JUDGMENT : Ravi S.Dhavan, J. 1. This is the second time that the court had cautioned the Central Government particularly the Army Headquarters that the manner in which the representation is to be disposed of upon the grievance of an officer is objective; it is to be fortified with reasons on record. The petitioner had to come to the court for second time in writ petition no. 8545 of 1980; Lt. Gol. Ashok Kumar v. Union of India. The court interfered by reposing its faith that the representation filed by the petitioner must be decided by the authorities, who are otherwise obliged to decide the statutory and nonstatutory complaints. The statutory complaints are decided by the Central Government and non-statutory complaints are decided by the Chief of the Army Staff. 2. The earlier complaint dated 19-4-1988 had received a cryptic disposal with the expression 'not accepted'. The Division Bench in writ petition No 8545 of 1989 by its order dated April 7, 1989 expressed displeasure in the manner in which the complaint of Lt. Col. Ashok Kumar had been processed and considered, and finding that no reasoned order had been passed the court even went to the extent of observing :- "Sri Shekhar Srivastava, learned Standing Counsel for the Union of India, has stated that a statutory complaint can be filed before the Central Government However, we may observe that we are not happy with the attitude adopted by the Army Chief in dealing with the representations made by the petitioner. In our order dated November I, 1988, it was implicit that the Army Head Quarters will look into the grievance of the petitioner and pass appropriate orders by giving reasons. The only order passed is 'not accepted'. This phrase, in our opinion, prima facie discloses a non-application of mind. The petitioner, if so advised may now prefer a proper representation before the Central Government. If this is done, the officer concerned of the Central Government will dispose of the representations objecively and while doing so it shall give reasons in support of its orders. As already indicated, since the petitioner is due to retire in June 1989, it is desirable that the representation should be decided expeditiously. If this is done, the officer concerned of the Central Government will dispose of the representations objecively and while doing so it shall give reasons in support of its orders. As already indicated, since the petitioner is due to retire in June 1989, it is desirable that the representation should be decided expeditiously. We accordingly direct that the officer concerned will dispose of the representation of the petitioner within a month from the date of the receipt of the same along with a certified copy of this order that we are passing today." What exactly were the implications of the order passed by the Bench of their Lordships the Honourable S K. Dhaon and the Honourable D. P. S. Chauhan, JJ., on April 7, ly89 : (1) The court expressed its displeasure in the manner in which the representations of Lt Col. Ashok Kumar were dealt with and disposed of by the Army; (2) the court expected the authority dealing with the representation to decide by disclosing reasons on record; (3) the court, noticing that the representation was disposed of with a cryptic observation 'not accepted', declared that this style of dealing with representation only discloses non-application of mind; (4) the court permitted a representation to be filed before the Central Government, this was on the preliminary objection of the Standing Counsel that 'a statutory complaint can be, filed before the Central Government'; (5) but the court cautioned the authority concerned that it will decide the representation objectively "and" give reasons in support of its orders"; and (6) as the petitioner was to retire in June 1989, the court desired that the representation be decided "expeditiously" and the officer concerned was directed to decide it within one month of a certified copy of the order being placed before him. 3. Then there was another aspect. The petitioner, while arguing his matter at the Bar on April 7, 1989 made a request to the Court for directions to be granted leave from service so that he could file a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. As appeal to a higher court is a right of a litigant, the High Court directed the officer concerned to consider the leave application when made and act on it within time so that the petitioner could "ventilate his grievance before a higher forum". 4. As appeal to a higher court is a right of a litigant, the High Court directed the officer concerned to consider the leave application when made and act on it within time so that the petitioner could "ventilate his grievance before a higher forum". 