JUDGMENT : 1. Respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred, to as workman) was working in the U. P. State Electricity Board. His services were terminated on April 3, 1976. The Government of U. P. in exercise of power under Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as Act), referred the dispute to the Industrial tribunal (III) Kanpur. Industrial1 Tribunal by its Award dated November 10, 1979 upheld the case of the workman that he has worked for more than 240 days in a year, but rejected the claim by ordering that the workman be paid compensation. The workman, thereafter, filed writ petition no. 3876 of 1980, before this Court, which was allowed on April 28, 1988. This court after holding that the workman would be deemed to be permanent employee of the Electricity Board and termination of his service was unjustified, directed his re- instatement with full back-wages. Against this judgment the Electricity Board filed a Special Leave Petition in the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which was dismissed on January 9, 1989. 2. The workman, thereafter made an application before the Deputy labour Commissioner, who is delegate of the State Government, under section 6-H (1) of the Act for recovering the back-wages as per chart annexed alongwith the application. On this application notices were issued to the Electricity Board by Deputy Labour Commissioner. The Electricity Board filed objection against maintainability of the application under Section 6-H (1) of the Act, on the ground that the amount of back-wages is to be determined which can only be done by Labour Court under section 6-H (2) of the Act, and the application, as such, is liable to be rejected. The Deputy Labour Commissioner rejected the objection of the board and directed for issuance of recovery certificate for recovering back-wages in accordance with the judgment of this court. The Electricity Board, thereafter, filed review application before Deputy Labour Commissioner for reviewing his order ; whereby recovery certificate was issued. The Electricity Board also filed Original Suit No. 368 of 1989 before the Civil Judge, Mathura, for permanent injunction, restraining the state from proceeding with the recovery of back-wages. The Electricity board also moved an application for interim injunction which was rejected by Civil Court on Feb. 9, 1990 by a reasoned order. The Electricity Board also filed Original Suit No. 368 of 1989 before the Civil Judge, Mathura, for permanent injunction, restraining the state from proceeding with the recovery of back-wages. The Electricity board also moved an application for interim injunction which was rejected by Civil Court on Feb. 9, 1990 by a reasoned order. The Civil Court held that money is liable to be recovered from Electricity Board in accordance with the judgment of this court dated April 28, 1988. The Deputy Labour Commissioner also rejected the review application of the Electricity Board by order dated March 23, 1990 and April 5, 1990 (Annexures 23 and 24 of the writ petition) and recovery certificate dated April 11, 1990 had been issued by this Deputy Labour Commissioner to the Collector, Mathura, for recovering the back-wages of the workman. This writ petition has been filed by the Electricity Board against the aforesaid recovery certificate and proceeding taken in pursuance thereof for recovering the back-wages of the workman. At the admission stage Sri K. P. Agarwal, Advocate, has appeared on behalf of the workman and we have heard learned counsel for both the parties and the writ petition is being finally disposed of in accordance with Rules of the Court. 3. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner, the Electricity Board, has challenged the recovery certificate before us on the following grounds : (i) Application under Section 6-H (1) is not maintainable because the amount of back-wages is to be determined and that can only be done by Labour Court under Section 6-H (2 ). (ii) Under Section 6-H (l) proceeding for recovery can be taken where money is due under a settlement or Award given by the industrial Tribunal or under an Award given by an Adjudicator. The judgment of the High Court on account of which the back-wages of the workman are being recovered cannot be said to be an Award or settlement given by Industrial Tribunal and an adjudicator. 4. Provisions of Section 6-H are analogous to Section 33-C of the central Industrial Disputes Act. It has been laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court that it is not necessary that the money due under Section 6-H (1) should be a pre- determined amount. 