Judgment :- Petitioners, who were members of the Board of Directors of a Co-operative Bank (for short, The Bank) were declared disqualified to hold the post since they were convicted and sentenced for offences under S.7 and 8 of the Kerala Gaming Act, 1960. The aforesaid action of the 2nd respondent (Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies) is in challenge now. 2. Facts, which are not disputed, are the following: Petitioners were elected to the Board of Directors of the Bank on 19-2-1989. The period of the Board, as per the bye-laws of the Bank, is five years. On 16-11-1987 the two petitioners along with six others were charged for offences under Ss.7 and 8 of the Gaming Act before a Magistrate. Except two, all the others pleaded guilty and the Magistrate convicted them and imposed a sentence of fine on them. The other two who pleaded not guilty faced trial and were ultimately acquitted. Petitioners are among those who pleaded guilty. The prosecution case was that all the accused were found engaged in playing cards with money on 29-7-1987 in the house of the 1st petitioner. 3. Second respondent issued a notice to the petitioners to show cause why they should not be declared disqualified as they were convicted and sentenced for the offences. Petitioners, in the reply admitted that they were convicted for the offences under the Gaming Act, and raised certain other contentions for avoiding disqualification. The second respondent as per Ext.P5 and P6 orders declared them disqualified. 4. Rule 44 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules (for short, The rules ) deals with disqualification from membership of the committee (or Board of Directors) of a Society. As per the said rule no member of a Society shall be eligible for being elected, or appointed as a member of the committee of the Society if he has been sentenced for, any offence other than an of fence of a political character or, an offence not involving moral delinquency, such sentence not having been reversed or offence pardoned and a period of three years has not elapsed from the date of expiration of the sentence. Sub Rule (2) provides that a member of the committee shall cease to hold his office as such, if he "is subsequently seen to be disqualified under sub-rule (1) on the date of election itself." The second respondent has taken the impugned action under R.44. 5. A conviction by a criminal court is not sufficient to invite consequence of rendering a member disqualified unless he has been sentenced for an offence involving "moral delinquency". The question here is whether the offences for which the petitioners were convicted and sentenced involve "moral delinquency". I do not think that the Rule making authority would have intended that the expression "moral delinquency" should be treated differently from "moral turpitude" since both expressions carry the same meaning. 6. The expression "moral delinquency" or "moral turpitude" has not been defined. All offences do not necessarily involve moral turpitude. Eg:-Violation of traffic rules or non-compliance with certain statutory requirements such as filing of returns or remittance of money etc. are not offences which can possibly be said to involve any moral turpitude or moral delinquency. Though the expression is vague, in a sense, it may carry slightly different meaning in different contexts. The term is generally taken to mean a conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It implies depravity and wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with a particular conduct. In Bouvier's Law Dictionary the expression "moral turpitude" is described as "an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man." Thus the conduct must be of such a degree as would cross the limit of mere violation or contravention of a statutory provision. The offence must be of such a type as would bring the offender to disrepute among the right thinking members of the Society. 7. In a particular situation where in the conduct of an advocate was the subject matter of consideration Supreme Court has observed that the expression "moral turpitude" or "delinquency" should not receive a narrow construction. (In re *P' An Advocate - AIR 1963 S.C.1313). Whether the expression should receive narrow or liberal construction would depend upon the facts of each case, in the absence of any fixed parameters for the expression. (In re *P' An Advocate - AIR 1963 S.C.1313). Whether the expression should receive narrow or liberal construction would depend upon the facts of each case, in the absence of any fixed parameters for the expression. A Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court observed in BaleshwarSingh v. District Magistrate (AIR 1959 Allahabad 71) that the expression "moral turpitude" means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. The test laid down by the learned judge is this: "If the individual who is charged with certain conduct, owes a duty either to another individual or to the society in general, to act in a specific manner or not to so act and he still acts contrary to it and does so knowingly, his conduct must be held to be "due to vileness and depravity." In the said context it was held that the offence under S.182 of the Indian Penal Code involved moral turpitude. Another Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court formulated two other tests to ascertain whether a particular offence involves moral turpitude (Mangali V. Chhakki Lal & others - AIR 1963 Allahabad 527). The tests are: (1) Whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience of society in general; (2) Whether the motive which led to the act was a base one and whether on account of the act having been committed the perpetrator could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who was to be looked down upon by the society. Applying the said tests learned judge found that the offence under S.60(a) of the U.P. Excise Act did not involve moral turpitude. A Single Judge of the Madras High Court has found on facts that the offence under S. 135(1)(b)(i) of the Customs Act does not involve moral turpitude. (1989 Lab. I.C. 1646). 8. The position seems to be this: The question whether a particular offence involves moral turpitude or moral delinquency has to be examined on the facts of each case. It is not merely the section of offence which matters much. Facts on which the offence is made out have also some bearing on the answer to the question. 9. Kerala Gaming Act was enacted for punishment of gaming and for keeping common gaming house. It is not merely the section of offence which matters much. Facts on which the offence is made out have also some bearing on the answer to the question. 9. Kerala Gaming Act was enacted for punishment of gaming and for keeping common gaming house. Common gaming house is defined as any house, room, tent, enclosure, vehicle, vessel or any place whatsoever in which cards, dice, tables or other instruments of gaming are kept or used for the profit or gain of the person owning, occupying, using or keeping such house etc. S.14 of the Gaming Act says that the provisions in that Act would not apply to any game of mere skill wherever played. This Court has held in Kunhikannan & others v. Asst Sub Inspector of Police (1985 KLT 484) that gaming in a private building or place would not make it a common gaming house. The Madras High Court has held in Emperor v. Subramonia (AIR 1935 Madras 648) that the fact that occasionally people used to play cards in a house, and perhaps for money, does not necessarily make it a common gaming house. A game does not become offensive merely because it involves some element of chance. Practically no game can be played without any element of chance. If a game predominantly involves skill of the player, such game is outside the scope of Gaming Act. The Court cannot overlook the fact that game of cards, in different forms, is played in clubs and other public places of amusement without performing the thin membrane which distinguishes it from being an offence. Here the charge is that the game of cards was played with money in the residence of the 1st petitioner and since the game was not one for mere skill the players were charge sheeted. If the game played involved more skill than chance the game would not have crossed into prohibited region. The very idea of prohibiting such games in common gaming houses is to prevent perpetration of serious crimes. So the measure is more in the nature of a preventive step. The game of cards, even if played with money and in whatever form, does not normally involve any transgression of code of justice or morality to a degree which could be characterised as wickedness of character. So the measure is more in the nature of a preventive step. The game of cards, even if played with money and in whatever form, does not normally involve any transgression of code of justice or morality to a degree which could be characterised as wickedness of character. On the facts of this case one cannot take the view that the offences for which the petitioners were convicted involved moral delinquency or moral turpitude. I therefore allow this Original Petition and quash the two proceedings of the 2nd respondent (Ext.P5 and P6) by which petitioners were declared disqualified from being members of the committee of the Bank.