S. MOHAN, J. ( 1 ) (ON the questions referred by the Division Bench)The two questions which have been referred to the Full Bench are asfollows:" (1) Whether the following question namely- 'whether on the coming into force of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 ('the Act' for short) and the establishment of the Administrative Tribunal, the jurisdiction of the High Court underarticle 226 of the Constitution of India to retain or entertain petitions presented under that Article before it, challenging the Constitutional validity of any law regulating recruitment and conditions of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or State and decide such petitions stood excluded andgot vested in the Administrative Tribunals'. WHICH was answered in the negative by this court in S. M. Pattanaik v Secretary to Government of India, ILR 1986 Kar. 3954, can be regarded ashaving been decided in the affirmative by the Supreme Court in the case ofs. P. Sampath Kumar v Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 386 : 1986 JT (SC) 996? (2) If the answer to the above question is in the negative, 'whether the statement contained in the order of the Supreme Court inchopra's case to the effect that in the case of Sampath Kumar that such aquestion had been decided in the affirmative'can be regarded as law declared within the meaning of Article 141 of theconstitution, and therefore the ratio of the decision of this court in S. M. Pattanaik's case should be regarded as overruled or no longer good law?"they arise in the following circumstances: in W. Ps. 21018 and 21019 of 1986, the petitioners are Surgeons in thedepartment of Health and Family Welfare of the State Government, and theyquestion the Constitutional validity of the Karnataka Medical Departmentservice (Recruitment) (Amendment) Rules, 1986. In W. Ps. 21492 and 21493 of1986, the petitioners are Second Division Clerks in the Revenue Department ofthe State Government, and they question the Constitutional validity of thekarnataka Revenue Subordinate Branch Services (Recruitment) Rules, 1977. The contention is that these Rules are void on the ground of violation ofarticles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The writ petitions themselvescame to be referred to a Division Bench under Section 9 of the Karnataka Highcourt Act, 1961. The contention is that these Rules are void on the ground of violation ofarticles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The writ petitions themselvescame to be referred to a Division Bench under Section 9 of the Karnataka Highcourt Act, 1961. The question that arose before the Division Bench forconsideration was whether on the coming into force of the Administrativetribunals Act, 1985, (hereinafter referred to as the 'act'), and theestablishment of the State Administrative Tribunal, the jurisdiction of the Highcourt under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could still be invokedwhen a challenge is made to the Constitutional validity of any law relating torecruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public servicesand posts in connection with the affairs of the State, and further whether suchwrit petitions should be excluded from the purview of Article 226 so as to beagitated before the Administrative Tribunal?the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, was enacted by the Parliament byvirtue of the power given to it under Article 323-A of the Constitution whichwas introduced by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act. As aresult, the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal was constituted with effect from6-10-1986. Sections 15 and 28 of the Act read as follows: "15. Jurisdiction, Power and Authority of Stale Administrative Tribunals. As aresult, the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal was constituted with effect from6-10-1986. Sections 15 and 28 of the Act read as follows: "15. Jurisdiction, Power and Authority of Stale Administrative Tribunals. (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, theadministrative Tribunal for a State shall exercise, on and from theappointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisableimmediately before that day by all courts (except the Supreme Court) inrelation to, (a) recruitment and matters concerning recruitment, to any civilservice of the State or to any civil post under the Slate; (b) all service matters concerning a person [not being a personreferred to in clause (c) of this sub-section or a member, person orcivilian referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 14] appointed to any civil service of the State or any civil post under the Stateand pertaining to the service of such person in connection with the affairsof the State or of any local or other authority under the control of thestatement or of any corporation or society owned or controlled by thestate Government; (c) all service matters pertaining to service in connection with theaffairs of the State concerning a person appointed to any service or postreferred to in clause (b), being a person whose services have been placedby any such local or other authority or corporation or society or otherbody as is controlled or owned by the Slate Government at the disposal ofthe State Government for such appointment. (2) The State Government may, by notification, apply with effect fromsuch date as may be specified in the notification the provisions ofsub-section (3) to local or other authorities and corporations or societiescontrolled or owned by the State Government: provided that if the State Government considers it expedient so to do forthe purpose of facilitating transition to the scheme as envisaged by