4. Provisions of Section 6-H are analogous to Section 33-C of the central Industrial Disputes Act. It has been laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court that it is not necessary that the money due under Section 6-H (1) should be a pre- determined amount. Where, what is required is mere arithematical calculation of the amount due, the case will fall under Section 6-H (1) and sub- section (2) of Section 6-H will not be attracted. Pro visions of Section 6-H of the Act was considered by Hon'ble Supreme court in Kays Construction Co. v. State of U. P. 1965 (11) F. L. R. 328 (S. C. ). Relevant passage from this judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is extracted below : "that there is some difference between the two sub-sections is obvious enough. It arises from the fact that the benefit contemplated in the second sub-section is not "money due" but some advantage or perquisite which can be reckoned in terms of money. The contrast between "money due" on the one hand and a "benefit" which is not "money due" but which can become so after the money equivalent is determined on the other, marks out the area of the operation of the two sub-sections. If the word "benefit" were taken to cover a case of mere arithmetical calculation of wages, the first sub-section would hardly have any play. Every case of calculation, however, simple, would have to go first before a Tribunal. In our judgment a case such as the present, where the money due is back-wages for the period of unemployment is covered by the first subsection and not the second. No doubt some calculation enters the determination of the amount for which the certificate will eventually issue but this calculation is not of the type mentioned in the. second sub-section and cannot be made to fit in the elaborate phase "benefit" which is capable of being computed in terms of money. The contrast in the two sub-sections between "money due" under the first sub-section and the necessity of reckoning the benefit in terms of money before the benefit becomes "money due" under the second sub-section shows that mere arithmetical calculations of the amount due are not re-quired to be dealt with under the elaborate procedure of the second sub-section. The contrast in the two sub-sections between "money due" under the first sub-section and the necessity of reckoning the benefit in terms of money before the benefit becomes "money due" under the second sub-section shows that mere arithmetical calculations of the amount due are not re-quired to be dealt with under the elaborate procedure of the second sub-section. But the anti-thesis between "money due" and a "benefit" which must be computed in terms of money still remains, for the inquiry being made is not of the kind contemplated by the second sub-section, but is one for the satisfaction of the State Government under the first sub-section. It is verification of the claim to money within the first sub-section and not determination in terms of money of the value of a benefit. " Same position was re-affirmed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in s. R. Mills Co. v. Baliram A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 616. where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that (1) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act. Relevant extract from this claim for compensation i for lay off is to be dealt with under Section 33-C (1) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act. Relevant extract from this judgment is quoted below : "the Government or the Labour Court may satisfy itself about the exact amount and then take action under that section. In the present case the dates of the Lay off are known and each workman will show to the Second Labour Court that he is qualified to receive compensation for lay-off. That will be shown from the muster-roll which the employer is required to maintain and it will then be a simple arithmetical calculation, which, in our judgment, Section 33-C permits to be made. " 5. It has now been settled that where money due is the back-wages for the period of un-employment due to termination of services, action is required to be taken under Section 6-H (1) and sub-section (2) of the act will not be attracted. 6. As regards second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, it may be observed that the Industrial Tribunal, although up held the claim of the workman having worked for more than 240 days in a year but ultimately gave Award against the workman on the ground that he is liable to be paid compensation against this Award the workman filed writ petition. This court up-held the rinding of fact of the Industrial tribunal about the workman having worked for more than 240 days in a year and directed the re-instatement of the workman with full back-wages after holding that the termination- of services of workman was unjustified and he shall be deemed to be permanent employee of the petitioner, Electricity Board. The result of the judgment given in the writ petition is that the Award of the Industrial Tribunal stands modified/substituted and the Deputy Labour Commissioner was fully justified to take recourse to sub-section (I) of Section 6-H for recovering all back-wages of the workman in accordance with the judgment of this court. The Electricity Board is a State Undertaking. We hope and expect that it will now make the payment to the workman who has remained un-employed from 1976 due to termination of his services. 7. Before parting with the case, it may be observed that if there' is calculation mistake, it is always open to the Government to rectify it. By issuing recovery certificate the Government does not become functus officio and if it is satisfied about the arithmetical mistake it can correct the recovery certificates and re-issue another corrected recovery certificate. 8. For the reasons given above the writ petition has no force and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Petition Dismissed.