P. R. GOKULAKRISHNAN, J. ( 1 ) THIS Letters Patent Appeal arises out of the judgment rendered by the learned single Judge of our High Court in Special civil Application No. 7654 of 1988. Special Civil Application No. 7654 of 1988 is for issuance of a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order, directing the appellant to appoint the respondents herein to the post of Pre-Primary school Teachers. There is a further prayer for issuance of a writ of prohibition or any other appropriate writ, direction or order, restraining the appellant-Nagar prathmik Shikshan Samiti from filling in six posts of Pre-Primary School teachers. The learned single Judge of our High Court, after rejecting the contentions of the appellant herein, allowed the petition, directing the appellant- nagar Prathmik Shikshan Samiti, Vadodara Municipal Corporation to issue appointment orders to the respondents herein for the post Pre-Primary School teachers, latest by 28/12/1989 and permit the respondents to join the duties. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant has preferred the above Letters Patent Appeal. ( 2 ) THE short facts of this case for the purpose of disposing of the letters Patent Appeal are that the respondents are candidates for the post of Pre-Primary School Teachers. On 26/12/1986, the appellant invited applications for the post in question for preparing the select list. The respondents got selected and by letter dated 17/03/1987, all the respondents were informed that they were included in the select list and that each of the respondents must attend the office of the appellant on 12/06/1987 at 1. 00 p. m. for receiving the order of appointment. This letter dated 17-3-1987 further stated that if any one of the respondents does not remain present at the aforesaid time in the office of the appellant, his name shall be cancelled from the select list. There is a further averment in the said letter that within two months, each of the respondents should learn harmonium. When the respondents reported to the office of the appellant herein at the specified time and date, they were not given the appointment order. There is a further averment in the said letter that within two months, each of the respondents should learn harmonium. When the respondents reported to the office of the appellant herein at the specified time and date, they were not given the appointment order. Even though the respondents were selected at the relevant time and put in the selection list, they were not given the appointment order on the ground that in Special Civil Application No. 1398 of 1987, an order was passed on 17-4-1987 to the effect that fresh advertisement for filling up these posts has to be given. In this connection we can refer to the filing of the Special Civil Application No. 1398 of 1987 by one Bhavnaben S. Gosai on 7/04/1987. In that Special civil Application, Bhavanben S. Gosai has prayed for quashing the selection of 7 respondents mentioned therein on the ground that they were ineligible 3 for being considered for the post in question. The 7 respondents in that Special civil Application, along with the respondents herein, were in the select list. In the above said petition, i. e. Special Civil Application No. 1398 of 1987, the respondents herein were not parties and they were not aware of any proceedings thereof. In that Special Civil Application No. 1398 of 1987, an interim order was passed on 17-4-1987, after issuing rule in the main Special Civil Application, to the following effect :" Rule. The Respondents shall not give appointment orders to the following candidates: 1. Manjulaben Govindlal Joshi, 2. Gitaben Vipulbhai Jani, 3. Nirmla Asharam Shrimali, 4. Charulata Jethalal Makwana, 5. Bhanumati Somabhai Rathod, 6. Sushilaben Sureshchandra Goswami, 7. Champaben Jotibbhai Patel. However, the Respondents are permitted to give fresh advertisement for filling up these posts. Pursuant to the advertisement if the standard prescribed in the advertisement permits the above mentioned seven candidates shall also have liberty to apply". Interpreting this interim order to mean that the High Court permitted the appellant- board to give fresh advertisement for filling up these posts, wherein the respondents in this Letters Patent Appeal were also selected, fresh adverstisement was issued. Questioning this fresh advertisement the respondents herein came forward with Special Civil Application No. 7654 of 1988 with the reliefs mentioned in paragraphs supra. Questioning this fresh advertisement the respondents herein came forward with Special Civil Application No. 7654 of 1988 with the reliefs mentioned in paragraphs supra. In this connection, we can also mention that special Civil Application No. 1398 of 1987 came to be finally disposed of, by stating that the selection list, to the extent that it included the names of the 7 candidates mentioned in that Special Civil Application, who were admittedly ineligible for the post in question, deserves to be quashed and set aside. ( 3 ) IN the above said factual background, we can now examine the contentions raised in this Letters Patent Appeal. Mr. P. G. Desai, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, mainly contended that the respondents can have only right to be considered