JUDGMENT 1. - This is a petition under Section 114, read with Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C., seeking review by Mst. Vaziran, defendant-appellant of judgment & decree dated August 3, 1988 in Civil Second Appeal No. 171/86, which was dismissed. 2. A decree was passed against the appellant-petitioner on January 13, 1984 by Additional Civil Judge, Bharatpur in civil suit No. 372/80. The petitioner applied for certified copy of the judgment & decree on February 1, 1984; the copy was ready on Feb. 3, 1984 but actually was delivered to the petitioner on March 8, 1984 and the appeal was filed before the first appellate court on March 13, 1984. Alongwith the appeal, the petitioner filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal for the following period- (a) February 8, 1984 to March 7, 1984 due to illness-Medical certificate & affidavit to support period of illness were filed; (b) 9th March, 1984 to 12th March, 1984 due to illness-Medical certificate for second time illness was not filed. First appellate court dismissed the petitioner's appeal holding it to be time barred. In second appeal by the petitioner, this Court upheld the finding of the first appellate court for the appeal being time barred. Hence this review petition. 3. Shri B.L. Mandhana, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the review petition is maintainable under Section 114 read with Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. on the grounds that, there is mistake or error apparent on the face of record; and that there is "sufficient reason" to accept the review petition. Learned counsel added that the first appellate court has not held that the petitioner was not ill from February 8. 1984 to March 7, 1984 rather it took note of the fact that Vajiran was suffering from fever and bronchitis for the aforesaid period according to the medical certificate, and then it observed that even assuming that she was ill from 8.2.84 to 8 3.84 then also, she was required to explain the delay for 9.3.84 to 12.3.84. According to the learned counsel, the first appellate court only discussed & considered about alleged illness between 9.3.84 to 12.3.84 (second time illness) and decided the point against the petitioner. According to the learned counsel, the first appellate court only discussed & considered about alleged illness between 9.3.84 to 12.3.84 (second time illness) and decided the point against the petitioner. Taking the aid of the above finding of the first appellate court, learned counsel urged that pertinently appellate court held sufficient cause for period from 8.2.84 to 7.3.84 on account of illness of the petitioner and however, the cause of second time illness (from 9.3.84 to 12.3.84) was not held sufficient. In this regard, learned counsel drew my attention to the following circumstances recorded by this Court in second appeal- "An application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act praying for condoning the delay in filing the appeal was also filed by the appellant No. 1 stating therein that appellant No. 1 was bed ridden because of her illness; and further that, other appellants were attending the appellant No. 1 so they were also unable to file an appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. The first appellate court was of the opinion that if for the sake of arguments, it is admitted that due to illness the appellant No. 1 was not in a position to file appeal but, there was no reason for not filing the appeal by the other appellant Nos. 2, 3 and 4 who are the sons of the appellant No. 1". At this stage, Shri Mandhana urged that from the above observations it is clear that no adverse finding about illness of Mst. Vajiran during 8.2.84 to 7.3.84 was recorded either by the first appellate court or this Court rather it has been held that Mst. Vajiran remained ill in-between 8th February and 7th March, 1984. Taking the aid of such observations, Shri Mandhana vociforcely contended that such observations duly come within the ambit of 'apparent error on the face of record' warranting review. 4. Learned counsel for Smt. Vajiran then argued that Smt. Vajiran cannot be penalised for the negligence of other appellants. Her appeal has been dismissed by this Court and first appellate court merely on the ground that her sons (appellant Nos. 4. Learned counsel for Smt. Vajiran then argued that Smt. Vajiran cannot be penalised for the negligence of other appellants. Her appeal has been dismissed by this Court and first appellate court merely on the ground that her sons (appellant Nos. 2, 3 & 4) have not explained as to why did they fail to file the appeal within stipulated period of limitation Learned counsel in this regard cited the following decisions reported in AIR 1965 SC 1305; AIR 1950 PC 28 ; AIR 1976 Raj 249 ; AIR 1972 Raj 176 ; and AIR 1950 