this Act,different dates may be so specified under this sub-section in respect ofdifferent classes of, or different categories under any class of, local or other authorities or corporations or societies. (3) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Administrativetribunal for a State shall also exercise on and from the date with effect fromwhich the provisions of this sub-section apply to any local or other authorityor corporation or society, all the jurisdiction, powers and authorityexercisable immediately before that date by all courts (except the Supremecourt) in relation to, (a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment to any service orpost in connection with the affairs of such local or other authority or corporation or society; and (b) all service matters concerning a person [other than a personreferred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of this section or a member,person or civilian referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 14] appointed to any service or post in connection with the affairs of suchlocal or other authority or corporation or society and pertaining to theservice of such person in connection with such affairs. (4) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the jurisdiction,powers and authority of the Administrative Tribunal for a State shall notextend to, or be exercisable in relation to, any matters in relation to whichthe jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrativetribunal extends or is exercisable. ""28. Exclusion of jurisdiction of courts except the Supreme Court underarticle 136 of the Constitution. On and from the date from which anyjurisdiction, powers and authority become exercisable under this Act by atribunal in relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment toany service or post or service matters concerning members of any service orpersons appointed to any service or post, no court except (a) the Supreme Court; or (b)any Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or other authority constitutedunder the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) orany other corresponding law for the time being in force,shall have, or be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority inrelation to such recruitment or matters concerning such recruitment orsuch service matters. "in the light of the above provisions, the question would be whether the writpetitions, in which the Constitutional validity of service laws had beenchallenged, could be decided only by the Administrative Tribunal, as a result ofwhich the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitutionwould stand excluded. "in the light of the above provisions, the question would be whether the writpetitions, in which the Constitutional validity of service laws had beenchallenged, could be decided only by the Administrative Tribunal, as a result ofwhich the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitutionwould stand excluded. In other words, whether notwithstanding theseprovisions, the writ jurisdiction of the High Court still continue to be exercised?this aspect, in so far as it related to Central Administrative Tribunal,came to be considered in S. M. Pattanaik v Secretary to Governmentof India, ILR 1986 (4) Kar. 3954, in which it was held by Rama Jois, J. , as follows:"neither Article 323-A nor Section 2 (r) which defines 'service matter' norsection 14, 28 or 29, provide that disputes and complaints which could beraised before the tribunal would include questions relating to the constitutionalvalidity of the law regulating the conditions of service and recruitmentof civil servants. A jurisdiction of that magnitude has to be conferredand cannot be inferred. Therefore, the very absence of a provision in Article323-A of the Constitution which enables the Parliament to confer onan Administrative Tribunal the jurisdiction to decide the Constitutional validityof the laws, constitutes a strong ground to say that judicial review of legislation,which is expressly conferred on the courts established by the Constitutionitself, namely, the High Court and the Supreme Court, which wasexclusive before the insertion of Article 323-A continues to be exclusiveeven after its insertion. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case ofdikshitulu, if the Parliament intended to include officers and servants ofhigh Court and subordinate courts and members of judicial service in theexpression 'civil servants' the Parliament would have expressly stated so. Similarly in this case if the Parliament intended that the Administrativetribunal to be constituted under a law enacted by the Legislature, should beinvested with the jurisdiction to decide Constitutional validity of the lawsregulating the conditions of service, it would have used the words 'includingquestions relating to the Constitutional validity of laws regulating recruitmentand conditions of service' after the words 'disputes and complaints' used inarticle 323-A of the Constitution, particularly when the jurisdiction todecide the Constitutional validity of all laws was vested in the High Court byvirtue of Article 226 and 228 and continued to be vested in the High Courtby Article 228-A introduced by Section 42 of the 42nd Amendment itself. The very fact that such words are not included in Article 323-A (1) after thewords 'disputes and complaints' takes the jurisdiction to decide theconstitutional validity of the Laws outside the purview of Clause (1) andconsequently outside the purview of the Administrative Tribunal constitutedpursuant to a law made pursuant to the power given under the Article andtherefore the exclusion of jurisdiction of the High Court which could