JUDGMENT 1. - This revision has been directed against the order dated 11.8.1989 passed by the Additional District Judge Gangapur City confirming the order dated 23.4.1988 passed by Munsif; Gangapur City by which he struck out defence against eviction of the petitioners. 2. Facts giving rise to this revision are that the trial court in a suit for eviction based on the ground of default in payment of rent determined the arrears of rent on 7.3.1984 and the petitioners deposited the same in time. On 27.1.1987 the petitioners submitted an application stating that they could not deposit the monthly rent for the period from 15.11.1986 to 14.12.1986 and from 15.12.1986 to 14.1.1987 in time because the petitioner No.1 Prahlad Kumar who was looking after the case was ill during this period and on that count the amount could not be deposited. The rent was offered to the father of the plaintiff but he refused to accept the same. The trial court struck out the defence of the petitioners on the ground that the petitioners were defaulters in making payment of rent for the period from 15.11.1986 to 14.12.1986. The trial court was also of the view that the petitioners failed to pay/deposit the amount of rent in time and it had no jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond fifteen days. The petitioners filed an appeal which was dismissed by the Additional District Judge Gangapur City vide his order dated 11.8.1989. The learned Judge was of the view that the petitioners failed to explain each day's delay in submitting the application. The appellate court was also of the view that the reasons given for condonation of delay by the petitioners were not sufficient. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. Shri G.C. Garg learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the delay in depositing the monthly rent for the period from 15.11.1986 to 14.12.1986 was due to the reason that the petitioner No. 1 who was looking after the case fell ill. In the alternate he argued that there was no other default in payment of monthly rent and as such the lower courts should have exercised their discretion in favour of the petitioners by condoning the delay. In support of his submission Shri Garg placed reliance on a decision of this Court in (1) Ramesh Chand Vs. In the alternate he argued that there was no other default in payment of monthly rent and as such the lower courts should have exercised their discretion in favour of the petitioners by condoning the delay. In support of his submission Shri Garg placed reliance on a decision of this Court in (1) Ramesh Chand Vs. Man Mohan Singh and another (1988(2) RLR 194) . In this case also there was only one month's default after determination of the rent. This Court held that in view of the alternative submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners that even if the same is treated as unpaid striking out defence under Section 13(5) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') was only discretionary and not mandatory. This Court held that in these circumstances the learned lower courts should have declined to strike out the defence under Section 13(5) of the Act. This Court on the basis of the judgment of Hon. Supreme Court in (2) M/s. B.P. Khemka Vs. Birendra Kumar ( AIR 1987 SC 1010 ) allowed the revision and set aside the order of the lower courts striking out the defence. The counsel for the petitioners further argued that on the same principle this Court allowed the Civil Second Appeal No. 17/1988 Mahendra Kumar Vs. Nathi Lal and remanded the case back to the trial court to decide the matter afresh keeping in view the principles laid down by Hon. Supreme Court in B.P. Khemka's case (supra). 5. Shri R.P. Garg counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner supported the orders passed by the lower courts and argued that as there was no sufficient cause shown in the application for condonation of delay the lower courts rightly struck out defence of the petitioners as the petitioners admittedly remained defaulters in payment of monthly rent for the period from 15.11.86 to 14.12.1986. In support of his arguments he placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in (3) Ram Saran Vs. Nathu Lal (1984 RLR 168 = 1984 RLW 644) . In this case this Court held that the Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time beyond 15 days. It is pertinent to note here that after the full Bench judgment in (4) Vishan Das Vs. Savitri Devi (1988(1) RLR 1) the view taken in this case has been over-ruled. Nathu Lal (1984 RLR 168 = 1984 RLW 644) . In this case this Court held that the Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time beyond 15 days. It is pertinent to note here that after the full Bench judgment in (4) Vishan Das Vs. Savitri Devi (1988(1) RLR 1) the view taken in this case has been over-ruled. The Full Bench in Vishan Das's case (supra) held that Section 13(5) of the Act is not mandatory but is discretionary and that the Court has power to condone the delay and extend time in suitable cases. In view of this the judgment of Ram Saran's case (supra) does not help the non-petitioner. The counsel for the plaintiff-non- petitioners also placed reliance on a judgment of Hon. Supreme Court in (5) The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautic Ltd. Balanagar Hyderabad and another Vs. Ajit Prasad Tarway ( AIR 1973 SC 76 ) . The facts of this case are not applicable to the facts of present case and as such this case has no relevancy. The present case is directly covered by the judgment of this Court in Ramesh Chandra's case (supra) in which this Court allowed the revision on the alternative submission made by the counsel for the petitioners that even if it be taken that there was a default in depositing the monthly rent of one month striking out of the defence is discretionary and not mandatory. In view of the fact that the Act has been enacted for the benefit of tenants and further that the tenant-petitioners have already deposited all the rent except the rent for a particular month I think it proper that the lower courts should have exercised their discretion in favour of the petitioners. Thus the lower courts by rejecting the application of the petitioners in arbitrary way refused to exercise their discretion and thus committed illegality in the exercise of their jurisdiction and as such I allow this revision set-aside the orders passed by the lower courts striking out the defence of the petitioners. The defendant-petitioners are directed to deposit the rent for the period from 15.11.1986 to 14.12.1986 within one month in case they have not deposited the same as yet. Parties are left to bear their own costs. Revision allowed. *******