PC 128(c). Relying upon the aforesaid citations, learned counsel urged that this Court fell in error in dismissing the appeal of Smt. Vajiran and the appeal of Smt. Vajiran was maintainable and cannot be held to be beyond time. The first appellate court was of the opinion that if for the sake of argument it is admitted that due to illness, appellant No. 1 was not in a position to file the appeal but there was no reason to file by other appellants who are sons of the appellant No. 1 (Smt. Vajiran-petitioner herein), and similar observations have been adopted by this Court while dismissing the second appeal as would be evident from a perusal of the judgment of this Court in second appeal wherein it was observed as under:- "......in my opinion, the first appellate court was justified in observing that there is nothing on record to show absolutely as to why the appeal was not preferred by the appellant Nos. 2, 3 & 4 within prescribed period of limitation." Therefore, learned counsel argued that Smt. Vajiran has been punished for the mistake of other appellants in view of the observations but, this Court totally ignored to consider that when Mst. Vajiran had a right to file an appeal on her own behalf then how her appeal being within limitation could be thrown because co-appellants are held to have failed to show their sufficient cause for condonation of delay and this is an apparent error on the face of record. 5. Having considered the arguments of the parties, I may reiterate that Smt. Vajiran had admittedly filed medical certificates in order to support her plea of her illness during 8-2-84 to 7-3-84 and that apart, an affidavit was also filed by her for her illness (second time) from 9-3-84 to 17-3-84. 5. Having considered the arguments of the parties, I may reiterate that Smt. Vajiran had admittedly filed medical certificates in order to support her plea of her illness during 8-2-84 to 7-3-84 and that apart, an affidavit was also filed by her for her illness (second time) from 9-3-84 to 17-3-84. There is no reason to disbelieve the medical certificates inasmuch as the first appellate court obviously nowhere in its judgment rejected the medical certificate or disbelieved them because apparently these medical certificates could not have at all been controverted by the respondents. Viewed this, I have no option but to hold that there was sufficient cause for Smt. Vajiran being unable to file her appeal after 7-3-84 from 8-2-84 and for the delay caused on account of her illness which is duly supported by her certificate, for the period from 8-2-84 to 7-3-84 it deserves to be condoned having found sufficient cause which could not be taken into consideration erringly. As regards the alleged delay for three days 9-3-84 to 12-3-84 there was sufficient cause as has been rightly contended by the learned counsel because, the appeal was filed on 13-3-84 and the impugned judgment was dated 13-1-1984. Thus, the appeal was filed after 58 days and it was to be filed taking benefit of grace period taken in obtaining certified copy of the impugned judgment (i.e. three days) within 33 days (30 days stipulated period for filing appeal), and as held above, the period commencing from 8-2-84 to 7-3-84 (28 days) was condoned and therefore, in all Smt. Vajiran was allowed 61 days period to file the appeal (33 days stipulated period and 28 days condoned period) whereas it was filed on 13-3-84, i.e. fifty-ninth day from 13-1-84. Having benefited by the enlightments stated above, in my view, her appeal was and can easily be held to have been filed within limitation taking the benefit of condoned period. And, taking an over-all conspectus of the matter, I am of the opinion that it was an error apparent on the very face of record while holding that since Mst. Vajiran was bed-ridden from 8-2-84 to 7-3-84 her appeal albeit within limitation was time barred on the ground that co-appellants who were sons of Smt. Vajiran (appellant No. 1) failed to show as to why they could not have filed appeal within stipulated period of limitation. Vajiran was bed-ridden from 8-2-84 to 7-3-84 her appeal albeit within limitation was time barred on the ground that co-appellants who were sons of Smt. Vajiran (appellant No. 1) failed to show as to why they could not have filed appeal within stipulated period of limitation. Moreover, Order 41, Rule 4, C.P.C. was not taken into consideration by this Court when it decided the second appeal. Order 41, Rule 4 CPC lays down that even one of the appellants/defendants in her own right may appeal from the decree without joining other defendants as co-appellants. And, the appeal is maintainable at the instance of even one appellant because the decree proceeds on a ground common to all the defendants, as has been observed in the above cited decisions. It is thus clear that when the appeal was dismissed by this Court the principle laid down by the Apex Court were not taken into consideration nor were they referred to by either of the parties. 