beprovided for in view of clause (d) and the overriding effect given to Article323-Aby Clause (3) thereof, would not operate in respect of the jurisdictionof the High Court to decide Constitutional validity of any law regulatingrecruitment and conditions of service. "this decision has become final since it was not appealed against. It is this view which has been reiterated by the Division Bench. However, in S. P. Sampath Kumar v Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 386 : 1986jt (SC) 996 decision of a Constitution Bench, though several contentions wereurged, ultimately the contentions canvassed at the time of hearing were thefollowing:" (1) Judicial review is a fundamental aspect of the basic structure of ourconstitution and bar of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 as contained in Section 28 of the Act cannot be sustained. (2) Even if the bar of jurisdiction is upheld, the tribunal being asubstitute of the High Court, its constitution and set up should be such thatit would in fact function as such substitute and become an institution inwhich the parties could repose faith and trust. (3) Benches of the tribunal should not only be established at the seat ofevery High Court but should be available at every place where the Highcourts have permanent Benches. (4) So far as tribunals set up or to be set up by the Central or the Stategovernments are concerned, they should have no jurisdiction in respect ofemployees of the Supreme Court or members of the subordinate judiciaryand employees working in such establishments inasmuch as exercise ofjurisdiction of the tribunal would interfere with the control absolutelyvested in the respective High Court in regard to the judicial and othersub-ordinate officers under Article 235 of the Constitution. In answering the first of the contentions it was held that havingregard to the express provisions contained in Article 323-A, the conferment of power ofjudicial review in respect of matters falling under the said Article, viz. In answering the first of the contentions it was held that havingregard to the express provisions contained in Article 323-A, the conferment of power ofjudicial review in respect of matters falling under the said Article, viz. , disputes andcomplaints relating to service matters, on the Administrative Tribunal andthereby excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226, couldnot be regarded as affecting the basic structure of the constitution. As regards contentions 2 to 4, observations were made in regard to the constitution of the tribunal and the qualification of the members of the tribunal, and that does not concern us in this case. The matter does not rest here. In J. B. Chopra v Union of India, AIR 1987 SC357, which came to be decided by a Division Bench consisting of two learned Judges, special leave was sought on the ground that the Administrative Tribunal had struck down certain rules framed under Article 309 of theconstitution by the President and the tribunal had no such jurisdiction. This argument was repelled, and in so doing, reference was made to Sampath Kumar's case, and in paragraph-2 it was observed as under:"2. In S. P. Sampath Kumar v Union of India, 1986 JT (SC) 996: AIR 1987sc 386, the Constitution Bench has held that the Act is a law made byparliament under Clause (1) of Article 323-A to exclude the jurisdiction ofthe High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Section 28of the Act which bars the jurisdiction of all courts except the Supreme Courtis relatable to Clause 2 (d) of Article 323-A for adjudication of servicematters including questions involving the validity or otherwise of such lawson the ground that they abridge the fundamental rights under Articles 14and 16 (1) of the Constitution, and that the Administrative Tribunal set upunder Section 4 of the Act is a substitute of, and not supplemental to, thehigh Court providing an equally efficacious alternative remedy foradjudication of such disputes. It has further held that the establishment ofthe Administrative Tribunal under the Act therefore lakes away thejurisdiction and power of the High Court to interfere in such matters but itis not violative of the doctrine of judicial review which is a fundamental aspect of the basic structure of our Constitution because Section 28 of the Act which bars the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution preserves the jurisdiction and power of the Supremecourt under Articles 32 and 136 of the Constitution. It accordingly followsthat the Administrative Tribunal being a substitute of the High Court had thenecessary jurisdiction, power and authority to adjudicate upon all disputesrelating to service matters including the power to deal with all questions pertaining to the Constitutional validity or otherwise of such laws as offending Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution. That being so, the contention advanced by the petitioners that the Administrative Tribunal had no authorityor jurisdiction to strike down the impugned notification dated March 15,1980,purporting to amend Rule 4 of the Centra! Hindi Directorate (Class III andclass IV) Posts Recruitment Rules, 1961, reserving 100 per cent vacancies tothe post of Superintendent to be filled by the Head Clerks and thereby debarring Stenographers (Sr.)from being considered for promotion to that post, as beingwholly mala fide, arbitrary and irrational and thus offending Articles 14 and16 (1) of the Constitution, must therefore fail" (emphasis supplied)THE Division Bench which has made this reference to us, proceeded to considerwhether the statement contained in Cnopra 's case, could be regarded as adeclaration of law