JUDGMENT M. P. CHANDRAKANTARAJ URS, J. - These sales tax revision petitions are by the assessee, M/s. Shanthi Industries, No. 10, Pampamahakavi Road, Shankarapuram, Bangalore 4. The assessee was aggrieved by the order dated March 28, 1981, passed by the Commercial Tax Officer, I Circle, Bangalore, in purported exercise of his power under section 12-B (2) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957, pertaining to the assessment year 1977-78. 2. The petitioner-assessee, a registered dealer under the Act, was required to furnish monthly returns and pay advance tax thereon in the relevant assessment year but the same was filed long after it was due and taxes due thereon had not been paid. In the result no tax was paid for the period of 12 months covered under the relevant assessment year. The advance tax payable on monthly turnover was Rs. 31,863.58 for the assessment year 1977-78. In the result, the maximum penalty provided at 1(1/2) times the tax not paid in time was worked out to Rs. 47,795 and a penalty of Rs. 47,795 was proposed to be levied and show cause notice in that behalf was issued on September 28, 1979. The assessee in reply to the show cause notice, on October 6, 1979, filed his objection stating that its sales in favour of M/s. Kirloskar & Co. and others were on credit basis and that it would be in a position to pay only after the money was received from its purchasers (debtors). It further stated that it was operating overdraft in Syndicate Bank and in order to improve its business it had invariably reached the permitted limit and therefore it claimed that there was delay in payment of tax. 3. Similar were the facts in the case of the petitioner in respect of the assessment year 1978-79. The proposition notice proposed to levy a penalty of Rs. 21,162 in accordance with the prescription under section 12-B (2) of the Act. The explanation offered for non-payment of tax and non-filing of returns in time was not exactly identical for the succeeding assessment year as in the case of the assessment year 1977-78, in that the Commercial Tax Officer had taken steps to recover part of the taxes due by resorting to procedure prescribed under section 14 of the Act. The explanation offered for non-payment of tax and non-filing of returns in time was not exactly identical for the succeeding assessment year as in the case of the assessment year 1977-78, in that the Commercial Tax Officer had taken steps to recover part of the taxes due by resorting to procedure prescribed under section 14 of the Act. The petitioner-assessee therefore brought that to the notice of the Commercial Tax Officer and in his reply to the show cause notice had prayed for further time to pay the amount of tax which had not been recovered under section 14 of the Act. It was in the light of those explanations that the two orders, as earlier noticed dated March 28, 1981 and April 29, 1981, for the years 1977-78 and 1978-79, respectively, came to be passed under section 12-B (2) of the Act by the Commercial Tax Officer. Aggrieved by the said orders the petitioner preferred appeals to the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Tax (Appeals), Bangalore City Division, Bangalore. 4. The two appeals presented in Appeals Nos. 59 and 104 of 1981-82. By a common order dated August 3, 1981, the appellate authority, partially allowed the appeal reducing the penalty for the assessment year 1978-79 to a sum of Rs. 6,211 while confirming the order of penalty imposed in the sum of Rs. 31,861.58 for the assessment year 1977-78. Therefore in view of the failure to get the relief prayed for in the appeals the petitioner presented Sales Tax Appeals Nos. 973 and 974 of 1981 before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal"). 5. The Tribunal by its order dated November 19, 1984 (common order) disposed of the two appeals dismissing the appeals. Therefore the present two sales tax revision petitions under section 23 of the Act in this Court, inter alia, raising the following question of law : "(i) Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in confirming the impugned penalty levied under section 12-B (3) of the Act whether the penalty so levied is valid and sustainable in law ? (ii) Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that there was a clear contravention of section 12-B (1) of the Act warranting the levy of penalty ? (ii) Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that there was a clear contravention of section 12-B (1) of the Act warranting the levy of penalty ? (iii) Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in confirming the penalty quantified at 36 per cent. per annum of the tax amounts ? (iv) Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned orders are valid and sustainable in law ?" 