JUDGMENT : Amerendra Nath Verma, J. 1. A decision of this Court in the case of Satna Cement Works v. The Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad and another reported in 1985 AWC 165 and a few decisions of the Supreme Court conclude the controversy raised in this case. The short question is whether octroi imposed by the Nagar Mahapalika is leviable on the stocks of steel bars and iron slab and cutting, etc. which, according to the petitioners, enter the limits of the Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad, only in transit enroute the various points of destination situate outside the limits of the Nagar Mahapalika. At identical controversy arising in respect of the trade of cement came up for consideration before this Court in the above case. That pronouncement, in our opinion, furnishes a complete answer to the question arising in this case. 2. We may straightaway extract Section 172 of the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 (the "Act" for the short hereafter), upon a true and proper construction of which the fate of this case hinges. It provides : "172. Taxes to be imposed under this Act- (2) In addition to the taxes specified in sub-section (1) the Mahapalika may for the purposes of this Act and the subject to the provisions thereof impose any of the following taxes, namely, (a) an octroi on goods or animals brought within the city for consumption, use or sale therein ; Provided that octroi on goods under cl. (b) and a tax under cl. (c) shall not be levied at the same time. It will thus be seen that for the incidence and attraction of octroi on goods two elements must be present : (i) whether the goods sought to be taxed were meant for consumption, use or sale within the limits of the Nagar Mahapalika. (ii) the goods should be 'brought within'. 3. We will, therefore, examine the issue arising in the case in the light of these two factors. 4. Having set out the outlines of the legal controversy raised by the parties we revert to the essential facts. The various petitioners are iron and steel dealers and commission agents having their offices within the territorial limits of Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad. In the course of the trade they buy iron and steel ginders, bars, 'T' iron, slab and cuttings etc from the Steel Authority of India (the 'SAIL'). The various petitioners are iron and steel dealers and commission agents having their offices within the territorial limits of Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad. In the course of the trade they buy iron and steel ginders, bars, 'T' iron, slab and cuttings etc from the Steel Authority of India (the 'SAIL'). They take delivery of these items from the godown of the SAIL at Naini which is situate outside the limits of the Nagar Mahapalika on Mirzapur Road and is about one kilometer from the octroi post of the Nagar Mahapalika. When the petitioners bring any goods for sale, use or consumption within the territorial limits of the Nagar Mahapalika they claim that the same are subjected to octroi at the octroi post and there is no dispute about it between the parties. In addition to such sales the petitioners assert that they also export the iron and steel goods purchased by them to destinations outside the limits of Nagar Mahapalika. The petitioners claim that against such orders they make the supplies directly from the SAILS godown at Naini to those points of destination. Accordingly they lift the requisite quantity of goods from the SAIL'S godown and load them on trucks at that very place for being transported to destinations outside the limits of Nagar Mahapalika. Such consignments enter the Mahapalika through the Mahapalikas octroi barrier at one end and without stopping within the limits of Mahapalika they pass through the outer barrier at the other end at the exit point and thereafter the trucks continue their onward journey to destinations outside Allahabad. On these facts, the petitioners contend that the goods passing through Allahabad in the course of such journeys are not liable to be subjected to octroi as they are not 'brough within' the city. Merely passing through the limits of Mahapalika in the course of their onward journeys, it was argued, could not, by any stretch, be construed as the goods having been 'brought within' the limits of the Nagar Mahapalika. The submission is completely covered by the decision of this Court in Satna Cement Works' case (supra). Merely passing through the limits of Mahapalika in the course of their onward journeys, it was argued, could not, by any stretch, be construed as the goods having been 'brought within' the limits of the Nagar Mahapalika. The submission is completely covered by the decision of this Court in Satna Cement Works' case (supra). In the Satna Cement Works case the petitioners had challenged the levy of octroi on the cement which was stocked in a village outside the limits of the Mahapalika on the ground that the cement entered the limits of Nagar Mahapalika only in transit in the course of journey to places outside the limits of Allahabad and consequently it could not be subjected to octroi as the entry into the Nagar Mahapalika could not, in those circumstances, be treated as an entry for the purpose of consumption, use or sale, within the limits of the Mahapalika. The contention was upheld by this Court. Honourable N. D. Ojha, J. (as he then was), who spoke for the Court, stated the law thus : "It is admitted that the said cement enters within the limits of the Nagar Mahapalika the