4. These are the aspects, otherwise on record which engaged the attention of this Court when the petitioner arguing in person, and Mr. N. B. Singh, Senior Standing Counsel, appearing on behalf of the two opposite parties were heard. The opposite parties as arrayed are (1) Mr. Naresh Chandra, Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, and (2) Brigadier P. K. Gupta (retired). It may be set on record that the counter affidavit of opposite party no 1, Mr Naresh Chandra, as Secretary, Ministry of Defence though affirmed on March 6, 1990 was served on the petitioner on May 10, 1990 and filed into court the same day, more than two months after it was affirmed, and the affidavit of opposite party no. 2. Brigadier P. K Gupta (retired) was affirmed on April 11, 1990, and served on the petitioner, oq May 10, 1990 and filed on that day, about a month after affirmation. Also, there was much reluctance in arguing the case on behalf of the two opposite parties. Then the affidavit of Brigadier P. K,. Gupta, does not even disclose to the court the address of the deoonent. The law requires parties before the court to reveal their addresses. The age and address verification reads thus : "Affidavit of Brigadier P. K. Gupta (Retired) about 55 years, son of late Sri Kamta Prasad at present living a retired life". The only request which was made on every occasion when the matter was placed before the court, was for an adjournment In fact the request for adjournment was passed with much vehemence. The prayer for adjournment, was opposed with equal vehemance. When the hearing began on May 9, 1990, it was only then that the counter affidavits of the opposite parties were filed the next day. These are matters of record. Regard being had to all these circumstances, the court did not consider it appropriate to adjourn the proceedings without a plausible cause. 5. Now the issues of the matter, in perspective after hearing the petitioner, the opposite parties through Mr. N. B. Singh, Advocate, for the opposite parties and thereafter the petitioner in rejoinder. These are matters of record. Regard being had to all these circumstances, the court did not consider it appropriate to adjourn the proceedings without a plausible cause. 5. Now the issues of the matter, in perspective after hearing the petitioner, the opposite parties through Mr. N. B. Singh, Advocate, for the opposite parties and thereafter the petitioner in rejoinder. 6. The order of April 7, 1989, of the Honourable S. K. Dhaon, J. and the Honourable D. P. S Chauhan, J. had made specific observations as directions for the opposite parties in the writ petition in which it was made. One set of directions were for the authorities concerned in reference to deciding the representation to the Central Government and the other for the officer concerned of the Army Detachment at Ramgarh in reference to leave. What the petitioner received from the Central Government was an order which was not in keeping with the directions of the High Court nor within the time stipulated by the Bench The order which was passed on the representation of the petitioner, the statutory complaint on 3-8-1989 reads :- "No. 5 (45)/89/D(AG) Government of India/Bharat Sarkar Ministry of Defence/Raksha Mantralaya New Delhi, the 3rd August 1989. ORDER The Central Government after considering the statutory complaint dated the 19th July 1988 and 12th April 1989 submitied by Lt. Col. (TS) Ashok Kumar, OC 810 Bridging Training Camp, Allahabad under Section 27 of the Army Act, 1950, seeking redressal of grievances, hereby rejects the said complaint. By order etc. Sd. Malini Thadani Under Secretaty to the Government of India (TELE: 3011146) Copy to :- The Chief of the Staff (2) : With the request that the above orders may be communicated to the officer through the staff channels." 7. The sum total of this order of the Central Government, after the recital is eliminated virtually remains as "the Central Government......hereby rejects the said complaint. 8. Should this order of the Central* Government dated 3-8-1989 be kept side by side with the directions given by the High Court it is certainly not in obedience to the directions given .by the High Court. The disobedience part of it. The court shall consider subsequently. What the Division Bench had specifically asked the Central Government not to do, was done violating the directions of the court in its order of 7-4-1989. The disobedience part of it. The court shall consider subsequently. What the Division Bench had specifically asked the Central Government not to do, was done violating the directions of the court in its order of 7-4-1989. The court had expressed its displeasure in the manner in which an earlier non-statutory complaint of the petitioner had been processed by the Army. In the representation, which was to be filed before the Central Government, the Court had cautioned the authority not to fall into the error or make the mistake by using expressions like 'not accepted'. The court had directed that the representation would be decided objectively, and further directed that the authority will give reasons in support of its orders. Instead, despite all the cautions or warning given by the Division Bench of the High Court, the Central Government paid no heed to them and again merely rejected the statutory representation of the petitioner without assigning any reason on record nor decided objectively, as the High Court had directed. Mr. N. B. Singh, Advocate, appearing on behalf of two opposite parties has been at a loss to reconcile the order of the Central Government dated 3-8-1989 with the directions of the Court and has not been able to dislodge the proposition that the directions of the Division Bench in its order of 7-4-1989 have not been complied. When the non-statutory representation of the petitioner was disposed of with the words 'not accepted', the statutory complaint of the petitioner before the Central Government has been bluntly rejected. The observations of the Bench in its order of 7-4-98 were either forgotten or thrown to the 'winds. The result: an order which is a total negation of the directions of the Division Bench dated 7-4-1989. 