JUDGMENT : A.N.Varma, J. 1. A difference of opinion between two learned judges in regard to the court fee payable on the plaint of the suit filed by the plaintiff appellant has led to this reference. 2. The short question which falls for consideration is whether the court fees on the plaint in question is payable under clause 1 of Section 7 (iv-A) Court Fees Act as held by the" Honourable K. C. Agarwal ACJ (as he then was) or under clause 2 of that provision as held by the other learned judge, Brother S.N.Sahay. It is not necessary to set out the essential facts as the same have been noticed by the two learned judges in considerable detail. 1 shall, therefore, come straightaway to the provision, Section 7 (iv-A) of the Court Fees Act (as applicable in this State) which reads ; "For cancellation or adjudging void instruments and decree. In suits for or involving cancellation of or adjudging void other property having a market value, or an instrument securing money or other property having such value j (i) Where the plaintiff or his predecessor in title was a party to the" decree or the instrument, according to the value of the subject-matter, and (ii) Where he or his predecessor in title was not a party to the decree or instrument, according to one-fifth of the value of the subject-matter, and such value shall be deemed to be- if the whole decree or instrument is involved in the suit, the amount for which or value of the property in respect of which the decree was passed or the instrument executed, and if only a part of a decree or instrument is involved in the suit, the amount or value of the property to which such part relates." The instrument in question is a will dated 16-2-1981 alleged to have been executed by Late Shri Ram Agarwal in favour of defendants no. 1, 2, 3 and 4 while the relief claimed in the suit is one for declaration that the will is null and void. That being so, Section 7 (iv-A) is immediately attracted to the case. The only question is which one of the two clauses of that provision would apply- For resolving this question it will have to. 1, 2, 3 and 4 while the relief claimed in the suit is one for declaration that the will is null and void. That being so, Section 7 (iv-A) is immediately attracted to the case. The only question is which one of the two clauses of that provision would apply- For resolving this question it will have to. be seen whether the plaintiffs or their predecessors were a party to the instrument- the will in this case, of the answer is in the affirmative, the case would be covered by clause (1) of Section 7 (iv-A). If, on the other hand, the answer is in the negative, clause (2) of the same provision would be attracted and the court fee payable would be one-fifth of the value of the subject matter. According to court below the case is covered by clause (I) and, therefore, the court fee shall have to be paid according to the value of the subject matter. 3. Construing the plaint the learned ACJ ruled that Shree Ram Agarwal, who according to him was the predecessor in title of the plaintiffs, was a party to the instrument and, therefore, clause (1) and not clause (2) of Section 7 (iv-A) would be attracted. 4. Brother S. N. Sahay, on the other hand, interpreting the same plaint has come to the opposite conclusion He says the plaintiffs have not stated in the plaint that will was executed by their predecessor. The learned judge states that according to the plaint case the plaintiffs were not claiming their title through Shree Ram Agarwal, but independently of him-of the house property as members of Joint Hindu Family, and, in the partnership business, on the basis of the partnership agreement. Summing up the plaint case, the learned judge observed : "It will be seen that the suit which has been filed by the appellants is for adjudging void a will alleged to have been executed by Late Sri Ram Agarwal in respect of the house property and partnership business. It is, however, not alleged that the said will has been executed by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were not party to the said will. The appellant did not claim to derive title through Lala Sri Ram Agarwal to the subject matter of the suit which are the house property and the partnership business. It is, however, not alleged that the said will has been executed by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were not party to the said will. The appellant did not claim to derive title through Lala Sri Ram Agarwal to the subject matter of the suit which are the house property and the partnership business. On the contrary, they claimed title to the said properties independently of Lala Sri Ram Agarwal, in one case regarding the house property as members of the Joint Hindu Family and in the other case, regarding partnership business, on the basis of partnership agreement. The appellants do not claim that the disputed will was executed by their predecessor in title nor can any such assertion be imputed to them. Even if it is regarded that Lala Sri Ram Agarwal was a party to the disputed will it cannot be said on the basis of the plaint allegations that he was a party to the will in his capacity as predecessor in-title of the appellants in relation to the properties in suit. Therefore, the provisions of Section 7 (iv-A) and clause (2) thereof and not clause (1), are attracted and as such court fee is payable according to one-fifth of the value of the subject matter." With respect, this is a correct construction of the plaint. I entirely agree that in the first place the plaintiffs are not claiming rights in the disputed property comprising a house and partnership business through Shree Ram Agarwal but are setting up a claim and title in repation to the properties in suit wholly independent of him. Secondly, according to the plaint case neither the plaintiffs nor Shree Ram Agarwal were party to the will. The plaint case is that the latter had not executed the will. 5. With great respect to the learned ACJ, I find it difficult to read into the plaint the plea that Shree Ram Agarwal was a party to the will, that is, he bad executed the will. Brother S. N. Sahay has correctly summed up the precise case set up in the plaint and its true purport. 6. With that, the reference stands answered, and I hold that the court fees are liable to be assessed under clause (2) and not clause (1), of Section 7 (iv-A). Brother S. N. Sahay has correctly summed up the precise case set up in the plaint and its true purport. 