JUDGMENT 1. - The facts giving rise to this appeal narrate a sad story of two gentlemen who were strangers but became so close relations in June 1977 that the daughter of the appellant became daughter-in-law of the respondent and the son of the latter became the son-in-law of the former but the fate has brought them to court to face each other to cross swords over a dispute relating to the guardianship of the minor who is very dear to both of them and who has been deprived of the love and affection of her parents by the cruel hands of death. The facts are as under:- Santosh the late son of the respondent (Ramdas Deolia) married Sudha the late daughter of the appellant (Jagdish Chandra Lathe) on 21.6.1977. At the time of marriage Santosh was posted as Assistant Director of Horticulture at Etanagar (Arunchal Pradesh) and after the marriage Santosh and Sudha lived together and cohabited as husband and wife at the place of posting of Santosh. A daughter of the wedlock "Vandana" (the minor) was born at Etanagar on 21.7.1978. The minor was deprived of the love and affection of her mother on 7.8.1978 when Sudha died at Etanagar. Santosh's mother (Smt. Champa Devi A.W. 5) who herself was then employed as a teacher in Delhi lived with him at Etanagar for some time and looked after him and the minor. After the expiry of her leave period she returned to Delhi and Santosh employed an "Aya" to look after the minor. Taking into consideration the fact that the minor who was the daughter of his deceased daughter the appellant agreed to the proposal of Santosh that Sudha's sister Asha should marry him and consequently Asha married Santosh on 18.6.1979. Asha and Santosh lived at Etanagar and the minor lived with them. The cruel hand of death however took away Santosh from this world on 29.10.1979 and thus the minor lost her natural father as well. Asha accompanied by her mother-in-law Smt. Champa Devi (A.W. 5) left for Ajmer on 5.11.1979 and lived at Ajmer till 12.11.1979 in the house of the respondent. She however left the house of the respondent and went to her father's house in Muradabad in the State of Uttar Pradesh and according to the allegations made during pendency of the case because she was turned out of the house of the respondent. She however left the house of the respondent and went to her father's house in Muradabad in the State of Uttar Pradesh and according to the allegations made during pendency of the case because she was turned out of the house of the respondent. 2. On 17.11.1979 the respondent with whom the minor was living at Ajmer filed a petition under section 8 of the Guardian and Wards Act (the Act) praying that he be appointed as the guardian of the person and property of the minor. It was stated that the father of the minor had left behind the estate in the form of Pension Gratuity Provident fund Bank account Life Insurance policy etc. and that the minor her step mother (Asha) and her grand mother (Champa Devi) were the only natural heirs of Santosh and that the share of the minor in the said estate would be about Rs. 15,000/-. Notice was given to the other relations of the minor including her step-mother (Asha). The petition was contested by Asha who denied the right of the petitioner- respondent for being appointed as the guardian of the person and property of the minor and claimed the right to be appointed as such. The dispute between the respondent and Asha had not been decided till Asha got re-married and stopped taking part in the litigation and an objection petition was filed by the appellant on 15.9.1988 contesting the claim of the respondent and claiming to be entitled to be appointed as guardian of the person and property of the minor. The learned trial Court recorded the evidence produced by the parties and also recorded the statement of the minor to find out her views in the matter and after hearing the learned counsel for the parties vide the impugned order dated 25.3.1989 held that the appellant as well as the respondent are financially sound enough to bring up the minor and each one of them is a fit person to be appointed as the guardian of the minor but taking into consideration the fact that the minor has been living with her grand-mother and has been receiving education and has also expressed her desire to live with her grand parents considered it appropriate to appoint the respondent as the guardian of the person and property of the minor. As during the trial it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the respondent might give in adoption the minor to his sister the learned trial court has in the impugned order restrained the respondent from doing so and has also directed him to maintain the estate received by way of share of the minor besides maintaining the gifts given to her by her maternal grand-father (the appellant) and to give all these articles to her on attaining the age of 21 years or on getting married and to execute a bond in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- undertaking to do so for getting the certificate of guardian- ship. Feeling dissatisfied with the impugned order the appellant has filed this appeal under section 19 of the Family Courts Act. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record of the case. 4. The first point raised by Shri Joshi the learned counsel for the appellant is that the application under section 8 of the Act moved by the respondent was not in accordance with clause (3) of Section 10 of the Act in as much as the declaration signed by the respondent at the foot of the application had not been attested by two witnesses and that as such the appeal should be accepted and the petition should be dismissed on this short ground. Reliance has been placed on the decision of Calcutta High Court in (1) Rabindra Nath Mukherjee Vs. Abinash Chandra Chatterjee (AIR 1972 Calcutta page 143) . The record does support the contention that the declaration signed by the respondent has not been attested by two witnesses but only one witness appears to have attested it. The record further shows that no such objection was taken at any stage in the learned trial court where the case proceeded without any such objection and the respondent also appeared in the witness box to support his case mentioned in the application under section 8 of the Act. Sections 10 and 11 of the Act are procedural in nature and section 11 provides that if an application is made by an applicant and the court is satisfied that there is ground for proceeding on the application it shall fix a day for the hearing thereof and cause notice of application and of the date fixed for the hearing. Sections 10 and 11 of the Act are procedural in nature and section 11 provides that if an application is made by an applicant and the court is satisfied that there is ground for proceeding on the application it shall fix a day for the hearing thereof and cause notice of application and of the date fixed for the hearing. If an objection had been taken during the pendency of the proceedings in the learned trial court the respondent could have removed the defect with the permission of the court. The respondent admittedly appeared in the court to support his application and the contents mentioned therein. In these circumstances the appellant cannot be allowed to contend before this Court for the first time that the application being defective in form it ought to be rejected. Our view finds support from the decision of the Calcutta High Court in case (2) Satyendra Nath Maitra and another Vs. Palaram Chakroborty (AIR 1981 Calcutta page 206) in which case also the authority relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant was considered. The first contention of Shri Joshi therefore cannot be accepted. 