for appointment and they cannot agitate for right to be appointed. According to the learned Counsel, there is absolutely no legal right for the respondents to approach the Court by way of a petition, seeking the issuance of a writ of mandamus and writ of mandamus will not lie for enforcing such demands when there is no legal right on the part of the respondents to enforce. It is the further say of Mr. Desai that there is no legal right for the respondents to ask for the select list to be operated and, as a matter of fact, it is stated that the select list, in which the respondents find place, has lapsed. Referring to Special Civil Application No. 1398 of 1987 and the order passed thereon, Mr. Desai contended that as per the interim order passed by this Court in the above said Special Civil Application, fresh advertisement was issued after cancelling the select list and as such, the respondents have no right to insist upon the operation of the old select list. ( 4 ) WE have carefully considered the facts of this case. It is an admitted position that the respondents find place in the select list prepared in March, 1987. It is also on record that on 7/04/1987, one Bhavnaben S. Gosai questioned the inclusion of 7 candidates in the select list by filing Special Civil application No. 1398 of 1987. The records show that an interim order was passed in that application as early as 17-4-1987, which we have extracted in paragraph supra. It is also on record that on 7/04/1987, one Bhavnaben S. Gosai questioned the inclusion of 7 candidates in the select list by filing Special Civil application No. 1398 of 1987. The records show that an interim order was passed in that application as early as 17-4-1987, which we have extracted in paragraph supra. Special Civil Application No. 1398 of 1987 came to be disposed of finally on 19/11/1988, with an observation that the select list to the extent that it included the names of the 7 candidates (candidates mentioned in Special Civil Application No. 1398 of 1987), who were admittedly ineligible for the post in question, was bad and the Selection List to that extent deserves to be quashed. Reading the interim order dated 17-4-1987 and the final order dated 19/11/1988, it is clear that the 7 respondents mentioned in Special civil Application No. 1398 of 1987 cannot be included in the select list. It is only to that extent, the select list was quashed and not the entire select list. In Special Civil Application No. 1398 of 1987, the respondents herein were not parties. In this background, it is futile on the part of the appellant to contend that the entire select list prepared as early as March, 1987 stands cancelled by the orders in Special Civil Application No. 1398 of 1987. The facts clearly and cogently reveal that the respondents have been properly put in the select list and that select list prepared in March, 1987 was not cancelled as far as the respondents herein are concerned by the order in Special Civil Application no. 1398 of 1987. ( 5 ) SUBSEQUENT to the preparation of the select list in March, 1987, the appellant sent separate letters dated 17-3-1987 to the respondents herein, stating that they have been select for the post and that they must remain present in the office of the Committee for obtaining appointment letter on 12-6-1987 at 1. 00 hour noon. The said letter, which is Annexure "b" to the main Special civil Application, reads as follows :" xxx xxx xxx subject : In the matter of selection as Balvadi teacher. We have pleasure to inform you that you have appeared before Selection committee on 14-3-1987 for the post of a Teacher in Balvadi run by our committee in which you have been selected as a Teacher. We have pleasure to inform you that you have appeared before Selection committee on 14-3-1987 for the post of a Teacher in Balvadi run by our committee in which you have been selected as a Teacher. You shall have to remain present in the Office of the committee for obtaining appointment letter on 12-6-1987 at 1. 00 hour noon. If you shall not remain present at the aforesaid time in this Office, your name shall be cancelled from the Select list which please note. Within two months, you will have to learn Harmonium". In spite of all these facts, the appellant herein, construing the interim order in special Civil Application No. 1398 of 1987, as if it directed a fresh advertisement for preparing the select list after dropping the select list prepared in March, 1987, came forward with a fresh advertisement in November, 1987. This action was questioned in the Special Civil Application. A learned single Judge of our high Court allowed the aforesaid Special Civil Application No. 7654 of 1988 which is under appeal now. ( 6 ) THUS, the facts mentioned above clearly reveal that the appellant, in spite of the specific interim order in Special Civil Application No. 1398 of 1987 and in spite of its letter to the respondents individually on 17- 3-1987, has arbitrarily cancelled the select list of March, 1987 and came forward with a fresh advertisement to prepare the select list. The angle in which Mr. Desai submitted his argument is that a person can have a legal right to be considered for appointment by operating the select list, but he cannot have any legal right to get appointment and that it is for the authority, which is vested with the power of appointment to give the appointment or not. However, when an authority arbitrarily refuses to appoint a person in the select list and such refusal is so unreasonable, the Courts are not helpless in rendering justice to the affected party. Each case has to be judged in the background in which it is placed and on the facts and circumstances, which led the parties to approach the Court for relief. The relevant facts narrated in paragraph supra clearly establish that the appellant called the respondents to be present in its office to get the appointment order on 12-6-1987 at 1. 