Judgment :- Kanakaraj, J.: The appellants are owners of 17 cents of land in Survey No.44/2 acres in Survey No.45/1 and 33 cents in Survey No:45/2 Part in Valasaravakkam Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu District. The Notification under Sec.4(1) of the Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) was published in the Tamil Nadu dated 11.6.1975 proposing to acquire a large extent of land including the abovesaid the appellants for what is called the Kalaig-nar Karunanidhi Nagar Extension According to the appellants, there was no publication of the substance of the notification the locality. They received notice under Rule 3 of the Rules framed under Sec.55 of to submit their objections at the enquiry proposed under Sec.5-A of the Act. They filed objections but the same were overruled. The declaration under Sec.6 of the Act was published. They were served with notices under Secs.9(3) and 10 of the Act. They appeared at the enquiry on 24.2.1980 and submitted their objections. According to the appellants, they filed the writ petition No.11646 of 1985, no award had been passed. On the facts, the appellants sought for a writ of certiorari to quash notification under Sec.4(1) Act published in the Gazette on 11.6.1975 insofar as the lands of the appellants concerned. The writ petition was dismissed on 7.1.1986. It is against the order the writ appeal has been filed. Pending disposal of the writ appeals, in respect of all the which are not covered by any stay order, the Land Acquisition Officer passed the award the year 1986 within two years from the date of the commencement of the Land Acquisition Act 68 of 1984. In respect of the lands of the appellants, there is a stay granted Court in C.M.P.No.2672 of 1986 against the passing of the Award and therefore the has not yet been passed in respect of the appellants’ lands. 2. Mr.M.Raghavan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, raises contentions: (1) The substance of the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act was published in convenient places of the locality and this being a mandatory provision, the land acquisition proceedings are vitiated. In any event there is long delay in such publication. (2) The long delay in passing an Award and offering compensation for the lands acquired, resulting in delayed payment of compensation also vitiates the acquisition proceedings. In any event there is long delay in such publication. (2) The long delay in passing an Award and offering compensation for the lands acquired, resulting in delayed payment of compensation also vitiates the acquisition proceedings. not disputed that the awards have been passed only in the year 1986 in respect of the other than those of the appellants. 3. In support of the first contention, the learned counsel for the appellants relies on decision in State of Mysore v. Abdul Razak Sahib, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2361: (1973)3 196. The Supreme Court holds as follows: "4. With the above background, we have to consider the scope of Sec.4(1). Under certain circumstances publications in the Official Gazettes are presumed to be notice concerned. But in the case of a notification under Sec.4 of the Land Acquisition Act, he has prescribed that in addition to the publication of the notification in the Official Gazette Collector must also give publicity of the substance of the notification in the concerned locality. Unless both these conditions are satisfied, Sec.4 of the Land Acquisition Act be said to have been complied. The publication of the notice in the locality is a mandatory requirement. It has an important purpose behind it. In the absence of such publication, interested persons may not be able to file their objections about the acquisition proceedings and they will be deprived of the right of representation provided under Sec.5-A, which is valuable right". Therefore, the publication of the substance of the notification in convenient places village is a mandatory requirement. In The Collector (District Magistrate), Allahabad Ram Jaiswal,A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1622, the Supreme Court has reiterated the said proposition. In fact the Supreme Court has pointed out in this decision that even if the landowner filed objection in pursuance of the Gazette Notification, it is still mandatory on the part Government to satisfy that they have complied with the second part of Sec.4(1) requiring publication of the substance in the locality. In fact the Supreme Court has pointed out in this decision that even if the landowner filed objection in pursuance of the Gazette Notification, it is still mandatory on the part Government to satisfy that they have complied with the second part of Sec.4(1) requiring publication of the substance in the locality. The following passage is