P. J. Sundararajan v. The Deputy General Manager, Unit Trust Of India
1990-01-17
S.T.RAMALINGAM
body1990
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER S.T. Ramalingam, J. 1. P.J. Sundararajan is the petitioner in the earlier Writ Petition No. 8711 of 1989 as also in W.M.P. No. 12477 of 1989. Dasaseelan is the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 8850 of 1990 as also in W.M.P. No. 12690 of 1989. 2. W.M.P. No. 16023 of 1989 is to vacate the interim injunction obtained by Dasaseelan in W.M.P. No. 12690 of 1989 and W.M.P. No. 12064 of 1989 is to vacate the interim injunction obtained by P.J. Sundararajan in W.M.P. No. 12477 of 1989. 3. Certain basic facts, which are not in dispute, may first be stated. P.J. Sundararajan and Dasaseelan, the respective writ petitioners in W.P. No. 8711 of 1989 and 8850 of 1989 are the Assistants in the Unit Trust of India, Madras Branch. The 1st respondent is the Deputy General Manager of the Unit Trust of India, Madras Regional Office. The 2nd respondent in both the petitions is the Enquiry Officer for the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the said P.J. Sundararajan and Dasaseelan. 4. Chargesheet was laid on 11.5.1989 against the respective writ petitioners for offences punishable under Sections 120-B read with Sections 381, 467 and 469 of the Indian Penal Code, in that the respective writ petitioners along with the approver one Kalaimamani, a peon were parties to a criminal conspiracy at about 21-15 hours on 72.1989 having agreed to do or cause to be done illegal acts to wit, to commit theft of the cover containing the spoilt and skipped blank cheque forms and other records from the ULIP section of the Unit Trust of India, Madras Office, to forge the blank cheques by inserting names and addresses of very important persons and others with imaginary amounts and to despatch them to the said addressees intending to harm the reputation of the individuals concerned as well as the Unit Trust of India, and carried out the conspiracy by committing theft of the cloth-lined cover containing a bunch of spoilt and skipped blank cheque forms from claims section and other records from ULTP section and in that process committed the various offences as mentioned above. 5. This charge sheet has been filed in pursuance of a complaint filed by the 1st respondent on 25.2.1989 before the Inspector General of Police (Crimes), Madras.
5. This charge sheet has been filed in pursuance of a complaint filed by the 1st respondent on 25.2.1989 before the Inspector General of Police (Crimes), Madras. The complaint was that a pocket of unused instruments (Dividend Warrants) has been stolen by an unscrupulous person with intent to use those instruments by forgery if possible for wrongful gain or with a view to cause some criminal acts to tarnish the image of the Unit Trust of India. The 1st respondent has not mentioned the name of any person in the complaint. The complaint was the result of letters written by Mr. V.P. Singh (now the Prime Minister of India) as well as Mr. S.B. Chavan, both of whom have returned to the Unit Trust of India, Madras Office, the dividend warrants which did not relate to them. In the course of investigation conducted by the police every member of the staff of the Madras office was enquired. The "Unit Trust of India Employees" Association, Madras Branch, at its extraordinary General Body meeting held on 27.2.1989 passed a resolution in that every member of the Union should render all his help in the matter of investigation into the complaint. P.J. Sundararajan is the secretary of the Union, and he arranged for and participated at the meeting. Dasaseelan is the Vice President of the Union. In pursuance of the chargesheet laid, the respective writ petitioners received summons to appear before court. As such they appeared on 9.6.1989 and the case was adjourned to 23.6.1989. 6. Meanwhile, the petitioners received a notice dated 27.5.1989 from the 1st respondent alleging that the petitioners have committed misconduct and are liable to be proceeded against under the Service Rules of the Unit Trust of India. The following charges have been framed against the writ petitioners, in the departmental enquiry. a) Committing fraud on the Trust by theft and criminal and fraudulent use of the office cheques and other documents; b) Resorting to unauthorised destruction of pilfered office records; c) Committing acts involving gross moral turpitude. The 2nd respondent was appointed as the Enquiry Officer, the enquiry was a proposed to be held on 22.6.1989. The petitioners asked for copies of documents and list of witnesses to be relied upon against them. Copies of documents were furnished to them on the same day, and the case was adjourned.
