JUDGMENT Mookherji, J. Appellant has been convicted under the provisions of section 7 (1) (a) (1) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 as also for violation of rule 3 of the Bihar Essential Articles (Display of Prices and Stocks) Order, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Display Order’) and Rules 3 and 7 of the Bihar Food grains Dealers Licensing Order, 1967 (hereinafter to be referred to as ‘Licensing Order’) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months on each count. The sentences are, however, to run concurrently. 2. Short facts. The Asst. Marketing Officer of Chapra inspected the retail food grain shop of the appellant along with a party on 18th of October, 1982 and found certain irregularities in the matter of stock and stock register of the food grains, as detailed in the complaint. Further, 43 bags of grams and 2 bags of peas were also found in excess in the stock, which were neither shown on the notice board nor in any connected register. Some papers on demand, it is alleged, were also not produced. The case proceeded on an information lodged with the police and ended with the result indicated above. 3. Mr. G. C. Bharuka, learned Counsel for the appellant has raised two law points, viz. (i) that Sanction for prosecution having not been obtained, which is mandatory in view of proviso to clause 6 (a) of the Display Order the prosecution is bad on this ground alone and (ii) The cognizance of the offence (s), alleged having been taken beyond one year, it is barred by limitation under section 468, of the Coda of Criminal Procedure. 4. In support of the first point, it has been submitted that the allegations made in the F.I.R. are not only for the offences under section 6 of the Licencing Order, but are also under section 7 of the Display Order, but for the prosecution of the offender for contravention of the Display Order, previous sanction of District Magistrate or of any of the authorities indicated therein under proviso to clause 6 (a) of the Display Order is mandatory, which has not been done in this case. 5. On a perusal of the entire order sheet, up to the date on which the cognizance of the offence was taken i.e. on 19.1.1984 no where there is an indication that sanction which was a must, had been taken. 5. On a perusal of the entire order sheet, up to the date on which the cognizance of the offence was taken i.e. on 19.1.1984 no where there is an indication that sanction which was a must, had been taken. Further, Mr. Bharuka referred to the List of exhibits wherein also, there is no indication that any order regarding the sanction for prosecution of the appellant had been obtained. In the circumstances, there is much substance in the first contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant. It is also covered by a decision of this Court reported in 1984 Bihar Law Judgment, Page 518 (Lal Chand and another v. State of Bihar). 6. As regards the second point, it has been submitted by Mr. Bharuka that the date of visit of the shop of the appellant by the officials of the Supply Department was on 18.10.82, whereas the cognizance of the offence was taken on 19.1.1984, i.e., much after one year and therefore, it is hopelessly barred under section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He has also submitted that there is no order of the Special Judge that either it was condoned or any special reason was assigned for condoning the delay while taking cognizance. In this connection he has cited a decision of this Court reported in 1980 B.L.J.R. page 658 (Jhopri Sao and others vs. State of Bihar). In the instant case, it appears that offence which the appellant is said to have committed was punishable under section 7 (1) (a) (i) with imprisonment for term which may extend to one year and shall also be liable to fine. Section 468 of the Cr. P. C. lays down that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, beyond one year of the date prescribed as the date of commencement of period of limitation under section 469 of the Core. Therefore, in this case as the date of the incident was 18th of October, 1982 and as the cognizance was taken undoubtedly more than a year after that date, the cognizance taken against the appellant was manifestly barred by time. 7. Therefore, in this case as the date of the incident was 18th of October, 1982 and as the cognizance was taken undoubtedly more than a year after that date, the cognizance taken against the appellant was manifestly barred by time. 7. On the factual aspect of the case, it has been submitted that the grain spotted to have not been mentioned in the stock register was purchased on that particular date and would have been entered in the stock register at the time of closing. But there was no opportunity to do so, because of the visit of the officials. The learned Counsel further submits that 'as and when' received theory is not applicable so far as the retailers are concerned, which is applicable to the whole sale dealers. It seems that the matter was also raised before the learned judge, but it was disposed of in a cryptic way. In the facts and circumstances of the case, this plea also can not be lightly brushed aside. 8. Thus, in either view of the matter the conviction of the appellant cannot be maintained under any of the provisions referred to above and the same are accordingly set aside and the appellant is discharged from his bail-bond forthwith. The appeal is accordingly allowed. AS. Appeal allowed.