relevant for the of this writ appeal: "The expression, ‘such notification’ in the latter part of Sec.4(1) and sequence of therein enumerated would clearly spell out that first the Government should reach a decision to acquire land, then publish a notification Sec.4(1) and simultaneously or within a reasonable time from the date of the publication the notification cause a notice to be published containing substance of such notification is published. Obviously, therefore, there cannot be a publication in the locality prior issuance of the notification." In Deepak Pahwa v. Lt.Governor of Delhi, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1721: (1984)4 S.C.C. second aspect of the case whether the Gazette Publication and the publication substance in the locality should be simultaneously or can be separated by gap of discussed in detail. The Supreme Court points out as follows: "But since the steps contemplated by Sec.4(2) cannot be undertaken unless publication made and public notice given as contemplated by Sec.4(1), it is implicit that the and the public notice must be contemporaneous though not simultaneously or immediately after one another. Naturally, contemporaneity may involve a gap of time and by nature of the things, the publication in the official Gazette and the public notice in the must necessarily be separated by a gap of time. This does not mean that the publication the public notice may be separated by a long interval of time. What is necessary is continuity of action should not appear to be broken by a deep gap. If there is publication the Gazette and if there is public notice in the locality, the requirements of Sec.4(1) held to be satisfied unless the two are unlinked from each other by a gap of time so may lead one to the prima facie conclusion of lack of bona fides in the proceedings acquisition. If there is publication the Gazette and if there is public notice in the locality, the requirements of Sec.4(1) held to be satisfied unless the two are unlinked from each other by a gap of time so may lead one to the prima facie conclusion of lack of bona fides in the proceedings acquisition. If the notification and the public notice are separated by such a large time, it may become necessary to probe further to discover if there is any cause for and if the delay has caused prejudice to anyone." Later on, the Supreme Court quotes with approval the observations of the High Andhra Pradesh which runs as follows: "What all that is required is that before anything is done as contemplated by Sub-sec.(2), substance of the Sec.4(1) Notification must be published in the locality of the land times it may prove to be a physical impossibility if simultaneous publication is insisted It is not possible to think that the Legislature has provided for an impracticable and same time unnecessary task. What Sec.4(1) requires is that Sec.4(1) Notification published in the Official Gazette and its substance at convenient places in the said. 4. The principle of law with reference to the publication of the substance of Notification in the locality is thus clear. The Supreme Court has pointed out that there a reasonable gap of time between the Gazette publication and the publication substance in the locality. As to what is reasonable time gap has, of course, to be the facts and circumstances of each case. For instance in G.Nandakumar v. State Nadu represented by the Secretary to Government, Housing and Urban Development Department, Madras-9, 1986 Writ. L.R. 164, the gap of six months between the Notification and the date of publication in the locality was considered to be too deciding the question whether the time gap is fatal to the acquisition proceedings or have to satisfy ourselves about two conditions as pointed out by the Supreme Deepak Pahwa v. Lt.Governor of Delhi, A.I.R 1984 S.C. 1721: (1984)4 S.C.C. 308 as above. (1) To discover if there is any cause for the delay and if the delay has prejudice to any one; (2) Whether any act has been done under Sub-Sec. (2) of Sec.4 the substance of Sec.4(1) published in the locality. (1) To discover if there is any cause for the delay and if the delay has prejudice to any one; (2) Whether any act has been done under Sub-Sec. (2) of Sec.4 the substance of Sec.4(1) published in the locality. On neither of these points, Counsel for the appellants has placed any materials to come to the conclusion that in this case is fatal. We will now refer to the facts of the case by reference to the find out whether there was publication in the locality and if so whether it was reasonable time from the Gazette notification. 