JUDGMENT : K.P.Singh, J. 1. The petitioner's father Sitar Ram Yadav was. a police constable in the Uttar Pradesh Police Force. After his death, the petitioner on completion of training at the Training Centre, Bahraich, was posted on duty at Bahraich from December, 1986 to 23-3-1987. From 23-3-1987 to 2-7- 1987 the petitioner was performing his duty at Azamgarh where his services have been terminated through annexure V dated 2-7-1987 attached with the writ petition. Aggrieved by the order the petitioner has approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The main prayer of the petitioner in this writ petition is for quashing the order dated 2-7-1987 and for a direction to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner with immediate effect as police constable and to pay his all arrears of salary from 2-7-1987. Other general reliefs have also been claimed. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before us that the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs claimed in the present writ petition on the ground of parity. According to him services of Mahendra Singh, Tej Bahadur Singh and Sumer Prasad were also terminated through the order dated 2-7-1987 as allegedly they all used unfair means at the time of examination and they have been taken in service as their claims have been allowed by the public services Tribunal through its order dated 2-9-1988 contained in Annexure I to the supplementary affidavit. 3. Second contentition raised on- behalf of the petitioner before us is that though the order dated 2-7-1987 contained in Annexure V attached with the writ petition is in innocuous words but in the facts and circumstances of this case, it is by way of punishment and the aforesaid order has been passed against the petitioner without affording him, reasonable opportunity to defend himself therefore, the order is bad in law and deserves to be quashed on the ground that it is violative of the principles of natural justice and fair play. 4. The third contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that in view of G. O. contained in Annexure IV attached with the writ petition, the petitioner was required to appear at the physical examination and interview and was not required to appear at any other examination, therefore, the termination of the petitioner's services on the alleged ground of using unfair means is wholly immaterial and irrelevant in the present case. ? The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has tried to justify the termination of the petitioner's services on the ground that the petitioner was found using unfair means at the examination and on that ground when he has not been considered as suitable for being retained in the Uttar Pradesh Police Force. No exception can be taken to the order contained in Annexure V. It has been asserted that if the conduct of the petitioner is taken into account in terminating his services, it is only motive and not foundation of the order, therefore, the petitioner's writ petition should be dismissed. In this connection the learned counsel for the opposite party has placed reliance upon the rulings reported in 1979 Supreme Court cases Vol. II, page 111 State of U. P. v. Bhoop Singh Verma and the ruling reported in 1981 (2) SCC 761 Union of India v. P. S. Bhatt wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court vide Para 9 have indicated that even if misconduct, negligence inefficiency may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the authority to terminate the services of the employee on probation, such termination cannot be termed as penalty or punishment and, therefore, Article 311 would not be attracted. 5. During the course of argument, the learned counsel for the opposite party has admitted that no appeal has been filed by the State against the judgment of the public services Tribunal dated 2-9-1988 contained in Annexure I to the supplementary affidavit, we, therefore, think that the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed in the present writ petition. The Tribunal has dealt with the cases of persons similarly situated as the petitioner in the following words :- "In view of the above cited authorities, we have no compunction in holding that the impugned termination order whereby the temporary services of the petitioners as constables had been terminated on the ground of their misconduct of having been found copying at their respective examinations, without affording them any opportunity of putting their own version by way of their defence in relation to such a misconduct, are patently violative of the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the constitution of India and that is why being patently illegal and invalid are liable to be struck down. The claim petition succeeds." 6. The claim petition succeeds." 6. In para 7 of the supplementary affidavit, it has been stated that the three persons who were similarly situated as the petitioner have been reinstated and they are discharging their duties on their respective posts as police constables, and they are drawing their salaries. The learned counsel for the state did not seek time to controvert these allegations, therefore, we have no option but to rely upon them and we are of of the opinion that the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs claimed in the writ petition on the ground of parity alone. In AIR 1985 SC 84 Nepal Singh v. State of U. P. their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed as below vide para 10 : ".........We may observe that where allegations of misconduct are levelled against a Government servant and it is a case where the provisions of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution should be applied, it is not open to, the competent authority to take the view that holding the enquiry contemplated by that clause would be a bother or a nuisance and that, therefore, it is entitled to avoid the mandate of that provision and resort to the guise of an ex facie innocuous termination order. The Courts will view with great disfavour any attempt to circumvent the constitutional provision of Art. 311 (2) in a case where that provision comes into play." 7. In the present case it does not appear that the authorities have served any charge sheet upon the petitioner or have provided to him the enquiry report due to which charge of use of unfair means have been levelled against the petitioner, therefore, we think that the petitioner has not got, reasonable opportunity to defend himself and the impugned order dated 2-7-1987 terminating the services of the petitioner is bad in law and against the principles of naturual justice. IN view of the observations made in AIR 1974 SC 2192 Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab and AIR 1984 SC 636 Anup v. Government of India we think that the order dated 2-7-1987 contained in Annexure V terminating the services of the petitioner should fall to the ground as the petitioner has not been afforded reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided in Art. 311 (2) of the constitution. 8. 8. In view of the above two submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and accepted by us, it is not necessary to deal with the third contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. For the foregoing discussions, this writ petition succeeds and the impugned order dated 2-7-1987, contained in Annexure V attached with the writ petition is hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be deemed to continue in service with consequential benefits by way of pay and allowances etc. In view of Annexure IV containing G. O. Regarding the dependence of a deceased servant, we do not think it proper to permit the opposite parties to hold fresh disciplinary action against the petitioner. There would be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.