9. In this regard learned counsel appearing on behalf of opposite party party no. 1 had suggested that the court should see the files of the Ministry of Defence to find out the reasons, otherwise not on record of the order of 3-8-1989. The submission of learned counsel for opposite party no. 1 is in line with the defence taken in paragraph 18 of the counter affidavit of opposite party no. 1, Mr. Naresh Chandra, the Defence Secretary. This defence is reproduced below :- "18. The submission of learned counsel for opposite party no. 1 is in line with the defence taken in paragraph 18 of the counter affidavit of opposite party no. 1, Mr. Naresh Chandra, the Defence Secretary. This defence is reproduced below :- "18. That in reply to the contents of paragraph 8 of the Contempt Petition, it is submitted that it is wrong to say that the opposite party no. 1 wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the orders of this Honourable Court. It is respectfully submitted that with regard to the non-giving of reasons while disposing of the statutory complaint of the petitioner it is submitted that the reasoned order regarding the complaint of the petitioner has been recorded on file. However, the communication regarding the rejection of the statutory complaint has only been communicated to the petitioner as per the age old practice in the Armed Forces. It is further submitted that in view of the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court it is well settled that the Army Authorities are not required to give any reason under law, while deciding the appeal or the statutory complaint. It is, however, respectfully submitted that the angering respondent can furnish original copy of the reasons/analysis recorded on the file to arrive at the decision on the statutory complaint of the petitioner, if this Honourable Court so direct or desire." 10. It gives an impression to the Court as if while taking the defence in the manner in which it has been taken the opposite party no. 1 closed his eyes on the directions given to him in the order of the High Court la his defence in paragraph 18 the opposite party no. 1 virtually accepts that he has not given reasons in the order while disposing of the statutory complaint of the petitioner. How does this defence reconcile with the directions given by the Division Bench, in effect, that the complaint will not be disposed of with expressions like "not accepted," but the decision will be fortified by reasons. The opposite party no. 1 submits in his defence that the reasons are on the file. But, by the directions given by the Division Bench the reasons were to be in the order. The opposite party no. 1 submits in his defence that the reasons are on the file. But, by the directions given by the Division Bench the reasons were to be in the order. No defence has been submitted before this Court why despite the directions to decide the representation objectively and give reasons in the order the matter was neither decided objectively nor fortified with reasons, on record to support the order. The very purpose of the High Court giving directions to place reasons on record of the order was to put confidence in the grievance procedure of a statutory complaint under the Army Act, 1950. The reasons were to be given where they are supposed to be given i.e. in the order itself, not on the file, which otherwise is not available to an officer, who is utilising the grievance procedure by filing a statutory complaint. The directions of the Court have been violated and disregarded. Then there is another aspect of the matter apart from the aspect of not placing the reasons on record of the order itself. The opposite party no. 1 as Defence Secretary, in Annexure C. A 1 has placed extracts of the file notings between the period 22-6-1989 and 3-8-1989 These notings are in reference to the representations of the petitioner dated 19-7-1988 and 12-4- 1989. The order of the Division Bench is dated 7-4-J989 permitting the filing of a representation before the Central Government as a statutory complaint, in effect, under Section 27 of the Army Act, 1950. The representation of 12-4-1989 is clearly in' pursuance and as a consequence of the order of the High Court dated 7-4-1989 The notings which have been appended as an Annexure to the counter affidavit make no reference to even to the order of the Division Bench dated 7-4-1989. The notings begin with a suggestion that the representation of the petitioner Lt. Col. Ashok Kumar be rejected. The file moved with a suggestion at the lowest level that the representation be rejected. The representation of the petitioner was processed as if it was to be rejected. It was ultimately rejected. Even before the representation could be considered, objectively, it had been decided that since disciplinary action IS under progress against the petitioner no interference was called for upon the representation of the petitioner. The representation of the petitioner was processed as if it was to be rejected. It was ultimately rejected. Even before the representation could be considered, objectively, it had been decided that since disciplinary action IS under progress against the petitioner no interference was called for upon the representation of the petitioner. The representation of the petitioner was processed obliviously, unconcernedly and regardless of the directions of the Division Bench. Before acting on the representation it was decided to reject it The representation was rejected. The order of 3-8-1989 IS on record. The foundation to reject the representation had already been laid before it was acted upon These aspects this court has noticed as the file nothings have been placed as an annexure to the counter affidavit. The , processing of the representation has been placed as a defence by the opposite party no. 1. 