5. The father of the minor being not alive in appointing the guardian of the minor the welfare of the minor has to be the paramount consideration. As provided in section 17 of the Act in considering what will be for the welfare of the minor the court shall have regard to the age,sex and religion of the minor the character and capacity of the proposed guardian and his nearness of kin to the minor and if the minor is old enough to form an intelligent preference to consider that preference. It has been contended by Shri Joshi that the respondent is not a fit person to be appointed as the guardian of the minor as he had sold away the imported car and one scooter left behind by the father of the minor and had not accounted for the sale proceeds thereof. Neither this case was suggested to the respondent when he appeared in the witness box as A.W. 6 nor was any evidence produced to prove the same. Neither this case was suggested to the respondent when he appeared in the witness box as A.W. 6 nor was any evidence produced to prove the same. Champa Devi appearing as A.W. 5 has of course admitted that her son had left behind one scooter but it was nowhere suggested to her that the scooter had been sold away and the sale proceeds had been misappropriated by the respondent or any of his family members. In these circumstances we are unable to find any force in this argument of Shri Joshi. 6. It has next been contended by Shri Joshi that the father of the minor had more confidence in the appellant and as such it should be taken that it was his desire that the appellant should act as her guardian. We have gone through the letters produced on record but find that nothing of that kind can be seen from the said letters. Much stress has been laid on letter proved on record as Ex. A.3 and written by Santosh (deceased) to the appellant. From this letter (which bears no date) it appears that before her marriage Smt. Sudha had taken a Life Insurance policy at Muradabad and was employed in a college at that place and Provident Fund dues besides insurance money was to be collected after her death. This letter further shows that Santosh had written to the appellant stating that he was not interested in the money to be received from the college or from the Insurance Policy of Sudha and the appellant could collect the same and spend it in any way he liked and that he would sign and send to the appellant all necessary documents to enable the appellant to do so. The letter further shows that at the time it was written Champa Devi was living with him at Etanagar and was expected to go to Delhi/Ajmer in December (1979) and Santosh was arranging to employ an elderly 'Aya' who would go with his mother and the minor to Delhi/Ajmer and when he would come on leave in January (1980) he would bring her back to Etanagar and when he would visit Muradabad he would take the minor there to seek blessings of the appellant. Dues against the Life Insurance policy and from the college of Sudha in Muradabad were recoverable at Muradabad and the appellant being an Advocate by profession there was nothing strange if the father of the minor had asked him to collect the said dues. It further shows that the father of the minor was not interested in the dues and had stated that the appellant was free to utilise the money received as the estate of Sudha in any way he liked. We cannot read this letter to show that Santosh did not have confidence in the respondent or had any wish of leaving the minor with the appellant. No other document has been pointed out to us which conveys any wish of the deceased that the appellant should act as the guardian of the minor. 7. As noted above the minor was examined by the learned trial court and she expressed her desire to live with her grand parents with whom she had been living since beginning and had specifically stated that she did not want to live in the house of her maternal grand-parents. The findings of the learned trial court that the minor was intelligent enough to form the preference has not been challenged before us. It is not disputed before us that the minor has been living with her grand mother Smt. Champa Devi in Delhi since 1982 and has been studying in a public school and there is no evidence to rebut the statements made by the respondent and his wife Champa Devi that they are looking after the minor nicely. The appellant had specifically stated before the learned trial court that he was not interested for being appointed as guardian of the property of the minor but was only interested in being appointed as the guardian of the person of the minor. The wife of the appellant is admittedly not alive and according to the appellant he would educate the minor by keeping her in a hostel. The wife of the appellant is admittedly not alive and according to the appellant he would educate the minor by keeping her in a hostel. Although it cannot be disputed that it is out of the love for the only child of her deceased daughter Sudha that the appellant wants to have the minor with him and to act as guardian of her person but the fact cannot be lost sight of that the appellant would not be able to give homely atmosphere to the minor and if the minor is separated from her paternal grand parents it would have adverse effect on her mind and it would disturb the development of her personality. In our view the learned trial court while appointing the respondent as the guardian has taken into consideration all these matters and has rightly come to the conclusion that it is proper to appoint the respondent as the guardian of the person and property of the minor and has also imposed necessary restrictions specified above in the impugned order and no interference is called for. 8. No other point has been raised before us. 9. In view of our above discussion the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case however we leave the parties to bear their own costs.Appeal dismissed. *******