JUDGMENT Nathoo Lal, Member - This second appeal is directed against the Judgement and decree passed by the Additional Commissioner, Bareilly Division, Bareilly on 12-3-1981 in appeal No. 269 of 1980 passed by Sub-Divisional Officer Sadar of District Shahjahanpur in case no. 73 of 1980 under Sections 229-B/209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, to be called the "Act" hereinafter. 2. Briefly speaking the facts of the case are that a suit under Sections 229-B/209 of the Act was brought by respondent Nanhey Lal son of Bhawani Prasad resident of Mohalla Akab Masjid Kauch, district Shahjahanpur against the appellant Rameshwar son of Laxman, resident of village Sehramau, Pargana, Tehsil and district Shahjahanpur and two others with the allegations that the defendant in conspiracy with the Lekhpal of the circle could manage to get his name recorded in class 9 in the khatauni which is farzi and therefore the plaintiff sought declaration of his co-tenancy rights along with the ejectment of defendant, if found in possession and expunging of his name from the records. The suit was dismissed under the Judgement and decree dated 19-5-1980 passed by the trial court against; which an appeal was preferred which was appeal No. 269 of 1980 of district Shahjahanpur and the same has been disposed of by the Additional Commissioner Bareilly Division, Bareilly under his Judgement and decree dated 12-3-81 whereby the appeal was allowed and the suit was decreed. The defendant feeling aggrieved has come to this court in second appeal. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and have perused the record. None appeared on behalf of the respondent. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant during the course of his argument has laid great stress on the point that the plaintiff himself admitted in his statement on oath recorded by the trial court that the land in a suit was let out on Batai to the appellant defendant and the contentions of the learned counsel are that if the fact disclosed by the plaintiff himself are taken to be correct cultivatory possession of, defendant is proved which has also been admitted by witnesses examined by the plaintiff and consequently the tenancy rights have accrued to the appellant-defendant by operation of law and the rights and title of the plaintiff-respondent have extinguished automatically. The learned counsel for the appellant has therefore argued that this aspect of the matter has totally been ignored by both the learned courts below. The learned counsel for the appellant has also contended that the learned first appellate court while passing the reversal order by allowing the appeal and decreeing the suit of the plaintiff, the Judgement recorded is sketchy and brief having no discussions of evidence nor the findings in detail with the grounds and reasons for holding the findings recorded by the learned trial court to be perverse and illegal. 5. From the perusal of the record both the above contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant are found to be correct. The learned first appellate court has himself admitted that the fact about the letting of land by plaintiff to the defendant on Batai was raised by the learned counsel for the respondent in that court laying stress on the point that the provisions of Section 156 read with Section 165 of the Act, are applicable -and the rights & title of the plaintiff, if any, stood extinguished. The learned lower appellate court has opined that since this fact had not been pleaded by, the defendant in his written statement and contrary to it he pleaded adverse possession over the land in suit it would amount to set up a new case which has not been a case of either party. On this ground the learned lower appellate court refused to express his opinion about the consequences of letting of land on Batai by the plaintiff. The learned trial court also discussed in brief the admission of plaintiff in his statement about the fact of letting the land on Batai. On this ground the learned lower appellate court refused to express his opinion about the consequences of letting of land on Batai by the plaintiff. The learned trial court also discussed in brief the admission of plaintiff in his statement about the fact of letting the land on Batai. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, it is clear that letting of land on Batai is the statement of plaintiff himself and if the fact is proved it will entail the legal consequences with regard, to rights' and title of the parties and even if, no specific issue has been framed on this legal point, but since the fact has been disclosed by the plaintiff himself in his statement on oath it ought to have been considered and for legal matters specific issues are not always necessary nor it is necessary as to on what stage such legal questions are raised but what is necessary is that such legal questions if raised at any stage, must be considered, discussed and decided to do justice accordingly. 6. In view of the observations made above, this appears to be a fit case for remand. The second appeal is therefore allowed, the impugned Judgement and decree of the first appellate court dated 13-1-1981 is set aside and the case is remanded back to the first appellate court for deciding the appeal afresh in the light of the observations made above.