Judgment N. C. KOCHAR, J. ( 1 ) -THIS is defendants appeal against the decree and judgment dated 16-10-1987 passed by the learned District Judge, Kota in civil suit No. 149 / 84. The facts giving rise to this appeal are as under :- a suit for eviction on the grounds of default in payment of rent and bona fide personal necessity was filed by the plaintiffs against the defendant stating that the defendant was a tenant in respect of the shop in dispute at a monthly rent of Rs. 600. 00 and had committed default in payment of rent which was due from him to the plaintiff respondents for the period from 1-6-1983 and the amount so due was Rs. 8400. 00 for the period ending February, 1984 and that the shop in dispute was bona fide required by the plaintiffs for their personal use. The suit was contested by the defendant who controverted the ground of default as also the other ground. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, vide order dated 30-9-1986 passed by the learned trial Court under sub-sec. (3) of S. 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (the Act), the defendant was directed to pay to the plaintiffs or deposit in Court a sum of Rs. 23,400. 00 towards rent for the period from 1-4-1983 to 31-8-1986 and Rs. 2223. 00- by way of interest due on the said amount i. e. in all Rs. 25,623. 00 within a period of 15 days from the said order and also the rent for subsequent months by 15th of each succeeding month. The defendant moved one after the other applications and the time for making deposits was extended under the orders of the Court but the rent was neither paid to the plaintiffs nor deposited in Court and consequently, an application having been moved by the plaintiffs the defence of the defendant against eviction was struck off vide order dated 26-3-1987. The other ground of eviction was given up by the plaintiffs who pressed only the ground of default of payment of rent for a period of more than six months. The other ground of eviction was given up by the plaintiffs who pressed only the ground of default of payment of rent for a period of more than six months. The learned trial Court after recording the evidence of the parties held that the defendant had committed default in payment of rent for more than six months and since he had not complied with the order passed under Section 13 (3) of the Act, was liable to be evicted and as such a decree for recovery of possession of the shop in dispute besides for recovery of the sum of Rs. 25,623. 00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum was passed in favour of the plaintiffs, and against the defendant. It was further held that the plaintiffs are entitled to receive from the defendant a sum at the rate of Rs. 600. 00 per month by way of charges for use and occupation of the shop in dispute from the date of filing of the suit till the possession of the shop in dispute is delivered to the plaintiffs. Feeling aggrieved the defendant has approached this Court by filing this appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code ). ( 2 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record of the case. ( 3 ) SHRI Meherish, the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant, has not disputed that no amount was deposited by the defendant in the learned trial Court in compliance with the order passed under Section 13 (3) of the Act, but has submitted that during the pendency of this appeal, the defendant has deposited the entire amount payable towards arrears of rent and that he has moved an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act giving reasons as to why rent could not be deposited within the time granted by the learned trial Court and praying that the amount deposited in the learned trial Court during the pendency of this appeal be considered as the amount deposited in compliance with the order passed under Section 13 (3) of the Act and the delay in depositing the rent be condoned. The contention of Shri Mandahana, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs respondent is that it was only when this Court directed vide order dated 2-5-1988 that the execution of the impunged decree shall be stayed during the pendency of the appeal only if the defendant appellant deposited the amount due by way of arrears of rent within the period specified in the said order, that the amount was deposited by the defendant and that such deposit cannot be treated as the deposit in compliance with the order under Section 13 (3) of the Act and further that the reasons mentioned in the application for not depositing the amount during the pendency of the case in the learned trial Court are different than the ones mentioned in the applications moved by the defendant with a prayer that the time for depositing the rent in compliance with Section l3 (3) of the Act be extended by the learned trial Court. ( 4 ) THE record shows that the appeal was filed in this Court on 9-12-1987 and an application for stay of execution of the decree was also filed by the appellant. While disposing of the stay application, vide order dated 2-5-1988, this Court had directed that the execution of the decree shall remain stayed only if the appellant deposited the arrears of rent within the time specified in the order. It was only to avoid the execution of the decree during pendency of the appeal that the amount was deposited by the appellant defendant in the learned trial court. If a tenant commits default in payment of rent, a right accrues to the landlord to ask for his eviction from the premises in question and that right can be defeated only if the tenant deposits the rent in accordance with the directions given by the Court under Section 13 (3) of the Act and in view of Section 13 (6) of the Act, he gets benefit of not being evicted if the case is of first default. In order to get that benefit, it is necessary for the tenant to strictly comply the orders passed by the Court under Section 13 (3) of the Act and to deposit the rent during the pendency of the case in the learned trial Court. In order to get that benefit, it is necessary for the tenant to strictly comply the orders passed by the Court under Section 13 (3) of the Act and to deposit the rent during the pendency of the case in the learned trial Court. In this case as noted above, the appeal was filed on 9-12-1987, the rent was deposited in order to get the benefit of the conditional stay order