ORDER S. Padmanabhan, J. 1. This petition, under S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, came up before us on reference doubting the correctness of the decision in Damodaran v. Abdulla Kunhi ( 1987 (2) KLT 838 ). 2. First respondent, Food Inspector, prosecuted the second respondent for having sold adulterated skimmed milk powder. Second respondent produced warranty for having purchased the article from third respondent, a wholesale dealer of the manufacturing concern, 'Foremost Dairies', Bombay, and applied to implead him. He was impleaded as second accused. On his application, supported by production of the invoice received from 'Foremost Dairies', the fourth respondent and later thepetitioners were impleaded as accused 3 to 8. This order and all further proceedings against the petitioners are sought to be quashed on various grounds in exercise of the inherent powers of this Court. 3. Petitioners admit that 'Foremost Dairies' (second petitioner), represented by its Chairman (sixth petitioner) and Chief Executive (first petitioner), is the manufacturing concern of the product and the third respondent is its wholesale dealer. It is from this wholesale dealer that the second respondent purchased the food article sold by him. 'Foremost Dairies' is admittedly a public limited company. Under S.17, when an offence under the Act is committed by a company, liability thereof falls on the company. In addition, under S.17(l)(a), subject to the proviso and sub-section (2), the person, if any, who has been nominated under sub-section (2) to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business (the person responsible) is also having personal liability. It is not disputed that at the time of transaction involved in this case the fifth respondent was the person responsible even though now he is out of service and the fifth petitioner was appointed in his place. The first contention of the petitioners is that even if the company is liable to be proceeded in the present case as manufacturer, the only person who could have been made an accused is the fifth respondent and nobody else. 4. We are not in a position to accept that contention. Primary liability, even without reference to S.17, is that of the manufacturing company itself. Over and above . that liability, the substantive law embodied in S.17 only created statutory criminal liability on the part of certain persons under certain circumstances. 4. We are not in a position to accept that contention. Primary liability, even without reference to S.17, is that of the manufacturing company itself. Over and above . that liability, the substantive law embodied in S.17 only created statutory criminal liability on the part of certain persons under certain circumstances. That is how criminal liability is fastened on the "person responsible" over and above the primary liability of the company itself. Therefore, in addition to the "person responsible", the company itself is liable to be impleaded. We agree that many officers of the company ought not to have been impleaded. Second petitioner company, represented by petitioners 1,5 and 6, was sufficient. Petitioners 3 and 4 and the 4th respondent were unnecessarily impleaded. Since the person responsible under S.17(l) at the time of the transaction was the fifth respondent, he ought to have been impleaded, but he was not impleaded. These defects will have to be rectified. 5. The provision in S.16-A that all offences under S.16(l) 'shall' be tried in a summary way, need be understood only as 'may', according to the discretion of the Magistrate. Under S.16(1), the penalty can go upto imprisonment for a period of three years. In a case tried in the summary way, the sentence cannot go beyond a term of imprisonment for three months under S.262(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. S.16-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is an exception to that. Even there the sentence of imprisonment cannot go beyond one year when tried summarily. If all such cases are to be tried summarily, without any discretion in that respect to the Magistrate, the provision for maximum sentence will become meaningless. The discretion given in this respect under S.260 of the Code is not in any way affected by S.16-A. When the case is tried in a summary way, the procedure to be followed is that of a summons case. Trial in a summons case begins when the accused enters appearance and the particulars of the offence stated to him (Siddappa v. Patel Shivappa, AIR 1967 Mysore 248). It could be said that when the case is tried as a warrant case instituted otherwise than on a police report, the trial commences only when the charge is framed after compliance with S.244. It could be said that when the case is tried as a warrant case instituted otherwise than on a police report, the trial commences only when the charge is framed after compliance with S.244. But, as held in State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey and another ( AIR 1957 SC 389 ) followed in M/s. Pure Ice Cream Pvt. Ltd. v. Narendrajitsingh and others (1975(2) P. F. A. Cases 385), 'trial' in S.20-A or even under certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be understood to mean proceedings after framing of charge alone. The proceedings even before that could be treated as trial for the purpose of S.20-A and evidence adduced at that stage also may be sufficient. 