aforesaid octroi barrier, even though only for going out through the octroi barrier at the other end on its onward journey to village Dubrajpur and it cannot be disputed that if the aforesaid entry satisfies the requirement of the goods being 'brought within' as contemplated by Section 172 (2) (b) of the Act the levy of octroi will be vaid. The crucial question, therefore, which falls for consideration is the true import and interpretation of the aforesaid two words 'brought within'. In Burma Shell Co. v. Belguam Municipality, AIR 1963 SC 906 it was held in paragraph 21 of the report that the true concept of octroi included the bringing in of the goods in local area so that the goods came to a repose there. The word 'repose' used by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid expression according to dictionary, inter alia, means 'rest, quiet, stillness' and the word 'there' obviously means within the limits of the local area concerned. The word 'repose' used by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid expression according to dictionary, inter alia, means 'rest, quiet, stillness' and the word 'there' obviously means within the limits of the local area concerned. In Town Municipal Council v. Urmilla Kothari AIR 1977 SC 873 , it was held that if goods are carried In trucks which merely pass through the areas which lie within the municipal limits and are not unloaded add reloaded at any place within the municipal area the important element of repose and rest which the words 'brought into the municipal limits for the purpose of immediate exportation' in Section 124 of the Karnatak Municipalities Act, 1964 imply is absent. It is further held that in such a case as the continuity or continuation process of the carriage of goods is not in any way in fact broken within the municipal limits it cannot be said that the goods were brought in or exported as contemplated by Section 124 aforesaid. Before octroi can, therefore, be levied on goods under Section 172 (2) (b) of the Act the journey of the goods after being brought within the limits of a Nagar Mahapalika should break within the said limits and the said goods should lie there in a state of rest, quiet or stillness for 'consumption, use or sale therein'. The view taken by it in the case of Burma Shell Co. (supra) was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Hiralal Thakaralal v. Broach Municipality, AIR 1976 SC 1446 ." 5. We respectfully agree with the enunciation of the law and hold if the goods merely enter the limits of the Nagar Mahapalika in the course of journey to destinations beyond such limits i. e. the goods merely pass through the limits of Mahapalika, it cannot be said that the goods are 'brought within ' the limits of the Mahapalika for consumption, use or sale. And this would be so even if the sales are effected through the offices of the petitioners located within the Mahapalika provided of course that the consignments are despatched directly from points located outside the Mahapalika for destinations beyond the limits of Mahapalika. And this would be so even if the sales are effected through the offices of the petitioners located within the Mahapalika provided of course that the consignments are despatched directly from points located outside the Mahapalika for destinations beyond the limits of Mahapalika. The mere fact, therefore, that the sales offices of the petitioners are situate within the Mahapalika would not by itself be sufficient to attract the duty of octroi for in that case the further condition that the goods should be brought 'within the limits of the Nagar Mahapalika' shall still have for be present before octroi can be levied. Here again we are fortified by the view expressed by the Division Bench in the Satna Cement Works' case. In paragraph 6 of the judgment the Bench held ; "The mere fact that after the cement has been stored in village Dubraj pur the transaction of its sale is effected by the petitioner and its sale office at Bansidhar Market within the limits of the Nagar Mahapalika with the cement still lying in the said village will not be sufficient to levy octroi inasmuch as the other condition precedent for such levy namely of the said cement being 'brought within' would be lacking." Again, in paragraphs 8 and 9, their Lordships observed : "Counsel for the respondents then urged that since the cement stored by the petitioner at its Cement Dump in village Dubrajpur sold by it at its sale office within the limits of the Nagar Mahapalika, it is apparent that the ultimate purpose of bringing the said cement within the limits of Nagar Mahapalika at the stage of its initial entry is 'sale' within the said limits and the mere fact that the cement was stored beyond the said limits was of no consequence and it shall be deemed that there has been a national repose of the cement within the limits of the Nagar Mahapalika, notwithstanding the fact that there may have been no loading or unloading of the cement and no break of its journey within the said limits. The argument is no doubt attractive but having given our auxious consideration we find it difficult to agree. Firstly, there seems to be no scope for invoking a legal fiction, as urged by the counsel for the respondents in view of the interpretation put on the words 'brought within' referred to above. The argument is no doubt attractive but having given our auxious consideration we find it difficult to agree. Firstly, there seems to be no scope for invoking a legal fiction, as urged by the counsel for the respondents