6. Contrarily, learned counsel for the respondents contended that this Court has given a considered finding that the first appellate court was justified in holding that the appellant No. 1 was negligent in obtaining the certified copy of the judgment & decree of the trial Court. According to Shri Garg, the aforesaid finding is correct and cannot be assailed on any grounds whatsoever assuming even if to be erroneous and this cannot be and is no ground for review. To fortify his contention, learned counsel cited AIR 1957 Nagpur 97, wherein it has been observed as under:- "It does not appear that the review of a judgment which proceeds upon an incorrect exposition of law is covered by any of the clause in Order 47 Rule 1. That a decision is erroneous in law is therefore no ground for ordering review." I, with due respect, disagree with the above observations keeping in view the peculiar circumstances of the case referred to above and because, no case shall be decided against the view taken by the Apex Court as I have already discussed and observed that the view taken by this Court was against the principles laid down by the Apex Court and there is no bar in following the view taken by the Apex Court by way of review. 7. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents also added that the appeal was by four persons against whom the decree was passed. The appeal is required to be accompanied by certified copy and is to be filed within 30 days and when admittedly the appeal in question was filed beyond 30 days after allowing the time taken in obtaining certified copy and that. Smt. Vajiran has been claiming condonation of delay from 8-2-84 to 7-3-84 because of her illness and even if this period is excluded from computation of limitation period, the appeal should have been filed on 8-3-84 when the copy was obtained and in any case on 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th March, 1984, atleast, but, there is no explanation for delay caused in filing the appeal on 13-3-1984. Learned counsel then argued that if the case is considered from another angle, the appeal was barred by limitation, and in case of such a finding in respect of sufficient cause for condonation of delay it is a finding of fact and could not be challenged in second appeal and muchless now in review. According to the learned counsel, Order 41 Rule 4, CPC is not applicable to the instant matter as the appeal has been filed by all the appellants and Rule 4 applies only when one of judgment debtors appeal and others do not. Keeping in view the principles laid down by the Apex Court, referred to above, in addition to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, taken note of above, in my considered view, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is bizzare and barren of force and the citations made by him help in no way. 8. It is settled law that a review may be granted whenever the Court considers that it is necessary to correct an evident error or omission and it is immaterial how the error or omission occurred. Since I have found an error on a point of law, e.g. failure to apply the law of limitation to the facts found by the Court and failure to consider a significant aspect of the matter which I have noted above, I have no option but to review my earlier judgment, so far as the present appellant-petitioner Smt. Vajiran is concerned. 9. 9. In the result, this review petition is allowed; judgment & decree dated 3-8-88 in civil second appeal No. 171/86 so far as it relates to the appeal of Smt. Vajiran, is re-called; and for the reasons stated in earlier part of this order, I hold that appeal of Smt. Vajiran before the first appellate court was within limitation and the delay caused in filing her appeal is condoned because, the appeal of Smt. Vajiran was wrongly rejected as barred by limitation without applying the law of limitation to the facts found proved by the Court and without assigning or recording any finding on the question arose and to that extent, the judgment & decree passed by the first appellate court dated 7-8-86 in civil appeal No. 31/84 (30/84) (ADJ No. 1, Bharatpur) are set aside; and as a legal and logical corollary to it, since the first appeal was dismissed on technical ground and not on merits, learned first appellate court is directed to decide appeal of Smt. Vajiran treating it within limitation as held above, on merits after hearing both the parties, without any delay and giving expeditious hearing keeping in view eviction matter, but not later than six months. Both the parties are directed to appear on October 15, 1990 before the first appellate court.No order as to costs.Review Allowed. *******