5. Learned Government Pleader in his arguments brings out the following facts: notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act was published in the Gazette on 11.6.1975. As date of publication of the substance in the locality, there is some discrepancy averments in the counter-affidavit and the actual records, According to the counter-affidavit, the substance the notification under Sec.4(1) was published on 5.8.1975 in the locality. But it is safer by the records which have been produced before us. By letter date 18.7.1975, Acquisition Officer has addressed as many as six Statutory Authorities directing publish the notification under Sec.4(1) in the Notice Board of the respectiv e offices furnish the necessary Certificates for having published the same. While sending thereof to the Special Revenue Inspector, the following instructions have been given: “He is directed to publish the notice in the Village and obtain and submit Certificate of publication from the Village Munsif.” The records also show that there are Certificates regarding the publication of the under Sec.4(1) in the Notice Board of the several offices to whom the requisition Such publication is on different dates. In the Office of the Special Deputy Collector, been pasted in the Notice Board on 5.8.1975. In another, it has been pasted on The only thing that is missing in the record, is the Certificate of the Village Munsif for published the notice in the Village. But there is contemporaneous record in the questionnaire with answers prepared by the Land Acquisition Officer on 17.5.1978 to the Government at the time of approval of the Declaration under Sec.6. The details so far as the question of publication of the substance are as follows: “1. Date of Publication of * 4(1) * Notification in the Gazette*... 11.6.75. 2. But there is contemporaneous record in the questionnaire with answers prepared by the Land Acquisition Officer on 17.5.1978 to the Government at the time of approval of the Declaration under Sec.6. The details so far as the question of publication of the substance are as follows: “1. Date of Publication of * 4(1) * Notification in the Gazette*... 11.6.75. 2. Date of publication of public notice of the substance of 4(1) notification in the per Rule 1 of the Rules framed under Sec.55(1) of the Land Acquisition Act with the (Government) places where published. 3. Whether copies of public notice were fixed upon the office of the L.A.O. and the as required under Rule 1 of the Rules framed under Sec.55(1) of the Land Acquisition. 4. Date of expiry of 30 days time allowed within which objection should be filed.” As will be seen from the answer to question No.2, there was publication of the substance the locality on 21.7.1975. On an examination of the records, we are satisfied that been publication of the substance of the notification under Sec.4(1) in the accordance with the second part of Sec.4(1) of the Act. In this connection, we have note of the fact that if really the appellants wanted to question the publication substance in the Village they should have approached this Court long earlier. notifications having been made in the year 1975, the filing of the writ petition in 1985 cannot be tolerated. In fact, this very question has been answered in favour Government in State of Mysore v. V.K.Kangan, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2190. The following clearly illustrates the point: “The notification under Sec.4 was published on 13.4.1967. Objections were filed respondent under Sec.5-A of the Act. The Deputy Commissioner submitted his report Government. The Government overruled the objections. The notification under Sec.6 published in the Gazette on 19.10.1968. The writ petition challenging the Validity notifications was filed some time in July or August, 1969. We do not think respondent was entitled to challenge the validity of the notification under Sec.4 of the writ petition challenging the notification was filed after an unreasonable lapse of public notice as required by Sec.4 of the Act was not given and that would per se notification under Sec.4, the appellant should have challenged its validity reasonable time of the publication of the notification. The respondent knew notification and filed objection under Sec.5-A of the Act. In these circumstances, we reason to accept the submission of counsel.” 