Judgment :- Petitioners - District Executive Officers, functioning under the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985, called the Act hereinafter, challenge orders of the appellate authority modifying orders passed by them. 2. S.3 of the Act provides for constitution of a welfare fund and S.6 for constitution of a Board to administer the fund. S.7 provides for appointment of officers to determine contributions payable by employers. Petitioners were so appointed. The Government or other authority specified by the Government, is empowered to hear appeals against orders made by such officers. Appellate orders made by Government are challenged by petitioners, who claim to be aggrieved by those orders. To show that they have locus standi, petitioners rely on S.35C(2) of the Central Excise & Salt Act which enables a Collector, to authorise his subordinate officers, to file appeals against orders of 'Appellate' Collectors. In that department, there are 'Collectors' and 'Appellate Collectors' and the latter perform only quasi-judicial functions. 3. Counsel for respondents submit that petitioners are not aggrieved persons, that permitting them to challenge orders of the appellate authority would militate against well established tenets in areas of quasi judicial functioning, and that the doctrine of merger and bias must halt them in their track to reach remedies. To support the first contention, Shri.M.B. Kurup appearing for some of the respondents, relied on a decision of this court in Divisional Forest Officer v. Pushpan (1983 KLT 951). A learned judge of this court held that a Divisional Forest Officer after issuing an order, became functus officio, and that he has no locus standi after his order merged with the order of the superior authority. This contention was endorsed by Shri.B. Radhakrishnan, who appeared as Amicus Curiae. He pointed out that the petitions are not filed by the Board, or on behalf of them, and that in the light of S.6(2) of the Act, the Fund is a body corporate which "shall by the said name sue and be sued". According to him, petitioners are not aggrieved persons because, even in a pecuniary sense the contributions go to a pool, and not to the petitioners. The doctrine of merger also stands against petitioners, submits Sri. Radhakrishnan. The contention that petitioners have no locus standi commends acceptance, as they cannot act for the fund and as they have no enforceable interest. 4. The doctrine of merger also stands against petitioners, submits Sri. Radhakrishnan. The contention that petitioners have no locus standi commends acceptance, as they cannot act for the fund and as they have no enforceable interest. 4. Relying on the decision in M/s. Gojer Brothers (P) Ltd. v. Sri. Ratan Lai Singh (AIR 1974 SC 1380), Sri. Radhakrishnan submitted that there can only be one operative order governing the same subject, and that the order of an inferior tribunal loses identity by merger with the order of the superior tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the principle of merger extends not only to judicial proceedings, but also to proceedings of quasi judicial and executive orders. Both on principle and precedent, this contention must be sustained. 5. He also relied on the decision in Sayed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan (AIR 1964 SC 477) to contend that a tribunal cannot place itself in the position of an interested party and challenge an order. If a tribunal acts as a party with an interest in the subject matter, the quality of its determination cannot commend approval. That will be a case of the party being judge of his cause. Answering this contention, counsel for petitioners submitted that petitioners did not judge their cause because, they filed the writ petitions after the cause was determined. That would make no difference. It is not the point of time when bias exerts which matters, but the combination of two inconsistent characteristics, in one authority. A personal interest and a quasi judicial power cannot inhere in the same source. 6. Bias is a feature that stamps the decision making process, with vice on its forehead. This rule is based on principles of natural justice. The right to be heard, postulates the right to be heard by an impartial adjudicator. That is the principle of Nemo debet esse judex in propria cause. In the American Law, this principle forms part of the Due Process. The offending element is not actual bias, but a reasonable suspicion of bias (Metropolitan Properties Co. Ltd. v. Lannon --1-1969) I Q.B. 577). The principle that no man shall judge his cause, however remote his interest be, had been uniformly recognised. Lord Campbell stated the principle lucidly in Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Proprietors ((1852) 3 HL C 759). The offending element is not actual bias, but a reasonable suspicion of bias (Metropolitan Properties Co. Ltd. v. Lannon --1-1969) I Q.B. 577). The