6. Satisfaction on the evidence adduced before it during trial need not be from the complainant's evidence itself. It can be from the materials furnished by the accused also. Evidence is either oral or documentary. It can in some cases be by affidavit also when permitted by court. A fact is said to be proved when after considering the matters before it, the court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought to act on the supposition that it exists. In order to invoke the powers under S.20-A, the satisfaction of the Magistrate, on the evidence adduced, that the person proceeded against is also concerned with the offence is necessary. That satisfaction is not an empty formality. But what is required at that stage is not a satisfaction necessary for conviction, but only a prima facie satisfaction for proceeding against the persons. That can be equated with the satisfaction required under S.319(1) of the Code, which is just like the one under S.204, 228 or 240, as held in Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala ( 1987(1) KLT 871 ). We said so because an argument was raised that impleading was ordered without evidence and without a speaking order and hence invalid. In this case, the company is admitted to be the manufacturer and the third respondent, from whom the second respondent made the purchase, to be its dealer. The third respondent produced the invoice alleged to be issued by the company with an affidavit. That document was accepted as prima facie evidence of sale made by the company to the third respondent and impleading was ordered by a speaking order. The third respondent produced the invoice alleged to be issued by the company with an affidavit. That document was accepted as prima facie evidence of sale made by the company to the third respondent and impleading was ordered by a speaking order. In our opinion, even such a speaking order was not necessary. The mere fact of proceeding against the person will be proof of satisfaction. Such satisfaction is not appealable. A revisional court also may not lightly interfere with that satisfaction which cannot be said to be illegal or without jurisdiction. Proof of genuineness or otherwise of the bill is a matter that may arise during trial when it is challenged. On that ground, we do not think that the order is liable to be challenged under S.482 as abuse of the process of Court. 7. Then the contention was that the impleading of petitioners after respondents 3 and 4 were impleaded is against the spirit of S.20-A as interpreted in Damodaran's case ( 1987(2) KLT 838 ) and some other unreported decisions of this court. Relying on the decision in Food Inspector v. Indian Medical Practitioners Pharmacy & Stores Ltd. ( 1961 KLT 980 ), it was contended that S.19 does not apply to successive warranties and the case of successive warranties does not fall under the provisions of the Act. Halsbury's Laws of England, relied on in that decision, only said that when a man is prosecuted for giving a false warrantly, it is no defence for him to say that he himself purchased under a warranty from another man. We are not at that question. In the decision in Ramanatha Agencies v. Food Inspector (1973 KLT 295), this court said that the plea under S.19(2) is available only to the vendor and not to the manufacturer, distributor or the dealer. It was held in that decision that the word Vendor' is not defined in the Act and it is used in the Act in different meanings in different contexts. In S.10, it may include manufacturer, distributor and dealer also, whereas inS. 14, they are excluded. But it may not be correct to say that Vendor' in S.19(1) and (2) will not include manufacturer, distributor or dealer. Vendor is only the person who sells or exposes for sale. The definition of 'sale' in the Act is very wide. In S.10, it may include manufacturer, distributor and dealer also, whereas inS. 14, they are excluded. But it may not be correct to say that Vendor' in S.19(1) and (2) will not include manufacturer, distributor or dealer. Vendor is only the person who sells or exposes for sale. The definition of 'sale' in the Act is very wide. Sale by the manufacturer to the distributor or dealer and the sale by the distributor or dealer to the vendor are also sales. They can sell to the ultimate consumer directly also. In all these cases, what is involved is sale and the person who sells is the vendor and he could come under the term Vendor' used in S.19(l) and (2) if he is prosecuted for having sold adulterated or misbranded articles of food. When the manufacturer is prosecuted for having sold or distributed adulterated article of food, he may not be able to raise a plea under S.19(2) because he cannot claim to have purchased from anybody else. All others when prosecuted for sale of an adulterated item of food could rely on S.19(2) on the basis of the purchase made by. him, whether it be from the dealer, distributor or manufacturer. All these terms are relative. 8. Manufacture for sale or storing or selling or distributing in contravention of S.7 are violations punishable under S.16, whoever be the offender. When prosecution is for manufacture or sale without warrantly or licence, the question of invoking S.19(2) may not arise. In all other cases, when a person, whether he be distributor, dealer or vendor, is prosecuted for possession, sale or distribution of adulterated food, he can rely on S.19(2) if that plea is available. In such cases, irrespective of the question whether he is the distributor or dealer, he is the vendor and the person to whom he sold the article is his vendee. He can turn against his immediate seller. It may not be correct to say that the benefit of S.19(2) is available only to the last vendor in contra-distinction to the dealer or distributor who is also prosecuted for vending. He can turn against his immediate seller. It may not be correct to say that the benefit of S.19(2) is available only to the last vendor in contra-distinction to the dealer or distributor who is also prosecuted for vending. Otherwise an absurd position may arise whereby the plea under S.19(2) could be resorted to only by the last vendor and it may not be available to the dealer or distributor who also purchased under a warranty and satisfies the requirements of S.19(2) when they are prosecuted for such sales. That could not have been what the legislature would have meant. 