GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA v. RAMALINGA SETTY — 1990 DIGILAW 534 (KAR)

N. D. V. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THESE four appeals preferred by the Governmcnl of Karnataka are directed against the common Judgment dated 18-12-1978 passed by the Civil Judge, Tiptuf in regular Appeal Nos. 109/1978,110/1978, 114/1978 and 115/1978. ( 2 ) THE facts leading to these appeals lie in a narrow compass. They are brieflystated as under: ( 3 ) THE Government of Mysore by its order dated 13/14-11-1963 under No. RD 42lkd 63 was pleased to accord sanction for the release of 16 acres of land in Sy. No. 61 of Thirthapura village in Chikkanaikanahalli Taluk, from the date reserve list for cultivation purpose. Sanction was also accorded by the same order to the grant of 8 acres of land each in favour of C. M. Mallappa and C. M. Mallikarjunaiah, out of the released land. It was stipulated in the Government Order that the land granted to c. M. Mallikarjunaiah was free of upset price under P. S. C. Rules and an upset price was required to be fixed by the Deputy Commissioner in respect of the land granted to C. M. Mallappa. In furtherance of the aforesaid Government Order the point open a grant certificate (Ext. P-l) in Form-I under Schedule-E of Land Revenue Rules was issued to C. M. Mallappa by the Tahsildar, Chikkanaikanahalli on 9-12-1963. Similarly, a grant certificate as per Ex. P-19 was issued to C. M. Mallikarjunaiah. In both the certificates a condition that the grantee should not alienate the land within a period of 15 years with effect from the date of grant certificate was imposed. The said condition was inserted by a separate writing in ink in continuation of the printed condition No. 7. ( 4 ) IT appears that the Government of Mysore by its order No. RD 131 LKD 66,dated 8-11-1971 cancelled the grant made in favour of the aforesaid two persons on the allegation that Sri C. M. Mallappa alienated the land granted to him by mortgaging the property in question with possession to one Sri T. B. Honnappa and sri C. M. Mallikarjunaiah had sold the land granted to him to one Sri T. R. Mallikarjunappa Shetty. It was also ordered that the lands be resumed to the government. It was also ordered that the lands be resumed to the government. ( 5 ) WHEN this was so, it appears that defendants-1 to 9 started asserting that they have been in possession of the land in question from 1961 itself. It is under these circumstances that the said two grantees viz. , Sri C. M. Mallappa (since deceased) and Sri C. M. Mallikarjunaiah by the two suits viz. , O. S. Nos. 351/1972 and O. S. No. 352/1972 respectively in the first instance, in the Court of Munsiff, Tiptur against ramalinga Shetty and 8 others. On the establishment of the Court of Munsiff at chikkanaikanahalli the said suits were transferred to the Court of Munsiff at chikkanaikanahalli and were respectively numbered as O. S. Nos. 57/1974 and 58/1974. In the meanwhile steps were taken by each of the plaintiffs in the respective suits to add the Government of Karnataka as party defendant-10 and by the order of the Court on the interim application for amendment, Government of Karnataka was added as party dcfendant-10 in each of the said suits. ( 6 ) THE case made out by the plaintiffs in their respective suits, in brief, is that theconditions imposing prohibition to alienate inserted in the grant certificate (Ex. P-l iand Ex. P-19 respectively) was repugnant to the order granting the lands (Ex. D-l) and that therefore, the condition was void. It was also their case that the Government had no power to cancel the grant made in their favour. They asserted that they continued to be in lawful possession of the properties in question on the date of the suit and alleged interference on the part of the defendants. They, therefore, prayed for a decree declaring that they are the absolute owners of the suit properties; for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their peaceful possession and for a declaration that the condition sought to be imposed by the government in Ex. P-l and Ex. P-19 is repugnant to the grant. ( 7 ) IT is seen that defendants-1 to 9 made a common cause in each of the said suits. The written statement filed by defcndant-2 was adopted by dcfendants-1 and 3 to 9. In fine, they contended that they have been in possession of the lands in question eversince 1961. They denied that plaintiffs were in possession. ( 7 ) IT is seen that defendants-1 to 9 made a common cause in each of the said suits. The written statement filed by defcndant-2 was adopted by dcfendants-1 and 3 to 9. In fine, they contended that they have been in possession of the lands in question eversince 1961. They denied that plaintiffs were in possession. They asserted that the cancellation of grant by the Government was in accordance with law. They also contended that records were being built up to grant the lands in their favour. They prayed for the dismissal of the suit. ( 8 ) DEFENDANT-10, the Government of Karnataka, resisted both the suits in it swritten statement filed in each of the said suits, by contending that the condition imposing prohibition to alienate was in order and the cancellation of the grant was in accordance with law; with the result plaintiffs lost all their rights in the lands. Defendant-10 also contended that the suits were not maintainable since plaintiffs did not exhaust their remedy under the Revenue Code/rules, that the suits were barred by time and also that the suits were barred for want of notice under Section 80 of cpc. Government also raised a contention challenging the jurisdiction of the Civil court to entertain and try the suits in question. ( 9 ) THE learned Munsiff, having regard to the common questions of facts and lawinvolved in the trial of the said two suits clubbed the same and after raising the issues (including additional issues) as reflected in para-5 of the Judgment and after recording the evidence of the witnesses and marking the documents tendered by the parties to the suits, by its common Judgment dated 30-9-1977 dismissed both the suits. ( 10 ) BEING aggrieved by the said Judgment, defendants-1 to 9 preferred Regular Appeal Nos. 109/1978 and 110/1978 before the Civil Judge, Tiptur, Government of karnataka preferred Regular Appeal Nos. 114/1978 and 115/1978. ( 11 ) THE learned Civil Judge, Tiptur by his common Judgment dated 18-12-1978 disposed of all the four appeals by dismissing them for the reasons recorded in his judgment. ( 12 ) BEING aggrieved by the same, the Government of Karnataka has preferred the aforesaid four appeals. ( 13 ) ALL the four appeals preferred by the Government of Karnataka were admitted and were clubbed together. ( 12 ) BEING aggrieved by the same, the Government of Karnataka has preferred the aforesaid four appeals. ( 13 ) ALL the four appeals preferred by the Government of Karnataka were admitted and were clubbed together. The following substantial questions of law have been raised at the time of admission: (1) Whether the lower Appellate Court was right in holding that the suit was maintainable? (2) Whether the lower Appellate Court was justified in law in holding that the condition imposed in saguvali chits prohibiting alienation for a period of 15 years was void? ( 14 ) I have heard the. argument of Smt. T. N. Manjula Devi, the learned High Court Government Advocate, Sri M. S. Gopal and Sri T. R. Rangaraju, learned Advocates for the respondents. ( 15 ) THE case made out by the plaintiffs in the two suits in O. S. Nos. 57/1974 and 58/1974 on the file of the Munsiff, Chikkanaikanahalli and the defence putforth by the respective defendants have already been set out hereinabovc. It is not necessary to risk a repetition here. ( 16 ) BEFORE examining the correctness or otherwise of the findings given by the two Courts below particularly in the context of the substantial questions of law set out earlier, it would be indeed convenient to marshal certain facts which arc cither admitted or not disputed or which can be taken as having been established by acceptable, evidence on record. It is an admitted fact that the Government of Mysore (as it then was) under No. RD 42 LKD 63, dated 13/14-11-1963 issued an order as per Ex. P-2. It reads as under:"order No. RD 42 LKD 63, dated 13/14-11-1963 read: Letter No. LND 3 SR 1102/1962-63, dated 6-2-1963 of the Divisional commissioner, Bangalore Division, Bangalore requesting the release of 16 acres of land in Sy. No. 61 of Thirthapura village, Chikkanaikanahalli taluk from the date reserve list for cultivation purposes. ORDER sanction is accorded to the release of an extent of 16 acres of land in Sy. No. 61 of Thirthapura village, Chikkanaikanahalli Taluk from the da,tc reserve list for cultivation purpose and the land may be demarcated so as to have the entire length of the two blocks in a continuous line along the Western boundary of Sy. No. 61 and also to prevent grantees from having access to the halla. No. 61 of Thirthapura village, Chikkanaikanahalli Taluk from the da,tc reserve list for cultivation purpose and the