within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Thedivision Bench also referred to Municipal Corporation of Delhi v Gurunamkaur, 1989 SCC 101 , and ultimately concluded that having regard to the greatconstitutional importance of the question which affects the jurisdiction of thehigh Courts, the two questions will have to be referred to a Full Bench. Thus,the matter is before us. ( 2 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that in Sampath Kumar's case, the precise question which arises in this case, viz. whetherthe Administrative Tribunal constituted under Article 323-A of the Constitutioncould decide the Constitutional validity of service laws, was not decided. Theobservation in Chopra's case to the effect that such a question has been decidedin the affirmative in Sampath Kumar's case is not warranted. whetherthe Administrative Tribunal constituted under Article 323-A of the Constitutioncould decide the Constitutional validity of service laws, was not decided. Theobservation in Chopra's case to the effect that such a question has been decidedin the affirmative in Sampath Kumar's case is not warranted. Therefore, it isurged before us that the decision of the learned single Judge in S. M. Pattanaik'scase must be held to be good law. As a matter of fact, that is thecorrect approach; otherwise, the consequences would be startling. Further, if really thejurisdiction to decide the Constitutional validity as well, was intended to beconferred on the Administrative Tribunal, it would have specifically slated so. In so far as that not having been done, it cannot be assumed. Article 323-Amerely states 'disputes and complaints'. Only concerning this, the jurisdictionof the High Court would stand excluded, but not with regard to the adjudicationof Constitutional validity of Service Laws. ( 3 ) THE learned Attorney-General of India, on notice from this court, submits that this is an extremely important question and the power of judicialreview being one of the basic structures of the Constitution is vested in thesupreme Court and the High Courts. In this regard, he draws our attention tothe proviso to Section 113, CPC, as well as Section 395, Cr. P. C. Under boththese provisions, the function of declaring the unconstitutionality is only withthe High Court. He then draws our attention to Article 32 of the Constitution,particularly to Clause (4), where without prejudice to the powers of thesupreme Court the Parliament may empower any other court to exercise suchpower. In this context, Article 226 (4) will have to be seen because that clearlystates that the power conferred on the High Court to issue certain writs is not tobe in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by Clause (2) ofarticle 32. The power of superintendence by the High Court under Article 227is not available over a tribunal constituted under law. Then again, under Article228 the High Court could withdraw to its file any case pending in a courtsubordinate to it if a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of theconstitution is necessary to be determined for the disposal of the case. Then again, under Article228 the High Court could withdraw to its file any case pending in a courtsubordinate to it if a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of theconstitution is necessary to be determined for the disposal of the case. Article 371-D, Clause (7) makes it clear and states that the High Court shall have no powerof superintendence over the Administrative Tribunal and no other court thanthe Supreme Court could exercise the jurisdiction with regard to any matterconferred on the Administrative Tribunal. When Article 323-Astatesadjudication or trial, whether it will take within its ambit the Constitutional validity ofany law is the question; Clause (2), sub-clause (d) again refers to disputes andcomplaints referred to in Clause (1); further, Clause (3) is a non-obstanteclause. While constituting the Administrative Tribunal under the Act, thepreamble itself refers to Article 323-A. In Section 3 (q) while defining 'servicematters' it says that such a jurisdiction is conferred exclusively on the tribunal. No doubt in S. M. Pattanaik 's case, the learned single Judge took the view thatthe exclusion must be express and it cannot be by way of implication. Theexclusive jurisdiction talked of in that case must be understood in the backgroundset up in paragraph-14 of the judgment. It is true that in Sampath Kumar's case, the specific question whether thehigh Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 stands excluded did not come up forconsideration. The observations in that case must be understood as having beenmade when the court wanted to repel an argument that such exclusion would beopposed to the basic structure. It did hold that the Administrative Tribunal is asubstitute for the High Court. Based on this, in Chopra's case, when a specificquestion which has now arisen before us was sought to be decided, it was heldthat such jurisdiciion of the High Court would stand excluded. In other words,the Administrative Tribunal was competent to decide all questions pertainingto the Constitutional validity as well, as violalive of Articles 14 and 16 of theconstitution. In Union of India v Parma Nanda, AIR 1989 SC 1185 , it was heldin paragraph 18 that the tribunal could exercise such powers which the civilcourt or High Court could have exercised by way of judicial review; it is neitherless nor more. In Union of India v Parma Nanda, AIR 1989 SC 1185 , it was heldin paragraph 18 that the tribunal could exercise such powers which the civilcourt or High Court could have exercised by way of judicial review; it is neitherless nor more. As a matter of fact, in