00 hour noon. The relevant facts narrated in paragraph supra clearly establish that the appellant called the respondents to be present in its office to get the appointment order on 12-6-1987 at 1. 00 hour noon. This letter further states that if any one of the respondents is not present at the aforesaid time in the office of the appellant, his name will be cancelled from the select list. There is a further direction in the said letter that within two months from that letter, the respondents must learn harmonium. This letter clearly spells out that a decision has been taken for operating the list and for giving appointment orders and the only thing left was that the respondents concerned must come and take that order on a particular date at a particular time. All of a sudden, this decision is changed as if the interim order in Special Civil application No. 1398 of 1987 directs the appellant to prepare a fresh select list, and a fresh advertisement was issued in November, 1987 for preparation of the fresh select list. This attitude of the appellant is clearly unreasonable and arbitrary on the facts and circumstance of the present case and rightly the helpless respondents, who are the recipients of the letter from the appellant, asking them to come and take the appointment order, have to approach this Court for getting justice. In this backdrop, we can refer to the decisions cited by Mr. P. G. Desai in support of his contentions. ( 7 ) THE first decision cited by Mr. P. G. Desai is the decision in the case of Jatinder Kumar and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. , reported in 1985 (1) SCC 122 . In this case, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the selection by the Public Service Commission and the right of the person to get appointed by the Government on such selection. The Supreme Court held :"in absence of any provision in the Constitution making the acceptance of the advice tendered by the Public Service Commission, when consulted, obligatory, Art. 320 (3) is rendered only directory and not mandatory. The selection by the Commission is only a recommendation and the final authority for appointment is Government. The Government may accept the recommendation or may decline to accept the same. The selection by the Commission is only a recommendation and the final authority for appointment is Government. The Government may accept the recommendation or may decline to accept the same. But if it chooses not to accept the recommendations, the Government is made answerable to the legislature under Art. 323. If the vacancy is to be filled up, the Government has to make appointment strictly adhering to the order of merit as recommended by the Public Service Commission. It cannot disturb the order of merit accordingly to its own sweet will except for other good reasons, viz. bad conduct or character. The Government also cannot appoint a person whose name does not appear in the list. But it is open to the Government to decide how many appointments will be made. The process for selection and selection for the purpose of recruitment against anticipated vacancies does not create a right to be appointed to the post which can be enforced by a mandamus". The reason for refusing appointment in our case is not that there is no post to be filled in, but for unjustifiable and arbitrary reasons, even though the select list is a valid one and that vacancies for those selected are available. In spite of that, appointment is refused. When such is the position, it cannot be said that the respondents are agitating for the right to be appointed, merely on the ground of their names being in the select list. Here is a case in which (i) the applicants are selected, (ii) vacancies are there and a decision was taken to fill them up, (iii) call letters were issued to the respondents to appear and receive appointment and posting letters, (iv) but at the last moment actual appointment orders are withheld arbitrarily by interpreting a Court order in a way in which no rational person could have interpreted it, viz. that it required scrapping of the whole list. In these circumstances, the decision cited by Mr. Desai can have no application to the present case. ( 8 ) THE decision in the case of Bihar State Construction Corporation and Ors. v. Thakur Munendra Nath Sinha and Ors. , reported in 1988 (Supp) SCC 542, is to the effect that the Court cannot, by a writ of mandamus, direct the party therein to appoint a person on an ad hoc basis as General Manager. ( 8 ) THE decision in the case of Bihar State Construction Corporation and Ors. v. Thakur Munendra Nath Sinha and Ors. , reported in 