was one where som dass was sued in his capacity as a person who claimed as mahant of dcra. But som dass contended that he was lawfully appointed as mahant of dera. Admittedly, that suit was filed by rikhu dev purporting to be de jure mahant of dera against som dass as de facto mahant. When som dass died during the pendency of the appeal in the high court, one shiama dass was elected to be the mahant of the dera. The question was whether the appeal was maintainable when shiama dass was not substituted in the place of deceased som dass under order xxii, Rule 10 of the code. The Supreme Court, in considering the matter, having found that it was dealing with the question whether the interest in the subject matter of the suit in appeal before it devolved upon shiam dass, proceeded to state thus:"the subject matter of the suit was the interest of som dass in the dcra and its properties and it devolved upon shiam dass by virtue of his election as mahant subsequent to the death of som dass. And, as it was in a representative capacity that the appeal was sought to be continued against shiam dass, order 22, Rule 10 will apply. And, as it was in a representative capacity that the appeal was sought to be continued against shiam dass, order 22, Rule 10 will apply. "the subject matter of the suit, out of which the present appeal has arisen, did not relate to any interest as such of puttarangaswami, chairman of the managing committee of the plaintiff-sln charities, as had happened in the case before the Supreme Court, and hence no question could arise as to the devolution of his interest in the subject matter of the suit upon the chairman, who might have been appointed to the managing committee of the plaintiff-sln charities, as would attract the application of order xxii, Rule 10 of the code for substitution of the chairman of the new managing committee in the place of the chairman of the previous managing committee. If so, in our view, there is no merit in the plea put forth on behalf of the defendants that the suit, out of which the present appeal has arisen, became unmaintainable for non-substitution of the chairman of the new managing committee in the place of the chairman of the previous managing committee by invoking the application of order xxii, Rule 10 of the code. The suit, out of which the present appeal has arisen, is similar to suits filed by the government represented by its chief secretary or by the university represented by its registrar or a statutory corporation represented by the person authorised to so represent under the relevant act. When such suits by the government or the universities or the corporations do not attract the application of order xxii, Rule 10 of the code, if, during the pendency of such suits, there is any change in the chief secretary or registrar or the person authorised, as the case may be, because of non-devolution of any personal interest in them in their successors, and become unmaintainable, the same would be the position of the suit of sln charities, with which we are concerned, because its position would be the same as that of the suit of the government or university or statutory corporation, as the case may be. Hence, we are of the considered opinion that the suit of the plaintiff-sln charities out of which the present appeal has arisen, did not become unmaintainable for non-substitution of the chairman of the new managing committee in the place of the chairman of the previous managing committee, who had filed the suit representing the plaintiff-sln charities. ( 7 ) IN the result, we allow this appeal andreversal of the judgment and decree of dismissal of the suit by the trial court, we decree the suit directing the defendants to pay to the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 1,28,126-20 together with current interest at 12% per annum thereon from the dale of the suit until today, the date of this decree, and future interest at 6% per annum on that amount from this date till the dale of realisation. The defendants-respondents shall pay full cost of the suit as well as the appeal to the plaintiff-appellant. Appeal allowed. --- *** --- .