The Management, Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank Limited v. The Assistant Commissioner, Madurai
1990-07-26
GOVINDASAMY
body1990
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. The petitioner has filed the above writ petition to issue a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the first respondent dated 21.11.1983 made in TNSE Appeal No. 22/80. 2. The petitioner, the Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank Limited, has a branch at Eriodu near Dindigul. The said branch is a one man branch wherein there shall be a Manager, a Cashier cum-Clerk and an attender. The entire activity of the petitioner Bank at Eriodu has to be carried out with the active co-operation of the Manager, Cashier-cum-Clerk and the Aitender. Since the branch at Eriodu is a one man branch the procedure applicable to all other main branches cannot be made applicable to this branch. 3. The second respondent was posted as Manager of the Eriodu branch. At the relevant time, one Balasubramaniam was working as Cashier cum-Clerk and one Ulagudia Sivagururaja was working as Attender of the said bank. On 11.5.1979 it was reported that while the said attender was counting and receiving a sum of Rs. 20,000 from the Dindigul branch for taking it to the Eriodu branch he lost a sum of Rs. 10,000. On 9.6.1979 the said Attender had redeemed the jewels pledged in the said Bank. Thereafter, investigation team was sent to Eriodu branch on 25.7.1979 and that the investigation team made an exhaustive examination of all the accounts and found certain irregularities. It is on the basis of the investigation report, the petitioner initiated disciplinary proceedings against the second respondent and the Cashier-cum-Clerk and also placed both of them under suspension with effect from 3.8.1979. The petitioner Bank issued a charge memo dated 17 8.1979 containing certain charges and also called upon the second respondent to submit his explanation. Subsequently, the petitioner issued a second charge memo dated 16.10.1979 which includes certain charges specified in the first charge memo dated 17 8.1979. Thereafter, the petitioner on 19.1.1980 issued a third charge memo consisting of two new charges. In respect of all the charge memos, the second respondeat submitted his explanation, wherein he denied his guilt. Thereupon, the petitioner appointed an Enquiring Authority to hold an enquiry in respect of the charges framed against the second respondent. The Enquiring Authority, after holding the enquiry, submitted a report holding that all charges, except charge No. 10 were proved.
In respect of all the charge memos, the second respondeat submitted his explanation, wherein he denied his guilt. Thereupon, the petitioner appointed an Enquiring Authority to hold an enquiry in respect of the charges framed against the second respondent. The Enquiring Authority, after holding the enquiry, submitted a report holding that all charges, except charge No. 10 were proved. On the basis of the findings of the Enquiring Authority, the petitioner, by order dated 10 6.1980 dismissed the second respondent from service with effect from the date of suspension. In fact, the enquiry was common against the second respondent as well as the Cashier-cum-Clerk and the services of both the second respondent as well as the Cashier-cum-Clerk were terminated by order dated 10 6.1980. Aggrieved by the said order of dismissal, the second respondent preferred an appeal on 17.7.1980 under S. 41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act hereinafter referred to as the Act. The petitioner, on receipt of a notice from the Appellate Authority, filed a detailed statement. 21 documents which had been marked before the Enquiring Authority were taken on file and in addition the petitioner marked 24 additional documents and examined two witnesses. The second respondent examined himself as a witness on his side. 4. The Appellate Authority, the first respondent herein, on consideration of the entire materials on record, including the report, the findings of the enquiring authority the additional evidence and the additional documents marked before him, did not agree with the findings of the enquiring authority and held that the impugned order of dismissing the second respondent herein from service was unwarranted and unjustified and that the second respondent was denied an oppoirtunity by reason of the fact that the petitioner had not produced the documents which were required by the second respondent herein to disprove his guilt and ultimately set aside the order of the petitioner dated 20.6 1980 dismissing the second respondent from service as Branch Manager of the petitioner Bank as illegal, void and in operative. Consequently, the Appellate Authority allowed the appeal It is at this stage, the petitioner has filed the above writ petition to issue a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Appellate Authority, the first respondent herein. 5. Mr.
Consequently, the Appellate Authority allowed the appeal It is at this stage, the petitioner has filed the above writ petition to issue a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Appellate Authority, the first respondent herein. 5. Mr. Vijayanarayanan, leamed counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, contended that the power conferred under S. 4) (2) of the Act is not a revisional or supervisory power and that the Appellate Authority should have dealt with each and every charge and should have given a specific finding with reference to each and every charge. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the Appellate Authority misdirected himself as a revisional authority and assimilated all the charges into three issues and dealt with (them?) accordingly; as a result the impugned order is vitiated. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that there were number of admissions made by the second respondent herein and that the Appellate Authority had not taken into account all those admissions while allowing the appeal filed by the second respondent herein. In this connection, learned counsel for the petitioner cited the decision Kotak and Company v. Additional Commissioner for Workmens Compensation and another 1 , for the purpose of pointing out the scope of the Appellate Authority under S. 41 (2) of the Act. 6. Repelling the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Somayaji, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the second respondent, contended that the scope and the power of the Appellate Authoritv is dual in character and that the Appellate Authority gets into the shoes of the original authority and has power to reappraise the whole evidence. While so, the Appellate Authority has considered all those charges and there is nothing wrong so long as the Appellate Authority has followed the procedure prescribed in respect thereof. In this context, learned counsel pointed out the procedure prescribed under Rule 9 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Rules, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), wherein it is provided that the procedure to be adopted by the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation when hearing appeals preferred to him under sub-S.(2) of S. 41 shall be summary and he shall record briefly the evidence adduced before him and then pass orders giving his reasons therefor.