1988 (Supp) SCC 542, is to the effect that the Court cannot, by a writ of mandamus, direct the party therein to appoint a person on an ad hoc basis as General Manager. As far as the present case is concerned, the appointment order which has to be issue, was withheld arbitrarily, on unjustifiable grounds and the Court, in this case has only directed the appellant to issued that appointment order to the respondents herein. But for the arbitrary action and unjustifiable refusal by the appellant, the respondents who have been correctly put in the select list, would have received the appointment order as per the letter dated 17/03/1987, given by the appellant itself. ( 9 ) IN the decision in the case of the State of Haryana v. Subash Chander marwaha and Ors. , reported in AIR 1973 SC 2216 , the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the right of the person, who has been selected in the competitive examination, to get appointment. The Supreme Court, in that decision, observed :"the competitive examination is for the purpose of showing that a particular candidate is eligible for consideration. Selection for appointment comes later. It is open then to the Government to decide how many appointments shall be made. The mere fact that the candidates name appear in the list does not entitle him to be appointed". In the view we are taking, this decision can have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is, no doubt, true that it is for the authority to decide as to how many vacancies it has to fill in. A person cannot insist for his appointment even though he has been put in the select list. The facts in the present case clearly reveal that the appellant has decided to appoint all the respondents and has arbitrarily, without justifiable grounds, refused to hand over the order of appointment. In such circumstances, the respondents could approach the Court for necessary relief. Hence, this decision also cannot have any application to the facts of the present case. ( 10 ) IN the decision in the case of Jatinder Jumar and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. In such circumstances, the respondents could approach the Court for necessary relief. Hence, this decision also cannot have any application to the facts of the present case. ( 10 ) IN the decision in the case of Jatinder Jumar and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. , reported in AIR 1984 SC 1850 , the Supreme Court has observed :"provisions of Art. 320 are only directory. A person cannot claim as of right that the Government must accept the recommendation of the Commission. If, however, the vacancy is to be filled up, the Government has to make appointment strictly adhering to the order of merit as recommended by the Public Service Commission. It cannot disturb the order of merit according to its own sweet will except for other good reasons, viz. bad conduct or character. The Government also cannot appoint a person whose name does not appear in the list. But it is open to the Government to decide how many appointments will be made. The process for selection and selection for the purpose of recruitment against anticipated vacancies does not create a right to be appointed to the post which can be enforced by a mandamus". This observation of the Supreme Court clearly visualises the method to be followed by the appointing authority if once it decides to fill up the vacancies. It cannot disturb the order of merit. according to its own sweet will except for bad conduct or character. In our case, it is not disturbing the order of merit, but wiping out the whole select list prepared after judging the merit on grounds which are arbitrary and unjustified even though there are vacancies to be filled up and specific letter has been sent to the parties concerned to come and collect the appointment order. Hence, the ratio decidendi in this decision will support the decision of the learned single Judge on the facts and circumstances of the present case. ( 11 ) THE decision in the case of Omprakash K. Sharma v. Deputy Director, ongc, reported in 1986 0 GLT 341, cited by Mr. P. G. Desai refers to the fact that the select list cannot be operated after the prescribed period and that too, after a lapse of 5 or 6 years after the selection. As we have observed already the proposition for which the decisions are cited by Mr. P. G. Desai refers to the fact that the select list cannot be operated after the prescribed period and that too, after a lapse of 5 or 6 years after the selection. As we have observed already the proposition for which the decisions are cited by Mr. P. G. Desai, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, cannot be of any use to the present case on hand since we are dealing with a proposition regarding the arbitrary and unjustified action of the appointing authority in refusing to issue the appointment orders and not the proposition regarding a party agitating certain rights for getting himself appointed in a post. ( 12 ) IT is unnecessary to refer to the decisions in the case of Basant lal Malhotra v. State of Punjab and Ors. , reported in AIR 1969 P. and H. 178, and in the case of State of Mysore v. C. R. Seshadrai and Ors. , reported in AIR 1974 SC 460 , wherein it has been held that it is not the duty of