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1990 DIGILAW 530 (KER)

R. v. K. Thampuran VS Kunnath Textiles

1990-12-07

S.PADMANABHAN

body1990
JUDGMENT S. Padmanabhan, J. 1. Second appeal filed by the defendant arose from a suit for realisation of price of goods purchased on credit. The suit was filed before the Munsiff, Thrissur. The appellant said that the purchase through agent was at Thripunithura and hence the Munsiff had no jurisdiction. He also said that his textile business ended in loss and the plaintiff's agent, K. G. Menon, through whom the purchase was made, took the entire goods in the shop worth Rs. 1,289.40 in full and final settlement and hence no amount is due. Want of privity of contract was also a contention. 2. Both the courts below found on evidence that part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Thrissur court and hence it had jurisdiction. But the Trial Court accepted the pleas of ' want of privity of contract as well as full and final settlement by the agent and dismissed the suit. The Appellants Judge said that there is nothing to show that K G. Menon was the agent of the plaintiff or that he had the authority to have a full and final settlement on behalf of the plaintiff. Appeal was allowed and the suit decreed for the full principal amount of Rs. 4,063.20 with interest only from the date of suit and costs in both the courts, 3. Now it is admitted and it is further proved by the evidence that one T. V. Menon was the agent of the plaintiff and in his absence, his son K. G. Menon acted as agent for the transaction. His authority is not questioned. Ext. A1 order form itself was signed by K. G. Menon. Ext. A2 contains a list of articles valued at Rs 1,289.40 taken by K. G. Menon from the shop of the appellant on 5-2-1981 in partial discharge of the liability under the disputed transaction. By Ext. B1 letter dated 26-2-1981, he informed the appellant that unless a demand draft for the balance amount is sent to the respondent, the price of goods received under Ext. B2 cannot be accounted. That means, the goods under Ext. B2 were not received in full and final settlement as contended. The amount covered by Ext. B2 will have to be deducted from the plaint claim since the authority of K. G. Menon is not in dispute. 4. B2 cannot be accounted. That means, the goods under Ext. B2 were not received in full and final settlement as contended. The amount covered by Ext. B2 will have to be deducted from the plaint claim since the authority of K. G. Menon is not in dispute. 4. Only other surviving contention is regarding the jurisdiction. It is a fundamental principle that a decree passed without jurisdiction is a nullity. That invalidity could be raised anywhere, including in execution, and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, pecuniary or territorial or in respect of the subject matter, strikes at the authority of the court and it cannot be cured by consent of parties. But there is a policy underlying S.21 and 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure and S.11 of the Suits and Valuation Act, viz. that when a case has been tried by the court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction, both territorial and pecuniary, as technical and not open to consideration by, an appellate court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits. 5. Section 99 of the Code deals only with mis-joinder or non joinder of parties except non joinder of necessary parties or causes of action or any error or defect or irregularity in proceedings not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the court. But the principle underlying S.11 of the Suit and Valuation Act is that a decree passed by a court, which would have had no jurisdiction to hear a suit or appeal but for overvaluation or under-valuation, is not to be treated as what it would be but for the section, null and void, and that an objection to jurisdiction based on over valuation or under valuation, should be dealt with under the provisions of that section and not otherwise. The same is the principle adopted under S.21 of the Code with reference to objection relating to territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction. The same is the principle adopted under S.21 of the Code with reference to objection relating to territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction. In order that an objection may be entertained by the appellate or revisional court fulfilment of three conditions is essential, i) the objection was taken in the court of first instance; ii) it was taken at the earlier possible opportunity and in cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement; and iii) there has been a consequent failure of justice. All the three conditions must exist. 6. Jurisdiction that is conferred on appellate courts under S.11 of the Suit and Valuation Act or under S.21 of the Code is an equitable one to be exercised when there was erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by a subordinate court as a result of overvaluation, under-valuation or lack of territorial jurisdiction and there was a consequent failure of justice. It is not possible or desirable to define such jurisdiction closely or confine it within stated bounds. It is in the nature of a revisional jurisdiction to be expressed with caution and in the ends of justice, whenever the facts and situations call for it. Question of prejudice is a matter to be determined on the facts of each case. Decree is not to be interfered in all cases as a matter of course, but only if prejudice such as is mentioned in the sections results. Prejudice contemplated in the sections is different from the fact of the appeal having been heard in a forum, which would not have been competent to hear it otherwise (Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 ) and Pathumma v. Kuntalankutty, AIR 1981 SC 1683 ). Prejudice must be attributable directly to the choosing of the wrong court. Error in a finding of fact or errors in conclusion of points cannot be taken as prejudice within the meaning of the sections. 7. Appellant was able to get the suit dismissed by the Trial Court. He cannot claim any prejudice otherwise also. Therefore, even though he raised the objection in the Trial Court and that too at the earliest possible opportunity before settlement of issues, he cannot succeed as the two courts decided the case on the merits and no prejudice has occasioned. Further, the findings of the courts below regarding jurisdiction are not liable to be reversed on merits also. Therefore, even though he raised the objection in the Trial Court and that too at the earliest possible opportunity before settlement of issues, he cannot succeed as the two courts decided the case on the merits and no prejudice has occasioned. Further, the findings of the courts below regarding jurisdiction are not liable to be reversed on merits also. What the appellant is entitled to is only adjustment of the amount covered by Ext. B2. Second appeal is allowed in part and the decree of the courts below will stand modified as under. There will be only a decree in favour of the respondent for realisation of Rs. 2,773.80 with 6% interest from the date of suit till realisation and costs proportionate to success in all three courts from the appellant and his assets.