principle that no man shall judge his cause, however remote his interest be, had been uniformly recognised. Lord Campbell stated the principle lucidly in Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Proprietors ((1852) 3 HL C 759). The issue is not merely whether justice has in fact been done, but whether it has manifestly and undoubtedly been seen to be done. A passage from Garner's Administrative Law (page 137) deserves notice: "Here we need to consider 'pecuniary interest' and 'appearance of bias' separately. The former rule, disqualifying for pecuniary interest in the subject matter of decision, has been applied with considerable strictness. The classic illustration in 'Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Proprietors', in which the House of Lords set aside a decision of the then Lord Chancellor, Lord Cottenham, on the ground that he was a shareholder in the canal company which was a party to the proceedings in his Court. Lord Campbell explained: "No one can suppose that Lord Cottonham could be, in the remotest degree influenced by the interest that he had in the concern; but, my Lords, it is of the last importance that the maxim that no man is to be judge in his own cause should be held sacred "" 7. To the same effect are the observations in Administrative Law by P.P. Craig (page 291): "The courts have long insisted that any pecuniary interest disqualifies the decision-maker, be he high or low. If a pecuniary interest exists, it is not necessary to go on to consider reasonable suspicion or real likelihood of bias ....The matter may also arise indirectly in situations in which the decision-maker belongs to an organisation which initiated the proceeding, but where he himself has taken no part in the decision to prosecute". Observations made by Prof. S.A. De Smith, 'Judicial Review of Administrative Action' (4th Edition - page 270) are apposite: "Disqualification for bias may exist where a member of a tribunal has an interest in the issue by virtue of his identification with one of the parties, or has otherwise indicated partisanship in relation to the issue. Two main classes of cases may arise although they are by no means exhaustive. Two main classes of cases may arise although they are by no means exhaustive. The first is where an adjudicator is associated with a body that institutes or defends the proceedings. The courts have refused to hold that a person is disqualified at common law from sitting to hear a case merely on the ground that he is a member of the public authority, or a member of or subscriber to the voluntary association, that is a party to the proceedings. He is, however, disqualified if he has personally taken an active part in instituting the proceedings, or has voted in favour of a resolution that the proceedings be instituted; for he is then in substance both judge and party". 8. Since petitioners have acted as a quasi judicial authority, they cannot be permitted to act as parties, whatever be the sequence of events. Having fulfilled one role, the other role should not be available. That was justification enough for the appellate authority to have interceded. 9. There is another and an equally fundamental objection to permitting petitioners to maintain actions. If a subordinate authority is to challenge the decision of a superior authority, that would be an unwholesome state in areas of quasi judicial functions. In Bhopal Sugar Industries v. Income Tax Officer (AIR 1961 S.C. 192), the Supreme Court held that when a subordinate authority in the hierarchy does not adhere to, or abide by the decision of a superior authority, its action cannot be justified. That was a case where an Income Tax Officer failed to carry out the directions of a superior tribunal, namely the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Court said: "Such refusal is in effect a denial of justice and is furthermore destructive of one of the basic principles in the administration of justice, based as it is, in this country, on a hierarchy of courts". This principle has been accepted by English Courts also In Cassel v. Broome ((1972) A.C. 1027), Diplock L.J. observed: "It is inevitable in a hierarchal system of courts that there are decisions of the Supreme Appellate Tribunal which does not attract unanimous approval the judicial system works only if some one is allowed to have the last word". 10. If the petitioners are permitted to assume a dual role, that would be permitting them to abandon the core principle of fair adjudication and judicial discipline. 10. If the petitioners are permitted to assume a dual role, that would be permitting them to abandon the core principle of fair adjudication and judicial discipline. Such a course cannot be assented to. 11. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petitions are not maintainable and they are dismissed. I record appreciation of the assistance rendered by ShriB.Radhakrishnan, who argued ably as Amicus curiae.