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1990 DIGILAW 545 (KAR)

K. P. RAMANNA v. CITY MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SHIMOGA

1990-10-08

N.Y.HANUMANTHAPPA

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N. Y. HANUMANTHAPPA, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition the point to be considered is whether Bye-law No. 10 of the Karnataka municipalities Regulation and Inspection of public Markets and Slaughter Houses Bye-laws, 1966, is valid in the absence of any specific provisions in the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) empowering the authorities concerned to collect fee on entry of articles to the market or otherwise. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is a vegetable vendor carrying on his business within the limits of the City municipal Council, Shimoga. He has got Stall no. 65 in the market known as "shivappa Naik market" which he obtained on lease from the municipality on a monthly rent of Rs. 40/- since 15 years. The petitioner is paying the rent under section 244 of the Act read with Bye-law No. 9 of the Bye-laws and the Municipality accepts the payment of rent. Bye-law No. 9 classifies stalls as permanent and daily stalls and prescribes that all stall holders shall pay stall fee or stallage at the rates fixed fron time to time by the Municipal council. The petitioner has no grievance in respect of Bye-law No. 9. His grievance is in respect of Bye-law No. 10 which reads as follows: "no goods shall be brought into the market except such as are intended for sale and except on payment of such entrance fee as may be fixed by the Municipal Council in this behalf. " (emphasis supplied) according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, till November, 1981 the municipality was not collecting any fee on the entry of goods into the market. The Municipality made an attempt to collect the same by issuing the notification at Annexure A. According to him, the petitioner being a vegetable vendor is getting supply of vegetables from various persons who bring the articles on their heads and under Bye-law no. 10 such persons shall have to pay fee on the entry of vegetables into the market. Challenging the same the petitioner filed this writ petition on the following grounds, viz. , (i) Bye-law no. 10 such persons shall have to pay fee on the entry of vegetables into the market. Challenging the same the petitioner filed this writ petition on the following grounds, viz. , (i) Bye-law no. 10 of the Bye-laws is ultra vires to the Act; (ii) Annexure A is without the authority of law; and (iii) If Bye-law No. 10 is given effect to, it amounts to collecting fee on the same article for two times i. e. , (a) at the time of supply of vegetables to the stalls of the petitioner and of others and (b) the stall holders like the petitioner have to pay the rent of stallage to the Municipality for the same. ( 3 ) SRI T. S. Amar Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that Bye-law No. 10 of the Bye-laws and Annexure are to be held ultra vires and illegal respectively. In support of his contention, he relied on 2 decisions. The first decision on which he placed reliance was rendered by the Supreme Court in Bimal chandra Banerjee v State of Madhya Pradesh, air 1971 SC 517 and the second decision relied upon by the learned counsel was by this Court in Bombay Saw Mills v State of Mysore and another, 1972 (1) Mys. LJ. 164. ( 4 ) WHEREAS the learned counsel for the respondents submit that Bye-law No. 10 and the notification at Annexure A are well within the powers conferred on the Municipality. According to them, the stallage is nothing to do with collecting fee on entry'of articles to the market. Thus, they pray that this writ petition may be dismissed. ( 5 ) IN order to appreciate the rival contentions it has to be seen whether there is any provision under the Act empowering to make regulations or Bye-laws so that the Municipality can collect fee on entry of articles to the market. No doubt, under Section 324 of the Act the municipality has got power to frame Bye-laws even in respect of "fixing rent and other charges to be levied for the use of any of them which belong to the municipal council". But, before considering the validity of Bye-law No. 10 it has to be ascertained whether there is any provision under the Act which empowers the Municipality to levy fee on entry of articles to the Market. But, before considering the validity of Bye-law No. 10 it has to be ascertained whether there is any provision under the Act which empowers the Municipality to levy fee on entry of articles to the Market. Learned counsel for the respondents made an attempt to establish, in support of their case, that under Section 244 of the Act the Municipality has got powers to levy fee on entry of articles to the market. The said section reads as follows: "244. Opening, closing and letting of markets and slaughter houses.