The 2nd respondent was appointed as the Enquiry Officer, the enquiry was a proposed to be held on 22.6.1989. The petitioners asked for copies of documents and list of witnesses to be relied upon against them. Copies of documents were furnished to them on the same day, and the case was adjourned. Among the list of witnesses Kalaimamani, the approver was the first witness and two other names were also mentioned as witnesses. The other witnesses are for proving the alleged acts, which were alleged to have taken place subsequent to the main occurrence, viz., theft and wrongful use of the dividend warrants. 7. The chargesheet laid by the Police and the documents furnished in the criminal proceedings and also the charges framed and the documents given in the disciplinary proceedings disclose the following: a) that theft of valuable security of the Unit Trust of India has been committed by Kalaimamani, peon; b) that on such theft, the articles of theft were brought to the writ petitioners, and that all the three (writ petitioners, and the approver) conspired to commit further acts of forgery; c) that on such conspiracy, the pre-signed dividend warrants were filled up and despatched to the persons named in the complaint; and d) that the records so pilfered were destroyed by all the three. 8. Before the disciplinary authority, a letter dated 10.4.1989 alleged to have been written by the approver is sought to be used against the writ petitioners. The statement contained in the letter dated 10.4.1989 is in substance the same statement which is said to have been made before the Magistrate under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but elaborated in greater details. The other documents and other witnesses relate only to matter relating to circumstantial evidence. 9. According to the writ petitioners, the criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings initiated against them are grounded upon the same set of facts viz., theft of records of the Unit Trust of India and use thereof on a particular day and thereafter destruction of the unused records. The witnesses in this respect are the same in both the proceedings. In such circumstances, it is not legal nor proper to have parallel proceedings at the same time. The disciplinary proceedings are held in the closed hall of the office room. The legal assistance at the time of the enquiry is not available.
The witnesses in this respect are the same in both the proceedings. In such circumstances, it is not legal nor proper to have parallel proceedings at the same time. The disciplinary proceedings are held in the closed hall of the office room. The legal assistance at the time of the enquiry is not available. Proceedings before the court are held according to law in open court hall with full assistance. In those circumstances, if the disciplinary proceedings were allowed the interest of justice will suffer. Hence they have filed the writ petitions directing the respondents to for bear from proceeding with the enquiry into the charges in the chargesheet dated 27.5.1989 issued by the 1st respondent until the disposal of the criminal proceedings initiated against the writ petitioners on the same set of facts. 10. The writ petitioners obtained interim injunction and the 1st respondent filed the above said W.M.P. Nos. 16023 and 16024 of 1989 to vacate the interim injunctions granted in W.M.P. Nos. 12690 and 12477 of 1989 by filing a counter. The case of the 1st respondent is that the writ petitions are not maintainable since the Unit Trust of India is not a state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The 1st respondent has raised many other points, but in the vacate stay petition, the learned senior counsel Mr. M.R. Narayanasamy confined his arguments only on the following points: a) there is no bar for continuing the departmental enquiry while proceeding against the writ petitioners in a criminal court; b) the misconduct and bringing down the image and reputation of the Unit Trust of India cannot be said to form part of the charges framed against the writ petitioners in the criminal proceedings; c) even in case the criminal proceedings end in favour of the writ petitioners, there is no bar for initiating departmental enquiry. In the same line of reasoning, the respondents need not wait for the termination of the criminal proceedings and as such they are entitled to proceed against the writ petitioners depart-mentally for violation of the departmental rules; and d) the basis of the charge under the Unit Trust of India (Staff) Rules, 1978, is independent of the criminal proceedings against the petitioners.