the Court to promote an officer or to appoint him, but it is the duty of the Executive. The Court may issue directions, but it should leave it to the Executive to carry it out. In our case, we are setting aside the arbitrary and unjustifiable action of the appellant by issuing necessary direction. hence, the above said decisions and also the decisions in the case of James Edwin Badshah v. State of Assam and Ors. , reported in AIR 1961 Assam 74 and in the case of Kapildeo Narayan Singh v. State of Bihar and Anr. , reported in AIR 1976 Pat 267 , have no bearing to the facts of the present case. ( 13 ) MR. P. G. Desai also cited decisions in the case of M/s. Chingleput bottlers v. M/s. Mojestic Bottling Co. , reported in AIR 1984 SC 1030 and in the case of Amrit Lal Berry v. Collector of Central Excise Central Revenue and ors. , reported in AIR 1975 SC 538 for the proposition that a writ of mandamus will not lie where there is no legal right for the respondents to agitate for getting appointed as teachers. In (M/s. Chingleput Bottlers case) AIR 1984 SC 1030 (supra) the Supreme Court deprecated the issue of mandamus, directing the government to grant the liquor licence. , reported in AIR 1975 SC 538 for the proposition that a writ of mandamus will not lie where there is no legal right for the respondents to agitate for getting appointed as teachers. In (M/s. Chingleput Bottlers case) AIR 1984 SC 1030 (supra) the Supreme Court deprecated the issue of mandamus, directing the government to grant the liquor licence. It has said that it must be left to the authorities concerned to consider the issue of such licence and it is not for the court to grant the licence. In (Amrit Lal Berrys case) AIR 1975 SC 538 (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed :"in order to succeed in a petition under Art. 32 the petitioner has to disclose how his fundamental right has been infringed by a particular rule or decision or its application". Continuing further, the Supreme Court held :"where a petitioner alleges that he has been denied equality of opportunity for service, during the course of his employment as a Government servant, it is incumbent upon him to disclose not only the rule said to be infringed but also how this opportunity was unjustifiably denied on each particular occasion". Apart from the fact that these two decisions reported in (Amrit Lal Berrys case) air 1975 SC 538 (supra) in a way, supports the conclusion arrived at by the learned single Judge, by stating that opportunity which has been unjustifiably denied by the authority can be a basis for questioning such an arbitrary action before the Court. ( 14 ) MR. P. D. Desai also cited the decisions in the case of B. N. Nagarajan and Ors. v. State of Mysore and Ors. , reported in AIR 1966 SC 1942 , and in the case of Dr. Amarjit Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors. , reported in AIR 1975 SC 984 , for the proposition that the first select list has come to an end and when there is no instruction or rule as to the select list, the authority concerned, by practice and circular, can lapse the select list at a particular time. According to Mr. Desai, in the present case, the appellant has, by advertising the posts in question, lapsed the first select list. According to Mr. Desai, in the present case, the appellant has, by advertising the posts in question, lapsed the first select list. The question involved in this case is not lapsing of the select list and the right of the authorities to do so, but the action of the appellants, which has led to injustice and irreparable loss to the respondents herein. The unjustifiable and arbitrary action of the appellant can be set right by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court by a writ of mandamus, which is always considered to be an effective residuary remedy in India. In the decision in the case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation, reported in 1948 (1) Kings Bench Division 223, the Kings Bench Division has an occasion to consider the grant of licence for Cinematograph performances under the Cinematograph Act, 1909. By sec. I, sub-sec. (1) of the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, an authority having power in any areas to grant licences for cinematograph performances under the cinematograph Act, 1909, is given power to allow a licensed place to be open and used on Sundays, "subject to such conditions as the authority think fit "to impose". In that case, when the local authority granted to the plaintiffs leave for Sunday performances subject to the condition that no children under fifteen years of age should be admitted to Sunday performances with or without an adult, the same was questioned as an act of unreasonable levy of condition. No doubt, in that case, the Kings Bench Division did not accept the contention that such condition imposed in the licence is unreasonable, by observing that it is for the authority concerned to decide what is reasonable or unreasonable that it might almost be described as being done in bad faith. Continuing further, the Kings Bench Division observed :"xxx For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting "unreasonably". Similarly, there may be something so absurid that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting "unreasonably". Similarly, there may be something so absurid that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority. Warrington L. J. in Short v. Poole Corporation (i) gave the example of the red-haired teacher, dismissed because she had red hair. That is unreasonable in one sense. In another sense it is taking into consideration extraneous matters. It is so unreasonable that it ought almost be described as being done in bad faith, and in fact, all these things run into one another". As a proposition of law, the Kings Bench Division further observed :"xxx It is true to say that, if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have came to it, then the Courts can interfere. That, I think, is quite right; xxx"this decision, in our view, squarely applies to the facts of the present case. The rejection of the select list in which the respondents have been put in and coming forward with a fresh advertisement to have another select list bristles with unreasonableness and arbitrariness. It is so unreasonable that it might almost be described as being done in bad faith. Having called the respondents to accept the appointment orders and at the point of handing over the said appointment orders, the authorities have gone back, and issued a fresh advertisement on unreasonable and arbitrary grounds as if the order of the Court directs them to issue a fresh advertisement. The facts discussed by us in paragraph supra clearly establish that there is no such order, directing the appellant to issue a fresh advertisement, by wiping out the respondents from the select list, which they have already prepared. There is absolutely no ground to refuse to issue the appointment orders to the respondents, who are otherwise qualified and the appellant has vacancies to take them in on the basis of the select list prepared as early as March, 1987. Where statutes, rules or bye-laws give power to the authority to be exercised for "sufficient cause", mandamus is the watchdog to see that perversity does not creep into the decision. Where statutes, rules or bye-laws give power to the authority to be exercised for "sufficient cause", mandamus is the watchdog to see that perversity does not creep into the decision. It has to see that the authority did not act dishonestly, arbitrarily, unreasonably, vindictively or capriciously. There must be an independent and bona fide exercise of the mind of the authority in reaching the decision. This principle may also be extended to cases other then infringement of fundamental rights under Art. 226 by appropriate formulation of rules of procedure. In cases where the ends of justice require it, it is most important that the Court must be enabled to call for and look into the relevant government records, and other connected papers. Courts must also be ready to exercise the power when it is necessary to do so. It is not only the legal right that has to be protected, but a legal duty must be enforced by necessary direction. When there is no other remedy open, mandamus can lie to enforce a legal duty. In our view, mandamus is supplementary means of substantial justice in any case where there is no other specific legal remedy for a legal right. In India, the writ of mandamus is the most popular writ, extensively and successfully used by aggrieved persons. De Smith rightly stated :"xxx The exact relationship between certiorari and mandamus remains somewhere indeterminate, and it is probably true to say that as a means of reviewing the exercise of statutory jurisdiction and discretion mandamus retains a greater degree of flexibility. But there is no prospect of seeing the ambit of mandamus enlarged to the point reached in India and in some American State Jurisdiction, where it has become "certiorarified" and has ousted certiorari from its status as the leading administrative law remedy". In the text book entitled "law of Writs", written by V. J. Ramachandran, it is stated as follows :"xxx Since the object of public law is to make functioning of administrative bodies in an efficient manner yielding the best results to the State, society and the individual without undue delay or costs, it is the duty of Courts to hold this process though the instrumentality of writs, more particularly by a writ of mandamus. It is respectfully submitted that the following observations of Baron Martin, J. , lay down correct proposition of law and, therefore, worth quoting :- "instead of being astute to discover reasons for not applying this great constitutional remedy for error and mis-governance, we think it our duty to be vigilant to apply it in every case to which, by any reasonable construction, it can be made applicable". xxx"we are in complete agreement with the above said observations. As we have discussed in paragraph supra, the appellant has arbitrarily and unjustifiably, refused to issue the appointment orders to the respondents herein. ( 15 ) THE last submission of Shri Desai was that since the present respondents had appeared at the subsequent interview held during the pendency of the Special civil Application pursuant to a fresh advertisement published in November, 1988, they had no right to claim appointment on the strength of their earlier selection in March, 1987 coupled with the issuance