6. Having found that there was publication of the substance of the Notification in the next question is whether there was inordinate delay in the publication of the in the locality. As will be seen from the dates given above, the Gazette publication 11.6.1975. The publication in the Notice Board was between 20.7.1975 and Applying the two tests relied on by the Supreme Court to which we have already made reference, we do not think that the time gap between the publication Gazette notification and the publication of the substance in the locality is too long and caused prejudice to the appellants. The appellants having not laid the foundation satisfying the above two tests and having regard to the materials available, we hold that publication of the substance in the locality has been made within a reasonable time from date of publication in the Gazette. The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the long delay passing the award and completing the acquisition proceedings has vitiated the acquisition proceedings. To bring home this point, the learned counsel for the appellants refers to the preamble of the Land Acquisition Act, Secs. 11 (2), 15, 16 and 48 of the Acquisition Act. It is not necessary to quote the above provisions of the law. The sum substance of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the reference the said provisions would show that the acquisition comprises of a single process. According the learned counsel for the appellants, acquisition and payment of compensation R.C.Cooper v. Union of India, A.I.R 1970 S.C. 564: (1970)1 S.C. J. 544: (1970)1 Com.L.J. 244: (1970)1 S. C. C. 248. Reliance is placed on paras 92,103 and 125 of the said judgment. Similarly, a reference is made to the decision in State of Madras v. D.Namasivaya, M.L.J. (S.C.) 82: (1965)2 An.W.R (S.C.)82:(1965)2 S.C.J. 163.A.I.R 1965 S.C. 190. the reference to the Judgment in R.C.Cooper v. Union of India, A.I.R.1970 S.C. 564 purpose of finding out as to what is generally meant by compensation, the reference decision in State of Madras v. D.Namasivaya, A.I.R 1965 S.C. 190 is, according misconceived. the reference to the Judgment in R.C.Cooper v. Union of India, A.I.R.1970 S.C. 564 purpose of finding out as to what is generally meant by compensation, the reference decision in State of Madras v. D.Namasivaya, A.I.R 1965 S.C. 190 is, according misconceived. In the latter case, the Court was concerned with the Madras (Acquisition of Land) Act, 1953 which provided for compensation for acquisition of bearing lands. Under the said Land Acquisition Act, 1953, as amended, the land is assessed on the market value of the land prevailing on April 28, 1947 and not on the which the Notification isissued under Sec.4(1) of the Act. In the instant case, that is position. It is not disputed that compensation is being awarded on the basis of the value on the date of the notification under Sec.4(1). The learned counsel for the appellants then relies on certain passage in the decision in Sanapala Suryanarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh by the Secretary, Health, Housing and Municipal Administration and two others, (1982)1 An. W.R 315. This judgment has been set aside by a Division Bench of the Court in the decision in M/s.Singareni Colleries Company Ltd. v. Satyanarana Murthy, (1984) 2 An.W.R 253 on the first point, while the decision was upheld on the second point. learned counsel for the appellants is relying upon certain passages which have been set by the Division Bench of the same Court. We will refer to the second point that is decided the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and which has been affirmed the Division Bench at a later stage. We are not impressed by the two English decisions Simpsons Motor Sales Ltd. v. Hendon Corporation, (1962)3 AII.E.R 75 and in Motor Sales Ltd. v. Hendon Corporation, (1962)2 AU.E.R 484. This is because the conditions prevailing in this Country are quite different from the conditions prevailing in England; Secondly, the Land Acquisition Act has been amended in the year 1984 which has significant impact on thearguments now advanced by the learned counsel. The judgment referred to by the learned counsel for the Appellants is in Sree Vengeeswarar Alagarperumal Devasthanam, by its Hereditary Trustee, Etc. v. The State of Tamil Nadu its Secretary, Housing and Urban Development Department, Fort St. The judgment referred to by the learned counsel for the Appellants is in Sree Vengeeswarar Alagarperumal Devasthanam, by its Hereditary Trustee, Etc. v. The State of Tamil Nadu its Secretary, Housing and Urban Development Department, Fort St. George, Madras another, (1984)2 M.L.J. 427 and in Special Deputy Collector v. Kuppu Gounder, 98L.W. Mohan, J. (as he then was) in the first quoted decision refers to two judgments. One the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the other is by a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The proposition of law is laid down as follows: "7. Adopting the reasoning of the Full Bench, it is seen in this case that there unexplained inordinate delay, which tends to hold the rights of the citizens, at ransom, whose properties are sought to be acquired. They are denied the compensation in spite reasonable time. The prices being pegged down to the Sec.4(1) notification compensations if not paid within a reasonable time, they would be sharp and pointed pieces of evidence to establish the lack of bona fides for the power. Judicial notice can be taken and indeed has to fee taken, of