The charge relates to certain acts of serious mis-conduct in the course of their duties as employees of the Unit Trust of India under the Staff Rules Committed by the petitioners, who are bound by those rules in the course of their employment. 11. According to the learned Senior Counsel, under the terms of the contract entered into between the Unit Trust of India and the writ petitioners, there cannot be any bar for the employer to hold departmental enquiry under the terms of the contract inspite of the fact that a criminal proceeding is being conducted on the same set of facts, as the results are independent of each other. The intention of the writ petitioners is to interfere in the natural course of the domestic enquiry, which is the right of the employer to have when an employee commits breach of the rules of conduct and discipline and as such, the petitioners have no cause of action for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 12. Learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that so far no court in India including the apex court, has held that an affected employee against whom a domestic enquiry as well as criminal proceedings are initiated should not resort to court. The only question that courts have taken for consideration is, whether continuation of parallel proceedings i.e. departmental enquiry as well as criminal proceedings will prejudice the affected party and each case has to be decided on its own merit. No authority has been brought to my notice that an affected employee cannot invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when his -, personal liberty, which is guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is affected. 13. Curiously enough, all the courts in India have entertained petitions filed by affected parties (employees) and even though (sic) they have observed that there is no bar for proceeding against the employee both departmentally as well as through criminal court but stated that stay of the departmental proceedings in certain cases should be refused, and departmental proceedings in certain other cases should be stayed depending upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case that is brought before the court.
Such is the position established in Kusheswar v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. The Supreme Court adverted to the earlier decisions and laid down the following principles: 6. The view expressed in the three cases (viz., Delhi Cloth & General Mills case A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 806, Tata Oil Mills case AIR. 1965 S.C. 55; and Jang Bahadur's case of this Court seem to support the position that while there could be no legal bar for simultaneous proceedings being taken, yet, there may be cases where it would be appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings awaiting disposal of the criminal case. In the latter class of cases, it would be open to the deliquent employee to seek such an order of stay or injunction from the court. Whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case there should or should not be such simultaneity of the proceedings would then receive judicial consideration and the court will decide in the given circumstances of a particular case as to whether the disciplinary proceedings should be interdicted, pending criminal trial. As we have already stated that it is neither possible nor advisable to evolve a hard and fast, straight-jacket formula valid for all cases and of general application without regard to the particularities of the individual situation. For the disposal of the present case, we do not think it necessary to say anything more, particularly when we do not intend to lay down any general guideline. 7. In the instant case, the criminal action and the disciplinary proceedings are grounded upon the same set of facts. We are of the view that the disciplinary proceedings should have been stayed and the High Court was not right in interfering with the trial court's order of injunction which had been affirmed in appeal. 13. The above observations made by the Supreme Court was considered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in John v. Indian Airlines Corporation, W.P. Nos. 4939, 4940 and 5037 of 1989. After extracting the aforesaid passages from the decision of the Supreme Court, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the facts of the case in which he was rendering judgment differed from the facts stated in the decision of the Supreme Court.