passed by this Court and the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed on 17-10-1989. The deposit made by the defendant in the learned trial Court in order to get benefit of the conditional stay can, therefore, not be said to be a deposit in compliance with the order passed under Section 13 (3) of the Act by the learned trial Court. Although the contention of Shri Mandhana that the reasons given in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for not depositing the rent in time in the learned trial Court are different than the ones mentioned by the defendant in the applications moved during the pendency of the case in the learned trial Court for extension of time, the bona fides of the application need not be gone into in view of the fact that the above deposit cannot be deemed to be a deposit under Section 13 (3) of the Act and the delay in depositing the rent cannot be thus condoned. ( 5 ) IT has next been contended by Shri Meherish that the learned trial Court was not bound to strike off the defence of the appellant-defendant and had erred in striking out his defence against eviction. It is not disputed that as held by the Full Bench of this Court in case Vishandas v. Savitri Devi, (1988) 1 Rajasthan LR 1: (AIR 1988 Rajasthan 198), the Court is not bound to strike out the defence and has a discretion in the matter. In the present case, however, it is not disputed that in spite of the fact that time was extended more than once by the learned trial Court on the applications moved by the appellant defendant, he neither paid any rent to the plaintiffs nor deposited the same in court and there was no explanation for not complying with order under Section 13 (3) of the Act. This conduct of the defendant shows that the default in payment of the rent in compliance with the order passed under Section 13 (3) of the Act was contumacious and wilful. There was thus no reason why the defence of the defendant appellant should not have been struck off by the learned trial Court. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, the discretion exercised by the learned trial Court cannot be said to be improper in any way and no interference is called for on that account. ( 6 ) THE last submission of Shri Meherish, the learned counsel for the defendant is that the defendant had specifically pleaded in paragraph 6 of the written statement that no notice to quit had been served by the plaintiff on the defendant in terms of the agreement between the parties and as such the suit filed by the plaintiff was incompetent, but the learned trial Court did not frame any issue on this point. From the impugned judgment I find that no such point was raised before the learned trial Court at the time when the arguments were addressed. Even otherwise, an issue has to be framed for deciding the point of controversy, which is essential for deciding a case. Issue was required to be framed only if it was necessary to serve a notice to quit on the tenant by the landlord before he filed a suit for eviction against him. While considering as to whether a notice to quit is necessary before filing a suit against a tenant, the Honble Supreme Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, AIR 1979 SC 1745 observed in para 7"such a cleavage of opinion cropped up in the various High Courts because of some observations of this Court in some decisions which will be presently alluded to. It was so on an erroneous assumption, if we may say so with great respect, that the difference in the phraseology of the different State Rent Acts justifies this difference of view. In our considered judgment on the question of requirement of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act there is no scope for taking different views on the basis of the difference in the phraseology of the various Rent Acts. In this regard, the difference in the language does not bring about any distinction. In our considered judgment on the question of requirement of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act there is no scope for taking different views on the basis of the difference in the phraseology of the various Rent Acts. In this regard, the difference in the language does not bring about any distinction. In all the States the law should be uniform viz. , that either a notice is necessary or it is not. It was high time, therefore, that this larger Bench was constituted to lay down a uniform law for the governance of the whole country and not permit the unjustified different trend of decisions to continue. " ( 7 ) IT was further observed in para 17"this is exactly the reason why we have thought it fit to review all the decisions and lay down a uniform law for all the States. "the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that no notice to quit is necessary before filing a suit for eviction against a tenant who has the protection of Rent Control law of any State. Shri Meherish has contended that Section 28 of the Act provides that the provisions of this Act would be in addition to and not derogatory of any other law on the subject for the time being in force in the whole or any part of Rajasthan and as such the Rajasthan Act cannot be said to be a complete Code and protection given to the tenants would be besides the protection available to them under the Transfer of Property Act and as such the judgment of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal (supra) will not apply. Same argument was raised before M. B. Sharma J. in case Panchayat Shri Digambar Jain Mandir Parshwanathji v. Vishnu Prasad, 1987 Raj LW 243 and relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanpal Chettiarys case (supra), the argument was rejected. With respect I am in entire agreement with the view of M. B. Sharma J. in the above said case, and as such I held that that it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to have served notice to quit before filing the suit for eviction against the defendant. The learned trial Court was, therefore, not required to frame an issue in this regard. This last submission of the learned counsel is also, therefore, rejected. The learned trial Court was, therefore, not required to frame an issue in this regard. This last submission of the learned counsel is also, therefore, rejected. ( 8 ) NO other point has been raised before me. ( 9 ) FINDING no force in the appeal, I dismiss it with costs. Appeal dismissed.