9. With due respect, we are of the view that Damodaran's case (1987(2)KLT 838) was not correctly decided. That decision proceeded under two wrong assumptions concerning S.20-A. Firstly, the decision assumes that if a manufacturer or distributor or dealer is already an accused in the case and the trial is pending against any one of them also along with the last vendor, S.20-A has no application. That means, if in a case instituted against the last vendor alone for having sold adulterated article of food, the distributor or dealer was impleaded and prosecuted along with him for having sold adulterated food to the Vendor', his seller cannot be impleaded and he may not be entitled to raise the plea under S.19(2) even if he is capable of proving it. Such a contingency was not at all contemplated in S.20-A. What S.20-A contemplates is only trial of any offence alleged to have been committed by any person, not being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer. In a case against the last vendor, if his immediate seller (whether he be distributor or dealer) is impleaded under S.20-A on the application under S.19(2) and prosecuted along with him for having sold adulterated food to him, the case will not cease to be one for an offence committed by the last vendor. Secondly, the distributor or dealer is not prosecuted as such, but only as vendor. The position may be different if they are prosecuted along with the last vendor only for some other offence, eg. sale without warranty or licence. In such cases, the question of benefit of S.19(2) may notarise. Otherwise if the distributor or dealer is impleaded along with the last vendor only as vendors, further impleading under S.20A is not barred. The position may be different if they are prosecuted along with the last vendor only for some other offence, eg. sale without warranty or licence. In such cases, the question of benefit of S.19(2) may notarise. Otherwise if the distributor or dealer is impleaded along with the last vendor only as vendors, further impleading under S.20A is not barred. Even without resort to S.20-A, at the initial stage itself, a prosecution jointly against vendor, distributor, dealer and manufacturer could be had for offences alleged to have been committed by them. In appropriate cases, all or any of them could be impleaded under S.20A also. 10. Another erroneous assumption we find in that decision is that the plea under S.19(2) is available only to the last vendor and not to the distributor or dealer even when he is prosecuted as the vendor and that the right to implead under S.20A is corelated to the defence under S.19(2,. We have already stated that the. defence under S.19(2) is available not only to the last vendor, but to the distributor and dealer also when they are prosecuted as vendors. The power to implead under S.20A is conditional only on the satisfaction on the evidence adduced during trial that the dealer, distributor or manufacturer is also concerned with that offence. It is part of the right and duty of the court to identify and proceed against all the offenders when cognizance is taken of the offence. It is not concerned with the defence of the accused under S.19(2) eventhough an application for impleading may be filed under S.20-A unconnected with that defence provided the person impleaded appears to be concerned in the offence for which the trial is in progress. The provisions of S.20-A are not intended to enable the accused to prove his defence under S.19(2). The said defence could be established even without impleading the manufacturer, distributor or dealer, from whom the article was purchased under a bill with or without warranty. 11. It appears that some of the decisions, particularly those of the Supreme Court, relevant on the point were not cited at the bar before His Lordship when the decision in Damodaran's case ( 1987 (2) KLT 838 ) was rendered. 11. It appears that some of the decisions, particularly those of the Supreme Court, relevant on the point were not cited at the bar before His Lordship when the decision in Damodaran's case ( 1987 (2) KLT 838 ) was rendered. If an article of food produced by the manufacturer, which reaches the consumer, is found adulterated, all the three agencies (manufacturer, distributor or dealer and vendor) are responsible just like persons accused of the same offence. Once a valid complaint is made against a dealer, it will include the prosecution not only against him, but also of all the persons who committed that offence. That is exactly what S.20A seeks to achieve. Offences committed by the dealer, distributor and manufacturer are part of the same transaction and they could all be jointly tried. In fact, the offence committed by the manufacturer is much more serious than that of the dealer who trusted him (Banarsi Das and another v. Municipal Council, 1975 Crl.L.J. 674). 