This is an application under Rule 36 of the Rules for the Administra­tion of Justice and Police in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills, 1937. The opposite party No. 2 (Srati. Willis Ryngkhlem) is the wife of the petitioner. She belongs to Pnar Community of Jowai. They are Christians. They were married in Presbyterian Church at Jowai in February 1977. Since then they have lived in the house of the opposite party No. 2 at Jowai according to the custom of the Thar Community. They had a daughter (Lichen Ryngkhlem j who was born in 1978 and a son (Khwaug Pha Ryngkhlem) who was born in S930. On 16. 12. 83 the petitioner left Jowai with the two minor children and lived at Sliillong. He did not return to opposite party No. 2 nor sent the two minors to her. The opposite party No. 2 therefore, filed an application on 18. 5. 85 in the Court of learned Additional Deputy Commissioner at Jowai for appointing her as guardian of the said minor children. In that application she prayed for directing the petitioner to produce both the minor children before the Court at Jowai for giving her the interim custody. The petitioner filed objection to the application. The grounds on which he objected were : 1) Jowai District is a Scheduled District and partially excluded area. So the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 does not apply to that area unless it is extended by a notification, and as the Act does not apply, the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner, Jowai has no power to take the instant proceeding to appoint a guardian. 2) Even if the Act is applicable to that district, the minors were residing at Shillong when the application was filed. Therefore, the jurisdiction of Jowai Court is barred by section 9 of the Act. The learned Additional Deputy Commissioner heard both the parties. On the first point he held that the Act would automatically apply to the Scheduled District and partially excluded area and a notification would be necessary only to exclude its application to such area. So he held that he had the power to take the, proceeding to appoint a guardian for the minors. On the first point he held that the Act would automatically apply to the Scheduled District and partially excluded area and a notification would be necessary only to exclude its application to such area. So he held that he had the power to take the, proceeding to appoint a guardian for the minors. On the second point he was of the view that the words "the words the place where the minors ordinarily resides" in section 9 of the Act did not mean the place where the minor temporarily resides. When the application was filed the minors admittedly were residing with the petitioner at Shillong only temporarily. As Jowai was the place where the minors had permanent residence he was of the view that the Court at Jowai had the jurisdiction to entertain the application. Thus he rejected the objection and directed the petitioner to produce the children before his Court. Hence this revision. Mr. S. Dutta, learned counsel for the petitioner urged the same points before me. He contended that the provisions of the Act could be made applicable to Jowai District only by notification under the Scheduled District Act, 1874. Notice was issued to learned Advocate General Meghalaya to assist this Court on this point. Mr. N. M. Lahin, learned Advocate General, Meghalaya has fairly conceded that the Act could be made applicable to the Scheduled District and partially excluded area only by a notification under the Scheduled District Act, or under the Assam General Clauses Act or under the Government of India Act, 1935. He admitted that there was no such notification to extend the Act to Jowai District. I, therefore, held that the Act does not apply to Jowai District. Mr. Lahiri, however maintained that although the Act is not applicable to Scheduled District and partially excluded area, the power of the Court to appoint a guardian of minor in those areas is saved by section 6 of the Act if such an appointment is valid by the law to which the minor is subject. Section 6 of the Act reads as below ; "In the case of minor nothing in this Act shall be construed to take away or derogate from any power to appoint a guardian of his person or property or both, which is valid by the law to which the minor is subject". Section 6 of the Act reads as below ; "In the case of minor nothing in this Act shall be construed to take away or derogate from any power to appoint a guardian of his person or property or both, which is valid by the law to which the minor is subject". In the instant case the minors are subject to Pnar Customary Law. It is not the case of the petitioner that the mother cannot be appointed as guardian of the minor children under the Customary Law of the Pnar Community. I am, therefore, of the opinion that although the Act does not apply to Jowai District, section 6 of the Act saves the power of the Court to appoint a guardian where such an appointm­ent is valid by the law to which a minor is subject. The learned Additional Deputy Commissioner, Jowai, therefore, has the power to take the proceedings to appoint a guardian in the instant case. The next contention of Mr. Dutta is that the minors were resid­ing at Shillong when the application was filed at Jowai. He, therefore, submits that in view of section 9 of the Act only District Court of Shillong would have the jurisdiction to entertain the application. Section 9 of the Act read as below : "If the application is with respect to the guardianship of the person of the minor, it shall be made to the District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides". Mr. Dutta submits that in view of this section the Court at Jowai has no jurisdiction to entertain the application. Mr. B. M. Mahanta, learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2 has in reply contended that the permanent residence of the minors are at Jowai and it cannot therefore be said that the minors were "ordinarily resides" do not mean temporary residence of the minors and on this point he placed reliance on Mai Saha vs. Smti. Bosanta Sana, (1989) 1 GLR 103 . In that case it was held that the words "ordinarily resides' appearing in section 9 of the Act mean more than a temporary residence even though such period may be consid­erable, and were temporary residence or by compulsion at a place however long, cannot be equated to, or treated as the place of ordinary residence. In that case it was held that the words "ordinarily resides' appearing in section 9 of the Act mean more than a temporary residence even though such period may be consid­erable, and were temporary residence or by compulsion at a place however long, cannot be equated to, or treated as the place of ordinary residence. In that case the minors were residing at Shillong only by compu­lsion of the petitioner and it is not also the petitioner's case that the minors were not residing at Shillong only temporarily. In view of the decision cited above it must be held that ordinarily the minors are residents of Jowai and therefore the jurisdiction of the Court at Jowai is not barred by section 9 of the Act. It is made clear that in deciding the custody of the minors, the Court has to see to the best interest of the minors. So when the minors are produced before Court at Jowai the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner will carefully explain to the children and ascerta­in their wishes and decide the interim custody to suit their best interest. In the result there is no force in this revision which therefore fails and is dismissed. I make no order as to costs.