6. With that, the reference stands answered, and I hold that the court fees are liable to be assessed under clause (2) and not clause (1), of Section 7 (iv-A). Sri Narendra Pal Singh learned counsel for the defendant respondent, however, placed strong reliance on the averments made in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the plaint and submitted that the allegation that at the relevant time the condition of Shree Ram Agarwal was precarious,, that the defendants 1. and 2 under the pretext of better treatment shifted him in January 1981 with ulterior motive that the defendants 1 and 2 Were clever individuals and also dominated the will of Shree Ram Agarwal and taking advantage of his mental and physical health got a fictitious will prepared clearly amounts to setting up the case that though the will was in fact executed by Shree Ram Agarwal he did not possess the requisite testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will nor was he a free agent, being a captive in the hands of the said defendants at that time. That being so, he submitted the case would squarely fall within the four corners of clause (1) of Section 7 (iv-A). 7. I have given a careful thought to the submission, but am unable to agree. No doubt, the allegations of weal health, both physical and mental, and of domination by defendants are there in the plaint. But the plaint must not be read in isolation or torn out of context. At best these allegations merely suggest that at the relevant time Shree Ram Agarwal was not in a fit state of health and that he was under the domination of the defendants. But the allegations go no further. Indeed, having thrown the hint that Shree Ram Agarwal was not in a fit mental condition the plaintiffs assert in paragraph 8 of the plaint ; "Having benefit of the mental and physical condition of Late Lala Sri Ram Agarwal, as stated above, got a fictitious will prepared of the properties of Item Nos. 1, 2 and 3 on 18-2-1981 in favour of defendant no. 2 alone by impersonation and without the knowledge, of Late Lala Shri Ram Agarwal, in collusion with marginal witnesses, and the scribe." 8. 1, 2 and 3 on 18-2-1981 in favour of defendant no. 2 alone by impersonation and without the knowledge, of Late Lala Shri Ram Agarwal, in collusion with marginal witnesses, and the scribe." 8. These allegations fit only with the case that the will had not been executed by Shree Ram Agarwal but by an imposter in collusion with the scribe and marginal witnesses. At any rate, if there be any doubt, the same would stand dispelled by the following averments in paragraph 9 of the plaint : v "As a matter of fact, he did not execute any will on 18-2-1981 or on any other date in favour of defendant no, 2, nor he had any such intention to deprive the plaintiff and other defendant nor he had ever exprersed his intention to change the natural line of succession." (Emphasis added) This is the crux of the plaint case. According to it, Shree Ram Agarwal, whether predecessor in title of the plaintiffs or not, was not a party to the Will. I, therefore, in agreement with brother S. N. Sahay, hold that in the first place in relation to the properties in suit the plaintiffs are not claiming through late Shree Ram Agarwal, and, secondly, even if they are, Shree Ram Agarwal was not a party to the instrument. The plaintiffs are claiming independent title in respect of the house, as members of Joint Hindu Family, and, in respect of the partnership business, on the basis of the partnership agreement. In the premise, the case is not covered by clause (I) of Section 1 (iv-A), but by clause (2) thereof. 9. With great respect to the learned Acting Chief Justice. I regret I cannot agree that the case is covered by clause (1). Indeed the entire conclusion of the learned Acting Chief Justice is based on the premises that the plaint allegations amount to setting up a case that the will was in fact executed by Shree Ram Agarwal and the further premise that Shree Ram Agarwal was "predecessor" in title of the plaintiff. Both these premises, I regret, seem to be wrong. Once these premises go, there is title difficulty in concluding that the case is covered by clause (2). 10. Both these premises, I regret, seem to be wrong. Once these premises go, there is title difficulty in concluding that the case is covered by clause (2). 10. In construing fiscal statutes, there is that time honoured rule often called the .'golden rule', namely, that if the provisions of a statute or an instrument can reasonably admit a construction which favours the subject, that construction rather than the one which goes against him should be preferred. The law is far too well settled to require further elaboration. Brother S. N. Sahay has noticed this aspect and I leave it at that time. In the present case, however, the plaint is not capable of being construed in any other manner except that Shree Ram Agarwal was not, On the averments made in the plaint, a party to the will in question. But even if it could be argued that the plaint was capable of being interpreted as being consistent also with the case that Shree Ram Agarwal was a party to the instrument but that he did not execute the same as a free agent, the principle propounded in the foregoing discussion would be attracted and the court fees shall have to be determined under clause (2) of Section (iv-A) of the Court Fees Act and not under clause (1). 11. Learned counsel for the defendants respondents, however, submitted that the general principle ennunciated above with regard to interpretation of fiscal statute would not apply where the payment of court fee under the Court Fees Act is concerned. In support learned counsel placed reliance on Section 17 of the Court Fees Act which provides j "Multifarious suit (1) In any suit in which two or more separate and distinct cause of action are joined, the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees with which the plaints or memorandum of appeal would be chargeable under this Act if separate suits were instituted in respect of each such cause of action : Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to affect any power conferred by or under the Code of Civil Procedure, to order separate trials. (2) Alternative reliefs when more reliefs than one based on the caus0 of action are sought in the alternative the fee shall be paid according to the value of the relief in respect of which the largest fee is payable." 12. This section obviously has no application. It deals with a situation where two or more separate and distinct causes of action are joined or where two or more reliefs based on the same causes of action are sought in the alternative. The present is neither a case of joinder of separate and distinct causes of action nor one of reliefs being claimed in the alternative. To sum up, I hold in agreement with S. N. Sahay, J. that the court fee in the present case is payable under clause (2) of Section 7 (iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, I would, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the court below. 13. Let the papers of this appeal be placed before the appropriate Bench with the above opinion for orders. Appeal allowed.