JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J. - The petitioner a class IV employee of the Sharda Devi Uchtar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Naudhiha Tarhar, tahsil Barah, district Allahabad, has preferred the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the order, dated 26-9-83 passed by the Principal of the College and the order, dated 22-9-88 passed by the District Inspector of Schools deciding the appeal or revision of the petitioner in pursuance of the order of remand passed by a Division Bench of this Court directing as follows:-- "After hearing counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel, we are of the opinion that since the representation of the petitioner was not decided by the management against his termination the petitioner approached the District Inspector of School under Regulation 32. The District Inspector of Schools should have decided the same on merits. We hereby direct the District Inspector of Schools to do so within two months of the presentation of a certified copy of the order. 2. The factual metrics of the case is that petitioner alleged to have been appointed on 1-7-78 as water peon and worked till 26-9-83 when the institution was raised upto the High School from Junior High School and on 26-9-83 the services were terminated by the Principal. The petitioner preferred a representation. The petitioner was getting salary since the date of his appointment from the Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Allahabad and his name was shown in the Manager's return as an employee of Class IV. Out of the five Class IV employees the petitioner was the senior most, The representation of petitioner was dismissed as time-barred The Court, however, has already directed to decide the matter on merits and the relevant portion of the order of this Court has already been quoted. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that as the Division Bench of this Court by its judgment, dated 9-7-86 has directed the District Inspector of Schools to decide the representation on merits, which obviously connotes that irrespective of the formal defect including the representation being time-barred, the same must have been decided strictly in accordance with legal rights of the petitioner and not just on the ground that the same was time barred. 4. 4. Learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, urged that the word 'merit' connotes decision on some formal defect including the claim or representation being time barred, and it does not mean that the representation has to be decided strictly on the basis of legal rights of the petitioner. Learned counsel for other respondents was also heard. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties we are of the opinion that as the Division Bench in its judgment, dated 9-7-87 (Annexure-3 to petition), has directed the District Inspector of Schools to decide the representation on merits, hence it has to be ascertained as to whether the District Inspector of Schools was justified in rejecting the representation of the petitioner as time-barred, or he must have ignored the same rather treating it to be within time and must have decided the same strictly in accordance with legal rights of the petitioner. 6. As the word 'merit' is not a statutorily defined term under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, nor in its Regulations, we may refer to some dictionary meanings of the expression 'merit'. In State of Orissa v. The Titagarh Paper Mills Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1296 at page 1328, it was observed as follows:-- "It was now well-settled that the dictionary meaning of a word cannot be looked into in case that word has been defined statutorily or has been judicially defined. But where no such definition or interpretation is there, the court may take aid of dictionaries to ascertain the meaning of the word in common parlance. In doing so the court must keep in mind that the word is used in different senses according to its context and the dictionary gives all the meanings of a word and the court would, therefore, have to select a particular meaning which would be relevant to the context in which it has to interpret the word. 7. According to New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary, the expression 'merit' connotes excellence, the intrinsic rights and wrongs of a case. In Black's Law Dictionary it has been stated that the expression 'merit' as a legal terms, is to be regarded as referring to the strict legal rights of the parties. In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the word 'merit' means (in law) to discuss only with regard to intensive excellence or defects, intrinsic rights and wrongs of the matter. In Black's Law Dictionary it has been stated that the expression 'merit' as a legal terms, is to be regarded as referring to the strict legal rights of the parties. In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the word 'merit' means (in law) to discuss only with regard to intensive excellence or defects, intrinsic rights and wrongs of the matter. In Webster's Third New International Dictionary, the word 'merit' means intrinsic rights and wrongs of legal cases as determined by matters of substance in distinction from matters of form, strict legal rights of the parties as distinguished from strict defendant on practices and jurisdiction. 8. In Hughes v. V.S., 71 U.S. 232, 237, it was held as follows: "Where the petition was dismissed for want of jurisdiction and absence of proper parties so far as related to the special relief sought by the suit ............... vacation and surrender of a patent ......... and was dismissed generally on the ground that it was defective, uncertain and insufficient in the statement of the cause of action, it was not a decision on merits so as to put a bar to subsequent suit involving the same subject-matter. Judgment is on merits without constituting declaration regarding the parties' rights and duties based on ultimate facts irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objection. 9. In Collector Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji and others, 1987 (13) A.L.R. 306 (S.C.), it was observed under para. 3 as follows:-- "The legislature has concerned power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. 10. We are of the opinion that the disposal of matter on merits was a subsequent stage than the condonation of delay under Section 5 or under some other provision. In the instant case this Court had directed the District Inspector of Schools to decide the representation of petitioner on merits (Vide Annexure-3 to the petition). There could be no inference possible except that the decision on merits was a subsequent stage after condonation of delay under Section 5 or other wise. 11. Decision on merit means strict legal rights of the parties and has nothing to do with the practice and jurisdiction including the plea of limitation. There could be no inference possible except that the decision on merits was a subsequent stage after condonation of delay under Section 5 or other wise. 11. Decision on merit means strict legal rights of the parties and has nothing to do with the practice and jurisdiction including the plea of limitation. In case a decision was rendered by holding a representation for suit being dismissed as time-barred, in that event it is not a decision on merit, rather it is a decision in accordance with the procedure prescribed that the suit must be within time or must be filed within the period prescribed. It is well known that even if a particular suit is held to be time-barred, in that event the legal right of the plaintiff subsists but only the remedy is lost, as the remedy to be made available the suit may be filed within the period prescribed. In the present case what was required by the decision of the Division Bench is that the representation of petitioner was to be decided on merits, which admits no to interpretation except that the same has not to be dismissed or rejected as being barred by limitation. 12. Otherwise also it is obvious that the services of petitioner was terminated on 26-9-83 and the petitioner has submitted his representation on 10-11-83, just after 15 days, to the management, which was within time (vide para. 18(g) of the petition). It could not, therefore, be said that the representation of petitioner was made after inordinate delay. This appears to be the basis for the decision of the earlier Division Bench in which the District Inspector of Schools was directed to decide the representation on merits, which obviously means that it was not to be decided as being barred by limitation rather with reference to actual legal rights of the petitioner. The impugned order passed by the District Inspector of Schools is manifestly erroneous and cannot be sustained. 13. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order, dated 22-6-88 is quashed. The District Inspector of Schools is directed to dispose of the representation of petitioner within two months from the date of production of certified copy of this order.