11. After the order of April 7, 1989, the representation was forwarded by the petitioner. The representation was dated 12-4-1989. The representation was delivered at the Sub Area, Allahabad on 12-4-1989. It was to be acted upon within 30 days of its receipt. On 28-4-1989 the Headquarter Central Command, Lucknow was forwarding the representation to a Adjutant Generals, Branch, Army Headquarter, New Delhi and the complaint Advisory Board, Army Headquarter, New Delhi. The letter of 28-4-1989 from the Headquarter, Central Command Lucknow is Annexure C. A. 7' to the counter affidavit of the opposite party no. 1, the Defence Secretary. It had been decided even before the representation was forwarded to the Army Headquarter not to act on the representation on two grounds : (a) The statutory complaint was not on the new format prescribed by the Army Headquarter and b) it was full of obnoxious and intemperate language. The statutory complaint had already taken sixteen days to move out from the Sub Area at Allahabad to the Central Command at Lucknow. 12. The petitioner has placed before the Court the format of 'a specimen lay out of complaints' as prescribed. Learned counsel for the opposite parties could not point out the defect in the complaint as presented, as being radically different from the format as prescribed. Then assuming that the complaint submitted was not in keeping with the format as prescribed, could this be a reason to reject it after the Division Bench had given directions to deal with it objectively ? Then assuming that the complaint submitted was not in keeping with the format as prescribed, could this be a reason to reject it after the Division Bench had given directions to deal with it objectively ? Then, the other defence is that the complaint is full of obnoxious and intemperate language. Certain paragraphs are referred to in the letter of Central Command, Annexure C. A 7, aforesaid, and was to be processed, dealt with and acted upon in accordance with law the Division Bench had already indicated the manner in which it would be dealt with. It is not that the authority concerned was without guidelines. The guidelines were given as directions. They were either ignored callously or disobeyed flagrantly. What is the worth of the decision of the Central Government ? And, of the directions given by the Division Bench on April 7, 1989 if they were to be treated as a dead letter ? No details of any specific obnoxious and specific intemperate language have been referred to. It must be remembered that it was a grievance complaint of an Army Officer filed in accordance with law. This leaves the court with the impression that not to act on the complaint had already been formulated when the Headquarter, Central Command, Lucknow had already suggested that no action is being taken on the statutory complaint. No explanation is forthcoming why the complaint was delayed for sixteen days at Allahabad when the Division Bench had made it clear that it would be decided within thirty days of the representation being received. The purpose of the direction to decide it within thirty days of its receipt was that the decision should be available to the petitioner before he retires in June 1989. The defence that the complaint was not on the prescribed format or that it was in language which the Army thought was obnoxious and intemperate is a feeble excuse. No format has been given to the Court on how the representation differed from the format prescribed. 13. The statutory representation was delayed at the Sub Area Allahabad when the opposite party no. 2 was the Sub Area Commander. A valid explanation to explain the delay has not been given by the opposite party no. 2, Brigadier P. K. Gupta the delay was drawing to a close the retirement of the petitioner in June 1989. 13. The statutory representation was delayed at the Sub Area Allahabad when the opposite party no. 2 was the Sub Area Commander. A valid explanation to explain the delay has not been given by the opposite party no. 2, Brigadier P. K. Gupta the delay was drawing to a close the retirement of the petitioner in June 1989. The Division Bench had in its directions set the schedule for giving the decision on the statutory representation before the petitioner was to retire in June 1989. The delay was again in disobedience to the Division Bench directions. The directions were given with the purpose not to delay the decision. The representation was delayed in forwarding it after it was delivered. It was delayed in processing. The directions of the Division Bench were ignored. The defence of the opposite party no. 2 is unsatisfactory, on this aspect. The Army Headquarters received the statutory representation on May 12, 1988. The Court has not been given an explanation with clarity why the schedule in the directions of the Division Bench had not been kept at the instance of opposite party no 1. The defence is that if "will be explained at the time of hearing of this petition by producing the entire judgment of the Honourable Court." This implies that this aspect has yet to be explained. 