12. A manufacturer and a distributor can also sell and each such sale can incur liability under S.7 and be prosecuted for it. The description of Vendor' in S.14 cannot affect the liability under S.7. Sale of an article of food by a manufacturer, distributor or dealer is a distinct and a separate offence. S.14 was not meant to carve out an exception in favour of a distributor or manufacturer who sells articles of food, found to be adulterated, irrespective of the question whether any warranty was given. Neither S.7 nor S.14 bars trial of several offences by the same accused person, be he a manufacturer or a distributor or a last vendor referred to as vendor in S.14. Sale or distribution by the manufacturer to the distributor and that by the distributor or dealer to the last vendor are parts of the same transaction coming under S.223(d) of the Code. In view of the strict liability under the Act and the object sought to be achieved, separate proof of a common design or conspiracy is not necessary to establish that fact. The mere fact that an adulterated or misbranded article of food was anufactured for sale to be used by the consumer and it reached the consumer through these agencies or any of them is sufficient to establish the common design enabling joint trial of all of them. The mere fact that an adulterated or misbranded article of food was anufactured for sale to be used by the consumer and it reached the consumer through these agencies or any of them is sufficient to establish the common design enabling joint trial of all of them. Lack of care and attention will then be presumed and that itself is sufficient to provide the common link. A sale at an anterior stage by a manufacturer or distributor to a vendor and a sale by the vendor to the actual consumer could be viewed as linked with each other as cause and effect (Bhagwan Das v. Delhi Administration - AIR 1975 S.C. 1309 ). 13. In Mangasdas v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1966 SC 128 ), it was held that Vendor' is not the only person from whom sample was taken. The word Vendor' means the person who sold the article. There can be successive Vendors' of the same article though sample was taken only from the last vendor. The vendor, whatever be the stage at which he became the vendor, is subject to the disability under S.19(l) from merely alleging that he was ignorant of the nature, substance Or quality of the food sold by him. The corollary is that such a vendor can also avail himself of the defence under S.19(2). It is, therefore, clear that the propositions of law laid down in Damodaran's case ( 1987 (2) KLT 838 ) in relation to S.20-A are not correct. 14. S.20-A is not an isolated provision. It is only an exception to S.20 of the Act as well as S.319 of the Code. The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding joinder of charges and trial are not in any way curtailed by S.20- A. It only gives an exception by enlarging the scope. Bhagwan Das Jagdish Chander's case ( AIR 1975 S.C. 1309 ) is authority for the position that in a suitable case, a vendor, a distributor and a manufacturer could be tried together. The connecting links between them could be provided by (i) the fact that an anterior sale could be viewed as the cause of subsequent sale, (ii) the allegation that each parted with the food when it was adulterated, and (iii) the common object that it should reach the consumer to be used as food which could be presumed. The connecting links between them could be provided by (i) the fact that an anterior sale could be viewed as the cause of subsequent sale, (ii) the allegation that each parted with the food when it was adulterated, and (iii) the common object that it should reach the consumer to be used as food which could be presumed. The last one is the most decisive factor. The discretion for ordering joint trial vests with the court. When joint trial is likely to jeopardise a fair trial, separate trials ought to be ordered. That should be determined on the facts of each case and the requirements of justice. S.20A, just like S.223(d) of the Code, is only an enabling provision. It has to be read alongwith S.319 and 223(d) of the Code in the matter of joint trial. 15. S.20 of the Act cannot be equated with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or other Acts, which require the sanctioning authority to apply its mind before ordering prosecution of a person. All that the provision enjoins is that prosecution shall be instituted only with the consent of the authorities mentioned in the section. No mode or manner is prescribed as to how consent is to be given. No question of applying the mind to the facts of the case arises before sanction is given. It is only conferment of an authority to institute a case or class of cases. The section merely prescribes that the person or authorities designated are also competent to file complaints (Dhian Singh v. Saharanpur Municipality, AIR 1970 S.C 318 ). Therefore, the provisions of S.20 need not, in anyway, affect the application of S.20-A which will have to be read along with the relevant provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, including S.319 and 223. S.20-A need only be treated as an addition or exception to the provisions in the Code. 16. The impugned orders are, therefore, passed with jurisdiction. They cannot be treated as abuse of process of court liable to be interfered with in exercise of inherent powers. Petitioners 3 and 4 and the fourth respondent will have to be removed from the party array and fifth respondent will have to be added as an accused, in his capacity as the person responsible. That is all the interference required and we interfere with the orders only to that extent. Petitioners 3 and 4 and the fourth respondent will have to be removed from the party array and fifth respondent will have to be added as an accused, in his capacity as the person responsible. That is all the interference required and we interfere with the orders only to that extent. Subject to what is stated in the preceeding paragraph, the Crl. M. C. is dismissed.