land may be demarcated so as to have the entire length of the two blocks in a continuous line along the Western boundary of Sy. No. 61 and also to prevent grantees from having access to the halla. The remaining extent of 14 acres 10 gunlas out of Sy. No. in question may be reserved in the Eastern halt' of the Sy. No. including halla as marked in the new survey map indicating the area released as (V) and the area to be reserved as (X ). Sanction is also accorded to the grant of 8 acres of land each in favour of snyuths C. M. Mallappa and C. M. Mallikarjunaiah out of the released extent subject to the conditions specified above. The land granted to Sri C. M, mallikarjunaiah is free of upset price under PSC rules and an upset price to be fixed by the Deputy Commissioner in respect of Sri C. M. Mallappa. By order and in the name of governor of Mysore sd/- under Secretary to Govt. , revenue Department. "it. is also an admitted fact that a grant certificate dated 9-12-1963 was issued in favour of C. M. Mallappa (plaintiff in O. S. No. 57/1974) as per Ex. P-l and a grant certificate dated 9-12-1963 was issued to C. M. Mallikarjunaiah (plaintiff in O. S. No. 58/1974) as per Ex. P-19. It is also evident from Condition No. 7 of the grant certificates at Ex. P-l and Ex. P-19 that the grant was subject to the provisions of the Land revenue Code and the Rules framed thereunder or under any other law for the time being in force. In addition to this the following condition is also incorporated therein w. hicli reads as under: is also an admitted fact that the Government under Order No. RD 131 LKD 66, dated 8-11-1971 and marked as Ex. D-l before the trial Court cancelled the grant and resuming the lands in question to Government on the ground that there was breach of condition No. 7 reflected in Ex. P-l and Ex. P-19 by each of the "grantees". D-l before the trial Court cancelled the grant and resuming the lands in question to Government on the ground that there was breach of condition No. 7 reflected in Ex. P-l and Ex. P-19 by each of the "grantees". It is also dear from the evidence on record as also the Judgments of the two Courts below that alienation, in fact, had taken place though it is sought to be made out that the same was got rectified subsequently, by getting them retransfcrred. It is also necessary to ram-tuber that except the Government Order at Ex. P-2 culled out earlier, there is no other order by any of the officers referred to in the Rule relevant in this context. It has been argued at the Bar for the plaintiffs that Ex. P-2 itself is an order evidencing giant though it was argued on behalf of the appellant (Government) that Ex. P-2 is not an order granting the lands but is only an order according sanction for the land, it was unequivocally stated by the Government Advocate that no separate order grajiting the land as such is forthcoming. The two Courts below also have proceeded on the basis that Ex. P-2, the Government Order itself is an order granting the land. In this connection, the observation made by the learned Civil Judge in the course of his judgment deserves to be noted. It is observed by the learned Civil Judge at para-29 of the Judgment that he asked the learned Advocate for the plaintiffs and also the Assistant government Pleader representing the 10th defendant (Government) whether any order of grant in respect of the suit lands in favour of the plaintiffs was made either by the Deputy Commissioner or by the Assistant Commissioner and that both of them submitted that no order apart from the order of the Government as per Ex. P- 2 is passed before the grant certificates as per Ex. P-l and Ex. P-19 were issued to the plaintiffs. Under these circumstances, this Court will have to proceed on the basis that apart from Ex. P-2, there is no other order by any of the Revenue Officers referred to in the Rule relevant for consideration granting the land in question to the respective plaintiffs. P-l and Ex. P-19 were issued to the plaintiffs. Under these circumstances, this Court will have to proceed on the basis that apart from Ex. P-2, there is no other order by any of the Revenue Officers referred to in the Rule relevant for consideration granting the land in question to the respective plaintiffs. ( 17 ) IN the context of what is staled hereinabove, it will have to be examined as to whether the Courts-below have erred with reference to the substantial questions raised for decision and/or many other points croping up for consideration in the context of the submissions made at the Bar by the learned Advocates appearing on either side. At this juncture, it is necessary to mention here that the tenor of the judgment of the learned Munsiff and the tenor of the Judgment passed by the learned civil Judge if read as a whole would go to show that both the Judgments have practically proceeded on the same lines. In this view of the matter, it will suffice if the Judgment of the learned Civil Judge is referred to, to see as to what are the reasons leading to the conclusions, reached by the two Courts below. In this connection, para-27 of the Judgment of the learned Civil Judge is required to be referred to. In para-27 of his Judgment, the learned Civil Judge has pointed out as under:"by the notification dated 20-1-1958, Rule 43 of the Mysore Land Revenue rules was substituted and Rule 43-A to 43-G were amended and Rule 43-D to 43-M were introduced. These Rules were in force at the time of grant of the suit lands in favour of the plaintiffs in 1963. This position was not disputed by the learned Advocates appearing for the parties at the time of arguments. Rules 43 and 43-A to 43-M dealt with the grant of unoccupied land belonging to the government. " ( 18 ) FROM what the learned Civil Judge has observed it is clear that the learned Civil Judge has proceeded on the basis that the 1958 Rules held the field at the time when Ex. P-2-the Government Order and Ex. P-l and Ex. P-19 (the grant certificates) came into being. " ( 18 ) FROM what the learned Civil Judge has observed it is clear that the learned Civil Judge has proceeded on the basis that the 1958 Rules held the field at the time when Ex. P-2-the Government Order and Ex. P-l and Ex. P-19 (the grant certificates) came into being. At this juncture only, it is necessary to mention here that the Rules referred to by the learned Civil Judge and the learned Munsiff did not held the field at the time when the Government Order and the grant certificates were issued. On the other hand, it is the Mysore Land Revenue (Amendment) Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1960 Rules') issued by the Government of Mysore under Notification No. RD 4 LAD 1960, Bangalore, dated 10-5-1960, in exercise of the powers conferred on it under Section 233 of the Mysore Land Revenue Code, 1988 which held the field. In fact, Sri M. S. Gopal, the learned Advocate representing the respondents-plaintiffs did not dispute this position. Whether the conclusion arrived at by the learned Civil Judge as also by the learned Munsiff is rendered erroneous on account of relying on the Rules which were not in existence at the time when Exs. P-2, P-l and P-19 were issued would be considered later. At this juncture, it will suffice if it is remembered that the two Courts-below addressed themselves with reference to the 1958 Rules instead of 1960 Rules. The learned Civil Judge after making the observation which is culled out hereinabove, proceeded to consider the various sub-rules of Rule 43, that is to say, Rules 43-A to 43-M as they stood next before the 1960 Rules came into force and has proceeded to observe at para-32 of his judgment as under:"it is clear from what has been stated above that the grants of suit lands in favour of both the plaintiffs did not attract the provisions of Rule 43 (6) because the grants were not made cither under Rule 43-A or under Rule 43-H. Unoccupied lands could be granted under Rules 43-C, 43-E, 43-I and 43-J. It is not the contention of the defendants that the grants made in favour of the plaintiffs was made under the provisions of Rules 43-C, 43-E, 43-I and 43-J. Obviously those provisions are not applicable to the grants in favour of the plaintiffs. There is no provision other than Rule 43-M under which the lands could be granted to the plaintiffs. According to the plaintiffs, the grant was made hy the Government in exercise of its power under Rule 43-M. It is clear from rule 43 (6) that the grant of land made under Rule 43-M does not come within ils mischief. "at this juncture, it would be indeed refreshing to cull out the provisions reflected in rule 43-M as it stood next before the 1960 Rules came into force since the 1st Appelate court has unequivocally stated that the land in question was granted by the government under Rule 43-M of the 1958 Rules. It reads as under:"government reserved the right to examine from the operation of these Rules in a particular case or any class of cases of grant of lands and in such cases, the grant shall be made subject to such terms and conditions as Government may deem fit to impose in each case. " ( 