Judgment :- Petitioner is now working at Kathiar office of the Bank as an officer. While working as a clerk in the Divisional Office, Cochin, the Chief Manager who is also the disciplinary authority, served on him a charge memo containing the following (vide Ext. P3): 1) for having allegedly received Rs. 100/- from one Mr. Balakrishna Bhat for purchase of shares of a Company but not remitted to the Bank for the said purpose. ii) for having issued a cheque bearing No. 937996 dt. 25-8-82 for Rs. 2.500/- in his overdraft account and another cheque hearing No. 488309 dt.18-10-82 for Rs.75,000/- drawn on the same overdraft account without required drawing power and hence returned unpaid and a withdrawal for Rs. 15,000/- in his HSS account without maintaining sufficient balance and hence returned unpaid. iii) for having not utilised the second instalment of housing loan sanctioned to him on 24-10-1981 even after a period often months from the said availment. iv) for having availed an advance of Rs. 1,500 against leave fare concession for a proposed tour in October, 1982, on the strength of his own declaration but submitted a final bill only for Rs.30.30 ps. (Rs. Thirty and paise thirty only) and that too after the stipulated period meant for submission of such bills by which there is every reason to believe that he has not utilised the advance for the purpose for which it was allowed by the Bank". The Inquiring Officer, the petitioner submits, considered his defence and submitted the report Ext.P4 to the disciplinary authority. The Inquiring Officer had exonerated the petitioner from charges 1 and 4. The disciplinary authority concurred with the finding as regards charges 1, 2 and 3 and differed from the finding as regards charge No.4. Accordingly a notice proposing the punishment was served on the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his explanation. The disciplinary authority was not satisfied with the explanation and consequently passed Ext. P10 order. The appeal taken therefrom has been dismissed by Ext. P 13. Exts.P 10 and P13 are under challenge in this Original Petition. 2. The charges, according to the management, constitute the misconduct within the meaning of para. 19.50) of Chapter XIX, captioned, 'Disciplinary Action and Procedure thereof, of the First and Second Bipartite settlements between Indian Bank's Association and All India Bank Employees Association. It reads: - "19.5. P 13. Exts.P 10 and P13 are under challenge in this Original Petition. 2. The charges, according to the management, constitute the misconduct within the meaning of para. 19.50) of Chapter XIX, captioned, 'Disciplinary Action and Procedure thereof, of the First and Second Bipartite settlements between Indian Bank's Association and All India Bank Employees Association. It reads: - "19.5. By the expression 'gross misconduct' shall be meant any of the following acts and omissions on the part of an employee; XX XX XX XX 0) doing any act prejudicial to the interest of the bank or gross negligence or negligence involving or likely to involve the bank in serious loss". Only the first limb of this clause namely, 'doing any act prejudicial to the interest of the bank' is relevant here. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner argues that this clause is vague and of a general nature and hence what act of an employee can be said to be prejudicial to the interest of the bank may vary with individuals, exposing the employee to vagaries of subjective evaluation. 4. The learned counsel for the management however submits that 'doing an act prejudicial to the interest of the bank' is one of the enumerated misconducts and therefore the question as to whether the same is vague or ambiguous does not arise at all. It is for the management to say, taking into account the materials before it, whether a specified commission or omission of an employee constitutes a misconduct within the meaning of the clause'doing any act prejudicial to the interest of the bank'. If once the management finds that the specified act is prejudicial to the interest of the bank and the said finding is supported by materials then it is a misconduct within the meaning of this clause. The scope of interference with the said finding under Art.226 of The Constitution of India is very little. Yet another argument advanced by the counsel is that if the delinquent is aggrieved by any such finding, his remedy is not to move this court under Art.226 of the Constitution but to approach the forums constituted under the Labour Laws. The O.P. therefore is not maintainable. 5. A close scrutiny of the charges would indicate that matters highlighted thereunder affect only private rights. The O.P. therefore is not maintainable. 