in view of the interpretation put on the words 'brought within' referred to above. Secondly, invoking the legal fiction, as urged by counsel for the respondents notion of equity, may be in a disguised from, have to be brought in. In Commissioner of Income Tax Patiala v. Messrs. Shahzada Nand and Sons, AIR 1966 SC 1342 it was held i "Before we advert to the said arguments, it will be convenient to notice the relevant rules of construction. The classic statement of Rowlett, J., in Cope Brondy Syndicate v. In Land Revenue Commrs., 1921 1 KB 64 at p. 71 still holds the field. It reads : In a Taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied, One can only look fairly at the language used. 6. I am further fortified by a recent pronouncement in the case of H. M. M. Ltd. v. Administrator Bangalore City Corporation reported in (1989) 4 SCC 640 . Their Lordships have ruled in this case that mere physical entry of goods within the limit of the Local Body is not enough to attract octroi. Consequently the octroi could not be levied or collected on the consignments of Horlicks powder as the same was intended only for being exported to places outside the city and was, therefore, not brought within either for use, consumption or sale. All the leading decisions on the subject were noticed by their Lordships including the case of Burma Shell Co. (supra). These pronouncements furnish a complete answer to the respondent's submission that since the sales are effected through the offices of the petitioners located within the limits of the Mahapalika it must be held that the goods are brought within the limits of the Mahapalika for the purpose of sale. As already observed mere physical entry of the goods within the limits of Mahapalika does not bring the goods into the net of octroi. As already observed mere physical entry of the goods within the limits of Mahapalika does not bring the goods into the net of octroi. Consequently, transit of the goods through the Nagar Mahapalika in the course of their onward journey does not tantamount to the goods being 'brought within' the limits of Mahapalika. That being so, octroi cannot be levied in respect of such entry. The taxable events as noticed above are two-fold- : (i) the goods must be brought within the limits of Mahapalika, and (ii) they must be brought within the limits for consumption, use or sale therein. 7. SRI Ashok Mohiley, learned counsel for the respondent, invited our attention to paragraphs 15, 16 and 18 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf Of the Nagar Mahapalika and submitted that in the challan issued by the SAIL the destination has been shown to be the offices of the petitioners which are located within the limits of Nagar Mahapalika and consequently it must follow that the goods were brought within the limits of sale therein, i. e. within the limits of Mahapalika. In our opinion, the fact that in the challans the destinations were shown to be the office premises of the petitioners in Allahabad would not be conclusive of the controversy. What is important is whether the goods sought to be subjected to octroi were brought within the limits of Mahapalika for sale therein. And where goods enter the municipal limits and pass through it only in transit for consumption, use and sale beyond such limits, the activity cannot attract octroi provided, of course, the journey is not broken, that is, the goods do not lie in rest or repose within Allahabad as ruled by the Supreme Court in the case of Burma Shell Co. v. Belgaum Municipality ( AIR 1963 SC 906 ), Town Municipal Council v. Urmitla Kothari ( AIR 1977 SC 873 ) and Hiralal Thokoralal v. Broach Municipality (AIR 1977 SO 1446). 8. IN conclusion, we hold that the respondents have no legal authority to levy octroi on the goods transported by the petitioners from the godown of SAIL at Naini to destinations outside Allahabad provided the goods merely pass though Allahabad and do not lie in a state of rest or repose thereby breaking the continuity of journey. 8. IN conclusion, we hold that the respondents have no legal authority to levy octroi on the goods transported by the petitioners from the godown of SAIL at Naini to destinations outside Allahabad provided the goods merely pass though Allahabad and do not lie in a state of rest or repose thereby breaking the continuity of journey. Of course, it will be open to the respondents to satisfy themselves on the basis of transport/travel documents and other papers both at the entry check post as well at the point of exit that the goods are intended merely to pass through Allahabad in the course of their onward journey and not for consumption, use or sale within the limits of Nagar Mahapalika. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The respondents are directed to issue transit passes to the petitioners in regard to the stocks of steel and iron taken by them for being transported to destinations outside Allahabad at the point of entry octroi check post and not realize octroi in respect of such consignments. It will, however, be open to the respondents to check the transport travel documents and other paper relevent for ascertaining the destination of such consignments both at the entry check post as well as at the exit. The respondents are further directed the refund to the petitioners the octroi realized from them and required to be kept in a separate account under the interim orders of this Court dated 20th September, 1988 within 6 weeks of the production of a certified copy of this order. Petition allowed.