19 ) AFTER having held that the lands in question were granted by the Government itself under Ex. P-2 (which order is culled out earlier) and that the grant certificates at Exs. P-l and P-19 were issued on the basis of the said order, the First Appellate court has held that under Rule 43-M Government is competent to grant lands subject to such terms and conditions as it deems fit to impose in each case. It is further held by the First Appellate Court that the Government is empowered to exempt from the operation of the said Rules (1958 Rules) of a grant in a particular case or in classes of cases. After having held as above, the learned Civil Judge has observed as under:"it is clear from Ex. P-2 that no condition prohibiting alienation for any period is imposed, while granting the land to the plaintiffs. It is thus clear that the provisions of Rule 43 (6) arc not attracted to the grants in favour of the plaintiffs and the grant made by the Government is not subject to any condition prohibiting alienation for any period. P-2 that no condition prohibiting alienation for any period is imposed, while granting the land to the plaintiffs. It is thus clear that the provisions of Rule 43 (6) arc not attracted to the grants in favour of the plaintiffs and the grant made by the Government is not subject to any condition prohibiting alienation for any period. "after having observed as above, it is pointed out by the learned Civil Judge that the tahsildar who was only required to issue the grant certificates had no such authority to impose a condition prohibiting alienation and that the same was repugnant to the conditions referred to in Ex. P- 2. In this view of the matter it was held that the conditions imposed in the grant certificates at Exs. P-l and P-19 prohibiting alienation for a period of 15 years is void. The 1st Appellate Court relying on the decision in seetha Rcddy v Snhba Ready, 1963 (1) Mys. L. J. 538 took the view that the proceedings relating to the grant or disposal of Government land by Government are in the nature of contract and as such are governed by the general principles"bf law or contract and that therefore, a grant once made by the Government or by any of its officers can be cancelled or rescinded subject to the same principles under which a contract can be rescinded or cancelled. In this view of the matter, it was held by the learned Civil Judge that cancellation of the grant by the order at Ex. D-l is illegal and inoperative. In the result, it was held that each of the, plaintiff became the owner of the respective hinds by virtue of Ex. P-2 and that their ownership remained unaffected by Ex. D-l. ( 20 ) THE Courts-below also took the view on an appreciation of the totality of the evidence that plaintiffs were in possession of the suit lands. The Courts below have also taken the view that the suits arc maintainable. ( 21 ) SUIT. Manjula Devi, learned Government Advocate took me to the various provisions of Rule No. 43 of 1960 Rules and in particular relied on Rule No. 43-G to contend that a restriction on alienation is provided for in sub-rule (4) thereunder. The Courts below have also taken the view that the suits arc maintainable. ( 21 ) SUIT. Manjula Devi, learned Government Advocate took me to the various provisions of Rule No. 43 of 1960 Rules and in particular relied on Rule No. 43-G to contend that a restriction on alienation is provided for in sub-rule (4) thereunder. She also relied on Rule 43-G (7) of the 1960 Rules in support of her submission that the grantees liable to be terminated and the land resumed if any of the conditions reflected in the preceding sub-rules of 43-G arc not fulfilled. Dilating on this aspect it was contended by the learned Government Advocate that Condition No. 7 in Exs. P-1 and P-19 only reflects the, provisions in the 1960 Rules and that the same has the support of Rules framed under the Mysore Land Revenue Code and that therefore, the lower Courts have erred in holding that the conditions are void. She has also placed reliance on Laxmamma v State of Karnataka, 1983 (1) Kar. L. J. 417. She contended that the two Courts-below have misled themselves by applying the wrong rules and the Judgments delivered by them arc therefore rendered erroneous. In fine, the learned Government Advocate contended that the Judgments of the Courts-below are liable to be set at naught. ( 22 ) SRI M. S. Gopal, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents contended that though the Courts-below have relied on Rule 43-M as it stood before 1960 Rules came into force the same will not affect the findings given by the two Courts-below since the same can be supported by the analogue provision in 1960 Rules. In this connection he has placed reliance on Rule 43-L of 1960 Rules. It was contended by him that in the instant case, it was the Government itself which has made the order of grant which according to him was obviously under Rule 43-L. Dilating on this aspect it was argued that the second para of the order, if read between the lines would indicate that it is not merely a sanction for the grant but an order of grant itself. In this connection, the expression "the land granted" in the second sentence of second para was pinpointed. In this connection, the expression "the land granted" in the second sentence of second para was pinpointed. Further, it was argued that the only condition subject to which the grant was made was that in the case of grant to Sri C. M. Mallikarjunaiah should be free of upset price under P. S. C. Rules and in respect of the grant of land to C. M. Mallappa an upset price was to be fixed by the Deputy Commissioner. It was also argued by the learned Advocate for the plaintiffs-respondents that the Government is deemed to have passed the said order in relaxation of the provisions reflected in the rules by virtue of the power vested in it in Rule 43-L of 1960 Rules. Under these circumstances, it was contended that it was not competent for the Tahsildar to impose a condition in Ex. P-l and Ex. P-19 restraining alienation which is not to be found in the order of grant itself. It was submitted that in the context of the submissions alluded to earlier, what is required to be seen in such a situation is not the Rules but the order (Ex. P-2) itself to see as to what the conditions are. He has also placed reliance on the decisions in Seetlia Reddy v Subba Reddy, 1963 (1) Mys. L. J. 538 and Sampu Gowda v State of Mysore, 1954 (32) Mys. L. J. 12. Making his submissions on these lines it was contended by the learned Advocate that the judgments of the two Courts-below cannot be found fault with. ( 23 ) SRI T. R. Rangaraju, the learned Advocate for respondents-4 to 8 in RSA Nos. 669/1979 and 745/1979 supported the submissions made by the learned Government advocate. ( 24 ) I have indicated hcreinabovc, the case made out by the respective parties in their pleadings, the findings given by the Courts-below on the issues and points raised for decision and the submissions made by the Government Advocate for the appellant and the learned Advocates representing the different respondents in these appeals. From what is staled earlier, it is clear that the Rules relevant for consideration are 1960 Rules and not the Rules which were in force next before 1960 rules came into force. From what is staled earlier, it is clear that the Rules relevant for consideration are 1960 Rules and not the Rules which were in force next before 1960 rules came into force. It is also clear that there is no order evidencing grant of lands by any of the Revenue Officers referred to in Rule 42 of 1960 Rules. It emerges that the only order with reference to which grant certificates were issued was the government Order at Ex. P-2. The plaintiffs in both the suits swear by the same. The two Courts-below also have held that it is Ex. P-2 which should be considered as an order granting the lands in question. In the context of these circumstances it is necessary to to see as to whether Ex. P-2 is an order granting the lands and if so whether the Government has the authority of law to directly issue an order granting lands. ( 25 ) THE order of the Government at Ex. P-2 is culled out in para-16 hereinabove. On a perusal of the order at Ex. P-2 it is difficult to agree with the findings of the Courts-below that it itself is an order granting the land. The sentence "land granted to Sri C. M. Mallikarjunaiah is free of upset price under P. S. C. Rules and an upset price to be fixed by the Deputy Commissioner in respect of Sri C. M. Mallappa" will have to be understood in the context of the earlier sentence which clearly states that "sanction is also accorded to the grant of 8 acres of land each in favour of Sriyuths c. M. Mallappa and C. M. Mallikarjunaiah out of the released extent subject to the conditions specified above. " The sanction of the Government was necessitated on account of the fact that the lands were required to be released from the date reserve list. Under these circumstances, I find it difficult lo agree with the submissions of Sri m. S. Gopal, learned Advocate for