Union of India v A. I. S. Pensioners' Asociation, air 1988 SC 501 , it has been held that where there is an order dismissinga special leave petition giving reasons therefor such a decision would be bindingas a precedent under Article 141. Therefore, this court is bound by the same andit is not open to this court to hold that this is not a declaration of law underarticle 141 of the Constitution. In Chopra's case, the Supreme Court has chosento interpret Sampath Kumar's case in a particular manner. Whether thatinterpretation was warranted or not, this court cannot decide. Till, of course, thesupreme Court interprets in future and lays down a contrary ruling, it ischopra's case, which will govern the field. ( 4 ) IT cannot be gainsaid that this is an important question having far-reaching consequences. As rightly submitted by the learned Attorney-General, the power of judicial review which is one of the basic structures of the Constitution, has been vested in the Supreme Court and the High Courts, First, we will refer to the proviso to Section 113, CPC, whichreads:"provided that where the Court is satisfied that a case pending before itinvolves a question as to the validity of any Act, Ordinance or Regulation or ofany provision contained in an Act, Ordinance or Regulation, the determinationof which is necessary for the disposal of the case, and is of opinion thatsuch Act, Ordinance, Regulation or provision is invalid or inoperative, buthas not been so declared by the High Court to which that Court is subordinateor by the Supreme Court, the court shall state a case setting out itsopinion and the reasons therefor, and refer the same for the opinion of thehigh Court. "similar is Section 395, Cr. P. C If that be so, it is inconceivable that such a powercould be exercised by any other court. Rightly, reference is made to Article226 (4) by the learned Attorney-General, which we will extract now:" (4) The power conferred on a High Court by this Article shall not be inderogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by Clause (2) ofarticle 32. Rightly, reference is made to Article226 (4) by the learned Attorney-General, which we will extract now:" (4) The power conferred on a High Court by this Article shall not be inderogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by Clause (2) ofarticle 32. "the importance of such power being conferred on the High Court can also begathered by reference to Article 228 which reads:"228. Transfer of certain cases to High Court. If the High Court is satisfiedthat a case pending in a court subordinate to it involves a substantialquestion of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution the determinationof which is necessary for the disposal of the case, it shall withdraw thecase and may, (a) either dispose of the case itself; or (b) determine the said question of law and return the case to the courtfrom which the case has been so withdrawn together with a copy of itsjudgment on such question, and the said court shall on receipt thereof,proceed to dispose of the case in conformity with such judgment. "even under Article 371-D which is a special provision with respect to the Stateof Andhra Pradesh, in Clause (7) all that is stated is as follows:" (7) The High Court for the State shall not have any powers ofsuperintendence over the Administrative Tribunal and no court (other thanthe Supreme Court) or tribunal shall exercise any jurisdiction, power orauthority in respect of any matter subject to the jurisdiction, power orauthority of, or in relation to, the Administrative Tribunal. "article 323-A, Clause (1) states:"parliament may, by law, provide for the adjudication or trial byadministrative Tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect torecruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services andposts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of anylocal or other authority within the territory of India or under the control ofthe Government of India or of any corporation owned or controlled by thegovernment. "the question, therefore, would be whether the adjudication or trial by theadministrative Tribunal of disputes and complaints would take within it,the Constitutional validity as well, In Clause (2), sub-clause (d) of the said Article,reference is made to Clause (1) in the following terms:" (2) A law made under Clause (1) may (d) exclude the jurisdiction of all courts, except the jurisdiction of thesupreme Court under Article 136, with respect to the disputes orcomplaints referred to in Clause (1 ). "we will now see the definition of 'service matters' occurring in Section 3 (q) ofthe Act which reads:" (Q) 'service matters' in relation to a person, means all matters relating tothe conditions of his service in connection with the affairs of the Union or ofany State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India orunder the control of the Government of India, or as the case may be, of anycorporation or society owned or controlled by the Government asrespect, (i) remuneration (including allowances), pension and other retirement benefits; (ii) tenure including confirmation, seniority, promotion, revision,premature retirement and superannuation; (iii) leave of any kind; (iv) disciplinary matters; or (v) any other matter whatsoever. "though it is comprehensive enough, does it take within it, the power to declarea rule or statute as valid? While we are on this, It is necessary to refer to Sections15 and 28 of the Act which we have already extracted. This is the scheme ofarticle 323-A and the Act as we see. ( 5 ) THE learned single Judge in S. M. Pattanaik's case, has held that not with standing the constitution of the Administrative Tribunal of