14. The directions of the Division Bench of the High Court dated April 7, 1989 were treated shabbily. If this is the response when the High Court reposes its trust not to quash the proceedings in question, but otherwise questionable and expects objectivity out of quasi judicial or even administrative representations, statutorily provided, it may be an occasion to reflect and take stock of ultimate orders on proceedings where this court in pursuance of extraordinary remedies is acting under its extraordinary jurisdiction. In this case the Division Bench desired and gave directions to decide a statutory representation under the Army Act, 1950 objectively by setting on record of order the reasons for taking the findings and1 the decision whatever it may be. The directions of the High Court were tossed in the dust bin. The statutory representation was still knocked off with the same style which was not to be used "not accepted" rejected, and like expressions. The directions of the High Court were tossed in the dust bin. The statutory representation was still knocked off with the same style which was not to be used "not accepted" rejected, and like expressions. If this is the reception on the orders of the High Court, this Court must rethink on the aspect of disposing of writ petitions in the hope that the directions will be followed. It would be better to keep the writ petition pending and adjourn proceedings to await a decision i on the directions of the High Court and let the administrative State action be subject to judicial review to certify it correct on a writ of certiorari if it is correct, or correct the error if it needs correction. Otherwise, like in the present case, further proceedings virtually imply multiplicity on merits all over again, and unpleasant contempt proceedings. The directions given by the High Court remain un-complied and compromised. This is not an issue but a matter of record. When the attention of the learned counsel for the opposite parties was drawn on this aspect by the Court, two additional submissions were made by Mr. N. B. Singh, Advocate. Thes3 were : (a) The defence Secretary is not the authority to deal with this matter and if at all an explanation is to sought it is of the Rajya Raksha Mantri and by implication notice be issued to him; and (b) if there be contempt by the opposite parties it is not wilful. Both arguments, the court is afraid, cannot be appreciated. 15. Let the second submission be taken first. The prospective in which the directions remain un-complied have already been discussed above. One of the directions, amongst others was to decide objectively and give reasons for the findings. This was not done. That this was not done is accepted in argument and in the defence in paragraph 18 of the counter affidavit. 16. Now the first submission-Learned counsel for the opposite parties has made an argument which will negate the theory of responsible government in a parliamentary democracy. Counsel was unable to show to the court that when in reference to the context, a statutory representation is to be decided, it is the Minister of State who is answerable. 16. Now the first submission-Learned counsel for the opposite parties has made an argument which will negate the theory of responsible government in a parliamentary democracy. Counsel was unable to show to the court that when in reference to the context, a statutory representation is to be decided, it is the Minister of State who is answerable. Unless otherwise specifically provided by law, a Minister, in a parliamentary democracy is answerable to the parliament or the State legislature as the case may be. Then where is the Minister of the last government available to the parliament or the court. What exactly is learned counsel for the opposite parties suggesting ? A Secretary to the Government of India is the administrative head of a Ministry or Department. He is the Principal Adviser of the Minister on all matters of policy and administration within his Ministry/Department, and his responsibility is complete and undivided. The argument, is a contradiction in terms to the defence taken. In paragraph 17 of the counter affidavit, the opposite party no. 1 submits : "Due to aforementioned reasons the complaint of the petitioner could not be decided by this answering respondent within time as directed by the Honourable High Court." Is there any doubt that the statutory representation was not to be decided by the Secretary to the Government of India, of the Ministry concerned ? The opposite party no. 1 accepts that it was to be decided by him as Secretary to the Central Government. 