Judgment ( 1 ) THIS appeal has been filed u/s. 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the order of the Judge, Family Court, Jodhpur dated 6-4-1989, whereby he rejected the application for comparing the signature of the appellant on documents Exs. 2, 15 and 52 and of adding new grounds in the petition. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order the appellant preferred this appeal before this Court. ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this appeal are as under: Once Major Raja P. Singh the appellant has filed a divorce petition on the grounds of adultery and cruelty before the District Judge, Jodhpur which was later on transferred to the Family Court, Jodhpur on 19-8-1988. The appellant by application dated 4-1-1989 prayed that the document Ex. 2 dated 13-9-69 purported to has been written by respondent to one Takhat Singh be compared with the signatures of the appellant and also prayed by another application dated 9-1-1989 that he may be allowed to amend the petition by adding new grounds. The respondent resisted and filed written statement on 12-12-1986 alleging inter alia that the document dated 13-9-1969 Ex. 2 is a forged one and Ex. 15 is the list of ornaments prepared at the time of her daughter Gayatris marriage and Ex. 52 is a photostat copy are of no concern and have no bearing in the case which is pending since 1983. ( 3 ) THE learned trial Judge of Family Court, Jodhpur dismissed the application dated 4-6-1989 on the ground that signatures can be compared with the admitted signatures of the respondent which are already on record. The application dated 9-1-1989 was rejected on the ground that no useful purpose will be served when as per averments appellant got himself operated in the year 1968 and the alleged child was born in January 1981. ( 4 ) MR. M. C. Bhoot, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contended that the court below without considering the true aspects rejected the application merely on the ground of dealy. ( 5 ) MR. A. L. Chopra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has raised the preliminary objection that there is no provision in the Act, for filing an appeal against an interlocutory order and as such the same be dismissed as not maintainable. ( 6 ) MR. ( 5 ) MR. A. L. Chopra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has raised the preliminary objection that there is no provision in the Act, for filing an appeal against an interlocutory order and as such the same be dismissed as not maintainable. ( 6 ) MR. M. C. Bhoot, learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contention submitted that the impugned order is not an interlocutory order. Mr. Bhoot, has drawn our attention to the decision of Rama Shanker v. Mahadev (1968 ACJ 109) in which their Lordships held that an order passed under O. 6, R. 17, C. P. C. "is the case decided" within the meaning of expression in S. 100, C. P. C. Thus the impugned order can also be challenged in this appeal u/ Sec. 19 of the Act. ( 7 ) THE point for consideration is whether allowing or rejecting an amendment amounts to a case decided and is appealable u/ S. 19 of the Act, so it is to be seen whether by the impugned order dated 6-4-1989 the rights of the parties have decided finally or not. ( 8 ) WE have heard learned counsel for the parties. It has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India v. Gokul Chand, AIR 1967 SC 799 that "no appeal lie from any interlocutory order which is merely procedural and do not affect the rights and liabilities of the parties, if however, any error, defect or irregularity is found in any interlocutory order it can be taken as a general ground of objection in appeal from final order in the main proceeding. "so far as comparison of signatures and handwriting is concerned it is a matter of procedure and does not decide the matter finally. Regarding application dated 9-1-1989 not allowing the amendment Mr. Bhoot, learned counsel for the appellant, has relied on Kisan Co-operative Ltd. v. M/s. Rajendra Paper Mills Ltd. (AIR 1984 Allahabad 143) and contended that an order allowing or refusing to allow an amendment is a case decided within the meaning of S. 115 C. P. C. and as such appeal lies. ( 9 ) IN the famous case, V. C. Shukla v. State, (1980 Cri LJ 690) the expression interlocutory order was interpreted. It would be convenient to quote paras 23 and 95 which runs as follows"23. ( 9 ) IN the famous case, V. C. Shukla v. State, (1980 Cri LJ 690) the expression interlocutory order was interpreted. It would be convenient to quote paras 23 and 95 which runs as follows"23. Thus, summing up the natural and logical meaning of an interlocutory order, the conclusion is inescapable that an order which does not terminate the proceedings or finally decide the rights of the parties is only an interlocutory order. In other words, in ordinary sense of the term, an interlocutory order is one which only decides a particular aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a proceeding, suit or trial but which does not however conclude the trial at all. This would be the result if the term interlocutory order is interpreted in its natural and logical sense without having resort to Criminal Procedure Code or any other statute. That is to say, if we construe interlocutory order in ordinary parlance it would indicate the attributes, mentioned above, and this is what the term interlocutory order means when used in S. 11 (I) of the Act. "95. Ordinarly speaking, the expression "interlocuted in legal parlance is understood in contra-distinction to what is styled as final. In the course of a judicial proceeding before a court, for judicially determining the main dispute brought to the court for its resolution, a number of situations arise, when that court goes on disposing of ancillary disputes raised by parties to the proceeding by making orders and unless the order finally disposes of a proceeding in a court all such orders during the course of a trial would be broadly designated interlocutory orders. Such interlocutory orders are steps, taken towards the final adjudication and for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending proceeding. They regulate the procedure only and do not affect any right or liability of the parties (See Central Bank of India v. Gokal Chand AIR 1967 SC 799 ). Every such interlocutory order may for the time being, dispose of a particular point of controversy raised in the proceeding, yet nonetheless the order would be an interlocutory order unless by such an order the controversy between the parties is finally disposed. ( 10 ) ). At the out set, we can say that the case cited by Mr. Every such interlocutory order may for the time being, dispose of a particular point of controversy raised in the proceeding, yet nonetheless the order would be an interlocutory order unless by such an order the controversy between the parties is finally disposed. ( 10 ) ). At the out set, we can say that the case cited by Mr. Bhoot was a civil revision u/ S. 115 C. P. C. and here, we are dealing with an appeal under the Special Law namely S. 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. It would be clear from the language used in S. 19 (1) (a) of the Act which is as follows:-"19. Appeal- (1) Save as provided in sub-sec. (2) notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (5 of 1908) or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in any other law, an appeal shall lie from every judgment or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Family Court to the High Court both on facts and on law. " ( 11 ) THE object of this Special Law of the Family Courts Act is to decide the matrimonial cases in a speedy manner. If, the order rejecting or allowing an amendment application will be termed as the case decided for the purpose of this Act and is appealable then, in ordinary course of law the decision of such cases would take years to come to reach the finality of the matter. In order to achieve the object of the Act i. e. speedy settlement of dispute relating to marriage, the purpose of expeditious trial is frustrated. That apart if the legislature intended that all interlocutory order be appealable, it should not have used the word in S. 19 of the Act "not being an interlocutory order" and that is why no appeal or revision has been provided. This Court in D. B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 107/ 90 smt. Vijay Kaur v. Radhey Shyam decided on 1-8-1990 has held that the order relating to adjournment cost is an interlocutory order and appeal is not maintainable u/ Sec. 19 of the Act. In this view of the matter, the order dated 6-4-1989 cannot be termed finally deciding the case i. e. the controversy being settled. The parties can agitate the point in appeal after final disposal of the case by the trial court. In this view of the matter, the order dated 6-4-1989 cannot be termed finally deciding the case i. e. the controversy being settled. The parties can agitate the point in appeal after final disposal of the case by the trial court. In our considered opinion, the allouing or refusing an amendment is an interlocutory order against which no appeal u/ sec. 19 of Act is provided. In conclusion the preliminary objection is sustained and it is held that the order dated 6-4-1989 is an interlocutory order and no appeal lies to this Court. ( 12 ) CONSEQUENTLY, the appeal is dismissed as not maintainable. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.