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1990 DIGILAW 58 (GUJ)

AHMEDABAD MILITARY AND RIFLE TRAINING ASSOCIATION v. HARSIDHBHAI GOVINDLAL SHAH

1990-04-18

R.A.MEHTA

body1990
MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THE respondent-original plaintiff filed a suit for injunction restraining the appellant-Association from holding the Annual General Meeting of the Association on Saturday, 7/04/1990 at 5-00 p. m. pursuant to the notice and not to transact any business as mentioned in the agenda of the said meeting annexed to the notice. The said notice of Annual General Meeting to be held on 7/04/1990 at 5-00 p. m. was for the following agenda items. (1) Approval of the minutes of the last meeting. (2) To consider the audited accounts and annual report for the year ending on 31/03/1989. (3) To elect members of the governing body of the Association in place of six retiring members (one of them was the respondent-plaintiff ). There was also a note that if polling is necessary, the same would be held on Saturday (Sunday), 8/04/1990 between 9-00 a. m. to 5-00 p. m. (4) To appoint auditors for the year 1989-90 and to fix their remuneration. (5) To consider such other material which may be permitted by the President. ( 2 ) THE respondent-plaintiff, while filing the suit on 4-4-1990, also took out a notice of motion for temporary injunction and the learned trial Judge granted ex parte injunction as prayed for limited upto 16-4-1990. It is not understood as to what is the meaning of limiting this interim relief upto 16-4-1990 when the interim relief was to the effect that the respondents are restrained from holding annual General Meeting on 9-4-1990. ( 3 ) THE main ground of challenge was based on Rule 29 of the Association which reads as follows :"fifteen clear days notice shall be given of every Annual or Special General Meeting to all the Members together with the Agenda for the same". It was submitted that the notice of the Annual General Meeting to the members together with agenda was posted on 27-3-1990 and was received by the respondent-plaintiff on 30-3-1990 and the meeting was to be held on 7-4-1990 and, therefore, there was no notice of 15 clear days as contemplated by Rule 29 and, therefore, the meeting and the election are illegal and, therefore, injunction should be granted to prevent such holding of illegal meeting. ( 4 ) AGAINST this ex parte interim order, which was served on the appellant- association on 6/04/1990 evening, an appeal was moved before me on 7-4-1990. ( 4 ) AGAINST this ex parte interim order, which was served on the appellant- association on 6/04/1990 evening, an appeal was moved before me on 7-4-1990. On that day, in the evening, I admitted the appeal and stayed the impugned order and fixed the appeal for final hearing At. that time. Mr. Gandhi had appeared for the respondent-plaintiff. ( 5 ) THE appellants submit that the respondent-plaintiff is a member of the outgoing governing body and in the governing body meeting of 9-3-1990, he was present in the meeting and a decision was taken to hold the Annual General meeting on 7-4-1990 and in pursuance thereto, a public notice was issued in sandesh dated 21-3-1990 notifying that the Annual General Meeting of the association would be held on 7-4-1990 at 5-00 p. m. and in place of the members retiring by rotation, election will be held on 8-4-1990 and that the nomination forms shall be filed between 23-3-1990 to 28-3-1990 and more particulars could be obtained from the notice board of the Association. It is also submitted that the respondent-plaintiff had also obtained the nomination form on 23-3-1990 and had filled in the same and the respondent-plaintiff had suppressed all these material facts while obtaining ex parte interim order. It is, therefore, submitted that there was substantial compliance of 15 days notice because public notice would be the notice to all the members and it was a notice of clear 15 days and the plaintiff had the notice and he had obtained and filled in the form of nomination. ( 6 ) ON the other hand, Mr. Gandhi, learned Counsel for the respondentplaintiff submits that all these facts were not material and, therefore, there is no suppression of material facts. The material fact according to the respondentplaintiff is individual notice to the members which the petitioner had received on 30-3-1990 and the election was to be held on 7-4-1990 and if such election was permitted to be held, such meeting and election would be illegal and, therefore, the plaintiff has rightly approached the Court for preventing such illegality. ( 7 ) THE plaintiff is a member of the outgoing governing body of the association and he retires by rotation and in his place, the election was to be held and he wanted to contest the election and, therefore, he filed his nomination paper. ( 7 ) THE plaintiff is a member of the outgoing governing body of the association and he retires by rotation and in his place, the election was to be held and he wanted to contest the election and, therefore, he filed his nomination paper. However, he goes to the Court at eleventh hour on 4-4-1990 even though, to his knowledge, he received notice on 30-3-1990. If he had gone to the Court earlier, the Court could have issued notice to the other side and ascertained all the facts and could have passed appropriate orders. However, the plaintiff deliberately went to the Court at eleventh hour and even after obtaining interim order on 4-4-1990, he served the interim order only in the evening of 6-4- 1990 whereas the meeting was to be held on 7-4-1990. This is also an aspect to be borne in mind. The trial Court should have seen that even though the plaintiff could have come earlier, he had not come earlier and for which he has not given any satisfactory explanation. The explanation given by him is too flimsy. The explanation for the intervening holidays is also worthless. Even on holidays, the Courts are available for urgent orders. In fact, this matter was also moved before me on holiday at my resider. ( 8 ) THE material question is whether the plaintiff has prima facie case in the suit and whether in election matters, any interim order could be granted to prevent the functioning of democratice process and holding of election and that too ex parte. It does not require any emphasise that it is always easy to find some or the other error, omission or irregularity in the conduct of election process of which is in many different stages. At some stage or the other, it is possible for an ingenious mind to find out some defect and to make legal argument about the same. On such grounds, if elections are to be stayed, no election can