the plaintiffs-respondents or for that matter the findings given by the Courts-below that Ex. P-2 is in itself an order granting the lands in question. It is needless to say that the order will have to be construed in the context of thc totality of the language reflected in the order including the preamble portion incorporated therein. ( 26 ) ASSUMING for a while that Ex. P-2 is in itself an order granting the lands in question. It is needless to say that the order will have to be construed in the context of thc totality of the language reflected in the order including the preamble portion incorporated therein. ( 26 ) ASSUMING for a while that Ex. P-2 can be construed as an order granting the lands, the question for consideration is as to whether it was within the competence of the Government to directly grant the lands in question. In this context, the provision relevant for consideration is Rule 43-L of 1960 Rules. The said Rule reads as under:"powers of Government Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding Rules, the Government may 'suo molu' or on the recommendation of the Divisional Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner if it is of the opinion that in the circumstances of any case or classes of cases it is just and reasonable to relax any of the foregoing provisions of these Rules, it may by order direct such relaxation subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order, and thereupon land may be granted in such a case in accordance with such direction. " ( 27 ) THE power that is vested in the Government is the power stated in the Rule. The Government in the first instance, has lo form an opinion thai in the circumslances of the case it is just and reasonable to relax any of the provisions preceding Rule 43- L. The said opinion will have to be formed by the Government either on the recommendation of Ite Divisional Commissioner or the Dcpuly commissioner or even sno molu. It is only after forming such an opinion, the government will have to pass an order directing such relaxation subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order and thereupon the land may be granted in such a case in accordance with such a direction. Rule 43-L requires the Government to expressly stale in the order that it had formed such an opinion and that it is just and reasonable to relax the relevant Rules. That, such an order is necessary is clear from the decision of this Court in Jacab Gowda and Others v The Stale of Mysore and another, 1964 Mys. L. J. Suppl. That, such an order is necessary is clear from the decision of this Court in Jacab Gowda and Others v The Stale of Mysore and another, 1964 Mys. L. J. Suppl. 494 as also from the decision in Venkataramaiah and others v State of Mysore and Another, 1967 (1) Mys. L. J. 301. It is needless to say that there is no order directing relaxation. Having regard lo the clear wording reflected in Rule 43-L of 1960 Rules, an order directing relaxalion cannot be presumed. That such an order is imperalive is clear from the decision cited earlier. In fact, the scope of power of Government under Rule 43-L has been the subject matter of various decisions of this Court. In the decision in K. N. Shivanna v Stale of Mysore, 1969 (1) Mys. L. J. 54, a Division Bench of this Court after considering the various decisions of this Court and the provisions of 1960 Rules as also the Mysore Land revenue Code has explained the legal position in great detail in this behalf. It would be indeed useful to cull out the relevant portion of the said Judgment. Among other things, it is held in the said case as under:"rule 43 provides that an application for grant of lands should be made to the Tahsildar of the taluk and sets out the particulars to be mentioned in the application and other ancillary matters. Rules 43-A to 43-K deal with various matters, such as preferences, priorities, restrictions, conditions of grant, etc, rule 43-L reads as follows: powers of Government Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding Rules, the Government may 'suo motu' or on the recommendation of the Divisional Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner if it is of the opinion that in the circumstances of any case or classes of cases it is just and reasonable to relax any of the foregoing provisions of these Rules, it may by order direct such relaxation subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order, and thereupon land may be granted in such a case in accordance with such direction. ""it is seen from the second part of Section 36 of the Code already copied, that the power of disposal of lands declared to be Government lands by the first part of the section is vested in the Deputy Commissioner. ""it is seen from the second part of Section 36 of the Code already copied, that the power of disposal of lands declared to be Government lands by the first part of the section is vested in the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner, according to Section 6 of the Code, is an officer appointed in respect of a district who may throughout the said district exercise all powers and discharge all duties conferred and imposed on him by the Code. Under Section 8 of the Code, the government may place the Assistant Commissioner in-charge of the revenue administration of one or more of the taluks of a district, and so far as regards the taluk or taluks in his charge, he is required to perform such duties and exercise such powers as are imposed or conferred upon the Deputy Commissioner by the code. The" Tahsildar (formerly called the Amildar) is an officer entrusted with local revenue administration of a taluk under Section 10 of the Code, and his duties and powers were such as may be expressly imposed or conferred upon hint by the Code or any other law, or as may be imposed upon or delegated to him by the Deputy Commissioner under general or special orders of the Government It will be seen therefore that an Assistant Commissioner under the Code was in effect the Deputy Commissioner in respect of the taluk or taluks placed in his charge and that a Tahsildar could be invested by delegation with any of the powers of the Deputy Commissioner to be exercised by him within the limits, of the taluk, the local revenue administration of which is entrusted to him. This is the background of the delegation of the Deputy Commissioner's powers of making grants of Government lands, to the Assistant Commissioner and she tahsildar under sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 42 of the Land Revenue Rules. In section 67 of the Act, it is made clear that all the three officers, viz. , the Deputy commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner and the Tahsildar, may, within their respective jurisdictions and subject to such limitations and restrictions and in accordance with such Rules as may be prescribed, dispose of Government land;;,"then again at para-18 therein this Court has observed as under:"hence, the question for consideration gets limited to this, viz. , the Deputy commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner and the Tahsildar, may, within their respective jurisdictions and subject to such limitations and restrictions and in accordance with such Rules as may be prescribed, dispose of Government land;;,"then again at para-18 therein this Court has observed as under:"hence, the question for consideration gets limited to this, viz. , whether the power of the Government under Rule 43-L to relax any of the provisions of Rules 41 to 43-K may be exercised in such a way or to such an extent as to remove the power of making a grant expressly conferred by the statute on the Deputy commissioner and to make a grant themselves. The question was raised in some of the earlier cases decided by this Court but has not been finally decided. Among the reported cases, the earliest is that reported in Hanumanthappa v hanumanthappa, 1963 (1) Mys. L. J. 17. In that case, a dry land of an extent of less than four acres, which was within the power of the Tahsildar to grant, was actually granted by the Government themselves. The grant was set aside. Dealing with an argument addressed by the Government Pleader therein that the grant could be supported as having been made in exercise of the powers conferred on the Government by Rule 43-L, the Court observed:"it is true as provided in this Rule that Government is authorised, if they are of opinion that the circumstances of a case or class of cases justify that course, to relax any of the provisions of the Rules, and, to make an order that a land may be granted in accordance with such direction. The clear meaning of this rule is that that power may be exercised by the Government if it is otherwise permissible to do so only after the application of their mind to the question whether there are circumstances in a given case or in a class of cases which justify the relaxation of the Rules. The clear meaning of this rule is that that power may be exercised by the Government if it is otherwise permissible to do so only after the application of their mind to the question