a continued inexorable uptrend in the prices of real estate. Consequently, if there exists no explanation all for the inordinate delay in finalising the land acquisition proceedings and concretise the so-called public purpose, the inference inevitably arises that no public purpose existed or was in sight which could be put in practical shape. If that follows that the exercise of the power of eminent domain was a colourable attempt prices forthwith, for an acquisition years later when they may well be double or treble existing prices. For a Welfare State to do so at the cost of the citizen, would something which would be a fraud on the power conferred by the Statute. “In Special Deputy Collector (L.A.) v. Kuppu Gounder, 98 L.W. 846 a Division Bench Court has practically adopted the reasoning of judgment in Sree Vengeeswarar Alagarperumal Devasthanam, by its Hereditary Trustee, etc. v. The State of Tamil its Secretary, Housing and Urban Development Department, Fort St. George, Madras another, (1984)2 M.L.J. 427 . In Sanapaia Suryanaray-ana v. State of Andhra Pradesh Secretary, Health, Housing and Municipal Administration and two others, (1982)1 315, as we have already pointed out, the Court has held in favour of the land owner grounds. v. The State of Tamil its Secretary, Housing and Urban Development Department, Fort St. George, Madras another, (1984)2 M.L.J. 427 . In Sanapaia Suryanaray-ana v. State of Andhra Pradesh Secretary, Health, Housing and Municipal Administration and two others, (1982)1 315, as we have already pointed out, the Court has held in favour of the land owner grounds. (1) Sec.23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which directs compensation paid on the basis of the market value on the date of the notification under Sec.4(1) and unconstitutional. (2) Long delay between the notification under Sec.4(1) and the award will vitiate the entire acquisition proceedings. The Division Bench while hearing appeal against the said judgment categorically set aside the first finding of the single Judge, that See.23 is ultra vires the Constitution. However, on the second Division Bench has also held that the inordinate delay on the completion of the enquiry resulting in delayed payment of compensation had vitiatedthe acquisition proceedings. 8. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is supported judgments viz., in Sree Vengeeswarar Alagarperumal Devasthanam, by its Trustee, etc. v. The State of Tamil Nadu by its Secretary, Housing and Urban Development Department, Fort St. George, Madras-9 and another, (1984)2 M.LJ.427, Special Collector (L.A.) v. Kuppu Gounder, 98 L.W.846 (D.B.) and in M/s.Singareni Company Ltd. v. Saryanarana Murthy, (1984)2 An.W.R. 253. The learned counsel appellants wants to strengthen his argument based on the said decisions by referring Board Standing Orders (now known as the Revenue Standing Orders) 90 Part relevant portion of the said standing Order is quoted below: “After the publication of the declaration above referred to, the Collector or other specially appointed to perform the functions of a Collector will proceed to acquire the manner directed by the Act. Notice must be issued quickly and the award passed promptly as possible. If a number of fields are being acquired and the enquiry has completed for all of them, an award may be passed for those fields for which the enquiry been completed and a separate award or awards may be passed subsequently remaining fields. Notice must be issued quickly and the award passed promptly as possible. If a number of fields are being acquired and the enquiry has completed for all of them, an award may be passed for those fields for which the enquiry been completed and a separate award or awards may be passed subsequently remaining fields. The award should not be delayed merely because the ownership of in dispute.....” Learned counsel for the appellants also relies upon the decision in B.S.Minhas v. Statistical Institute, A.I.R 1984 S.C. 363: (1983)4 S.C.C.582: (1984)1 Lab.L.J. 67 Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sebravardi,A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 487: (1981)1 S.C.C.722 for the proposition that arbitrariness in executive action should be avoided. 