coursethe case related to the Central Administrative Tribunal the jurisdiction ofthis Court under Article 226 to decide the Constitutional validity is not taken away. The learned Judge has given valid and cogent reasons for holding so. Of course, the Judgment has become final since it had not been appealed against. However, in Sampath Kumar's case, this specific question did not arise forconsideration. The learned Judge has given valid and cogent reasons for holding so. Of course, the Judgment has become final since it had not been appealed against. However, in Sampath Kumar's case, this specific question did not arise forconsideration. However, in paragraph 4, Bhagwati, C. J. , has observed asfollows:"it is necessary to bear in mind that service matters which are removed fromthe jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of theconstitution and entrusted to the Administrative Tribunal set up under theimpugned Act for adjudication involve questions of interpretation andapplicability of Articles 14,15,16 and 311 in quite a large number of cases. These questions require for their determination not only judicial approachbut also knowledge and expertise in this particular branch of Constitutionallaw. It is necessary that those who adjudicate upon these questions shouldhave same modicum of legal training and judicial experience because wefind that some of these questions are so difficult and complex that theybaffle the minds of even trained Judges in the High Courts and the Supremecourt. That is the reason why at the time of the preliminary hearing of thesewrit petitions we insisted that every bench of the Administrative Tribunalshould consist of one judicial member, one administrative member andthereshould be no preponderance of administrative members on any bench. Of course, the presence of the administrative member would provide inputof practical experience in the functioning of the services and add to theefficiency of the Administrative Tribunal but the legal input would undeniablybe more important, and sacrificing the legal input or not giving itsufficient weightage would definitely impair the efficacy and effectiveness ofthe Administrative Tribunal as compared to the High Court. Now Section 6provided that the Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal should be orshould have been a Judge of the High Court or he should have for at leasttwo years held office of Vice-Chairman or he should have for at least twoyears held the post of Secretary to the Government of India or any otherpost under the Central or State Government carrying a scale of pay which isnot less than that of a Secretary to the Government of India. I entirely agreewith Ranganath Misra, J. , that the Chairman of the Administrative Tribunalshould be or should have been a Judge of a High Court or he should have forat least two years held office as Vice-Chairman. I entirely agreewith Ranganath Misra, J. , that the Chairman of the Administrative Tribunalshould be or should have been a Judge of a High Court or he should have forat least two years held office as Vice-Chairman. If he has held office asvice-Chairman for a period of at least two years he would have gathered sufficientexperience and also within such period of two years, acquired reasonablefamiliarity with the Constitutional and legal questions involved in servicematters. But substituting the Chief Justice of a High Court by a Chairman ofthe Administrative Tribunal who has merely held the post of a Secretary tothe Government and who has no legal or judicial experience would not onlyfail to inspire confidence in the public mind but would also render theadministrative Tribunal a much less effective and efficacious mechanism thanthe High Court. We cannot afford to forget that it is the High Court which isbeing supplanted by the Administrative Tribunal and it must be so manned asto inspire confidence in the public mind that it is a highly competent andexpert mechanism with judicial approach and objectivity. Of course, I mustmake it clear that when I say this, I do not wish to cast any reflection on themembers of the Civil Services because fortunately we have, in our country,brilliant civil servants who possess tremendous sincerity, drive and initiativeand who have remarkable capacity to resolve and overcome administrativeproblems of great complexity. . . . . . . . . " (emphasis supplied) then again in paragraph 15, Ranganalh Misra, X, as he then was, has observedas follows:"15. Exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Courts in service matters andits propriety as also validity have thus to be examined in the background indicatedabove. We have already seen that judieial review by this Court is leftwholly unaffected and thus there is a forum where matters of importanceand grave injustice can be brought for determination or rectification. Thusexclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court does not totally bar judicialreview. This Court in Minerva Mills case, AIR 1980 SC 1789 , did point outthat 'effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements forjudicial review' can be madeby Parliament. Thus it is possible to setup an alternative institution in place of the High Court for providing judicial review. Thusexclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court does not totally bar judicialreview. This Court in Minerva Mills case, AIR 1980 SC 1789 , did point outthat 'effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements forjudicial review' can be madeby Parliament. Thus it is possible to setup an alternative institution in place of the High Court for providing judicial review. The debates and deliberations spread over almost two decades