- (1) The municipal council may, from time to time, open or close any public market or slaughter house. It may also either take stallage or other rents or fees for the use of any person of any such market or slaughter house or from time to time sell by public auction or otherwise the privilege of occupying any stall or space in, or of otherwise using, any such market or slaughter house, and levy fees on any animal slaughtered in any slaughter house, for purposes of consumption. (2) Any person who, without the permission or licence of the "municipal Coun-cil,sells or exposes for sale any articles in the said markets, or uses the said slaughter houses, shall be punished with fine which may extend to twenty-five rupees. (3) It shall be lawful for the municipal council to lease for a period not exceeding one year at a time by publication or private contract the collecting of any rent or fees which may be imposed under sub-section (1 ). (4) If any officer specially empowered in this behalf by the municipal council is satisfied that any person occupying any stall or space in any market is in unauthorised occupation of the stall or space or continues to occupy the stall or space after authority to occupy has ceased, he may, with the previous sanction of the municipal council, require such person to vacate the stall or space within such time as may be mentioned in the requisition and if such person fails to comply with the requisition , such person may, in addition to any penalty which may be imposed under this Act, be summarily removed from the stall or space. " but, one thing is clear that Section 244 of the act does not speak that the Municipality has got power collect fee on entry of goods to the market. " but, one thing is clear that Section 244 of the act does not speak that the Municipality has got power collect fee on entry of goods to the market. What it says is that the Municipality can collect rent or stallage for the use of the market space. Under Section 244 (2) of the Act the Municipality has got powers to punish any person for carrying on business or exposing any article for sale in the market area without the permission or licence from it. Under sub-section (3) of Section 244 the Municipality has power to lease for a period of one year and has right to collect any rent or fee which may be imposed under sub-section (1) of Section 244. Whereas under sub-section (1) of "section 244 of the Act the Municipality has got power only to collect fee or stallage for use of any market space of slaughter house, etc. But, the same cannot be said that it can be applied to the goods at the time of entry to the market area. It will come into operation only when the goods are sold in a particular space of the market. Thus Section 244 of the Act does not authorise the municipality to collect entry fee on goods. If that is so, any Bye-law that empowers the Municipality to collect entry fee, as now framed under Bye-law no. 10, has to be held as ultra vires. ( 6 ) IN similar circumstances, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in Bimal Chandra Banerjee's case ( AIR 1971 SC 517 ) The Supreme Court held as follows: "no tax can be imposed by any bye-law or rule or regulation unless the statute under which the subordinate legislation is made specially authorises the imposition even if it is assumed that the power to tax can be delegated to the executive. The basis of the statutory power conferred by the statute cannot be transgressed by the rulemaking authority. A rule-making authority has no plenary power. It has to act within the limits of the power granted to it. " while dealing with the scope of Rule 163 (2) and (4) of the Mysore Forest Rules, 1963, a Division bench of this Court held in Bombay Saw Mills' case (1972 (1) Mys. LJ. A rule-making authority has no plenary power. It has to act within the limits of the power granted to it. " while dealing with the scope of Rule 163 (2) and (4) of the Mysore Forest Rules, 1963, a Division bench of this Court held in Bombay Saw Mills' case (1972 (1) Mys. LJ. 164) as follows: "as seen earlier, sub-rule (4) of Rule 163 seeks to provide for levy of licence fee for grant or renewal of licences for saw mills, saw pits and other sawing contrivances. But, there is no express provision in Section 50 or in any other section in the Act which empowers the Government to make rules for levy of fee for grant or renewal of such licence. As we have held that sub-rules (2) and (4) of Rule 163 are ultra vires and invalid, the memo issued by the authorities requiring the petitioner to take a licence for his saw mill under Rule 163, must be held to be without the authority of law. In the result, we allow this petition in part and declare that sub-rules (2) and (4) of Rule 163 are ultra vires and invalid. We also quash the memo, Ext. A, issued to the petitioner by the Forest Authorities calling upon him to take a licence for his saw mill. " the situation in this writ petition is also similar to the one considered by this Court and the supreme Court in the decisions referred to above. Hence, without any hesitation it has to be held that Bye-law No. 10 of the Karnataka municipalities Regulation and Inspection of public Markets and Slaughter Houses Bye-laws, 1966, is ultra vires. Accordingly, the notification at Annexure A is liable to be held as one without the authority of law. ( 7 ) IN the result, this writ petition is allowed declaring Bye-law No. 10 of the Bye-laws as ultra vires and invalid. The notification at Annexure a is also quashed. No costs. Writ Petition allowed. --- *** --- .