ORDER 1. Shri H.N. Upadhyaya, Cousel for the petitioner. 2. Shri Arvind Dadawat, Additional Government Advocate, for the State. 3. A return has come on behalf of respondent No. 4 and other respondents Nos. 1 and 2, are duly served. We have considered it proper, therefore, to dispose if finally this petition on merit. This view we have taken to avoid protraction of the proceedings as interim relief is prayed and there is substantial merit in the prayer. 4. By order Annexure P/1, passed on 19-9-1988, petitioner came to be appointed as Chairman and six others as members of the Committee to manage the affairs of Mandi Samiti, Lahar, District Bhind. Shri Upadhyaya submitted that appointment was made by the Director of Mandis, acting under the Proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 56 of the M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1973, for short, the 'Adhiniyam'. We do not think if that position can be disputed. This view emerges from the admitted factual position that the Mandi Samiti had come into existence in the year 1973 and thereafter elected committees had been functioning. On the last elected committee being superseded, action had to be taken under Proviso to Section 56(3). Since 1986, there has been no elected Mandi Samiti in Lahar Mandi and in 1986-87, it was managed by the Secretary as the Administrator of the Samiti. In, 1987-89, S.D.O., Agriculture, was managing the affairs of the Samiti until 1-10-1988 when the petitioner and other members of the Committee appointed under Annexure P/1 took charge of the affairs of the Committee. 5. The returnee is now put in charge of the Samiti under Order Annexure P/6; that was passed by the Director of Mandis on 5-10-1989. He is required to hold charge till 23-2-1990 or till such date as the elected Committee is not put in charge 6. During the tenure of the appointed Committee with the petitioner as Chairman, as per statement made on oath in para 4 of the petition, the affairs of the Mandi improved a lot. The Mandi Samiti which was running in loss not only wiped off the loss, but made a saving of Rs. 3,00,000/- which was deposited in Lahar Branch of the State Bank of India. The Mandi Samiti which was running in loss not only wiped off the loss, but made a saving of Rs. 3,00,000/- which was deposited in Lahar Branch of the State Bank of India. These, in our view, are important facts, but in return, we are required to put on blinkers to those facts as a plea is made that the facts are irrelevant to the point involved in the petition. What cannot still be overlooked is that such evasive denial speaks really of the hollowness of the basis of the order and that is compounded by reliance of respondents' counsel on the fact that in Annexure P/1, the "admission" of petitioner and other members has been referred because of their accepting the order made under Section 10 of the Adhiniyam. It is, therefore, submitted that power in regard to dismissal of Committee appointed under Section 10 being absolute, the impugned order is unassailable. 7. We have no doubt at all that mere citation of a wrong provision in any order cannot affect rights of parties and no "admission" even can be considered to determine rights of any party in that regard. On facts, the correct position has to be ascertained in regard to the law applicable and we have reached accordingly, the conclusion that appointment of the Committee headed by the petitioner was made under Section 56(3), Proviso. Relevant provision which could be invoked to dismiss the petitioner and his colleagues could be those of Sub-section (4) of Section 56 of the Adhiniyam though in the impugned order Section 10(1) is cited to sustain validity of the act. The entire scheme of Section 56 in our view, must have relevance and bearing on the interpretation of Sub-section (4). The case of supersession of an elected Market Committee is dealt with under the provisions of Section 56 and proviso to Sub-section (1) requires the Director of Mandis to give a reasonable opportunity to the Market Committee (elected) for showing cause against supersession and he is required to consider explanation and objections submitted in regard to the proposal made. It is true that Sub-section (4) is not similarly circumscribed but a plain reading of the provision may be deceptive. It is true that Sub-section (4) is not similarly circumscribed but a plain reading of the provision may be deceptive. The provision invests power in the Director to remove any or all persons appointed on the Committee in charge under Sub-section (3)(b) of Section 56 and to appoint in his or their place any other person. 8. However, we do not think if such an absolute discretion can at all be in the contemplation of the Legislature when the case is one not of a paid official or single person being put as an Officer in-charge of the affairs of the Committee but of the democratic base of the institution being maintained putting seven members to form the Committee in-charge. Such a Committee, though not elected, may still possess trappings of a democratic body and persons serving on the Committee not being Government servants and being members of public, would be answerable and accountable to public. As and when any occasion arises for such members to be replaced, there must be material before the Director for taking the view that they are not persons fit and suitable to continue to discharge public functions and in that case, when such view is founded as may adversely affect the reputation of such persons, they are to be heard. In such cases, according to us, principles of natural justice operate and the omission in that regard has to be supplied in the relevant rule because of the severity of the action. Support for this view, we find in the direct authority of S.L. Kapoor's case, AIR 1981 SC 136 . 9. Indeed, for that proposition, authorities otherwise also abound, e.g. Liberty Mills, AIR 1989 SC 1271, et. at, in Kapoor's case, it was held that the status and office and the rights and responsibilities and the expectation of the Committee to serve its full term of office certainly creates sufficient interest in the Municipal Committee and their loss, if superseded, entails Civil consequences and in that view, the order of supersession of New Delhi Municipal Committee was quashed. 10. In the instant case, in the petition itself, at paras 5 and 6, materials have come on record which disclose the motive behind the order passed by Annexure P/6. 10. In the instant case, in the petition itself, at paras 5 and 6, materials have come on record which disclose the motive behind the order passed by Annexure P/6. The petitioner himself has stated that some complaints were made against the Committee headed by him and in that regard, Annexures P/4 and P/5 are filed with the petition. A representation was submitted as per statement made in para 6. What we find reading Annexure P/4 is that allegations were made and one of the allegations was a serious one involving moral turpitude of Chairman of the Committee. One of the allegations was that for entertaining some Minister and holding reception for him, a sum of Rs. 5,000/- was spent and cheque for that amount was drawn. But, there was no visit of any Minister and the amount was misappropriated. 11. In the impugned order, Annexure P/6, there is no manifestation of disposal of the representation in regard to the complaint made and it is submitted that the petitioner and other members of the Committee were not heard with regard to the allegations made against them and their representation was not considered and they have been removed arbitrarily. By that, reputation of the petitioner and other members of the Committee has been seriously damaged as they are all public-men and hold trust and confidence of public of which they were "appointed" to the ad hoc Committee. That position is not contested though it is submitted that the impugned order has not been passed on the basis of the complaint. In any case, neither in the return, nor in the order, any reasons are disclosed to satisfy us that the Director, Mandis, had not acted arbitrarily in removing the petitioner from the Committee which he had "appointed" under Section 56(3)(b) of the Adhiniyam. When allegation is made of an arbitrary action and of jurisdictional failure, Article 14 of the Constitution requires that reasonable explanation in that regard is furnished to the satisfaction of the Writ Court but no such explanation has come before us in this matter. 12. For all the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the order Annexure-P/6 is not sustainable in law and that is accordingly quashed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.