9. To reach the same conclusion, the learned counsel for the appellants relies second proviso to Art.31-A of the Constitution of India. The second proviso reads as “Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate shall not be less than the market value thereof.” The question whether Art.31-A of the Constitution of India can at all be invoked present case is doubtful. Art.31-A(1) refers to the law providing for certain aspects enumerated under Clauses (a) to (e) of Art.31-A(1) and we are unable to see how Acquisition Act, 1894 can be brought under any of the clauses mentioned in Art.31 need not even go to that extent, because the second proviso only relates to a law makes provision for acquisition by the State of any “estate” . Estate is defined later in A(2). In fact the proviso refers to land in personal cultivation and within the ceiling applicable to the person under any law for the time being in force. Thus, the proviso to be referring to a case of a law providing agrarian reforms or a law relating to land. 10. Estate is defined later in A(2). In fact the proviso refers to land in personal cultivation and within the ceiling applicable to the person under any law for the time being in force. Thus, the proviso to be referring to a case of a law providing agrarian reforms or a law relating to land. 10. Assuming, without admitting, that the said proviso will include the lands appellants, there is no material before us to come to the conclusion that the lands the personal cultivation of the appellants and within the ceiling limit applicable to them. if this is granted, the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the decision M/s.Singareni Colleries Company Ltd., represented by its Chairman, Kotha Khammam District v. V.Satyanarana Mur-thy, (1984) 2 An. W.R. 253, already referred analysis the applicability of the Proviso to Art.31 - A(1) and Sec.23 of the Land Acquisition Act and holds that it will have no application. We are in respectful agreement with this the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Further, the proviso only says that must make provision for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less market value thereof. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 also provides only for payment compensation according to the market value of the lands. The argument is compensation is the money equivalent as on the date of expropriation and must enable to purchase any other land of the same value. The Land Acquisition Act directs the of compensation as per the market value prevailing on the date of the notification Sec.4(1), and it provides for interest and solatium to bring it on par with the marketvalueon the date of expropriation. We will refer to these aspects of the Land Acquisition Act later. Suffice it to say that looked at from any angle, the second Proviso to Art.31 Constitution of India does not advance the case of the appellants. 11. We now come to the last and important aspect of the case as to whether the long in making the award will vitiate the acquisition proceedings. In this connection, we have remember that prior to the Amendment Act 68 of 1984, there was no time limit fixed which the Land Acquisition Officer should pass the award. 11. We now come to the last and important aspect of the case as to whether the long in making the award will vitiate the acquisition proceedings. In this connection, we have remember that prior to the Amendment Act 68 of 1984, there was no time limit fixed which the Land Acquisition Officer should pass the award. Courts were vested with cases where there were unreasonable delay in passing the award resulting in inadequate compensation being offered to the land owners because of the inflation of the money The argument that by issuing a notification under Sec.4(1), the Government paged down prices and offered the compensation leisurely after a long delay found favour with the We are in respectful agreement with the observations of Mohan, J., (as he then was) in Vengeeswarar Alagarperumal Devasthanam, by its Hereditary Trustee, etc. v. The State Tamil Nadu by its Secretary, Housing and Urban Development Department Fort St. George, Madras-9 and another, (1984)2 M.L.J. 427 , as affirmed in Special Deputy Collector (L.A.) Kuppu Gounder, 98 L.W. 846 and as repeated in M/s.Singareni Colleries Company represented by its Chairman, Kothagudem, Khammam District v. V.Satyanarana (1984)2 An.W.R. 253. Now let us turn to the statement of objects and reasons amendment Act 68 of 1984. The first paragraph of the statement of objects and reasons contains the following words: “The pendency of acquisition proceedings for long periods often causes hardship affected parties and renders unrealistic the scale of compensation offered to them. Now let us turn to the statement of objects and reasons amendment Act 68 of 1984. The first paragraph of the statement of objects and reasons contains the following words: “The pendency of acquisition proceedings for long periods often causes hardship affected parties and renders unrealistic the scale of compensation offered to them. More important is the following statements in paragraph 2(x):” As a large number of cases for the acquisition of land are pending before various authorities for a very long time and payment of the market value of the land obtaining on the date preliminary notification under Sec.4 of the Act in respect of such land