5. A close scrutiny of the charges would indicate that matters highlighted thereunder affect only private rights. So far as charge No. (2) is concerned, it should be said, the transaction made mention of therein brings about only the relationship of a banker and customer. The other two charges, 3 and 4, to my mind, if found established do not constitute any misconduct, much less a misconduct defined in the clause captioned, 'prejudicial to the interest of the bank'. I have deliberately made this observation only to show that a finding on such matters can vary with the individuals and hence a delinquent is likely to be exposed to vagaries of subjective evaluation. It is not unlikely that some disciplinary authorities may even opine that such acts will not constitute any misconduct at all although the conduct of the employee is such that it can be said that he failed to keep the high standards of moral, ethical or decorous behaviour befitting an officer of the bank. This by itself in my view, cannot constitute misconduct unless the same falls within the enumerated items of misconduct other than the one coming under caption 'any act prejudicial to the interest of the bank'. 6. What in a given context would constitute 'conduct prejudicial to the interest of the bank' to be treated as 'misconduct' would, to my mind, expose an area not amenable to objective evaluation. If that be the position such conduct cannot be treated as misconduct. Why it is said so is that a misconduct if proved would entail penal consequences. That is why it is always said that it is obligatory on the part of the employer to specify and if necessary define misconduct with precision and accuracy so that any ex post facto interpretation of an incident may not be comouflaged as misconduct. lam fortified in this view by two decisions of the Supreme Court: M/s. Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Presiding OfficerMeerut (AIR 1984 S.C. 505) and A.L. Kalra v. P&E Corpn. of India Ltd. (AIR 1984 S.C.1361). 7. Finding it difficult to grapple with the situation brought about by these decisions, the learned counsel for the management submits that the principles enunciated thereunder shall confine to the facts of that case.. of India Ltd. (AIR 1984 S.C.1361). 7. Finding it difficult to grapple with the situation brought about by these decisions, the learned counsel for the management submits that the principles enunciated thereunder shall confine to the facts of that case.. According to the counsel, the dictum that is applicable to the facts of this case is the one laid down by the Supreme Court in Tata Oil Mills v. Workmen (AIR 1965 S.C.155) and M.S. Dhantwal v. Hindustan Motors (AIR 1976 S.C. 2062). It is not necessary for me to go into the relevance of this argument because the Supreme Court, as is seen from the decision in Glaxo Laboratories case, before it laid down the dictum mentioned above, had considered the scope of these decisions also. It should therefore be held that the said decisions do not lay down a principle different from the one that is discernible from Glaxo Laboratories and A.L. Kalra. This argument of the learned counsel therefore is rejected. 8. I shall now deal with the second contention namely, that the O.P. is not maintainable. From the discussion above, It is clear that the proceedings right from the service of the memo of charges till the passing of the order of the appellate authority must be held to be arbitrary. Arbitrariness, to put it differently, is writ large on the face of the proceedings. It is axiomatic, that an action perse arbitrary denies equality of protection by law. That means, the proceedings are hit by the prohibition contained in Article 14 of The Constitution. Wherever there is arbitrariness in State action (it is not disputed that the Central Bank is a State within the meaning of Art.12 of the Constitution) Article 14 immediately springs into action and strikes down such State action. As observed by the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (AIR 1978 S.C. 597) Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The O.P. therefore is maintainable. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner then contended that the findings are based on no evidence and as such they are not sustainable in law. In support of this contention he relied on a Division Bench ruling of this court in W.ANo.708 of 1987. The O.P. therefore is maintainable. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner then contended that the findings are based on no evidence and as such they are not sustainable in law. In support of this contention he relied on a Division Bench ruling of this court in W.ANo.708 of 1987. This question, in my view, is unnecessary to be considered in the light of the finding that the charges even if established, would not continue misconduct within the meaning of 'any act prejudicial to the interest of the bank'. This question therefore is left open. 10. Exts.P 10 and P13 are quashed. The petitioner therefore is entitled to all the benefits, he would have got had he not been charge sheeted. The consequential orders in this regard shall be passed expeditiously. The O.P. is allowed. No costs.