4939, 4940 and 5037 of 1989. After extracting the aforesaid passages from the decision of the Supreme Court, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the facts of the case in which he was rendering judgment differed from the facts stated in the decision of the Supreme Court. In the Judgment rendered by the Supreme Court, the complaint was given by the employer himself, whereas in the case before the learned Single Judge, the original complaint was not given by the employer himself, to the respondent therein, but the prosecution was initiated at the instance of Customs Authorities, and the domestic enquiry alone was initiated at the instance of the respondent, viz., the employer. That is not the case here. The complaint was given by the 1st respondent forming the basis for the criminal prosecution and the departmental enquiry was also initiated by the employer viz., the 1st respondent. No doubt, under the rules framed in the Unit Trust of India Act, an employee can be proceeded against for the misconduct leading to bringing down the image or reputation of the Unit Trust of India. But, in this case, this is based on the same set of facts that had been spoken to by the approver. Hence the ratio decidendi laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court will apply to the facts of the present case on all fours. 14. Further, the observation of the Supreme Court in the Delhi Cloth & General Mills Case to the effect that it would be desirable if the employer stays the enquiry pending decision of the criminal court should be taken note of. The charges framed against the petitioners are grave charges, and they are not minor ones. Whatever they say before the departmental enquiry, will be their defence in the criminal proceedings, which they are not bound to disclose during the trial. As such, I am satisfied that this is a fit case where the departmental proceedings have to be stayed. 15. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Narayanasami appearing for the respondents brought to my notice the judgment rendered by the first bench of this Court in C. Chandrasekharan v. The Chairman, Madras Port Trust and another, W A. No. 4 of 1990 wherein the first bench did not find any justification to stay the disciplinary proceedings. I perused carefully the judgment in WA. No. 4 of 1990.
I perused carefully the judgment in WA. No. 4 of 1990. The reasons stated by the first bench for not staying the disciplinary proceedings are as follows: a) The appellant therein has prayed earlier in W.P. No. 329 of 1989 for enhancement of subsistence allowance, since he was paid only 50% of his pay as subsistence allowance and the writ petition was allowed on 3.3.1989; b) Thereafter, the appellant also filed another writ petition in W.P. No. 11063 of 1989 seeking a writ of mandamus directing the respondent-employer to permit the appellant to be represented by a legal practitioner in the departmental proceedings pending before the Enquiry Officer and that writ petition was allowed. The appellant thereafter, instead of participating in the enquiry and allow it to be concluded despite the directing of this Court in the earlier litigation filed W.P. No. 14035 of 1989 praying for issuance of a writ of mandamus forbearing the enquiry officer from proceeding with the departmental enquiry against him till the disposal of the criminal case in C.C. No. 1 of 1989 pending on the file of the Special VIII Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. c) The learned Single Judge found that the criminal case and the disciplinary proceedings with respect to facts and circumstances, cannot be said to be grounded on identical set of facts and that the facts differed vastly and on that ground dismissed the writ petition. The first bench while considering the facts of that case took into consideration the observations of the Supreme Court rendered in Kusheshwar v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 2118 and observed as follows: It is no longer disputed that disciplinary proceedings and criminal cases can go on simultaneously, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, as noticed by the Supreme Court in Kusheshwar's case . Courts will decide whether the disciplinary proceedings should or should not be stayed spending the judicial consideration of the criminal proceedings". They also found, "The gravamen of the charges in the disciplinary proceedings pertain to violations of the conduct rules which are not the changes in so far as the criminal case is concerned... Therefore we are not satisfied that this is a fit case in which an injunction should be issued in favour of the appellant to stay the departmental proceedings.
Therefore we are not satisfied that this is a fit case in which an injunction should be issued in favour of the appellant to stay the departmental proceedings. We are influenced in taking this view, also, since we find that the appellant appears to be delaying the disposal of the disciplinary proceedings, which this Court had ordered to be expedited in the earlier litigation between the parties. In Writ Petition No. 11042 of 1989 filed by the appellant seeking the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the 2nd respondent to permit the appellant to be represented by a legal practitioner in the departmental proceedings, no grievance was made of the nature, which has been projected in this writ petition, even though admittedly the criminal case had already been initiated and the disciplinary proceedings had commenced. This only shows that the appellant wants to delay the disposal of the disciplinary proceedings. 16. This is not the case herein. As I have stated earlier, the gravamen of the charges in the departmental proceedings is grounded on the same set of facts as those which led to the complaint to the criminal court. As such, it is but fair that the departmental proceedings should be stayed pending disposal of the criminal proceedings. 17. In the result the interim injunction granted in W.M.P. No. 12690 and 12477 of 1989 is made absolute and the petitions to vacate the interim injunction viz., W.M.P. Nos. 16023 and 16024 of 1989 are dismissed. No costs.