whether there are circumstances in a given case or in a class of cases which justify the relaxation of the Rules. If I had been satisfied that there was such application of the mind on the part of the Government to the question whether Rule 42 had to be relaxed which was the Rule which had to be relaxed in the case before a grant could be made to respondent-1, I might have found very little difficulty, unless the relaxation if the Government had made it under Rule 43-L had been challenged on some other ground, to come to the conclusion that the grant made to respondent-1 was one made pursuant to a relaxation made under Rule 43-L. But, it is clear as it is from the materials placed before us, that there was not the slightest application of the mind of the Government to the question whether any relaxation was necessary of the relevant Rules and whether there were any circumstances in the case of rcspondent-1 justifying such relaxation so that a grant may be made after such relaxation was made under Rule 43-L. "xx xx xx xx. The power to make a grant which should reside in the Tahsildar under Rule 42 could not be unless by the adoption of a process known to law, acquired by the government, and the fact that the Government may have general powers of superintendence or control under the Land Revenue Code cannot, in my opinion, confer on it the power to do an act which by the Rule is conferred on a tahsildar. " so far as the decision itself is concerned, the positive proposition of law laid down is that no relaxation of any of the Rules under Rule 43-L is possible or could validly be made unless the Government first apply their mind to the question whether the circumstances exist which make it just and reasonable to relax any of the Rules. Whether by a relaxation of Rule 42 which enumerates the officers empowered to make a grant the Government could make a direct grant themselves is not decided. In another case reported in Venkataramaiah v State of Mysore, 1967 (1) Mys. Whether by a relaxation of Rule 42 which enumerates the officers empowered to make a grant the Government could make a direct grant themselves is not decided. In another case reported in Venkataramaiah v State of Mysore, 1967 (1) Mys. L. J. 301 in which also the grant was set aside on the ground that there had not been the application of the mind by the Government to the question whether the case was a fit one for relaxation, the above passage was cited and the Court made the following observation at page 304 of the Report:-"the Rule itself presents no difficulty for interpretation. To confine ourselves only to the relevant ground, the following requirements are to be satisfied before the Government itself could exercise the power to make the grant delegated by rule 42 to various authorities. They arc, (1) the Government should be of the opinion that in the case before them or in the class of cases before them, it is just and reasonable to relax any of the foregoing provisions of the Rules; (2) if it is of such opinion, then it has to direct by an order that such relaxation was being made subject to the conditions to be specified therein; and (3) it is only "thereupon" that land may be granted in a particular case, or class of cases in accordance with such direction. In the present case, the order gives no clue to screw out any such opinion and order on the part of the Government. "although in this case also, there was no direct decision on the question now before us, it appears to be assumed or implicit in the above observations that on a proper relaxation of Rule 42, the Government may themselves make a grant. The question was raised again in Baliah v State of Mysore, 1968 (1) Mys. L. J. 137. The Judgment of the Court in this case was delivered by Somnath Iyer, J. , who had also delivered the Judgment in Hanumanthappa's case. Here again, the grant by the Government was quashed on the ground that a relaxation of Rule 42 was inadequate and insufficient to support the impugned grant because another Rule 43-F specifying certain priorities had not been relaxed. Here again, the grant by the Government was quashed on the ground that a relaxation of Rule 42 was inadequate and insufficient to support the impugned grant because another Rule 43-F specifying certain priorities had not been relaxed. Although the Court observed that it was not necessary to discuss the larger question whether in exercise of the power created by Rule 43-L the Government may themselves make a grant in a proper case, it became inevitable to deal with the argument that the observations in hanumanthappa's case might support the existence of such a power. Dealing with such an argument in the context of the facts in that case, the Court made the following observations: (See page 143 of the Report)"the Rule relaxed by Government was the 42nd Rule, and it is obvious that the relaxation of that rule was in the circumstances both inadequate and insufficient. It has already been explained that that Rule specifies the maximum extent of the land which could be granted by the three revenue officers to whom it refers. Sub-rule (4) of that Rule which prohibits a grant otherwise than by adherence to that Rule except with the previous sanction of Government, docs not, by the relaxation of Rule 42, clothe the Government to make a direct grant but only dispenses with the sanction of Government. That is so because, speaking generally, relaxation reduces the rigidity of the Rule and diminishes its rigour, but does not obliterate it. So the subordinate revenue officers would still be the persons in whom the power to make the grant could continue to reside. It is manifest that the relaxation of the 42nd Rule in the case before us rested upon imperfect comprehension of what was stated by this Court in Hanumanthappa v hamtmanthappa. In that case in which there was no relaxation under Rule 43-L as such, this Court observed that, if there had been a relaxation of the 42nd Rule which was the Rule which had to be relaxed in that case, and if it was otherwise permissible, to make that relaxation and if the relaxation was not open to any other criticism, it might have been possible to sustain the impugned grant. So this court did not make the enunciation that the relaxation of the 42nd Rule could support a direct grant in all cases, or that there could be acquisition of power to make a direct grant by the relaxation of any Rule. On those matters this Court expressed no opinion in that case. "two propositions flow from this case. The first is one which we have already made, viz. , that Hanumantlppa's case did not decide that by relaxation of Rule 42 the Government themselves could exercise the power of making a direct grant. The second is that the only possible legal effect of a relaxation of the entire Rule 42 would he to dispense with the previous sanction of Government as required by subrule (4) and not to deprive the Deputy Commissioner of the statutory power of making the grant or transmit that power to the Government. It appears to us that the second of the propositions really concludes the matter now be fore us. As we have already pointed out, the statute itself, which declares that certain lands belong to State Government, expressly confers the power of disposal in respect thereof on the Deputy Commissioner subject to and in accordance with such Rules as the Government may frame under the statute. Hence, if one looks at the statutory provision itself, the scheme of conferment and distribution of powers by it is that the actual power of disposal should be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner, and the power which the Government can exercise is the control over the exercise of the power of disposal by the Deputy Commissioner. As such control, is required to be exercised by the framing of Rules under the statute, the power of the Government is a rule making power which must be exercised subject to and in accordance with the provisions of the statute and not in such a way as to contravene the statute. The power of control vested in one authority over or in respect of the exercise of a power vested in another authority cannot be regarded as so large as to totally abrogate the power of the second mentioned authority or to empower the first mentioned authority to take over its exercise itself. The power of control vested in one authority over or in respect of the exercise of a power vested in another authority cannot be regarded as so large as to totally abrogate the power of the second mentioned authority or to empower the first mentioned authority to take over its exercise itself. Further, as observed in Hanumanthappa's case, the general powers of superintendence and control which the Government have under the Land Revenue Code, do not confer on the Government the power to do an act which under a statutory rule has to be exercised by a specified officer. It has been argued on behalf of the State Government before us that Section 36 of the Code declares certain lands to be the property of Government and that by stating that it is lawful for the Deputy Commissioner to