Judgment :- Invoking the jurisdiction of superintendence under Art.227 of the Constitution, petitioner-tenant seeks to quash an order of eviction concurrently made by the two authorities below, on the ground of bonafide need. First respondent moved an application for eviction under S.11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, on the ground that his son Viswambharan needed the tenanted premises for starting a trade in electrical goods. By Ext.P1, the Rent Controller negatived the plea of bonafide need. The appellate authority by Ext.P2, reversed the order of the Rent Controller, found the need alleged, and granted eviction. Ext. P2 was affirmed in Ext.P3 by the Revisional Authority. 2. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that the authorities below misread the expression 'dependent' in S.11(3). According to him, the dependence signified is economic dependence. First respondent's son was financially well off, and he needs no support from first respondent, submits counsel. A learned judge of this court in Muhammad & Ors. v. Sinnamalu Amma (1977 KLT 795) held that the expression 'dependent' in the Section is not limited to a person economically dependent on the landlord. 3. Dependency is not merely a matter of physical or pecuniary need. Like many words, it conveys many nuances of varying hues. The same word may mean different things in different contexts and is understood differently in different ages. In the words of justice Oliver Mandell Holmes, a word is not a crystal transparent and unchanged, it is the akin of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and time in which it is used. It will be myopic to cabin, confine and crib the meaning of the word. Many words for that matter, are indefinable and a situation of computerised precision is not always available. Dependency could be economic, emotional or otherwise. One may be dependent even on intangible elements. One may depend on his faith in a crisis. A physically handicapped person or a blind person could be 'dependent' on another, to run his trade, for purposes of S.11(3). A kaleidoscopia variety of fact situations could exist. I see no justification to read the word down, to mean economic dependence. 4. Learned counsel for petitioner then submitted that the second proviso to the Section protects the petitioner. This is purely a question of fact and the authorities below for cogent reasons, repelled the contention. A kaleidoscopia variety of fact situations could exist. I see no justification to read the word down, to mean economic dependence. 4. Learned counsel for petitioner then submitted that the second proviso to the Section protects the petitioner. This is purely a question of fact and the authorities below for cogent reasons, repelled the contention. The findings are not perverse in the sense that they are such, that no authority properly instructed on facts or law would have come to. No grounds are made out for interference in the exercise of the jurisdiction under Art.227. 5. However, in the circumstances stated by counsel for petitioner, petitioner is granted nine months time from today to vacate the premises, on his filing an affidavit before the executing court within three weeks from today, undertaking to vacate the premises within the aforesaid period and undertaking further not to put any other person in possession in the meanwhile. If petitioner fails to file an affidavit as aforesaid, this order to the extent of granting nine months time, will stand recalled. Subject to this direction, writ petition is dismissed. No costs.