proceed or can be held and it is easy for a person who wants to prevent election to get interim order and the present case is clearly of that kind. However, election is the heart of democracy and democratic functioning and such democratic functioning is not to be stopped by interim orders and certainly not by ex parte interim orders. However, election is the heart of democracy and democratic functioning and such democratic functioning is not to be stopped by interim orders and certainly not by ex parte interim orders. If elections are not allowed to be held, no democracy would work and if there is any material irregularity or illegality in the holding of the election, such election can be set aside. Therefore, there is a principle settled by the Courts including the Supreme Court that election process should not be stopped by interim orders and election can be challenged after the election results are declared and the election can be set aside if material illegality is shown. ( 9 ) IN the present case, there is no averment showing any material illegality or irregularity and the election result is not shown to have materially affected because the election is not allowed to be held at all. In the present case, the only ground of challenge is that there is no 15 days clear notice. If the public notice is considered as the notice to all the members, it is of clear 15 days. The respondent-plaintiff did not point out before the Court even though it was within his knowledge and even though he had filed the nomination much before he had received his individual notice. The purpose of notice is to inform all the members of the holding of the Annual General Meeting. Such public notice was issued not only in the newspaper having a very wide circulation in the city and amongst the members, but it was also published on the notice board of the Aossciation. It was a notice of clear 15 days. Individual notices have also been served and they have been received by the members. Even though that individual notice is not of 15 clear days, it is a notice to all the members and it is only the present respondent-plaintiff who has complained that the notice was of less than 15 days and no other member has made any such grievance or complaint. The petitioner had in fact the notice of more than 15 days. The petitioner had in fact the notice of more than 15 days. In view of the fact that there was 15 clear days notice by the public notice as well as by the notice on the notice board of the Association, it was a notice to all the members and there is due and substantial compliance with the requirement of Rule 29, and there is no illegality and no breach of Rule 29. Therefore, the plaintiff has no prima facie case. Further, even if the individual notice was required to be of 15 clear days, that breach of Rule 29 by itself would not vitiate the holding of the election and the election results. It would be further necessary to prove that the short notice had resulted into materially affecting the election result. Therefore also, the plaintiff has no prima facie case. As observed earlier, in election matters. Courts should not issue any interim order on the basis that election will be held illegally and on such tentative conclusion, election process cannot be prevented. It is required to take its own course and Courts should not interject into such election process and democratic functioning. As a result of the election and after the results of election, if anyone is aggrieved by the same, it is open to him to go to the Court of Law and challenge the election by proving that there was illegality and further proving that such illegality has materially affected the election result. Only at that stage, the Court can entertain dispute regarding election. If at an earlier stage disputes are entertained, democratic functioning would be prevented by the persons who may not find it convenient to face the election. ( 10 ) FOR all these reasons, the plaintiff has no prima facie case; the plaintiff has no irreparable loss if the meeting and elections are held and the plaintiff has no balance of convenience in his favour. The suit and the injunction application were clearly an abuse of the process of the Court because he had suppressed material fact and deliberately gone to the Court at eleventh hour and obtained ex parte interim injunction against the holding of the election. The suit and the injunction application were clearly an abuse of the process of the Court because he had suppressed material fact and deliberately gone to the Court at eleventh hour and obtained ex parte interim injunction against the holding of the election. ( 11 ) EVEN though the plaintiff has no prima facie case and had obtained ex parte injunction against the holding of the meeting on 7-4-1990 the date has gone, the meeting could not be held and he has practically succeeded in the suit even though there is no merit in it. Therefore, it would be necessary to put the clock back as far as possible by giving appropriate directions. Therefore, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order of the trial Court is set aside giving the following directions. These directions are given with a view to see that further flimsy controversies are avoided and election process is not hampered by any other mode. (1) The appellant-Association shall hold the adjourned Annual General meeting which was scheduled to be held on 7th and 8/04/1990 on 12th and 13/05/1990 and the nominations which were filed for the meeting of 7/04/1990 shall continue to be valid for the adjourned meeting and the adjourned meeting shall be held on the basis of such nominations. (2) The appellant-Association shall publish a public notice of the adjourned annual General Meeting to be held on 12th and 13/05/1990 in a Gujarati daily of Ahmedabad on or before 25-4-1990. By way of abundant caution, the appellant-Association shall also post notices of Annual General Meeting to all the members under Certificate of Posting by 23-4-1990. (3) The agenda for the adjourned Annual General Meeting shall be the same as that of the Annual General Meeting which was scheduled to be held on 7th and 8/04/1990. (4) The election to the governing body which was to be held on 7th and 8/04/1990 shall now be held on 13/05/1990 at the end of the Annual General Meeting. The entire cost of stationery, printing, postage and of publication in the newspaper shall be borne by the respondent-plaintiff. It is quantified at rs. 4,000/ -. The respondent shall also pay the costs of this appeal to the appellant- association quantified at Rs. 500. 00 (Rs. Five hundred only ). The respondent is directed to pay costs before 31/08/1990. .