17. It is a sad reflection that a member of the armed forces, has yet to be heard objectively by at least even one forum on what he has to say on whatever happened when he was in service. It has been argued, that the officer is cantankerous and has embroiled the Army and its officers in litigation from Lucknow, the circuit Bench of this High Court to Allahabad. This may be correct or incorrect; this Court cannot express itself on it. If indeed the petitioner was not worth being an officer than he should have been subjected to an appropriate proceeding prescribed under the law for army officers, to be tried summarily or otherwise, during his period and tenure of service so that he either remains in the army or goes out of it after a fair trial. Some times officers are cantankerous and at times circumstances make them cantankerous. Some times officers are cantankerous and at times circumstances make them cantankerous. This court would not know the truth, when the reception to the High Court's directions to decide a statutory representation objectively and fortify findings with reasons has been catered with, first a violation of the directions, and second, an abrupt order with nothing on public record except "The Central Government.........hereby rejects the complaint." The many cases filed by the petitioner, to which the attention of this court has been drawn, do not reflect a satisfactory situation. One such case led to a contempt proceedings, criminal contempt, against the same opposite party who is an opposite party before this Court. This is a matter which was before the Lucknow Bench of the Court, IT is criminal Miscellaneous case no. 1923 (C) of 1988 Lt. Col. Ashok Kumar v. Union of India case reference Annexure R. A. 1 to the rejoinder affidavit. The opposite party no. 2 Brigadier P. K. Gupta was subjected to an order of costs, and thereafter charged to answer' charges. The order is dated April 26, 1989, by their Lordships the Honourable S. C. Mathur and the Honourable D. S. Bajpai, JJ. Thus no presumptions can be drawn by this Court, of a litigation minded petitioner as submitted, as each circumstance and contempt will have to be seen in its own perspective. 18. BUT, the manner in which the directions in the writ petition were not complied and negated cannot but recall the observation of the Supreme Court in matters of armed forces redress procedure in the matters of Lt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh v. Union of India made, almost eight years ago. This is what the Supreme Court observed : "With the expanding horizons of fair play in action even in administrative decision, the universal declaration of human rights and retributive justice being relegated to the uncivilised days, a time has come when a step is required to be taken for at least one review and it must truly be a judicial review as and by way of appeal to a body composed of non-military personnel or civil personnel. Army is always on alert for repelling external aggression and suppressing internal disorder so that the peace loving citizens enjoy a social order based on rule of law: the same cannot be denied to the protectors of this order. Army is always on alert for repelling external aggression and suppressing internal disorder so that the peace loving citizens enjoy a social order based on rule of law: the same cannot be denied to the protectors of this order. And it must be realised that an appeal from Ceaser to Ceaser's wife-confirmation proceedings under Section 153-has been condemned as in judicious and merely a lip sympathy to form. The core question is whether at least there should be one appeal to a body composed of non- military personnel and who would enjoy the right of judicial review, both on law and facts as also determine the adequacy of punishment being commensurate with the gravity of the offence charged. Judicial approach by people well versed in objective analysis of evidence trained by experience to look at facts and raw objectively, fair play and justice cannot always be sacrificed at the altar of military discipline. Unjust decision would be subversive of discipline. There must be a judicious admixture of both. And nothing revolutionary is being suggested........." Though these observations were made in reference to Court martial procedures, they are relevant to army grievance procedures in generality. The present case becomes an example when a statutory representation, the expression it If implies a right under the law to represent and object, despite directions of the High Court to decide objectively with reasons fortifying the fingers, is simply rejected. The High Court's orders have been disrespected, the representation frustrated. Asking the High Court after violating directions to see the reasons and objectivity from Government files is itself disrespect. 19. Having carefully seen the record, and heard parties on their pleadings, this Court has satisfied itself that both opposite parties nos. 1 and 2, i.e. Mr. Naresh Chandra, as Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Defence, and Brigadier P. K. Gupta, now retired have ignored the directions of the High Court dated April 7, 1989 by their Lordships the Hon'bie S. K. Dhaon, J. and the Hon'bie D. P. S. Chauhan, I. and have rendered their actions, regardless of the directions which they were obliged to fol[ow, and that these contempt proceedings have been bona fide and validly initiated. On the contempt and disregard these two opposite parties have shown to the directions of a Division Bench of this Court, the matter be listed on July 31, 1990 for framing of charges.