dispose of the same, the Government as actual owner of the land is not deprived of what is described as the normal power which an owner has of disposing of land belonging to itself. The argument, to the extent it seeks to equate Government ownership to the ownership of a private individual is, in our opinion, fallacious. When the law states that certain property is government property, it declares that the same is the property of the State as such, i. e. , that it is public property. As the property is State property, it has necessarily to be utilised for purposes of the State or for such purposes as those for which the law declares that it may be utilised. The powers, which the Government as Government may exercise, are those comprised within what are regarded as the executive powers under the Constitution. It is well established that executive powers of a State Government which are coextensive with the legislative power of the State Legislators have to be exercised in respect of any matter subject to and in accordance with the law or an enactment of the Legislature governing the said matter. No executive power can be exercised so as to contravene any statute. No executive power can be exercised so as to contravene any statute. Applying these principles to the question before us, the following propositions clearly flow, if the Government exercise or is exercising what is described in Rule 43-L. as the power to relax any of the Rules 41 to 43-K, the highest result that they can achieve by the exercise of that power is to make any or all of the provisions of the said rule inapplicable to a given case or given class of cases after applying their mind to the question whether the circumstances exist making it just and reasonable to do so, but they cannot relax or abrogate the provision of the statute itself contained in section 36 of the Code or Section 69 of the Act; if the Government acts and is acting in exercise of its executive powers in regard to grant of lands declared to be Government lands under the Code or the Act, it cannot exercise the said powers so as to contravene the Code or the Act. Under the express provisions of the Code or Act, as the case may be, the power of disposal of Government lands, is vested in the Deputy commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner or the Tahsildar, as the case may be, and the power of the Government is limited to controlling the exercise of the said power of making the grant by the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner or the tahsildar, as the case may be, and docs not extend to taking up the said power of making a grant themselves. Our answer to the question raised in this case, therefore, is as follows:"the power of the Government under Rule 43-L of the Land Revenue Rules is limited to relaxation of any or all of the provisions of Rules 41 to 43-K, if after applying their mind to the necessity of making such relaxation they find that circumstances exist which make it just and reasonable that such relaxation should be made in any case or in any class of cases. The said Rule 43-L does not confer upon the Government the power to make a grant of land themselves which is vested in the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner or the tahsildar, as the case may be. The said Rule 43-L does not confer upon the Government the power to make a grant of land themselves which is vested in the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner or the tahsildar, as the case may be. By acting under Rule 43-L and relaxing the provisions of Rule 42, the Government cannot confer upon themselves the power to make a direct grant of any Government land. " ( 28 ) THE view taken in the aforesaid decision would indeed go to show that the power of the. Government under Rule 43-L is restricted only to the extent of relaxing the various provisions reflected in Rules 41 to 43-K of the 1960 Rules and cannot be. stretched to the extent of taking the power to grant the land itself. The said decision has a binding effect and that therefore, the same is required to be followed. In the context of the said decision, it is clear that even assuming for the time being that Ex. P-2 can be construed as an order in itself granting the land, the same has not the authority of law. The Government has no power to pass such an order granting the land. ( 29 ) FOR the reasons staled hcreinabove, it will have to be held that there is no order granting the lands at all. Evenotherwise, assuming that the Government Order ex. P-2 is an order granting the land the same is without the authority of law. Sri m. S. Gopal, learned Advocate for the plaintiffs-respondents contended that the various decisions including the decision in K. N. Shivanna's case were decisions rendered in Writ Petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the orders making the grant of lands and in the instant case no one has challenged the order and the parties are governed by their pleadings and when the Government which is a party itself has proceeded on the basis that there was a valid grant before cancelling the same under Ex. D-1, this Court cannot go beyond the pleadings of the parties in a Regular Second Appeal. Sri M. S. Gopal is right when he contends that the case will have to be decided in the light of the pleadings of the parties. That is so, because, no one should be taken by surprise. D-1, this Court cannot go beyond the pleadings of the parties in a Regular Second Appeal. Sri M. S. Gopal is right when he contends that the case will have to be decided in the light of the pleadings of the parties. That is so, because, no one should be taken by surprise. If however on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and if on proved facts certain legal position would irresistably emerge, the same will have to be given effect to. Further, the fact that the legal position with reference to the scope of power of the Government under Rule 43-L of the Mysore land Revenue (Amendment) Rules, 1960 is made clear in a writ petition will not make any difference. Once when the legal position is made clear by authoritative pronouncements the same will have to be applied whenever and wherever a situation calling for its application arises for consideration. At this juncture it is also necessary to recall as to what the pleadings of the parties particularly of the plaintiffs are-Plaintiffs ' case, in pith and substance, is that the Government by its order under Ex. P-2 granted 8 acres of land to each of them in Sy. No. 61 of Thirthapura village in chikkanaikanahalli subject to the conditions referred to therein and the condition imposed in the grant certificates at Exs. P-l and P-19 restraining them from alienating the lands is void, since the same is repugnant to the conditions reflected in Ex. P-2. It is also their case that the relevant Rules restraining alienation do not operate when the order is made by the Government itself. The question as to whether the Government has made an order granting the land, the question as to whether the order relied on by the plaintiffs can be construed as an order granting the land and the question as to whether the order if construed as an order granting the land is within the competence of the Government are all questions which arise for consideration in the context of the pleadings of the plaintiffs themselves. The order at Ex. P-2 is in black and j while. The true nature of Ex. P-2 will have to be decided by seeing as to what it contains. How the Government has construed it is not binding on this Court when the order itself is before the Court. Evcnothc. The order at Ex. P-2 is in black and j while. The true nature of Ex. P-2 will have to be decided by seeing as to what it contains. How the Government has construed it is not binding on this Court when the order itself is before the Court. Evcnothc. rwisc assuming for the lime being that it is possible to construe the order at Ex. P-2 as an order granting the land, the question as to whether the Government is competent to pass such an order directly granting the land will have to be decided in the context of the Rules issued by the Government governing such a grant. If the assertions of the plaintiffs themselves give rise to certain legal consequences by seeing the order at Ex. P-2 and by applying the provisions of law (Rules) relevant for consideration it is not possible to arrest the same and law will have to be allowed to take its own course and in such a situation the question of plaintiffs being taken by surprise docs not arise at all. Under these circumstances, the contention raised by the learned Advocate for the plaintiffs-respondents in this behalf is not tenable. ( 30 ) THE learned Advocate for the plaintiffs-respondents, however, sought to gain support from the decision in Seetha Reddy v Subba Reddy, 1963 (1) Mys. L. J. 338. In the said case, the facts in brief were as follows: ( 31 ) THE suit property measuring 19 guntas situated at Yerriahgcripally in Chintamani Taluk was granted to Scctha Reddy by the Government under Order No. R. 6227-30/lr-83-48-4, dated 