J.M. Srivastava, J.:- This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 30.7.88 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, West Tripura, whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 302/201 IPC and sentenced to R. I. for life and seven years respectively. 2. Briefly, the prosecution case was that Pankhi Rai Debbarma went to Padma Bill market to sell paddy on 29.11.84 but did not return home. Dilip Debbarma his son and some others had made search but could not find him. Dilip Debbarma and some others found by the side of the road in the jungle a nylon bag and tukri which Pankhi Rai Debbarma had carried to market and also found blood there. The matter was reported to police, at P. S. Kalyanpur on 4.12.84 where a general Diary entry was made and S. I. late R.K. Dutta took up investigation'. On suspicion due to some enmity, the appellant was taken into custody and as a result of information furnished, by him on 5.12.84 the dead body of Pankhi Rai Debbarma was discovered' from a well in jungle at the instance of accused appellant. He performed inquest over the dead body and sent it for post mortem examination. Investigating Officer R. K. Dutta inte­rrogated the witnesses and collected some blood stained earth, seized the bag and tukri. Investigation completed, charge sheet aga­inst the appellant and three others, was submitted. 3. At the trial before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, the accused pleaded not guilty. The prosecution in support of the charge examined two witnesses including PW-12 Dr. Pranbandhu Barma who had conducted post mortem examination on the dead body of Pankhi Rai Debbarma and PW-11 Mihir Kanti Das who conducted the investigation after the death of S. I. R. K. Dutta. The defence did not produce any evidence. On consideration of the evidence, the learned trial court held that the evidences of motive due to enmity and the statement made by the accused appellant before the invest­igating Officer admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, established the charge under Section 302 IPC against the app­ellant, who was accordingly convicted and sentenced as noted earlier. The other three accused were acquitted. 4. In appeal, Sri B. Das, learned senior Advocate appearing as amicus curiae assisted by Mr. The other three accused were acquitted. 4. In appeal, Sri B. Das, learned senior Advocate appearing as amicus curiae assisted by Mr. A. Bhattacharjee, has submitted that there was hardly any evidence on record against the appellant to justify the findings of the learned trial court and hence in the absence of any evidence, the accused appellant was entitled to acquittal. 5. Sri M. Majumdar learned P. P., on the other hand, has justified the finding of the learned trial court. 6. We have considered the submissions for the parties and the evidence on record. We find that the only evidence available against the appellant was the statement which led' to the recovery of the dead body of the deceased Pankhi Rai Debbarma from a well in the jungle and some evidence of motive due to enmity. The other prosecution evidence of the witnesses related inter-alia to recovery of nylon bag', tukri from the jungle, recovery of the dead body from the well, seizure of articles, etc. 7. The FIR (Ext. P/12) in the case was lodged by late S.I.R. K. Das on 7. 12. 84. In our opinion, it cannot be considered as FIR, for the reasons that on the basis of the G. D. entry on 4. 12. 84 about the missing report of deceased Pankhi Rai Debbarma, the police had already commenced investigation, had taken the accused appellant in custody, the body of the deceased had been recovered, the material objects like the nylon bag, tukri, etc. had been seized and as such investigation having had already advanced, in our opi­nion, it shall not be proper to consider Ext. P/12 as first Information Report. As a matter of fact, it was the police version, dressed up as FIR and was not available as evidence for any purpose at all. We are, therefore, quite clear that Ext. P/12 cannot be conside­red as First Information Report under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereafter referred as the Code. 8. PW-1 Dilip Debbarma, son of the deceased provided the evi­dence of motive in that he said that there was dispute for land between his father and the accused appellant. We are, therefore, quite clear that Ext. P/12 cannot be conside­red as First Information Report under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereafter referred as the Code. 8. PW-1 Dilip Debbarma, son of the deceased provided the evi­dence of motive in that he said that there was dispute for land between his father and the accused appellant. Even if this statement be accepted as true, there was evidence in the testimony of PW-2 Bir Mohan Debbarma, Panchayat Member of the village, to show that the deceased had enmity with others also, for he had clearly said in cross-examination that Pankhi Rai was arrested be police twice and he had enmity with others as he was a thief. The prosecution evidence itself show that the deceased had enmity with some others and hence the mere fact that deceased had enmity with the appe­llant also would not make 'motive' by itself significant, as a circ­umstance against the appellant, for the reason that some others also had similar motive due to enmity with the deceased. 9. The learned trial court has placed reliance upon the statem­ent said to have been made by the accused appellant to the Inve­stigating Officer, which had led to the recovery of the dead body. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that no such statement was made by the appellant. We had carefully considered: the evidence and in our opinion the learned trial court was in error in having placed reliance upon the part of the statement under Sec­tion 161 of the Code recorded by the deceased SI R. K. Datta marked Ext. P/10. It is settled law that only that much of the statement made by an accused in custody during investigation to the police is admissible as leads to the recovery of some article or thing. Any other part of the statement, which is not related with the recovery of article is not admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. We are also not satisfied about the prosecution version that the accused appellant had made any such statement, for the reasons that, the person before whom the said statement had been made, i. e. the Investigating Officer R. K. Dutta having had died was not before the court. It was part of statement under Section 161 of the Code. We are also not satisfied about the prosecution version that the accused appellant had made any such statement, for the reasons that, the person before whom the said statement had been made, i. e. the Investigating Officer R. K. Dutta having had died was not before the court. It was part of statement under Section 161 of the Code. The prosecution did not explain why when the accused had been taken into custody the statement of accused was required to be recorded under Section 161 of the Code, particularly when PW- 5 Sub W Ranjan Debbarma, an executive magistrate who had also acc­ompanied the Investigating Officer when the body of the deceased was recovered from the well, nowhere in his statement said that the accused appellant had led the party to the well wherefrom the dead body was recovered. PW-6 Panchu Telenga who was a sweeper and had accompanied the party when the dead body was recovered, has also said nothing about the accused appellant having led the party to the aforesaid well from where the body was recovered. In such state of evidence for the prosecution, it is difficult to accept that the recovery of the dead body was at the instance of the acc­used appellant. However, even if it be accepted that the accused appellant had made such a statement, only that part which led to the recovery of dead body would be admissible and on its basis ail-that could be said was that the body was hidden in the well which in fact could not be stretched to mean that the accused appellant had caused the death of Pankhi Rai Debbarma. There is no evidence at all who caused his death except that he died of strangulation. It follows that there was no evidence for the prosecution that accused appellant had caused the death of the deceased and accordingly, in our opinion, his conviction and sentence under Section 302 IPC cannot be sustained and has to be set aside. 10. In so far as the conviction and sentence under Section 201 IPC is concerned, for the reasons already stated that the prosecution evidence was not reliable and did not establish that the accused app­ellant had made the said statement we think that the charge under Section 201 IPC against the appellant was also not established and has therefore to be set aside. 11. 11. For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal is allowed. The imp­ugned judgment and order are set aside. The accused appellant is acquitted of the charges under Sections 302 and 201 IPC. He is on bail. His bail bonds are discharged. 12. Before we part with this appeal, we record our apprecia­tion of the pains taken by Sri B. Das, learned senior counsel ass­isted by Sri A. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel in the presentation of this appeal for the appellant.