6. At the outset we may say that question Nos. (ii), (iii) and (iv) do not rise for consideration on the admitted facts, inasmuch as there was no dispute that requirement of sub-section (1) of section 12-B was complied with by the petitioner-assessee. What really falls for consideration is question No. (i) but in a slightly different form, i.e., whether the assessing authority in the first instance and thereafter the Tribunal has applied its mind in exercising its discretionary power under section 12-B (3) of the Act before imposing the penalty subject to the maximum prescribed in the provision itself, namely sub-section (3) of section 12-B. 7. Mr. Indra Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, before us strenuously contended that once the petitioner pleaded certain hardships then there was a case in which the assessing authority should have taken notice of the hardship pleaded and absolved the assessee-petitioner of the burden of paying penalty prescribed by sub-section (3) of section 12-B of the Act. He specially drew our attention to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in Elestone Estates and Industries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [1983] 54 STC 341 wherein this Court observed that the power conferred by section 12-B (3) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act was penal in nature and the authority should exercise the power judicially and on a consideration of all the circumstances. It further held that in each case the authority must first examine after reasonable opportunity to the party whether there was good or sufficient cause for the default committed and if not whether the party had acted in conscious disregard of his obligation and acted deliberately in defiance of law. It was only when the party was guilty and had acted deliberately in defiance of law the penalty levied could be justified and not otherwise. It was only when the party was guilty and had acted deliberately in defiance of law the penalty levied could be justified and not otherwise. In the case of Elestone Estates and Industries Ltd. [1983] 54 STC 341 the Division Bench followed the earlier decision of this Court to which we also make a reference shortly. The assessing authority had not disclosed the reasons for levying penalty either in its order or in the show cause notice. It was in that circumstances this Court made the observation in regard to the scope and ambit of power under section 12-B (3) of the Act which we have summarised above. In other words this Court was satisfied that there was an error of law committed inasmuch as there was no application of mind to the cause shown which always should be implicit in the order where law imposed a duty coupled with discretion on the authority. It is now well-settled, where no reasons are disclosed for exercising the discretion one way or the other then that cannot be supplied later by any other means. Thus the order which is not a speaking order will be an order patently illegal and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of this Court under section 23 of the Act. 8. However, Mr. Indra Kumar, laid stress on the decision of this Court in Haji S. Mohammed Ghouse v. State of Karnataka [1982] 49 STC 154. It suffices for us to state that in the said this Court considered four of the reasons furnished by the petitioner therein as constituting sufficient cause on the facts of that case. Those four reasons were as follows : "(1) The appellant had not collected any tax on the sales of cotton waste. (2) During the earlier years, the turnover of cotton waste was not liable to tax and it was by virtue of an amendment to the Act, the liability arose and the appellant was not aware of the said liability. (3) The appellant was purchasing cotton waste locally and also from other State and all of them were mixed up. (2) During the earlier years, the turnover of cotton waste was not liable to tax and it was by virtue of an amendment to the Act, the liability arose and the appellant was not aware of the said liability. (3) The appellant was purchasing cotton waste locally and also from other State and all of them were mixed up. (4) The appellant was in a grant financial difficulty as he was to pay huge compensation to the workers who were retrenched from service and goods have been sold on credit basis and the amount had not been realised the particulars of which were furnished before the appellate authority." It was specially on the last of the causes shown in that case that Mr. Indra Kumar laid stress before us. He pointed out that in this case also the assessee-petitioner was hard-pressed for money as his debtors, namely, M/s. Kirloskar & Co. had not paid for the purchases made for the products of the assessee-petitioner and therefore it was in difficulty and as such could not comply with requirements of sub-section (1) of section 12-B of the Act. The significant difference in facts we notice is that the cumulative effect of the explanation given which was taken into consideration by this Court and the order made by the authorities below found fault with for not considering much of those causes in their proper perspective to levy or not to levy penalty. It so happened in that case that the assessing authority had levied certain amount of penalty where the first appellate authority reduced the penalty which was interfered with by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in exercise of power under section 22-A of the Act. It was that interference of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes which was found fault with by the Court, inter alia, on the ground that there was deemed application on mind by the first appellate authority which was not open to the revisional jurisdiction to interfere with that order having regard to the reasons furnished by the assessing authority. 9. Our attention was drawn to the case of Manilal Monaji Somayya v. Commercial Tax Officer, decided by a Division Bench of this Court and reported in [1973] 32 STC 541. 