Learned counsel for the second respondent further contended that the Appellate Authority consolidated all the charges into four heads of charges and has considered all the materials and ultimately came to the conclusion that it does not agree with the findings of the Enquiring Authority/Disciplinary Authority and allowed the appeal. 7. Considering the relevant contentions of both parties, it is clear that R. 9(2) of the Rules provides for procedure to be followed by the Appellate Authority. It is clear from the said Rule that the procedure to be followed by the Appellate Authority when hearing appeals under sub-S.(2) of S. 41 shall be summary and that the appellate authority shall record briefly the evidence adduced before him and then pass orders giving his reasons therefor. It is well settled that the Appellate Authority is entitled to take additional evidence and examine all materials before him and arrive at his own conclusion. In the instant case, the Appellate Authority has followed the procedure as provided under the Rules and in consonance with the law laid down in this behalf. -There is no infirmity whatsoever in the impugned order, as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The Appellate Authority has followed the procedure and has considered all materials placed before him and ultimately came to the conclusion that the order of dismissal is unwarranted in view of the conclusions arrived at by him. 8. Having regard the facts and circumstances in the instant case, there is nothing wrong in consolidating all the charges into three heads by the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority has considered all the charges framed against the second respondent and has dealt with in respect of each and every charge and has also given his conclusion in respect of the same. While so, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Appellate Authority should have considered each and every charge separately and should have given a finding has no force in the face of the aforesaid circumstances. 9. With reference to the contention on the part of the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the Appellate Authority has misdirected himself as a revisional authority and assimilated all the charges into three points and dealt with accordingly and as a result the impugned order is vitiated, the same has no substance in view of the reasons set out herein-above.
The ratio in Kotak and Companys case (supra) is only to the effect that the Appellate Authority can take additional evidence while considering the merits of the case. The ratio in the said decision is also to the effect that when the employer himself had not conducted the enquiry under S. 41(1) of the Act, the Appellate Authority could take evidence and uphold the order of the employer, then the statutory requirement of S. 41(1) would be wiped out and would render the provisions of S. 4 (1) nugatory. The facts of that case are not squarely applicable to the instant case. That was a case where there was no enquiry conducted by the original authority. In the instant case, the original authority conducted the enquiry and aggrieved by the order of the original authority the second respondent preferred an appeal. Hence the ratio laid down by this Court in the said decision is not applicable to the present case. 10. With reference to the contention that the second respondent made certain admissions which the Appellate Authority has not taken into account while disposing of the appeal, it is manifest from a perusal of the order of the appellate authority, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the second respondent, that the appellate authority has considered all aspects of the matter, including the so-called admissions made by the second respondent and has ultimately come to a conclusion. While so, the above contention has no force. 11. The Appellate Authority has considered the entire record of proceedings and the evidence adduced by both the parties and has given a finding to the effect that the second respondent was not guiltv and consequently held that the impugned order of dismissal of the second respondent from service was not warranted and was not justified and that the petitioner had not provided adequate opportuniy to the second respondent by furnishing all the documents which were required by the second respondent and consequently the second respondent was denied a reasonable opportunity. While so, the finding of fact reached by the appellate authority as a result of appreciation of evidence cannot be questioned in writ proceedings. This is a case where the findings of fact cannot be stated to have been based on no evidence.
While so, the finding of fact reached by the appellate authority as a result of appreciation of evidence cannot be questioned in writ proceedings. This is a case where the findings of fact cannot be stated to have been based on no evidence. The adequacy and sufficiency of the evidence with reference to the findings and the inference drawn from the said findings are within the jurisdiction of the appellate authority and those things cannot be agitated before this Court in a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. This Court cannot covert into an appellate forum to once again assess the fact and come to the conclusion that, on assessment of evidence, the findings are sustainable or otherwise liable to be set aside. The conclusion arrived at by the appellate authority cannot be assailed as it is based on evidence. It is in these circumstances the order of the appellate authority cannot be said to be unsustainable in law. Consequently, there is no warrant for interference with the impugned order by this Court. Hence the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. No costs.