is likely unrealistic and inequitous, it is proposed to provide for payment of simple interest at ten cent per annum on the amount of compensation for the period commencing from the date issue of the notification under Sec.4 of the Act to the date of tender of payment or deposit compensation awarded by the Collector in respect of all pending proceedings on the April, 1982, the date when the earlier Bill, for the amendment of the Act was introduced the House of the People." It is thus clear that the Parliament has taken note of this long delay in passing awards precisely for that reason, enhanced the rate of interest and doubled the percentage solatium payable to the land owners. We have also to take note of the fact that award is passed and possession is taken by the Government, the land owners benefit of the use of the lands and the income thereof. But what is more important case is the introduction of Sec. 11 -A of the Act which is quoted as below: “11. A. Period within which an award shall be made.....The Collector shall make under Sec. 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition land shall lapse: Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1894, the award shall with in a period of two years from such commencement. Explanation: In computing period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of shall be excluded." Therefore, when the Parliament has specifically paid attention to this very aspect of and has said that in respect of declarations which had been published before the amendment Act, the Award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement, be open to the Court to hold that even in respect of such awards made within two years such commencement of the amending Act, they are vitiated because of delay? considered opinion, when the Parliament itself has taken note of the difficulty decided to give relief in a particular manner, unless the said section itself is before us in a manner known to law, it will not be proper for the Court to hold awards passed within the said period of two years are vitiated and the entire proceedings should be set at naught. The author of the judgment Justice S.Mohan then was in Sree Vengeeswarar Alagarpe-rumal Devasthanam, by its Hereditary Trustee, v. The State of Tamil Nadu by its Secretary, Housing and Urban Development Department, Fort St. George, Madras-9 and another, (1984)2 M.L.J. 427 , has himself rendered elaborate judgment considering the introduction of Sec.11-A of the Act and how his decision will not apply after the amending Act. This judgment is rendered inSusan others v. State of Tamil Nadu representedby the Secretary to Government, Department, Fort St.George, Madras-9 and others, (W.P.Nos.4956 and 4991 of 1986 13.8.1986). We are in respectful agreement with the views expressed by the learned in the said judgment dated 13.8.1986. In Kaliyappan v. State of Kerala and others, 1989 S.C. 239, two grounds on which the acquisition proceedings were challenged case, were set out as follows: "(i) that the award not having been made within a period of two years from the date commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, that is, 24.9.1984, required by the proviso to Sec.11-A of the Act, the acquisition proceeding should be to have lapsed; and (ii) that the land acquisition proceeding was liable to be quashed on the ground that was inordinate delay in making the award." We are concerned with the second ground decided in the said case. The facts of were also similar to the facts of this case except that the delay in that case was shorter. notification under Sec.4(1) was issued on 24.2.1981. The declaration under Sec.6 was on 19.1.1984. The Amending Act 68 of 1984 came into picture on 24.9.1984. The award passed on 23.9.1986. On the question of inordinate delay in the passing of the award, the Supreme Court observed as follows: “ While we expect an award to be passed by the Collector as early as possible delaying till the close of the period of two years prescribed by Sec. 11-A of the Act, we see any good reason to set aside a proceeding for acquisition on the ground of applying our own standard of speed in the matter of making awards even where the occupied is less than two years from the date of publication of declaration under Sec.6 Act.” Later, the Supreme Court observed as follows: “The very fact that Sec.11-A has prescribed the period of two years from the date commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 as the maximum within which the award can be made suggests that the time taken by the Land Acquisition Officer in this case to make the award cannot be considered to be fatal to the acquisition proceeding.” 