of the call-letters issued to them. In order to appreciate this contention, the relevant factual background may first be noticed. It appears that the subsequent advertisement in question was published on 5-11-1988 and thereafter, there was an arrangement between the parties that all the six petitioners in the Special Civil Application may appear at this subsequent interview. The order dated 8-12-1988 passed by the learned single judge clearly indicates that the six petitioners had not applied for the post in response to the advertisement dated 5-11-1988. The order, dated 8-12-1988, shows that at the request of the parties the six petitioners were required to be called for interview and the earlier interim relief granted on 19/11/1988 was modified to the effect that the appellant will be at liberty to proceed further with the interview pursuant to the advertisement dated 5/11/1988. It was also directed by the Court, by its order dated 8- 12-1988, that the result of the interview in respect of the petition within seven days from the date of the finalisation of interview. It further appears that out of the six petitioners, who appeared at the subsequent interview, the original petitioner No. 4-Damninben was declared successful while the other five petitioners, i. e. the present five respondents were declared unsuccessful. It further appears that out of the six petitioners, who appeared at the subsequent interview, the original petitioner No. 4-Damninben was declared successful while the other five petitioners, i. e. the present five respondents were declared unsuccessful. The order of the Court dated 14-8-1989 shows that, in these circumstances, the original petitioner No. 4 was allowed to withdraw her petition and the earlier order dated 26-7-1989 directing the appellant to keep six posts vacant was modified to the extent that the appellant was then required to keep only five posts vacant for the remaining petitioners, i. e. the present respondents. The contention of Shri Desai noted above would amount to saying that the petitioners had abandoned the right claimed by them in the Special Civil application, by agreeing to appear and by actually appearing at the interview held during the pendency of the proceedings. It was contended that the remaining petitioners, i. e. the present respondents, wanted to continue the special Civil Application only because they could not succeed at the interview. However, the real question to be considered is whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it can be said that the present respondents had abandoned the right claimed by them in the Special Civil Application. It is impossible to impute any such intention to the respondents. They had not applied for the interview, but it was agreed that they will be called for the interview, the idea being that if they succeed at the interview, the parties will not continue to be embroiled in the litigation (Special Civil Application in question) which might get protracted. It appears that the parties thought that if all the respondents also succeeded at the interview, the petition would be rendered infructuous and both the sides will get extricated from a litigation which might take a long time for its termination. If by appearing at the second interview the respondents wanted to abandon the right claimed by them in the Special Civil Application, they would have withdrawn the Special Civil application. If the present appellant wanted the respondents to abandon the right claimed by them it would have insisted upon the respondents withdrawing the Special Civil Application before it (appellant) agreed to call the respondents at the interview even though they had not applied for the same. If the present appellant wanted the respondents to abandon the right claimed by them it would have insisted upon the respondents withdrawing the Special Civil Application before it (appellant) agreed to call the respondents at the interview even though they had not applied for the same. Even the order of the Court continuing the direction to the appellant to keep five posts still vacant indicates that the arrangement for the respondents to appear at the subsequent interview was obviously without prejudice to the rights claimed and the contentions urged by them in the Special Civil Application. The only right for the vindication of which the respondents had filed the petition was the right to get appointment pursuant to their selection in 1987 coupled with the issuance of the call-letters to them. If that right was intended to be abandoned the petitioner would have withdrawn the petition itself which they did not do. Therefore, for these reasons and for the reasons recorded by the learned single judge in paragraph 8 of the impugned order, we reject even this contention urged by Shri Desai. ( 16 ) IN the light of these facts, the learned single Judge of our High Court has correctly given directions to issue appointment orders to the respondents for the post of Pre-Primary School Teachers, for which the respondents have been selected. ( 17 ) FOR all these reasons, we do not find any ground made out to interfere with the order passed by the learned single Judge of our High Court and accordingly, this Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed. .