9. Our attention was drawn to the case of Manilal Monaji Somayya v. Commercial Tax Officer, decided by a Division Bench of this Court and reported in [1973] 32 STC 541. In the said case the late Chief Justice Govind Bhat speaking for the Bench stated that the Act provided for imposition of penalty for failure to pay every month the advance tax on the dealer's taxable turnover for the preceding month. But the liability to pay penalty did not arise merely upon proof of default in payment of tax in advance every month. As observed by the Supreme Court in Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1970] 25 STC 211 "an order imposing penalty for failure to carry out a statutory obligation was the result of a quasi-criminal proceeding, and penalty would not ordinarily be imposed unless the party obliged either acted deliberately in defiance of law or was guilty of conduct contumacious or dishonest, or acted in conscious disregard of its obligation ..." That principle in fact has been re-enunciated by this Court in the case of Elestone Estates and Industries Ltd. [1983] 54 STC 341. We certainly cannot have any quarrel with the decisions. Nevertheless, in this regard we should not lose sight of the fact that the Supreme Court in Coffee Board v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer [1970] 25 STC 528; AIR 1971 SC 870 stated that the facts must always play their due part and that each case should depend on its own facts. It was not possible to lay down all tests for all cases but it was always possible to lay down some tests which would be applied to all cases. Therefore, when an authority is required to exercise a discretionary power coupled with a duty, certainly he should have due regard to the facts of the case with which he is dealing. One cannot simply brush aside all explanations offered in regard to the alleged breach of law inviting the penalty merely because the authority has the power to impose such penalty. There must be implicit evidence in the process of imposition of penalty that all materials relevant to the exercise of discretion which was before the authority was indeed considered by it before penalty came to be imposed. There must be implicit evidence in the process of imposition of penalty that all materials relevant to the exercise of discretion which was before the authority was indeed considered by it before penalty came to be imposed. If that is the test accepted universally in all common law countries in regard to the exercise of a discretionary power then one cannot find fault with the Commercial Tax Officer in the instant cause. But for the assessment year 1977-78 he imposed a penalty of Rs. 21,162 which was affirmed by the subsequent appellate authority but it was only in the case of succeeding assessment year the appellate authority reduced the sum to Rs. 6,211 having regard to the fact that in that year by steps taken under section 14 of the Act most of the tax due had been recovered from M/s. Kirloskar & Co., which factor was absent in the earlier assessment year. But nevertheless on the facts disclosed in the case, admittedly, we find that for the assessment year 1977-78 the explanation offered was rejected without inviting the assessee to substantiate the cause shown by him in order to test whether he had defaulted in not paying the advance of tax and whether it was a wilful default or not. Normally, a person who pleads cause must support the same by adequate material placed and if by ignorance or otherwise he had failed to do it, the authority must, in order to see that the rules of natural justice were observed, invite material and only on failure to produce the material or on such material being produced and not being satisfied with the material and for reason of not being so satisfied it may proceed to levy the penalty and not otherwise. 10. We therefore, in the light of the observation made above, are of the opinion that the Revision Petition No. 8 of 1985 deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, we set aside the order of the Tribunal, first appellate authority and the assessing authority passed under section 12-B (3) of the Act and remit the matter to the assessing authority to give further opportunity to the assessee-petitioner to produce material in support of his contention that his disability to pay was on account of the money held up by his purchasers on the credit transactions entered into by the assessee. It is only on such further opportunity being given and if any material is produced, such material be considered and thereafter authority may proceed to exercise its discretionary power under section 12-B (3) of the Act. 11. Before parting with this case we caution that this Court's jurisdiction under section 23 lies within a very narrow compass. We can only interfere and correct erroneous orders involving only pure questions of law and we will not entertain revision petitions which relate to finding of facts recorded by the authorities below unless such finding of facts are perverse and therefore will give rise to jurisdictional question of law. 12. So far as S.T.R.P. No. 9 of 1985 is concerned we think the appellate authority has given the relief which in our opinion should enure to the benefit of Revenue and therefore we dismiss that petition. 13. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. Petition No. 8 of 1985 allowed. Petition No. 9 of 1985 dismissed.