12. The learned counsel for the appellants sought to distinguish the Judgment Supreme Court According to learned counsel they only laid down that it is open to Acquisition Officer to wait till the last day of limitation and he need not pass the award earlier point of time. Even assuming for the sake of arguments that this is what is laid by the Supreme Court, we are of the opinion that since in respect of pending declare the date of commencement of the Act, a period of two years has been given by Sec.11 the Act, it is certainly open to the Land Acquisition Officer to pass the award on before the last date of the said period of two years under the proviso to Sec.11-A. 13. Even assuming that the three Judgments relied on by the appellants viz., Vengeeswarar Alagarperumal Devasthanam, by its Hereditary Trustee, etc. v. The Tamil Nadu by its Secretary, Housing and Urban Development Department, Madras another, (1984)2 M.L.J.427, The Special Deputy Collector (L.A.) v. Kuppu Gounder, 846 (D.B.) and in M/s. Singareni Collieries Co. Even assuming that the three Judgments relied on by the appellants viz., Vengeeswarar Alagarperumal Devasthanam, by its Hereditary Trustee, etc. v. The Tamil Nadu by its Secretary, Housing and Urban Development Department, Madras another, (1984)2 M.L.J.427, The Special Deputy Collector (L.A.) v. Kuppu Gounder, 846 (D.B.) and in M/s. Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd. rep, by its Chairman, Kothagudam, Khammam Dist. v. Satyanarayana Muthy, (1984)2 An.W.R. 253 applied to the facts cases not with standing the introduction of Sec.11-A to the Land Acquisition Act, delay will vitiate the land acquisition proceedings only if the same, as already explained, without any reason. In this case, it is pointed out in the counter-affidavit that after of notice under Secs.9(3) and 10 of the Land Acquisition Act, proceedings had to be because of the promulgation of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) 1978. The Housing Board for whose benefit, the lands were sought to be acquired approach the Government and obtain necessary orders exempting them from the purview the said Ceiling Act and also from the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Act, 1961 (Tamil Nadu Act 58 of 1961). After getting the orders of exemption on 15.2.83 respondents had to set in motion the Award Enquiry proceedings. It is also pointed the acquisition related to the, large extent of land of 303.05 acres. Therefore, the question serving notice as per the mandatory provision of Secs.9(3) and 10 of the Act consumed quite a large amount of time. Though we cannot accept the explanation long delay in passing the award as satisfactory, we cannot characterise the unreasonable or amounting to supine indifference on the part of the respondents therefore unable to bring the facts of this case within the parameters of the three judgments quoted above. However, as we have already pointed, the Amending Act 68 of 1984 significant impact on the question and Sec.11-A of the Act enables the respondents awards in respect of pending matters within two years from the date of commencement the Amending Act. It is not disputed that this provision has not been violated. 14. However, as we have already pointed, the Amending Act 68 of 1984 significant impact on the question and Sec.11-A of the Act enables the respondents awards in respect of pending matters within two years from the date of commencement the Amending Act. It is not disputed that this provision has not been violated. 14. Learned counsel for the appellants criticized the Judgment of the learned single having invoked the principle of laches to dismiss the writ petition and in having relied the Judgment in Hari Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. Inasmuch as we are not dismissing the writ appeal on the ground that the appellants filed the writ petitions after a delay of nearly eleven years after the publication notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act, it is not necessary to canvass the said findings learned single Judge. No doubt, the question of delay in filing the writ petition is material far as the question of the non-publication of the substance of the notification in the locality concerned. We have already referred to this aspect of the case and relied on the judgment the Supreme Court in State of Mysore and others v. V.K.Kangan and others, A.I.R. S.C. 2190. So far as the ground, based on the delay in passing the award is concerned, question of delay in filing the writ petition will not arise because the cause of action only when the petitioners found the inaction on the part of the respondents unreasonable. 15. For all the above reasons, we are unable to grant any relief to the appellants hold that the appellants have not made out a case for quashing the notification under (l) and the declaration under Sec.6 of the Act. The writ appeal is dismissed. The orders are vacated. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.