4-1-1950 at the rate of Rs. 30/- per acre and Scetha reddy was put in possession of the same as per the saguvali chit dated 6-5-1950 on receipt of the consideration. Subsequent to the order, the Government reviewed the order on a petition filed by Subba Reddy in Revision Petition No. 24/1950-51 and granted the land to Subba Reddy. The original grantee instituted O. S. No. 260/1956 in the Court of Munsiff at Kolar for declaration of the title to the suit property and for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the suit land and in the alternative for possession. The suit was resisted by the defendant. The original grantee instituted O. S. No. 260/1956 in the Court of Munsiff at Kolar for declaration of the title to the suit property and for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the suit land and in the alternative for possession. The suit was resisted by the defendant. On evidence, the learned trial Judge had held that the plaintiff had obtained the order of grant in his favour by playing fraud on the Government. It was also held that the plaintiff was never put in possession of the suit property. In the opinion of the Munsiff, the order of the Government reviewing the grant was legal. In the result, the suit was dismissed. Plaintiff preferred an appeal in the Court of the Civil Judge, Kolar. In appeal, the learned Civil Judge agreed with the findings of the Munsiff, with the result, the appeal was dismissed. Under these circumstances, plaintiff-Seetha Reddy preferred second appeal before this Court. This Court dismissed the appeal on facts. However, in the course of its Judgment in the said case, this Court referring to a Full bench decision of the Mysore High Court in Sampu Gowda v State of Mysore, 1954 (32) Mys. L. J. 12 has pointed out that a grant once made by the Government or any of its officer duly authorised in that behalf can be cancelled or rescinded, subject to the same principles under which a contracting party can rescind the contract. It is necessary to note here that in the instant case there is not even an order granting the land as already pointed out earlier, either by the Government or by any subordinate officer. Even if it is possible to assume that Ex. P-2 was such an order granting the land it is not permitted by law as pointed out earlier. As such, it is forbidden by "law" within the meaning of that expression under Section 23 of the Contract Act. It is therefore, clear that the ratio of the decision in Seetha Reddy's case does not apply to the facts of this case at all. Further as indicated earlier, in the light of the decision in K. N. Shivanna's case, the Government did not have the power to make the grant. It is therefore, clear that the ratio of the decision in Seetha Reddy's case does not apply to the facts of this case at all. Further as indicated earlier, in the light of the decision in K. N. Shivanna's case, the Government did not have the power to make the grant. Looked at from any point of view, therefore, the contention raised by Sri M. S. Gopal, learned Advocate for the plaintiffs-respondents in this behalf is liable to be rejected. ( 32 ) THE learned Advocate for the plaintiffs-respondents had also relied on Sampu Gowda's case. The same is already referred to and considered while referring to seetha Reddy's case. Under these circumstances, it is not necessary once again to deal with Sampu Gowda's case. It will suffice if it is stated that the ratio in Sampu gowda's case does not help the plaintiffs in the facts and circumstances of this case. ( 33 ) FROM what is stated hereinabove, the conclusions which would emerge can be conveniently stated herein below: In the first place, it is clear that there is no order as such granting the lands at all in favour of the plaintiffs. Further, even if it is assumed that Ex. P-2 is an order granting the land, the same is not in accordance with law and is one without jurisdiction. In this view of the matter it would follow that the saguvali chits or to be more precise the grant certificates at Exs. P-1 and P-19 have no relevance at all. In this view of the matter, the condition viz. , Condition No. 7 in each of the said certificates also does not assume any relevance, because, grant certificates themselves will have to follow a valid order of grant and without a valid order of grant, the grant certificates themselves are devoid of any meaning. In this view of the matter, it would follow that the ownership in the properties does not flow to the plaintiffs. In this view of the matter, it would follow that the ownership in the properties does not flow to the plaintiffs. It is also clear that the question of cancelling the grant as such under rule 43-G (7) of 1960 Rules, does not arise became there is no valid grant made by any of the Officers referred to in Rule 42 or for that matter by the Government under rule 43-I since the question finvoking Rule 43-I would arise only where in fact, a grant has been made but the grant is obtained by making false or fraudulent representation. It would, therefore, follow that the findings given by the two Courts-below that the plaintiffs in the two suits have established their ownership with respect to the respective suit lands are not correct and a decree for declaration made in that behalf by the two Courts-bclow is not sustainable. ( 34 ) IF that be so it will ha-'c to be next seen as to whether the finding of the two Courts-below on the factum of possession of the respective suit lands by the respective plaintiffs is correct. This aspect is dealt with in para-14 of the Judgment of the trial Court and at para-43 of the Judgment of the First Appellate Court. It is seen that the learned Munsiff has relied on the contents of saguvali chits at Exs. P-l and P-19 to show that the plaintiffs were put in possession of the respective lands. The learned munsiff has also relied upon the receipt patta and land revenue receipts marked as exs. P-3 to P-5 with reference to the plaintiff in O. S. No. 57/1974. The learned Munsiff has also relied on the extract of R. T. C. for the years 1967-68 to 1971-72. The learned Munsiff has also discussed the other evidencejn detail in the course of his judgment and after appreciating the evidence in totality has reached the conclusion that plaintiffs in each of the suits were in possession of tlie suit properties on the date of the suit. The learned Civil Judge has concurred with this finding as to the factum of possession. On a perusal of the reasonings leading to such a conclusion, 1 do not find any justifiable ground to interfere with reference to a question of fact on which both the Courts-below have concurred. The learned Civil Judge has concurred with this finding as to the factum of possession. On a perusal of the reasonings leading to such a conclusion, 1 do not find any justifiable ground to interfere with reference to a question of fact on which both the Courts-below have concurred. Having regard to the same and in the context of the provisions reflected in Section 100, CPC, I am of the opinion that the finding of the two Courts-below that each of the plaintiffs was in possession of the respective suit lands on the date of the suit cannot be found fault with. If that be so, it will have to be next seen as to whether the plaintiffs arc entitled to the relief of permanent injunction. As pointed out earlier, they do not have any title. At the same time it is clear that they have been in possession of the respective suit properties since 19-12-1983 when they were so put in possession on account of Exs. P-l and P-19 respectively. It is also a hard fact that they continued in possession for a number of years without any interference till ofcourse Ex. D-l came into force. Further as far as defendants-1 to 9 arc concerned they arc third parties. They do not have any title in respect of the suit property. In the light of the evidence on record they were not in possession of the suit property at any time. Under these circuinstanccs, they cannoti disturb the possession of the plaintiffs notwithstanding the fact that plaintiffs have not established their title as such to the suit property. Further, in the light of what is stated hereinabovc, it is clear that the title of the property still vests in the Government only; at the same time it is clear that the Government cannot take forcible possession of the property. The ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Krishna ram Mahale v Mrs. Shobha Vcnkat Rao, reported in AIR 1989 Supreme Court at page 2097 would apply mutatis mutandis to a situation like this also. It would be indeed useful to cull out the relevant portion of the said Judgment of the Supreme court. The Supreme Court has among other things observed as under:"8. Mr. Shobha Vcnkat Rao, reported in AIR 1989 Supreme Court at page 2097 would apply mutatis mutandis to a situation like this also. It would be indeed useful to cull out the relevant portion of the said Judgment of the Supreme court. The Supreme Court has among other things observed as under:"8. Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel for defendant No. 3 the appellant herein rightly did not go into the appreciation of the evidence cither by the trial Court or the High Court or the factual conclusions drawn by them. It was, however, strongly urged by him that the period of licence had expired long back and the plaintiff was not entitled to the renewal of licence. It was submitted by him that in view of the licence having come to an end, the plaintiff had no right to remain in charge of the business or the premises where it was conducted and all that the plaintiff could ask for was damages for unlawful dispossession even on the footing of facts as found by the High Court. We find ourselves totally unable to accept the submission of Mr. Tarkunde. It is a well settled law in this Country that where a person is in settled possession of property even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. If any authority were needed for that proposition, we could refer to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Lallu Yeshwant Singh v Rao Jagadish Singh, (1968)2 SCR 203 at pp. 208-210: air 1968 SC 620 at pp. 622 and 623. This Court in that Judgment cited with approval the well known passage from the leading Privy Council case of midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. v Naresh Narayan Roy, 51 Ind. App. 293 at p. 299 : AIR 1924 PC 144 where it has been observed at p. 208 of SCR : at p. 622 of air 1968 SC; "in India persons arc not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court. ""9. This proposition was also accepted by a Division Bench of this Court in ram Rattan v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1977)2 SCR 232 : AIR 1977 SC 619 . ""9. This proposition was also accepted by a Division Bench of this Court in ram Rattan v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1977)2 SCR 232 : AIR 1977 SC 619 . The division Bench comprising of three learned Judges held that a true owner has every right to dispossess or throw out a trespasser while he is in the act or process of trespassing but this right is not available to the true owner if the trespasser has been successful in accomplishing his possession to the knowledge of the true owner. In such circumstances, the law requires that the true owner should dispossess the trespasser by taking recourse to the remedies under the law. In the present case, we may point out that there was no question of the plaintiff entering upon the premises as a trespasser at all at the bad entered into the possession of the restaurant business and the premises where it was conducted as a licensee and in due course of law. Thus defendant No. 3 was not entitled to dispossess the plaintiff unlawfully and behind her back as has been done by him in the present case. It was pointed out by Mr. Tarkunde that some of the observations referred to above were in connection with a suit filed under Section 6 of Specific Relief act, 1963 or analogous provisions in the earlier Specific Relief Act, 1877. To our mind, this makes no difference in this case as the suit has been filed only a few weeks of the plaintiff being unlawfully deprived of possession of the said business and the premises and much before the period of six months expired. In view of the aforesaid conclusions arrived at by us, we do not propose to consider the question whether the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 amounted to a licence or a sublease. "having regard to the fact that it is the officers of the Government themselves who have put the plaintiffs in possession, it is obvious that the plaintiffs cannot be dispossessed forcibly. In other words, possession will have to be taken in due course of law and in accordance with the remedies available under the law, as pointed out by the supreme Court in the aforesaid case. The remedy available under law in this behalf will have to be worked out by defendant No. 10-Government of Karnataka and/or its officers. In other words, possession will have to be taken in due course of law and in accordance with the remedies available under the law, as pointed out by the supreme Court in the aforesaid case. The remedy available under law in this behalf will have to be worked out by defendant No. 10-Government of Karnataka and/or its officers. Though the decree of permanent injunction granted by the trial Court wholesale is not correct, it is obvious that a decree in the form of injunction with a condition is necessary in the context of what is stated herein above. ( 35 ) THE only other point that is required to be considered by this Court is as regards the maintainability of the suit in respect of which Point No. 1 relating to substantial question oflaw is raised hereinabovc. It is seen that the First Appellate Court after observing that the suit is not one to challenge "grant" made by the Government but is one for declaration of title and injunction and with this observation as the major premise the First Appellate Court has in the course of its Judgment on a consideration of the various provisions of the Land Revenue Act as also the provisions reflected in Section 9 of CPC, did reach a conclusion holding that the suit of the plaintiffs is maintainable. In fact, the learned Government Advocate or for that matter the Advocate representing the contesting defendants in the trial Court have not been able to show as to how and why they could say that the suit is not maintainable. On a clear perusal of the reasoning adopted by the learned Civil Judge, I find that the conclusion arrived at by the learned Civil Judge with reference to the maintainability of the suit cannot be found fault with. It is not necessary to dilate on this aspect since the learned Government Advocate or the learned Advocates representing the contesting defendants have not addressed any arguments worth the name. Evenotherwise, having regard to the provisions of Section 9 of CPC and having regard to the fact that the suit is one for declaration and permanent injunction it cannot be said that the suit is not maintainable. Under these circumstances, I do not find any justifiable ground to take a view different from the one taken by the First Appellate Court with reference to this point. Under these circumstances, I do not find any justifiable ground to take a view different from the one taken by the First Appellate Court with reference to this point. ( 36 ) THUS from what is stated hereinabovc, it is clear that the suit of the plaintiff ismaintainable. It is also clear that plaintiffs have not acquired any title or ownership in respect of the suit land for the reasons stated earlier. In that context, it is also clear that the question as to whether the trial Court is right in holding that the condition reflected in Ex. P-l and Ex. P-19 restraining alienation of the land is void does not fall for consideration. The substantial questions of law raised for decision are answered accordingly. ( 37 ) FOR the reasons stated hereinabove, it would follow that the decree for declaration in each of the suits will have to be set aside. It is also clear that the decree for permanent injunction granted in favour of the plaintiffs in each of the suits deserves to be confirmed against defendants 1 to 9. However, in so far as defendant-10 is concerned, a direction in the nature of an injunction deserves to be granted to the effect that the plaintiffs shall not be evicted otherwise than in the course of law. ( 38 ) IN the result, I pass the following order:all the appeals are partly allowed; The Judgments and decrees passed by the two courts-below declaring the plaintiffs in O. S. No. 57/1974 and O. S. No. 58/1974 on the file of the Munsiff, Chikkanaikanahalli are the owners of the suit properties are hereby set aside. The Judgments and decrees passed by the two Courts-bclow relating to permanent injunction are hereby modified as undcn- it is hereby ordered that there shall be a decree in O. S. No. 57/1974 filed in the court of the Munsiff, Chikkanaikanahalli, restraining defendants 1 to 9 in the said suit permanently from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the suit property by the plaintiff (since deceased by his heirs) and defendant 10-Government of Karnataka is restrained from dispossessing the plaintiff (since deceased by his heirs) otherwise than in due course of law and according to the remedies available under the law. In O. S. No. 58/1974 filed before the Munsiff, Chikkanaikanahalli, defendants 1 to 9 are permanently restrained from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the suit property by the plaintiff and defendant 10-Government of Karnataka is restrained from dispossessing the plaintiff otherwise than in due course of law and according to the remedies available under the law. ( 39 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case all the parties to this appeal are directed to bear their own costs in all the Courts including the costs of these appeals. ( 40 ) THE original Judgment shall be kept in R. S. A. No. 669/1979 and a copy thereof shall be kept in each of the companion appeals viz. , R. S. A. Nos. 745, 746 and 747 of 1979. --- *** --- .