Research › Browse › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

1990 DIGILAW 553 (KER)

State of Kerala v. Popular Automobiles

1990-12-14

THULASIDAS

body1990
Judgment :- The order of the Sessions Judge, Mavelikkara, in Crl.RP.No. 57 of 1988 is challenged in this revision filed on behalf of the complainant in S.T. No.57 of 1987 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court, Kayamkulam. The complaint was filed by the Inspector of Weights and Measures, Karthikappally, who alleged that when he inspected the trade premises of M/s.Gopan Automobiles in Nangiarkulangara Muri, Chingoli Panchayat owned by one R. Gdpinatha Pillai, he found certain articles kept for sale in packaged form did not carry the label in accordance with the provisions of Standards of Weights and Measures (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 1977. He seized among other goods one packet of N.A.C. wheel joint for matador vehicle. The owner of the shop reportedly, told him that it was supplied by the respondent herein. Accordingly, notice was issued but the reply received was not satisfactory. It was alleged that the respondent violated the provisions of R.6(1) and 23(1) of the Standard of Weights and Measures (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 1977, read with S.63 of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976. 2. On a petition by the respondent that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to try the case, the matter was heard and it was held that under Ss.177,178(b) and 179 Cr.P.C, he has jurisdiction "including territorial jurisdiction" to try and dispose of the case. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. In the above revision, the Sessions Judge set aside the order and held that the Magistrate has no territorial jurisdiction to try the complaint. 3. As to the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge to interfere in revision, I think, reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1978 Crl.LJ.165) was rightly placed. The order of the Magistrate certainly was not an interlocutory order as explained by the Supreme Court in amarnath v. State of Haryana (1977 (4) SCC 137), wherein it was held: "The term "interlocutory order" is a term of well known legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, letters patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster's New World Dictionary "interlocutory" has been defined as an order other than final decision. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, letters patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster's New World Dictionary "interlocutory" has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that term "interlocutory order" in S.397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in S.397 of the 1973 Code." The above observations were quoted with approval in Madhu Limaye's case, wherein it was held: " If a complaint is dismissed under S.203 or under 5.204(4), or the court holds the proceeding to be void or discharges the accused, a revision to the High Court at the instance of the complainant or the prosecutor would be competent, otherwise it will make S.398 of the new Code otiose". The above decisions were relied on by the Supreme Court in Haryana Land Reclamation and Development Corporation Limited v. State of Haryana and another (1990) 3 SCC 588. In my view, the Sessions Judge rightly exercised his revisional jurisdiction in respect of the order of the Magistrate. 4. The respondent is a trader in Ernakulam from whom Gopan Automobiles, Kayamkulam, purchased the article in respect of which the complaint was filed. Gopan Automobiles is not a subsidiary of the respondent company or its agent. The alleged violation of R.23(1) of the Standard of Weights and Measures (Packaged Commodities) Rules, if there was such violation arising out of the sale by the respondent, must be held to have taken place within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Court, Ernakulam and not within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, Kayamkulam. S.177 Cr.P.C. must be held inapplicable to the case against the petitioner. 5. S.177 Cr.P.C. must be held inapplicable to the case against the petitioner. 5. I do not think this is a case where S.178(b) Cr.P.C. applied since it would not be correct to say that the offence was committed partly in Ernakulam and partly within the local limits of the Kayamkulam Magistrate Court. The alleged of fence was committed and completed in Ernakulam as soon as the packaged commodity was sold to Gopan Automobiles. Display and storage by Gopan Automobiles in the shop at Nangiarkulangara did not form part of the offence committed by the respondent at Ernakulam as rightly noticed by the Sessions Court. The observations to the contrary by the Magistrate were rightly discountenanced. 6. The Kayamkulam Magistrate did not get jurisdiction to entertain the complaint against the respondent under S.179 Cr.P.C. too. It lays down that when an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which was ensued, the offence can be enquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued. To make the section applicable, the act and the consequence together must constitute the offence. A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court held in In re Jivandas Savchand (AIR 1930 Bom. 490): "What S.179 provides is that when a person is accused of the commission of any offence by reason of two things; by reason, first, of anything which was been done, and secondly of any consequence which has ensued, then jurisdiction is conferred on the court where the act has been done or the consequence has ensued. The offence therefore must be charged by reason of the two things, the act done and the consequence which ensued; and the consequence therefore forms the necessary part of the offence. S.179 does not refer to an offence charged by reason of an act done, from which act any consequence has ensued". This was followed in Banwarilal Jhunjhum Walla v. Union of India (1958 KLT1079), where it was held in order that S.179 must apply, "the particular offence charged must be not merely by reason of the thing done, but also by reason of the consequence that has ensued". This was followed in Banwarilal Jhunjhum Walla v. Union of India (1958 KLT1079), where it was held in order that S.179 must apply, "the particular offence charged must be not merely by reason of the thing done, but also by reason of the consequence that has ensued". If the offence is complete in itself by reason of the act having been done and the consequence is a mere result which was not essential for the completion of the offence, S.179 would not apply as held in State v. Dhulaji Bavanji (AIR 1963 Guj. 234). 7. As already stated, the sale of the packaged commodity took place at Ernakulam, The offence, if any, was committed here. The display of the packaged articles at another place constituted a separate and independent offence by itself. It is not possible to hold that such offence on account of the storage and display was the consequence of the act of the respondent. I am unable to hold that the prosecution could be saved under S.179 Cr.P.C. 8. I agree that the question of jurisdiction was rightly considered at the threshold by the Magistrate. I do not think the decisions reported in Balakrishna Panicker v. Thevan (1987 (1) KLT 628) and Ramkumar v. K.M. Mathew (1958 (1) KLT 579) could be pressed into service, where there was jurisdictional incompetence to try the case. 9. I do not find any grounds to interfere with the order of the Sessions Judge. The Crl.R.P. is dismissed.