for exploringways and means for relieving the High Courts of the load of backlog of casesand for assuring quick settlement of service disputes in the interest of thepublic servants as also the country cannot be lost sight of while consideringthis aspect. It has not been disputed before us and perhaps could not havebeen that the tribunal under the scheme of the Act would lake over pan of theexisting backlog and a share of the normal load of the High Conns. Thetribunal has been contemplated as a substitute and not as supplemental to thehigh Court in the scheme of administration of justice. To provide the tribunalas an additional forum from where parlies could go to the High Court wouldcertainly have been a retrograde step considering the situation andcircumstances to meet which the innovation has been brought about. Thusbarring of the jurisdiction of the High Court can indeed not be a validground of attack. " (emphasis supplied) it was these observations which led the Division Bench in Chopra's case tocome to the conclusion that the Administrative Tribunal being a substitute ofthe High Court had the necessary jurisdiction and power and authority toadjudicate upon all disputes relating to service matters including the power todeal with questions pertaining to the Constitutional validity or otherwise ofsuch laws as offending Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution. We do notknow how, as rightly urged by the learned Attorney-General, this Court couldtake the view that the interpretation placed in Chopra's case, is warranted ornot. We are of the view that it may not be open to us to do so. In fact, whiledeclining to grant special leave in Chopra's case, this very question came up fordecision and it has rendered such a decision. We find no escape from thedecision unless of course the Supreme Court itself holds otherwisewhile interpreting Sampath Kumar's case, in an appropriate case in future. In fact, whiledeclining to grant special leave in Chopra's case, this very question came up fordecision and it has rendered such a decision. We find no escape from thedecision unless of course the Supreme Court itself holds otherwisewhile interpreting Sampath Kumar's case, in an appropriate case in future. As a matter offact, in Param Nanda's case, while deciding the question whether the tribunalhas power to interfere with the punishment awarded by the disciplinaryauthority on the ground it was disproportionate to the proved misconduct, thescope of the Act and some other provisions came to be dealt with as under (paragraphs 17 and 18):-"17. The Act thus excludes the jurisdiction, power and authority of all courtsexcept the Supreme Court and confers the same on the tribunal in relationto recruitment and service matters. Section 3 (2) comprehensively defines'service matters' to mean all matters relating to conditions of service including the disciplinary matters. 18. From an analysis of Sections 14,15,16, 27, 28 and 29, it becomesapparent that in the case of proceedings transferred to the tribunal from a civilcourt or High Court, the tribunal has the jurisdiction to exercise all thepowers which the civil court could in a suit or the High Court in a writproceeding could have respectively exercised. In an original proceedinginstituted before the tribunal under Section 19, the tribunal can exercise anyof the powers of a civil court or the High Court. The tribunal thus couldexercise only such powers which the civil court or the High Court could haveexercised by way of judicial review. It is neither less nor more. Because, thetribunal is just a substitute to the civil court and High Court. That has beenput beyond the pale of controversy by this Court while upholding Constitutionalvalidity of the Act in S. P. Sampat Kumar v Union of India, (1987)1scc 124 : AIR 1987 SC 386 . In this view, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel forthe petitioners that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 todecide Constitutional validity or otherwise of service laws is not taken away. Weaccept the submissions of the learned Attorney-General that it is not for us tohold that the decision rendered in Chopra's case, would not constitute astatement of law under Article 141 though that was not the actual decision insampath Kumar's case. Weaccept the submissions of the learned Attorney-General that it is not for us tohold that the decision rendered in Chopra's case, would not constitute astatement of law under Article 141 though that was not the actual decision insampath Kumar's case. In this regard, we may usefully refer to AIR 1988 SC 501 , (AIS Pensioners' case) in which it is observed in paragraph 6 as follows:". . . . . . . . . THE first ground relied on by the tribunal not to follow the saiddecision is that it had been rendered by this Court while dismissing somespecial leave petitions. This is a wholly untenable ground. The special leavepetitions were not dismissed without reasons. This Court had given reasonsfor dismissing the special leave petitions. When such reasons are given thedecision becomes one which attracts Article 141 of the Constitution whichprovides that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on allthe courts within the territory of India. . . . . "insofar as reasons having been given in Chopra's case, for declining to grantspecial leave, it would constitute a binding precedent under Article 141 of theconstitution. If the Supreme Court has viewed Sampath Kumar' case, in aparticular way, we are bound by the same as a precedent under Article 141. ( 6 ) ACCORDINGLY, we answer Question No. 1 in the affirmative. In view of our answer to Question No. 1, answer to Question No. 2 does not arise. --- *** --- .